Decline of Canada's ASW priorities dates back to Trudeau, 1971

[ltmaverick25]

I was just in the process of researching Cabinet Meeting discussions from the 1970s as part of a paper I will be publishing on Arctic Sovereignty and Security and discovered the true culprit of our lack of ASW capabilities.

On 15 Jul 71 while discussing particulars of the new White Paper on defence, Trudeau "stressed his desire to ensure full understanding within the Service of the governments intention to wind down the ASW role"...

Other ministers disagreed, but, to no avail. 

You can view the document for yourself at the following link to Library and Archives Canada

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e034/e000833649.gif

 

[ModlrMike]

One can see the seeds of this desire in the retirement of the Bonnie in 1970.

 

[time expired]

Just another nail this clown drove into the coffin of an
effective Canadian Armed Forces.
                      Regards

 

[gwp]

I was just in the process of researching Cabinet Meeting discussions from the 1970s as part of a paper I will be publishing on Arctic Sovereignty and Security and discovered the true culprit of our lack of ASW capabilities.

What current lack in our ASW capabilities??

The towed array sonar fitted in the Halifax Class Frigates is amongst the best kit in the world.  There are many USN Submarine Captains who have learned that the hard way. 

Our CP-140 Aurora crews are very good at what they do meeting their primary role to hunt and (kill) submarines.  Witness the most recent drug bust down south involving a semi-submersible.  Our MH Squadrons are no slouches either.

 

[Sailorwest]

Certainly Trudeau did more to destroy Canada's military than any other leader in history, but I am not sure that this document is the basis for any real or perceived loss of ASW capability. I think you could point at the focus over the last almost 20 years on interdiction operations as taking away from ASW capability more so. It seems to me that our naval ASW platforms have been more consistently used for that purpose since the end of the cold war and the initial deployment into the Persian Gulf. These ships were built long after that comment was made and they were clearly designed and capable for the ASW role. Lack of a credible threat and a move to focus on different things would be the bigger detriment for ASW capability

 

[ltmaverick25]

Certainly Trudeau did more to destroy Canada's military than any other leader in history, but I am not sure that this document is the basis for any real or perceived loss of ASW capability. I think you could point at the focus over the last almost 20 years on interdiction operations as taking away from ASW capability more so. It seems to me that our naval ASW platforms have been more consistently used for that purpose since the end of the cold war and the initial deployment into the Persian Gulf. These ships were built long after that comment was made and they were clearly designed and capable for the ASW role. Lack of a credible threat and a move to focus on different things would be the bigger detriment for ASW capability

What you are saying certainly makes sence, but, as was the case with Trudeau insisting ASW no longer be the Navy's prominent role, the adoption of a mindset of more multi purpose oriented Navy has its origins in the same set of documents.

The argument front the standpoint of the Trudeau government was to move away from collective defence priorities, of which ASW was viewed a part of due to NATO requirements, and a move towards national sovereignty roles, ie general purpose ships to assist the civil powers in exercising sovereignty control over Canada's waters.

Trudeau was also critical of ASW as a legitimate military function.  He reasoned that sinking a submarine after it had already launched nuclear missles did little good from a defence perspective, and that, sinking submarines prior to any outbreak of hostilities was not tenable as "they" had just as much right to be in the ocean as anyone else in peacetime.  This argument does make a certain amount of ironic sence, but it ignores the roles played by submarines in sinking surface vessels.

 

[ltmaverick25]

What current lack in our ASW capabilities??

The towed array sonar fitted in the Halifax Class Frigates is amongst the best kit in the world.  There are many USN Submarine Captains who have learned that the hard way. 

Our CP-140 Aurora crews are very good at what they do meeting their primary role to hunt and (kill) submarines.  Witness the most recent drug bust down south involving a semi-submersible.  Our MH Squadrons are no slouches either.

I have no doubts that our personel are of extremely high calibre and excellent training.  However, if you compare the prevalence of our ASW role today, to the role it played in the 50s and 60s, it pales in comparison.  My comments are not a slight against our people, rather, an indication of a proactive policy change in maritime operations that dates back to 1971. 

Edit, I adjusted my original thread title to more accurately reflect what I was trying to get across.  The damn MSM bastages are starting to affect my vocabulary!!!

 

[aesop081]

What current lack in our ASW capabilities??

Oh we have an ASW capability alright. Its on life support and the machine is failing. The ventilator has sprung a leak , several seals need replacement and we could use a modern computer to monitor vital signs because the current one is no longer supported.

 

[exspy]

Mav,

The demise of ASW capability, as was stated, started with the plan to scrap the Bonaventure in 1970.  This decision was announced as a part of the government's 1969 policy to reduce defence spending and numbers, and to change Canada's defence priorities.  On Friday, Sept 19, 1969, the MND made the announcement which included the decision to decommission the recently refitted carrier within the year.  The Bonaventure was less than a year out of a refit that took 18 months and cost $11 million dollars.

Trudeau had only been in power for 15 months when the cuts were announced.  Fortunately for the Navy the four new Tribal class destroyers ordered under the previous government of Lester Pearson had already been laid down (and were being built in Quebec shipyards).  Unfortunately for the Navy, with NATO membership now priority 4 and Canadian sovereignty priority 1, it was felt by the government that an aircraft carrier was no longer needed, thus the decision.  I think that possibly Trudeau thought of ASW as synonymous with NATO, hence the remarks.

FYI, this 1969 decision lead to the White Paper called 'Defence for the 70's' (remember that?).  Among other results to come out of the 1969 announcement was the reduction of the NATO commitment from 12,000 personnel to 5,500 and its consolidation in Lahr, the removal of nuclear weapons from all three services and the storage and sale of most of the brand new CF-5 fleet.

It seems like yesterday.

Cheers,
Dan.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Scrapping Bonaventure didn't do much for or against the ASW capability.

The Trackers were obsolescent, and Bonnie couldn't be upgraded to handle their replacement (S-3 Viking). The helicopters in the air wing could be carried on the AOR and DDH's.

 

[gwp]

Certainly Trudeau did more to destroy Canada's military than any other leader in history, but I am not sure that this document is the basis for any real or perceived loss of ASW capability. I think you could point at the focus over the last almost 20 years on interdiction operations as taking away from ASW capability more so. It seems to me that our naval ASW platforms have been more consistently used for that purpose since the end of the cold war and the initial deployment into the Persian Gulf. These ships were built long after that comment was made and they were clearly designed and capable for the ASW role. Lack of a credible threat and a move to focus on different things would be the bigger detriment for ASW capability

This comment is parallel to and supported by the USN experience

http://www.jhuapl.edu/areas/warfare/papers/art4-sp05.pdf

and

http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/confseries/ASW/ASW_Report.html

or

http://www.navlog.org/asw_feb06.html