Def Min's "Architect" Statements (split fm Walts et. al.)

[Gunner98]

“The official reason for his not being able to attend is he was asked to be elsewhere at the time. That is what I was told,” said Elliott..."

Perhaps he had a meeting with the Association of War Plans Architects. More likely he had to take a day to review his speech for CDAI and prepare some canned replies to the questions that he can expect to hear on 3 May 17. 

 

[Jarnhamar]

This is turning out to be the best thread ever.

Easily destroyed with one pot-bomb
;D

 

[Journeyman]

Easily destroyed with one pot-bomb
;D

Now you've done it.....  :not-again:

 

[kratz]

Now you've done it.....  :not-again:

[tangent] It seems Navy.ca might have to invoke it's own version of Godwin's MJ's law/  [  [/tangent]

 

[NavyShooter]

The memes that are appearing as a result of this are, well, amusing. 

That said, the minister is no longer a soldier, he's a politician.  (Regardless of whether or not he still holds a Commissioning scroll.)

Have we ever known politicians to lie?

Have we ever known politicians to embellish?

Have we ever known politicians to do or say things for their own grandification?

I think the HOPE within the lines of the CAF was that maybe this MND would be different, and that maybe he would, as 'one of us' represent our values, our ethos, our concerns to the highest levels of the government.

Unfortunately, it would seem that he has not chosen that path, and to be truthful, none of us should be surprised, because he is, after all, a politician now, and politicians lie.  That's how they get us to vote for them.  They say what they think the crowd wants them to hear, and those who don't say what the crowd wants to hear get ousted and rejected.

The unfortunate parts of this are the breaking of faith with the military ethos that I think the CAF had hoped he would maintain, and the loss of the his credibility in the face of dealing with both our allies, and our enemies. 

Do you not think this failure in judgement will have an impact on the perceptions and conversations the next time he interacts with Mr. Mattis? 

The collective disappointment by us as the CAF is palpable, but, looking at it realistically, it should not have come as a surprise to any of us.

I'm just relaxing and enjoying the memes...there was one about how he saved Private Ryan, another about how he beat Chuck Norris, another showing him starring in the War of 1812, planning Operation Overlord from a landing craft...and so on.

The other thing that's in the back of my mind....what else is on the go?  If the attention is focused on the MND, what has our attention been distracted from?  Did the contract for the Super-Hornets just get signed?  Did we need something that'd distract from the VCDS circus?  What funding got cut this week?

Ah well, life will carry on, babies will be kissed, politicians will lie, and we'll still be wondering about our pay-raise. 

As King Solomon is reputed to have said....there is nothing new under the sun.

NS

 

[Lumber]

The collective disappointment by us as the CAF is palpable, but, looking at it realistically, it should not have come as a surprise to any of us.

and Rona Ambrose said:

"What he did was wrong, and now he has lost the confidence of our men and women in uniform".

Maybe it's because I don't have high expectations regarding the conduct of politicians, former serving members or not, but I can say that I am not disappointed, nor has my confidence in his ability to perform as MND been lost.

Which serving members did Rona Ambrose actually ask to come up with this conclusion? Did any of you get surveyed? Did she just make it up?! Shame! She should be fired!

 

[Stoker]

On the news stories online there is the letter that General Fraser sent praising the MND for deployment there, its quite the read.

16 September 2006

Chief Constable J.H. Graham

Chief Constable of the Vancouver Police

1. I have had the pleasure of having Constable and Major Harjit Sajjan work for me for the past nine months on OPERATION ARCHER/ATHENA, Canada’s contribution to the global war on terror in Afghanistan. I must say that Major Sajjan is one of the most remarkable people I have worked with, and his contribution to the success of the mission and the safety of Canadian soldiers was nothing short of remarkable.

2. Maj Sajjan was specially selected for that demanding and challenging task of acting as the Liaison Officer of the Afghan National Police on behalf of the Combined Task Force (CTF) Aegis HQ because of the civilian skillset he has brought to the table as an undercover narcotics officer. His job further changed into being a special intelligence officer working direct to Commander CTF Aegis because of his ability to understand and exploit criminal networks. He consistently provided the most timely and accurate intelligence available, and he personally fused broad sources of information into an extremely coherent picture upon which most of the formations major operations were based. Not only did he display a rare high level of intellect and experience in his analysis, he also demonstrated remarkable personal courage in his collection efforts, often working in the face of the enemy to collect data and confirm his suspicions, and placing himself almost daily in situations of grave personal risk. His products were cogent and demonstrated a profound understanding of the Taliban (TB) and tribal networks which were critical in making formation and unit operations successful. He was the best single Canadian intelligence asset in theatre, and his hard work, personal bravery, and dogged determination undoubtedly saved a multitude of Coalition lives. Through his courage and dedication, Major Sajjan has single-handedly changed the face of intelligence gathering and analysis in Afghanistan.

3. He tirelessly and selflessly devoted himself to piecing together the ground truth on tribal and Taliban networks in the Kandahar area, and his analysis was so compelling that it drove a number of large scale theatre-resourced efforts, including OPERATION MEDUSA, a large scale conventional combat operation that resulted in the defeat of the largest TB insurgent cell yet identified in Afghanistan, with over 1500 Taliban killed or captured. I rate him as one of the best intelligence officers I have ever worked with - fearless, smart, and personable, and I would not hesitate to have him on my staff at any time in the future. I have advised my chain of command that the Canadian Forces must capture his skillset, and seek his advice on how to change our entire tactical intelligence training and architecture to best meet the needs of future deployed units fighting in extremely complex battle space.

4. I cannot thank you enough for allowing Constable Sajjan to deploy with us on OPERATION ARCHER, and he has been an outstanding representative of the Vancouver City Police. I would ask that you pass my personal thanks to Constable Sajjan, and to those who supported him and his family while he was over here with us. I pray that he stays safe now that he returns to the challenges and dangers of his “everyday job,” and ask that if I can ever be of assistance to either Constable Sajjan or your Department, that you do not hesitate to ask.

Sincerely,

David Fraser

Brigadier General

Commander CTF Aegis



Now that being said are these letters often written by Generals or are they written by a staff officer and often without the general even looking at it? Was this inflated a bit or is he that good?
Further to that here is a response concerning the MND supposedly from someone in theater. Its looks real but I never deployed there. I wonder if there is any truth to it.

From M. Allen.

"I have kept my head out of the news and facebook for a while, but this one caught my attention. As many of you know I was in Afghanistan during the time that Sajjan boasts about. I had limited engagements with him, but have many accounts of his f*ckery. The best description of what he accomplished during the 7 months we were there, is that he continuously undermined the efforts of every REAL analyst on the ground. So, below are a few of his greatest hits.
Minister Sajjan’s embellishments throughout his campaign rubbed me the wrong way, but they were just that, embellishments. His recent outright lies have compelled me to give my account of his, well, quite frankly shenanigans in Afghanistan. My statements are a true account of my recollections and do not serve to slander. The sarcasm is free.
From what the media has explained and from what I remember, Sajjan was a liaison between the ANP and Task Force Kandahar Headquarters (TFKHQ) or something like that. He was NOT a member of the 1 RCR BG. I know that he was often present at daily meetings at the Provincial Governors compound.
We too had a liaison with the provincial governor, a Cpl. By all accounts Sajjan’s behavior at the governor level was deplorable. Our Cpl often exclaimed that it was hard to work with him because his blatant disrespect and disdain that he showed the local Afghans made them too angry to work with at times.
I also question his involvement in the Intelligence process at Kandahar. I knew, or at least “knew of”, every Canadian analyst there and he wasn’t one of them. I would like to ask him a few questions though. Questions that every soldier present that day should hear the answers to. Why was the BG ordered to cross the river that day? Two days early? When EVERY actual intelligence person I know that was in theater that day said not to? Was that on your wise old intelligence analyst advice? You claimed to have been one of the best intelligence officers Gen Fraser had ever met. Because let’s be honest, you wrote it he signed it right? If that is the case, only you know why that decision was made.
While we are asking questions, I have another for you. You wear the Commander in Chief commendation. Do you were that for your service in Afghanistan with the TFK HQ? Pretty sure that commendation was awarded to the 1 RCR BG. If that is the case, I ask that you kindly remove it and publicly apologize to all of the soldiers of TF 3-06 for being such a disgrace to the uniform.
You cannot apologize for what you have done. You lied, in public, about a very sensitive topic. You did this of your own free will. There is no forgiveness for stolen valor and that is exactly what you have done."
Sooo, if you could just go ahead and resign, that would be great.

 

[Jarnhamar]

In my opinion Rona Ambrose has a habit of talking out of her ass when speaking on behalf of members of the military when she's also not in a position to do so. She's quicker than a gun slinger when it comes to capitalizing on liberal faux pas and facts seem to take a backseat to drama.  I actually like her a lot but it's a very annoying habit.

As for the MND I'm pretty disappointed in him.  I really wanted to buy into the whole  'he's one of us' mantra but I can't help shaking the feeling that he's a yes man. This architect of medusa crap just lowers my respect for him further, unfortunately.

 

[Loachman]

In my opinion Rona Ambrose has a habit of talking out of her ass when speaking on behalf of members of the military when she's also not in a position to do so. She's quicker than a gun slinger when it comes to capitalizing on liberal faux pas and facts seem to take a backseat to drama.  I actually like her a lot but it's a very annoying habit.

That is common practice for MPs - anything is usable as a "weapon" to attack those from other parties, no matter how outlandish it is.

As for the MND I'm pretty disappointed in him.  I really wanted to buy into the whole  'he's one of us' mantra but I can't help shaking the feeling that he's a yes man. This architect of medusa crap just lowers my respect for him further, unfortunately.

I did not know of him before his appointment, and based my opinion upon what others said about him, in and out of the media, which was all glowingly positive. I did not think that his reputation would be improved by his appointment, though, based upon how I've seen others change. Two were former high-ranking Officers and a third was a woman that I'd known for several years - at least, I thought that I knew her - and, until she was finally elected after two or three campaigns, thought would be an excellent MP.

If it is ever revealed in the press that a brainwashing/wiping or alien-pod-replacement programme exists for MPs, I'd not be the least bit surprised.

 

[FJAG]

On the news stories online there is the letter that General Fraser sent praising the MND for deployment there, its quite the read

...

Now that being said are these letters often written by Generals or are they written by a staff officer and often without the general even looking at it? Was this inflated a bit or is he that good?
Further to that here is a response concerning the MND supposedly from someone in theater. Its looks real but I never deployed there. I wonder if there is any truth to it.

...

As to Brigadier Fraser's letter I can tell you that these types of letters are either dictated by the officer or written by a staff officer under specific direction from the brigadier especially when, like here, there would have been a number of these types of letters to be done at the end of the tour. Either way they would be reviewed before signing so there is generally little chance Fraser would have been unaware as to what was in the letter. As to whether it was wholly true or inflated I wouldn't want to say. The CF as a whole (primarily through its PER system) tends to inflate achievements but even then they are generally based on positive acts. I would tend to think that in Fraser's eyes, the MND's performance was noteworthy in a positive sense.

As to the Allen letter, all that I can say is that it's a long standing tradition within our military to gripe and grouse. It's noteworthy that the individual cites no personal observations but just things he heard second hand.

Allen's issue with the MEDUSA assault going in two days early had nothing to do with the MND, however.

I think the record is very clear that Fraser ordered Lavoie to cross the Arghandab and go in ahead of the planned schedule because of pressure that Fraser received from his superior headquarters. In Colonel Horn's book, No Lack of Courage, he clearly recounts the Multinational Brigade's Ops O LCol Shane Schreiber stating that there were widespread reports that the Taliban were leaving and that Major-General Freakley (The US ISAF Deputy Commander for Security and Lieutenant-General Richards (the UK Comd of ISAF) were drawing the conclussion that the Taliban were slipping out of the bag and put pressure on Fraser to get into the objective area and to find out what was going on which resulted in Fraser directing the BG to go earlier.

I won't argue the tactics involved or whether the decision was right or wrong. I wasn't there. I do know however that Canadians tend to be generally risk adverse while the US and UK are tactically more aggressive. What I see here is simply a difference of opinion as to what to do based on the limited intel that reached the various headquarters and how they interpreted that. Fraser's actions were not predicated on what Sajjan may or may not have "analysed" but were based on what his ISAF superiors considered the tactical situation to be and what they directed/urged Fraser to do.

I think Mr Allen, even though he may have been there, has a very limited understanding of what happened at the higher levels of command and is using the situation for an ad hominem attack against the MND without any substantiation as to his actual involvement in the decision.  I personally put absolutely no weight on Allen's article. :2c:

:cheers:

 

[Loachman]

And it's the only such complaint to come to light, as far as I know.

A lot of potential complainants would have released in the eleven years since the op. Until several more come forward to back this Allen fellow up, I give it no credence either.

 

[Stoker]

As to Brigadier Fraser's letter I can tell you that these types of letters are either dictated by the officer or written by a staff officer under specific direction from the brigadier especially when, like here, there would have been a number of these types of letters to be done at the end of the tour. Either way they would be reviewed before signing so there is generally little chance Fraser would have been unaware as to what was in the letter. As to whether it was wholly true or inflated I wouldn't want to say. The CF as a whole (primarily through its PER system) tends to inflate achievements but even then they are generally based on positive acts. I would tend to think that in Fraser's eyes, the MND's performance was noteworthy in a positive sense.

As to the Allen letter, all that I can say is that it's a long standing tradition within our military to gripe and grouse. It's noteworthy that the individual cites no personal observations but just things he heard second hand.

Allen's issue with the MEDUSA assault going in two days early had nothing to do with the MND, however.

I think the record is very clear that Fraser ordered Lavoie to cross the Arghandab and go in ahead of the planned schedule because of pressure that Fraser received from his superior headquarters. In Colonel Horn's book, No Lack of Courage, he clearly recounts the Multinational Brigade's Ops O LCol Shane Schreiber stating that there were widespread reports that the Taliban were leaving and that Major-General Freakley (The US ISAF Deputy Commander for Security and Lieutenant-General Richards (the UK Comd of ISAF) were drawing the conclussion that the Taliban were slipping out of the bag and put pressure on Fraser to get into the objective area and to find out what was going on which resulted in Fraser directing the BG to go earlier.

I won't argue the tactics involved or whether the decision was right or wrong. I wasn't there. I do know however that Canadians tend to be generally risk adverse while the US and UK are tactically more aggressive. What I see here is simply a difference of opinion as to what to do based on the limited intel that reached the various headquarters and how they interpreted that. Fraser's actions were not predicated on what Sajjan may or may not have "analysed" but were based on what his ISAF superiors considered the tactical situation to be and what they directed/urged Fraser to do.

I think Mr Allen, even though he may have been there, has a very limited understanding of what happened at the higher levels of command and is using the situation for an ad hominem attack against the MND without any substantiation as to his actual involvement in the decision.  I personally put absolutely no weight on Allen's article. :2c:

:cheers:

Thank you for the insight although this is not the only time in the last week I heard people who were over there cast dispersion on his achievements as overstated. Perhaps its just sour grapes or they have an axe to grind with the MND. I would imagine this will fade in time but still will rear its ugly head from time to time.

 

[Kat Stevens]

I think it's a disgrace. His regiment should be disbanded and scattered to the four winds.  [

 

[Loachman]

"I'd rather eat shit with the Airborne
Than steak with Collenette"
- Sign in Petawawa the last time a "regiment (was) disbanded and scattered to the four winds".

 

[Fishbone Jones]

I don't know Mr Allen, however, I won't disparage him. Nor will I say he doesn't understand higher level tactics, etc. I'll wait until the dust settles and then have a good look at things while I draw my conclusion. Anything less is a disservice to those involved.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Easily destroyed with one pot-bomb
;D

FFS, just can't leave well enough alone, can you Jarnhammer.

I've asked people to be respectful of those that use it medicinally by not being cavalier about it. I guess some must need personal invitations.

 

[Jarnhamar]

FFS, just can't leave well enough alone, can you jarnhammer.

I've asked people to be respectful of those that use it medicinally by not being cavalier about it. I guess some must need personal invitations.

You're right poor humour attempt on my part.

 

[FJAG]

I don't know Mr Allen, however, I won't disparage him. Nor will I say he doesn't understand higher level tactics, etc. I'll wait until the dust settles and then have a good look at things while I draw my conclusion. Anything less is a disservice to those involved.

RG. Just a point here; I never said that "he didn't understand higher level tactics".

What I said was that he:

has a very limited understanding of what happened at the higher levels of command

I drew that conclusion from the fact that Mr Allen, in his article, said:

I would like to ask him a few questions though. Questions that every soldier present that day should hear the answers to.Why was the BG ordered to cross the river that day? Two days early? When EVERY actual intelligence person I know that was in theater that day said not to? Was that on your wise old intelligence analyst advice? You claimed to have been one of the best intelligence officers Gen Fraser had ever met. Because let’s be honest, you wrote it he signed it right? If that is the case, only you know why that decision was made.

The point here is that Mr Allen in posing the question in the way he did himself admitted that he didn't know why the decision was made, however, he then went on to unfairly, and without evidence, make the claim that the fault was Sajjan's. The historic evidence is relatively clear on where the pressure on Fraser to go early came from. Mr Allen either is unaware of that and/or deliberately misstated things in order to disparage Sajjan.

It was because of this that I said that:

I personally put absolutely no weight on Allen's article

The fact is that the only disparagement that went on here was that of Mr Allen in respect to Sajjan.

:cheers:

 

[daftandbarmy]

Chris Vernon - Retired Senior British Army Officer who was Chief of Staff of the Canadian-led HQ in Kandahar - Operation Medusa

https://omny.fm/shows/am640-the-morning-show/chris-vernon-retired-senior-british-army-officer-w#description

 

[Stoker]

Chris Vernon - Retired Senior British Army Officer who was Chief of Staff of the Canadian-led HQ in Kandahar - Operation Medusa

https://omny.fm/shows/am640-the-morning-show/chris-vernon-retired-senior-british-army-officer-w#description

I don't think anyone doubts he wasn't important and a integral part of the team over there however I guess his choice of words still wasn't the greatest and it does appear that he embellished his role over there either by design or just an honest mistake. He apologized and I'm sure he'll never make that mistake again. This no doubt will dog him for the rest of his political career.