Dutch ships and designs and the possibilities for Canada

[Kirkhill]

From the OG's post.

Key User Requirements​

Defining the requirements for MRSS-LPX will be complicated as there are some conflicting demands and hot debates about the direction of amphibious warfare. Both the Royal Marines and the Dutch Korps Mariniers are reconfiguring their commando forces to operate in smaller, more agile, dispersed and highly networked teams. The ever-increasing vulnerability of a stationary vessel positioned close to the shore suggests troops, weapons, vehicles and their logistic support will have to travel longer distances from the main assault platform. This in turn suggests greater reliance on helicopters. Albion and Bulwark’s lack of hangar facilities has long been regretted as a major weakness.

Assuming the ambition for Littoral Strike extends beyond light raiding, then heavy equipment and stores will still have to come ashore by boat. A helicopter carrier (LPH) is not the solution and a well dock will remain a key part of the design. The Landing craft (LCU) will also need to be faster, capable of independent operation over longer ranges and in higher sea states than the slow craft Royal Marines make do with today. Good aviation facilities and a well dock for capable LCUs appears to demand a large ship.

There will be a balance to be struck between size, expense and capability. It may be possible to go for a smaller LPD depending on the total force projection requirement. The aim is to have the KURs agreed by both parties by the end of this year. These will dictate space for troop accommodation, lane-meters for vehicles, hangar capacity and the ship’s displacement. 19,500 tonne HMS Albion is designed to carry around 400 marines with 65 assorted vehicles and has good command and control facilities. 14,000-tonne HMNLS Rotterdam can carry around 600 troops and similar vehicle numbers to Albion. The Bay class have a smaller well dock, accommodation for 356 troops but a large vehicle deck reflecting their cargo-carrying role. (In all ships at least 30% more troops can be carried in austere conditions if required).

At this stage, it is difficult to predict what MRSS-LPX may eventually look like. In the Netherlands, Damen has developed their Enforcer LPD concept with variants of various sizes aimed at both the domestic and export markets. The smallest ‘Enforcer 7000’ is 121m in length up to the ‘Enforcer 13000’ which is 163m in length. (The number denotes the approximate displacement in tonnes). In the UK, BMT have proposed the ELLIDA MRSS concept, although this vessel emphasises the logistic support element and includes replenishment at sea capabilities which is likely outside the scope of the current requirements. In both cases, these are still outline designs that would need a lot more work to mature them to the point of manufacture.

Something of a complication is the RNLN desire for the programme to encompass the replacement for their 4 large OPVs of the Holland class, built 2010-11. There does not seem to be a great deal of synergy between the very different capabilities and size of an OPV and an LPD, other than possibly cost-savings derived from a common hull.

Well if the desire is for a minimally manned hull capable of launching helicopters, boats and tanks, of acting as a mothership for minewarfare, anti-piracy operations, command and support of shore operations, transport, supporting small units and being suitable for anti-submarine warfare and convoy escort duties - and you want to keep it in the low end of the Enforcer displacement range at 7000 tonnes - might I suggest this MOTS design.

General characteristics
Type	Frigates (formerly support ships)
Displacement	4,500 tonnes light,[1] 6,600 tonnes full load[1]
Length	137 m (449 ft 6 in)[1]
Beam	19.5 m (64 ft 0 in)[1]
Draft	6.3 m (20 ft 8 in)[1]
Propulsion	2 × MTU 8000 M70 diesel engines Two shafts 22,300 bhp (16.6 MW)[1]
Speed	24 knots (44 km/h)[1]
Range	9,000 nmi (17,000 km) at 15 kn (28 km/h)[1]
Boats & landing craft carried	2 × RHIBs, 2 × SB90E LCP
Complement	100, plus aircrew and transients (accommodation for up to 300 in total)
Sensors and processing systems	Thales SMART-S Mk2 3D volume search radar Terma Scanter 6002 surface search radar Atlas ASO 94 sonar 3 × Saab CEROS 200 fire control radars ES-3701 Tactical Radar Electronic Support Measures (ESM)
Electronic warfare & decoys	4 × 12-barrelled Terma DL-12T 130 mm decoy launchers 2 × 6-barrelled Terma DL-6T 130 mm decoy launchers
Armament	5 × StanFlex modules, typically: 3 × 12 RIM-162 ESSM SAM in Mk 48Mod3/ Mk 56 VLS 2 × 8 Harpoon Block II SSM Fixed weapons: 1 × 5"/62 Mk 45 mod 4 gun 2 × Mk32 Mod 14, each with 2 × MU90 torpedoes 2 × Millennium 35 mm CIWS 7 × 12.7 mm M/01 LvSa HMG
Aircraft carried	2 × AW-101 helicopters[1] or 2 MH-60R helicopters
Aviation facilities	Aft helicopter deck and hangars

Production started at Odense Steel Shipyard on 30 April 2003,[1] with the lead ship Absalon laid down on 28 November of that year.[1] Esbern Snare followed on 24 March 2004; they were both launched later that year.[1] They were delivered on 19 October 2004 and 17 April 2005 respectively, and commissioned on 10 January 2005 and 17 June 2005.[1] At this point they had the StanFlex modules installed, but would have to wait until 2007 for full operational capability,[1] with the installation of the 35mm CIWS, Mk32 torpedo launchers and Seagnat/SRBOC decoy systems.

Among other upgrades the two ships of the Absalon class were fitted with the newer Terma Scanter 6002 to replace the Scanter 2001 in 2020.

For political reasons, the ships were originally launched as "Flexible support ships" to avoid antagonising Russia after the end of the cold war.[8] On the 16th of October 2020, both ships were reclassed as anti-submarine warfare-frigates. Both ships will be upgraded with towed array sonars in addition to the existing, hull-mounted sonar. The Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk helicopters will be equipped with dipping sonars, sonobuoys and torpedoes. This upgrade is expected to complete in 2026.[9]

Absalon begat the Iver Huitfeldt which begat the Arrowhead which begat the Type 31 which begat the Polish Miecznik frigates.



Canadian version - take 15 CSCs and put large flex decks in 6 of them.

 

[Kirkhill]

That's not how crewing works, but our current forecast of CSC crewing is comparable to the RAN setup that also has AEGIS. That is driving massive amounts of watchkeepers and maintainers. AOPS basic crew is the same as Svalrbard; the extras are to do additional things (which the Svalrbard also does).

The ships are designed to have a certain amount of crew to properly operate, and the crew numbers are tabletopped to see if they can do what we expect in the CONOPs.

Things are already pretty automated, so that cuts down a lot of people, but also means we have to maintain the automation and remote control, which we are currently not great at due to the cost and time, as well as scheduling enough time for maintenance.

You also need somewhere to train people, so given how much we rely on recruitment because of how brutal our retention is, a lot of the extras are trainees (to the point on some ships where it's being questioned if they are actually safe).

Trainees aren't crew. They are passengers as are their instructors. Just like the OGDs are not crew, IMO, they too are passengers.

I am glad to hear that there is a high level of automation. And I agree that finding good techs is a problem. It is a problem ashore in small communities as well. Even plants in cities struggle to find good help. That still doesn't encourage designers or employers to plan for more employees.

If the watchkeeper bill is rising then you are going to have to do the other thing. Longer shifts? Fewer ships? Or more automation and reliance on Artificial Intelligence?

 

[JMCanada]

Problems do arise when undermanning the vessels...

The F-35 accident report – a reality check for UK Carrier Strike | Navy Lookout

www.navylookout.com

 

[Stoker]

Trainees aren't crew. They are passengers as are their instructors. Just like the OGDs are not crew, IMO, they too are passengers.

I am glad to hear that there is a high level of automation. And I agree that finding good techs is a problem. It is a problem ashore in small communities as well. Even plants in cities struggle to find good help. That still doesn't encourage designers or employers to plan for more employees.

If the watchkeeper bill is rising then you are going to have to do the other thing. Longer shifts? Fewer ships? Or more automation and reliance on Artificial Intelligence?

We don't have instructors for the most part on ship to only train personnel and yes both are considered part of the ship and not passengers. Often in the technical trades our personnel are qualified watchkeepers that train towards a higher qualification and they are certainly not passengers. Even trainees with no qualifications are still considered members of the ships company and not passengers.

 

[Navy_Pete]

@Stoker with a caveat that the trainees have NETP completed and some ship famil. The issue is some of the plans for non-NETP folks to sail in big groups, which isn't something we can usefully support with normal OJT and existing SS supervision.

Even with additional supervision that's a lot of extra senior people that need to be there for basic herding of cats during emergencies (which is way more frequent then they should be due to age/state of the ships).

Big difference compared to the old tiger team sails is that the ship's crews are cut down to pretty low numbers, and a lot of them are still pretty new or doing their own training for the next job, so quite a different context for the 'normal sail' even compared to 5 or 10 years ago. The big issue seems to be the people doing a lot of the higher level planning are basing it on their sailing experience from a decade or more ago and there is limited opportunity for reality checks on how the ships are today.

 

[Stoker]

@Stoker with a caveat that the trainees have NETP completed and some ship famil. The issue is some of the plans for non-NETP folks to sail in big groups, which isn't something we can usefully support with normal OJT and existing SS supervision.

Even with additional supervision that's a lot of extra senior people that need to be there for basic herding of cats during emergencies (which is way more frequent then they should be due to age/state of the ships).

Big difference compared to the old tiger team sails is that the ship's crews are cut down to pretty low numbers, and a lot of them are still pretty new or doing their own training for the next job, so quite a different context for the 'normal sail' even compared to 5 or 10 years ago. The big issue seems to be the people doing a lot of the higher level planning are basing it on their sailing experience from a decade or more ago and there is limited opportunity for reality checks on how the ships are today.

Fair enough, there is always exceptions. Seems like some very uninformed comments though. I'm of course speaking from a small ship point of view.

 

[Rainbow1910]

Absalon begat the Iver Huitfeldt which begat the Arrowhead which begat the Type 31 which begat the Polish Miecznik frigates.

Canadian version - take 15 CSCs and put large flex decks in 6 of them.

The issue with a design like Absalon is that it is a compromise, it's an inferior transport vessel to a purpose built vessel and its an inferior warship to a proper frigate. Canada needs proper warships far more than it needs compromise transport warships. If we want transports, buy transports. Using our combatant program to do so seems like its asking for trouble.

The flex deck concept is a damage control nightmare considering its either going to be crammed with cargo or will be a huge open compartment that spans a major portion of the ship. When not operating in a transport role, all of that extra space is effectively deadweight that could be better spent on actually being a warship. I cannot fathom trying to modify the Type 26 design to accept a flex deck, nor can I see the RCN throwing away the advantages in training and logistics that a common hull form design provides by producing another design.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Doesn't quite work that way.

First of all, in order to have a proper deployment of, say, 1000 crew, accounting for recruiting/training/manning shore establishments of all sorts (including the fleet maintenance groups, dockyard, bases and naval HQ's) you need almost 1.8 persons ashore for each sea position. Anything lower and you start having to send crew to sea over and over again, depriving them of their proper ratio of time ashore.

Second, we currently do not have the crewing you are representing. The HAL's and MCDV are not fully manned and even then they are not all crewed. The submarines can only put one real operational crew together right now, if pushed came to shove, they might bundle up a second one. Since the objective is to man the fleet as you mention above in the end state of the CSC's entry into service, then it is more than 1000 extra crew that you have to qualify, plus the then multiplication I mention above to maintain proper sea/shore ratio.

Finally, even if what you indicate was the case, it is not the way to look at it. All crewing issues come down to a breakdown of various trades and their criticality. If everyone was up to scratch in levels but the MarEng Techs were at 50 %, you still couldn't operate all the ships even if you wanted to. So each trade as to be looked at in isolation, and right now, the technical trades are definitely the ones hurting the most.

Does all the navy training need to be near the ports? Since that is where the prime real estate is and I don't see the government buying up expensive real estate to increase navy bases. Unless they went to a small town and replaced the closed pulp mill as the main employer.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

@Stoker with a caveat that the trainees have NETP completed and some ship famil. The issue is some of the plans for non-NETP folks to sail in big groups, which isn't something we can usefully support with normal OJT and existing SS supervision.

Even with additional supervision that's a lot of extra senior people that need to be there for basic herding of cats during emergencies (which is way more frequent then they should be due to age/state of the ships).

Big difference compared to the old tiger team sails is that the ship's crews are cut down to pretty low numbers, and a lot of them are still pretty new or doing their own training for the next job, so quite a different context for the 'normal sail' even compared to 5 or 10 years ago. The big issue seems to be the people doing a lot of the higher level planning are basing it on their sailing experience from a decade or more ago and there is limited opportunity for reality checks on how the ships are today.

As I previously mentioned we could build a similar program to what the USN had and since it also helps boost immigration , might actually be politically possible. Navy to Stop Recruiting Filipino Nationals : Defense: The end of the military base agreement with the Philippines will terminate the nearly century-old program.

 

[dapaterson]

So, CFB Liverpool then? I have a picture from 2016 with a destroyer and an AOR awaiting ship breaking, tied up alongside what used to be the mill's jetty ..

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Does all the navy training need to be near the ports? Since that is where the prime real estate is and I don't see the government buying up expensive real estate to increase navy bases. Unless they went to a small town and replaced the closed pulp mill as the main employer.

Actually, it does, for three reasons:

(1) It is where the fleet schools are right now, why move them?
(2) we "home port" the NCM's so that they can spend their whole career in the same harbour. If you had to ship them away to another town to train, it would wreck the system, and
(3) ditto for the actual trainers. The training is done mostly by CPO's and PO's who are home ported on that coast, so why move them around?

As I previously mentioned we could build a similar program to what the USN had and since it also helps boost immigration , might actually be politically possible. Navy to Stop Recruiting Filipino Nationals : Defense: The end of the military base agreement with the Philippines will terminate the nearly century-old program.

The US program for Filipino nationals existed because the US has a base in the Philippines and that is where they are hired, then trained, then taken into the fleet. We don't have overseas bases from which we can take on nationals from another country.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Actually, it does, for three reasons:

(1) It is where the fleet schools are right now, why move them?
(2) we "home port" the NCM's so that they can spend their whole career in the same harbour. If you had to ship them away to another town to train, it would wreck the system, and
(3) ditto for the actual trainers. The training is done mostly by CPO's and PO's who are home ported on that coast, so why move them around?




The US program for Filipino nationals existed because the US has a base in the Philippines and that is where they are hired, then trained, then taken into the fleet. We don't have overseas bases from which we can take on nationals from another country.

Is the size of the current bases hampering retention and recruiting efforts? If so your going to have to get creative in how you solve that, as the government is unlikely to buy more real estate in Halifax or Esquimalt for DND.

As for recruiting overseas, we need people not a new base, it is likley the same economic drivers still exist there and that you can easily fill as many slots as you want and will have ample applicants to select from. The question is are we willing to think outside of our box or will we just pretend there are not other solutions, which would be a oh so Canadian way of doing things.

 

[dapaterson]

A base where Francophones could have their families live and work in French would materially improve the RCN.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Worth the read -

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/23/286/Gransden.pdf

 

[Kirkhill]

The issue with a design like Absalon is that it is a compromise, it's an inferior transport vessel to a purpose built vessel and its an inferior warship to a proper frigate. Canada needs proper warships far more than it needs compromise transport warships. If we want transports, buy transports. Using our combatant program to do so seems like its asking for trouble.

The flex deck concept is a damage control nightmare considering its either going to be crammed with cargo or will be a huge open compartment that spans a major portion of the ship. When not operating in a transport role, all of that extra space is effectively deadweight that could be better spent on actually being a warship. I cannot fathom trying to modify the Type 26 design to accept a flex deck, nor can I see the RCN throwing away the advantages in training and logistics that a common hull form design provides by producing another design.

Let's say the RCN gets its 15 CSCs and that all 15 ships delivered over the next 15 to 20 years are built to the same fit and finish standard. How difficult would it be to build another flight without the full suite of weapons systems but which, essentially, had a large hangar above the waterline? Can we really call an open volume dead weight? The advantage of such a strategy, as far as I am concerned is that the transport and support ship could keep up with the fleet at large and also contribute to the defence of the fleet. It could also find employment in the convoy escort role.

 

[Rainbow1910]

Let's say the RCN gets its 15 CSCs and that all 15 ships delivered over the next 15 to 20 years are built to the same fit and finish standard. How difficult would it be to build another flight without the full suite of weapons systems but which, essentially, had a large hangar above the waterline? Can we really call an open volume dead weight? The advantage of such a strategy, as far as I am concerned is that the transport and support ship could keep up with the fleet at large and also contribute to the defence of the fleet. It could also find employment in the convoy escort role.

I would venture to say very difficult if not infeasible. Flex bays are something which takes up immense space within a ship and is something that has to be designed into the ship from the beginning to be feasible. By their very nature as well they also require a huge amount of weight margins to be set aside for their cargo. It makes little sense to try and cludge a very expensive high end anti-submarine frigate like Type 26 into a design like you are speaking about, it would make more sense to design a ship like that from the ground up, excluding expensive elements wherever possible like the Danish. I have my doubts it is possible as you would need to be removing so many internal systems to fit such a storage space, it would be a mess to try and put the ship back together.

It very much is deadweight when it is not in use considering how much you are sacrificing for such a thing. I would much rather Canada procure purpose built transport vessels instead of having a compromised warship and compromised transport. There is a reason why this model of warship hasn't left Denmark.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

There is a advantage to a faster transport and one that has some self-defense capability. Along with good high speed cruising range. I can see the day when a Transport carries a couple of UAV's that fly out and hunt for subs along their route in addition to any airborne assets from their escorts. My guess is any long distance moves will carry the equipment but a minimum number of troops, who will fly to staging points, to meet up with the ships. Every ship design is a compromise, between speed, carrying capacity, livability, range, manoeuvrability, damage control, fighting and sensing capability and also cost to build/operate. If we get transports, I would prefer a Mistral or Canberra Class ship. They will have more flexibility for the multitude of roles that navies in non-major conflict see themselves getting tasked to. If Canada wanted to rebuild some of it's "Middle Power" capabilities, a RCN equipped with KS-III subs, CSC, 3-4 AOR's and a couple of the classes of landing/helicopter ships above, it would go a long way in allowing Canada to play that role.

 

[Kirkhill]

Part of the discussion has to revolve around what is a survivable force these days. Is it a small number or large exquisites or a large number of small exquisites.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Always remember that Canada is a two navy country. With two widely separated fleets with different operational needs and areas. Technically we are actually 3, but we have currently addressed the 3rd with the AOP's. So those two blue water fleets need to project a long ways and to keep one ship on station you pretty much need 3 of them. So in reality with 15 CSC, assuming enough crews, we can guarantee 2 ships per operational area, with the possibility of surging 3 for a period of time in one ocean.

 

[YZT580]

A base where Francophones could have their families live and work in French would materially improve the RCN.

we are having enough troubles manning the fleet without adding a 3rd major base. Would need the equivalent of Esquimault staffing all in french. Not practical. Kiss a third of your fleet goodbye to make up the budget requirements