Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves
Brad Sallows
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>The biggest efficiencies would be gained by reducing secondary duties (UEnvO, RadSO, UGSO, OIC Armoury, SHARP Instr, IO, etc).
I would frankly be surprised if it were not required that each physical location continued to have a representative for the administrative and safety appointments.
I would frankly be surprised if it were not required that each physical location continued to have a representative for the administrative and safety appointments.
McG
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"Re-organization is always bad. We need to re-organize NDHQ to make things better"TCBF said:
A little contradictory, don't you think? What is the invariable harm that would come from re-organizing the reserves? . . . or are you just fear-mongering?
"Re-orging and streamlining the headquarters levels would have the potential of saving lots of money and manpower, but is probably best left as a topic for a different thread."
Noted.
"A little contradictory, don't you think? What is the invariable harm that would come from re-organizing the reserves? . . . or are you just fear-mongering?"
Contradictory? Probably, in that if I think a re-org would hurt the Reserves, I probably shouldn't be wishing it on another org, should I ?
If we re-org to better accomplish our missions - including the traditional ones few people really understand - then yes, a properly fed and funded re-org can work. But any re-org done to field units simply to save resources invariably costs more than it saves in the long run, and cuts the meat, not the fat.
My earlier posts reflected a stance I once took in a conversation: "We have a big defence budget, but a tiny military budget" and "Whenever they send civilians from Ottawa out to determine which units get downsized and streamlined, the military should send officers to Ottawa to determine which programs and offices at NDHQ should be downsized and streamlined."
Defence spending is not necessarily military spending. I don't think I am fear mongering. The best predictor of future performance is past performance.
Noted.
"A little contradictory, don't you think? What is the invariable harm that would come from re-organizing the reserves? . . . or are you just fear-mongering?"
Contradictory? Probably, in that if I think a re-org would hurt the Reserves, I probably shouldn't be wishing it on another org, should I ?
If we re-org to better accomplish our missions - including the traditional ones few people really understand - then yes, a properly fed and funded re-org can work. But any re-org done to field units simply to save resources invariably costs more than it saves in the long run, and cuts the meat, not the fat.
My earlier posts reflected a stance I once took in a conversation: "We have a big defence budget, but a tiny military budget" and "Whenever they send civilians from Ottawa out to determine which units get downsized and streamlined, the military should send officers to Ottawa to determine which programs and offices at NDHQ should be downsized and streamlined."
Defence spending is not necessarily military spending. I don't think I am fear mongering. The best predictor of future performance is past performance.
McG
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Well, good news. I think this is what we would achieve by going with sub-regional Bn HQs under the existing regional Bde HQs.TCBF said:
More important than any gains in efficiency across the existing units (and there would be some gains) would be the increased capacity of the of the now full bn organizations to conduct and support up to level 4 training.
The money saved in gutting local units to fund a "mega-regional battalion" would;
1. Not save any money.
2. Not put money where you and I want it if it did.
The advantages - if any - would be fleeting, the damage permanent. T
There is nothing stopping units from banding together and conducting that training now. Except that someone, somewhere does not want you to do it, and no matter how much money you save them, that will not change it. Lack of money is an excuse given to not do things someone higher does not want done. Trust me, if the CF wanted it done, they would do it. How much does SHARP Trg cost? How much do all of those MFRCs cost? How much does the ombudsman cost? How much did it cost to put me up in Guam for four days? If they wanted you to to do level four - you would, they don't - so you won't. Don't flush 100 years of tradition into the outhouse just to see the gleam in the eye of a sycophantic bean counter. You and your unit will suffer in the end, and you will make nothing beter.
1. Not save any money.
2. Not put money where you and I want it if it did.
The advantages - if any - would be fleeting, the damage permanent. T
There is nothing stopping units from banding together and conducting that training now. Except that someone, somewhere does not want you to do it, and no matter how much money you save them, that will not change it. Lack of money is an excuse given to not do things someone higher does not want done. Trust me, if the CF wanted it done, they would do it. How much does SHARP Trg cost? How much do all of those MFRCs cost? How much does the ombudsman cost? How much did it cost to put me up in Guam for four days? If they wanted you to to do level four - you would, they don't - so you won't. Don't flush 100 years of tradition into the outhouse just to see the gleam in the eye of a sycophantic bean counter. You and your unit will suffer in the end, and you will make nothing beter.
McG
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You are clearly not trying to argue against my proposal (which is not about saving money or shifting money). The local establishments would not be gutted as most of the full-time capacity would shift to the sub unit level. Any savings would be small (no RQMS doing the SQMS's job and the sub unit learning the false lesson that regiment will always deliver).TCBF said:
The reserves should be able to do level 4 trg, and that is why the reserves should restructure.TCBF said:
. . . and you still have not defined the damages that you have promised.
You can re-structure until the cows come home, but you won't do level four until they want you to, and it ain't money.
Leave Bn HQs where they are. If you regionalize them, but give the CO's the same responsibilities, and you won't spend time training, you'll spend it commuting, or tele-conferencing, or administeriung, or whatever.
Leave it the way it is. If they want you to do level for, they will tell you. If you find money to do level four, they will take it away from you.
Leave Bn HQs where they are. If you regionalize them, but give the CO's the same responsibilities, and you won't spend time training, you'll spend it commuting, or tele-conferencing, or administeriung, or whatever.
Leave it the way it is. If they want you to do level for, they will tell you. If you find money to do level four, they will take it away from you.
McG
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So, reserves should not restructure because "they" don't want the reserves to train above sub-sub unit (pl & tp) level?TCBF said:
My experiences with the linear reserve chain of command was that the RQ often became the the SQ and that the squadron often had everything delivered/handed to it. Reserve sub units do not know their own CSS needs when in a BG/Bn context, and they will never know what goes into those requirements unless they start to interact within real Bn structures. (Granted, the RQ likely knows what is required to support a Coy, but why not just make the RQ the CQ & stop pretending?)
Wouldn't the reserves provide a better training ground for staff officers if their battalion HQ staff actually learned to support multiple sub units?
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TCBF has a point, there is no point to rearranging the deck chairs in the effort to increase efficiency or save a few bucks - the cost of rearranging is usually more in terms of cohesion and physical costs.
However, I am not advocating a rearrangement of the deck chairs, I am proposing that we tear up the deck and rebuild it, because it isn't suited to the realities on the ground - I am in effect arguing for transformation as opposed to reorganization.
A gamble? Yes - but nobody ever one by preparing for the last war.
I address the issue here:
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/30150.new.html#new
However, I am not advocating a rearrangement of the deck chairs, I am proposing that we tear up the deck and rebuild it, because it isn't suited to the realities on the ground - I am in effect arguing for transformation as opposed to reorganization.
A gamble? Yes - but nobody ever one by preparing for the last war.
I address the issue here:
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/30150.new.html#new
"Wouldn't the reserves provide a better training ground for staff officers if their battalion HQ staff actually learned to support multiple sub units?"
Sure, but you don't need to re-org to do that, do you? Just Ex with other units, and take turns.
Sure, but you don't need to re-org to do that, do you? Just Ex with other units, and take turns.
McG
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I think you would need to re-org. For all the superfluous COs, DCOs, RSMs, etc, there are several missing bn pers from all units. These missing pers are typically the Cpl & MCpl that fill out the RQMS staff, run the regt tpt/pol sect (and are of the same occupation as the msn element), etc.TCBF said:
Unlike the local battalions (which train with multiple sub units maybe 25% of the time and always lack the structure to provide the bn context in which to train any sub unit), the sub-regional battalions would train with all the elements of a unit 100% of the time and it would have the full structure to train sub units in a bn context.
"would train with all the elements of a unit 100% of the time and it would have the full structure to train sub units in a bn context."
For which they would then pull the funds to save money, because they don't want you to do it as much as they want you to do something else.
And you are stuck with a regional Bn no one wants to join or stay in, because it has lost touch with it's roots. You think all of those keen Militia Capt s and Lt s will stay in a unit they can never LOCALLY be CO of? Or the OR s to RSM? Why?
It ain't the Org that's broke - it's the people. You can't fix broken people just by re-orging. We have very flex and traditional orgs now, best of both worlds. Fire the losers, and promote people with immagination.
We don't have to re-org every time the cart goes off the track - we just have to provide direction and leadership. Our present Regt System has stood the test of time - the problem is the current generation of weak leaders.
For which they would then pull the funds to save money, because they don't want you to do it as much as they want you to do something else.
And you are stuck with a regional Bn no one wants to join or stay in, because it has lost touch with it's roots. You think all of those keen Militia Capt s and Lt s will stay in a unit they can never LOCALLY be CO of? Or the OR s to RSM? Why?
It ain't the Org that's broke - it's the people. You can't fix broken people just by re-orging. We have very flex and traditional orgs now, best of both worlds. Fire the losers, and promote people with immagination.
We don't have to re-org every time the cart goes off the track - we just have to provide direction and leadership. Our present Regt System has stood the test of time - the problem is the current generation of weak leaders.
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We are well into two projects in this area, under LFRR Ph II. We are tactically grouping our three arty units into a 38 CBG Arty Tac Gp, with one CO and a Gp RSM. The Gp HQ function is centred on one unit, but the staff tasks can be shared around the various HQs. Within a month, this tactical gp will be complete. There is one CO for all three units, with FULCOM. He is the boss.
We are also in the process of completing the tac gp of our three Svc Bns. The structure will function in a similar manner.
In both tac gps, the commanders of the subordinated units (rank of Maj or Capt) will perform as DCOs/OCs/BCs. They will focus on the lvl 1-3 trg and local issues that really represent their major capabilities and concerns. The Gp CO will focus on Gp level issues, such as directing lvl 4 (or higher) trg, developing and issuing a single Operating Plan for all three units, and acting as the Bde Comd's advisor and "advocate" on Arty or CSS issues. Our Bde Comd will go from trying to deal with 16 COs (incl three OPCON) to 12. There is a travel requirement for the CO and RSM but that is SOP in a Bde that stretches from Thunder Bay to Prince Albert.
The plans were developed starting about seven or eight years ago. In the case of the Arty, there was already a solid basis of joint training to build on. We were able to finally get the plans accepted under LFRR Ph II (after a lot of flak from various "Friends of the Militia" and institutional fear from the Army itself). Our own Res and our Hons bought into it-that was not the problem. It was more the "we must never change the Militia I served in" crowd who caused the problems, all from outside our Bde. We have also had an internal info battle to fight with getting the facts down to the Armoury floor, as opposed to the BS and mess rumours that tend to dominate.
We set some very strict criteria for implementing the plans:
-no reduction in overall unit strength (in fact the aim is to grow the elements to a healthy level);
-no closure of locations (we have, and intend to maintain four CSS locs and five Arty locs);
-no reduction of community footprint;
-no reduction of equipment (except as imposed by WFM, etc) budgets or trg ammo; and
-no reduction or redistribution of FTS (Reg or Res) until we have analyzed what we need (as it is, it has been years since the RCA has been able to fill all of the RegF FTS posns in our Bde).
Of course, this is not amalgamation, although if we can make tac gp work we will achieve some of the same efficiencies. The plan leaves the road open for eventual amalgamation, but only as a possible option and only based on a review of how well tac gp works. This is not likely to happen in the near future for two reasons: the Army wants to see how our projects work out, and the Army is still terrified of the "A-word" where the Res is concerned.
The plan equally leaves the road open to preserve the tac gp or to dismantle it if it no longer serves a purpose. Personally, I hope it works, and I hope that eventually we see our way to a new and stronger Res structure, which does not have dozens of little units squabbling for limited resources and recruits (ie: five units in a city of 100,000 people: suicide), or leadership positions being filled by the "Last Man Standing" promotion system, thus further aggravating attrition by miserable leadership. It would be great if our Bde and Area Comds actually had a range of good candidates to pick from for unit-levewl command and RSM, instead of scraping the bottom of the barrel or doing a retread. (No offense to some of the retreads who step up and do a good job).
Cheers.
We are also in the process of completing the tac gp of our three Svc Bns. The structure will function in a similar manner.
In both tac gps, the commanders of the subordinated units (rank of Maj or Capt) will perform as DCOs/OCs/BCs. They will focus on the lvl 1-3 trg and local issues that really represent their major capabilities and concerns. The Gp CO will focus on Gp level issues, such as directing lvl 4 (or higher) trg, developing and issuing a single Operating Plan for all three units, and acting as the Bde Comd's advisor and "advocate" on Arty or CSS issues. Our Bde Comd will go from trying to deal with 16 COs (incl three OPCON) to 12. There is a travel requirement for the CO and RSM but that is SOP in a Bde that stretches from Thunder Bay to Prince Albert.
The plans were developed starting about seven or eight years ago. In the case of the Arty, there was already a solid basis of joint training to build on. We were able to finally get the plans accepted under LFRR Ph II (after a lot of flak from various "Friends of the Militia" and institutional fear from the Army itself). Our own Res and our Hons bought into it-that was not the problem. It was more the "we must never change the Militia I served in" crowd who caused the problems, all from outside our Bde. We have also had an internal info battle to fight with getting the facts down to the Armoury floor, as opposed to the BS and mess rumours that tend to dominate.
We set some very strict criteria for implementing the plans:
-no reduction in overall unit strength (in fact the aim is to grow the elements to a healthy level);
-no closure of locations (we have, and intend to maintain four CSS locs and five Arty locs);
-no reduction of community footprint;
-no reduction of equipment (except as imposed by WFM, etc) budgets or trg ammo; and
-no reduction or redistribution of FTS (Reg or Res) until we have analyzed what we need (as it is, it has been years since the RCA has been able to fill all of the RegF FTS posns in our Bde).
Of course, this is not amalgamation, although if we can make tac gp work we will achieve some of the same efficiencies. The plan leaves the road open for eventual amalgamation, but only as a possible option and only based on a review of how well tac gp works. This is not likely to happen in the near future for two reasons: the Army wants to see how our projects work out, and the Army is still terrified of the "A-word" where the Res is concerned.
The plan equally leaves the road open to preserve the tac gp or to dismantle it if it no longer serves a purpose. Personally, I hope it works, and I hope that eventually we see our way to a new and stronger Res structure, which does not have dozens of little units squabbling for limited resources and recruits (ie: five units in a city of 100,000 people: suicide), or leadership positions being filled by the "Last Man Standing" promotion system, thus further aggravating attrition by miserable leadership. It would be great if our Bde and Area Comds actually had a range of good candidates to pick from for unit-levewl command and RSM, instead of scraping the bottom of the barrel or doing a retread. (No offense to some of the retreads who step up and do a good job).
Cheers.
Exactly what we need - programs that make our present structure work. Amalgamation would take a good idea past it's logical conclusion. Lots of little units give us the ability to flush out or re-role in an emergency. It gives us flexibility at little or no price. I think we should be opening new units in our new urban areas, and resurecting units we have shut down, with old traditions and new roles.
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Well--based on our experiences, I would not say "lots of little units". Maintaining all these miniature unit structures, in which COs, RSMs and Bn HQ staffs receive very little useful training and experience at anything above level four because they are enmeshed in sub-unit level activities, doesn't do much for us in the long run. What I would say is a healthy, rational Res structure with "lots of Reserve presence" is the way to go. The presence can be provided equally well by batteries, coys and squadrons-we do not need a full unit HQ in each location. That presence is IMHO better provided by a functional 90 or 100 mbr sub-unit than a dysfunctional "battalion" of the same size.
Cheers.
I would like the "cadre" concept we presently have to be accepted for what it is. We have 'little' units because we do not fund the units that could be much larger, and we have put other financial and institutional barriers in the way of military efficiency.
we have non-trained RHQs because we demand an ever increasing administrative product from them for no noticeable gain. Military effectiveness is not measured in the volume of e-mails sent, yet that is the sort of activity rewarded and funded by our system. If we got rid of some RHQs to give each unit 8 sub-units each, someone at those sub-units would invariably have to take off wear the disbanded RHQ left off, and start filling the recycle bins to keep the green machine happy.
I see no benefit to tearing the guts out of a system we have merely because we fail to use it properly. I don't scrap my car every time it runs out of gas, or needs an oil change. Simplistic solutions, poorly thought out, executed without a true knowledge of the social institutions of the Army, merely hide the problem, not solve it.
we have non-trained RHQs because we demand an ever increasing administrative product from them for no noticeable gain. Military effectiveness is not measured in the volume of e-mails sent, yet that is the sort of activity rewarded and funded by our system. If we got rid of some RHQs to give each unit 8 sub-units each, someone at those sub-units would invariably have to take off wear the disbanded RHQ left off, and start filling the recycle bins to keep the green machine happy.
I see no benefit to tearing the guts out of a system we have merely because we fail to use it properly. I don't scrap my car every time it runs out of gas, or needs an oil change. Simplistic solutions, poorly thought out, executed without a true knowledge of the social institutions of the Army, merely hide the problem, not solve it.
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No-not necessarily. What you would want to do is restrict the sub-units to looking after sub-unit level things only, plus local community footprint. The majority of the more complex pers admin, budget mgt, etc would be done at the unit HQ where you could concentrate a greater percentage of your full time staff. OC/BCs and their people would be focused on leading the soldiers in their armoury and training to level three. The unit HQ would look after the level four and almost everything else. The Operating Plan, etc would be written and managed from the unit HQ. This is essentially the way the USARNG works, with normally only one or two full time ARNG in outlying sub-units, and the majority of the full time ARNG in the unit HQ. Admittedly they do not train as often as our Res does, but I believe that it can be made to work quite well. I just don't see the benefit of all these little unit-level command structures.
Cheers.
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