Combat Team of tomorrow? Mechanized Infantry Company of tomorrow?

[Humphrey Bogart]

Or, apparently, many 2nd world armies e.g.,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_Army

Parachute Infantry Brigade, with: 3x Parachute Infantry Battalions
1x Parachute Cavalry Troop.

1x special operations Brigade, with: 1x Special Operations
1x Commando
1x Psychological Operations Battalions.

1x Light Infantry (Air Assault) Brigade, with: 3x Light Infantry Airborne Battalions
1x Light Cavalry Troop.

1x Light Infantry Brigade GLO (Peacekeeping Operations/Urban Warfare), with:

Troops during patrols in action law and order.3x Light Infantry GLO Battalions
1x Mechanized Cavalry (Wheeled) Battalion.

1x Frontier Infantry (Wetlands Infantry) Brigade, with: 3x Wetlands Infantry Battalions.

2x Armoured Cavalry Brigades, each with: 2x Armored Cavalry
2x Armoured Infantry Battalions
1x Mechanized Cavalry (Wheeled) Troop.

4x Mechanized Cavalry (Wheeled) Brigades, each with: 3x Mechanized Cavalry Battalions
1x Armoured Cavalry Battalion.

5x Jungle Infantry Brigades, each with: 3 - 4 Jungle Infantry Battalions
1x Mechanized or Jungle Cavalry Troop.

10x Motorized Infantry Brigades, in change to Mechanized Infantry Brigades, each with: 3x Mechanised Infantry Battalions
1x Mechanized Cavalry Troop.

4x Divisional Artillery Brigades, each with: 3 - 5 Field and/or Rocket Artillery Battalions (Agrupements, in Brazilian Army).

2x Construction Engineer Brigades.
1x Air Defence Artillery Brigade, with: 5x Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

1x Army Aviation Command(Brigade), with: 4x Army Aviation Battalions (Anti-tank, reconnaissance, multi-purpoise, transport, utility).

hence why I said near-peer

let us not pretend for a second though that a Brazilian EE-9 Cascavel can stand up to a LAV III though

I would state that slightly differently: an army without medium and long range anti tank weapons, and without any Air Defence capability at all is not optimised to fight a near peer enemy ALONE.  We can of course be an integral part of a coalition.  I would also suggest that there is a wide range of potential foes that fall in between the Taliban and the Chinese.

Agreed, I think our army does what we need it to do and our equipment isn't that bad, in fact some of it is actually quite good.  We have some glaring deficiencies which PPCLI Guy alluded to in a few areas but for what we use it for, it does the trick.

 

[Jarnhamar]

and without any Air Defence capability

Bit of a sidebar.  Can out Air Defence units engage drones and UAVs? Or how about those smaller little spy like UAVs?

 

[a_majoor]

Not entirely sure how our AD guys would be able to deal with that kind of threat.

The ADATS/Skyguard systems that we had were optomised towards a cold war threat of Frontovaya Aviatsiya figher bombers, ground attack aircraft and Army armed and attack helicopters. The search radars were quite good, but the ADATS missiles and 35mm cannon rounds were designed to tear large aircraft out of the sky.

Perhaps what is needed would be a combined gun/missile system using light missiles (Stinger/Starstreak/Mistral) and an automatic cannon or gatling gun. The USMC used to operate the Blazer system with a 25mm gatling gun and 8 X Stinger missiles on a LAV 25 chassis, the turret would fit on a modernized LAVIII hull as well. The gun would be useful against small UAVs, as well as secondary duties like local self defense. The missiles would be to take out larger targets and engagte at longer ranges. Some missiles like Starstreak have a potent KE punch (similar to a 40mm cannon round), which also gives it a secondary ability to deal with hard targets (up to LAV class vehicles)

 

[a_majoor]

Recycling this from the CCV thread, the IDF works out ways to deal with operating in complex terrain by integrating various enablers into an integrated combined arms unit. Since this is built around an armoured unit as the core, we might see this as analogous to a "square" combat team, although in our terms it is probably deficient in Infantry:

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131029/DEFREG04/310290016/Israel-Revamps-Armored-Units-Urban-Brush-Battles

Israel Revamps Armored Units for Urban, Brush Battles
Oct. 29, 2013 - 01:05PM  |  By BARBARA OPALL-ROME  | 

TEL AVIV — Starting next month, select draftees inducted into Israel’s Armored Corps will undergo training for eventual deployment in new multi-discipline companies designed to support future battalions of main battle tanks (MBTs).

The new specialty companies, each composed of reconnaissance, observation and mortar platoons, will form an integral part of future armored battalions, which consist of two active-duty MBT companies and a third MBT company from the Israel Defense Force (IDF) reserves.

The merger of traditional infantry missions into Israel’s future armored order of battle is part of an Army-wide revamp aimed at retiring older-model Merkava MBTs and optimizing Israel’s maneuvering ground forces for urban and heavily forested arenas.

Under the plan, mortar platoons will be equipped with Keshet, an M113-based, autonomous, self-propelled 120mm mortar by Elbit Systems, according to Brig. Gen. Shmuel Olansky, IDF chief armor officer.

“We’re building in every battalion of the Armored Corps a supporting company of infantry equipped with Keshet, which knows how to provide destructive firepower at a high rate,” Olansky said in a report posted Oct. 24 on the IDF’s Hebrew-language website.

New mortar platoons, together with new reconnaissance and observation platoons, will operate “shoulder-to-shoulder” with MBT battalions, Olansky said.

In an interview with Shachar Ruppin of the IDF spokesman’s office, Olansky said budget cuts and changing battle conditions were driving the revamp, which will allow the retirement of older-model MBTs as it brings on new infantry support cadres.

“Retirement of older tanks is a process that is being implemented after lengthy discussions and simulations,” Olansky said. “It allows us, in parallel, to equip ourselves with essential combat support elements.”

Maj. Arieh Berger, operations officer for the Armored Corps’ first brigade slated for the revamp, said infantry support elements will be equipped with advanced command-and-control systems for rapid transfer of targeting data to armored formations. The revamp, he said, will maximize the IDF’s ability to operate in closed and built-up areas.

“There are no more battles where tanks face off against other tanks on an exposed hill,” Berger said in the IDF-posted story. “These new forces will be able to direct tank battalions between homes of villages or into brush, according to our needs.”

A Canadian version could be attempted today with Coyotes to carry both surveillance gear and "dismasted" Coyotes to carry dismounted scout teams. Bison mortar carriers are also a possibility (especially if we were to adopt the Dragonfire 120mm mortar) for the indirect fire role, and of course the dismounted Infantry would be able to go to battle in their LAV III's.

Since we are divesting the Coyote and Bison, and the TLAV isn't really suitable for the roles envisioned, any attempts to move in this direction with current Canadian kit will have to involve a reapportion of LAVs and possibly re rolling the TLAV as a mortar carrier. While not ideal, these platforms would provide the basic ability to carry out the roles the IDF has identified in their new composite units.

 

[KevinB]

The Israeli way is not likely to be a good Canadian way.

Unless we move to Israel and start trying to fight the locals.

 

[a_majoor]

We moved to Afghanistan and fought the locals there (and had to make constant adjustments during the time).

I am intregued by the thought process behind the IDF's redesign of an armoured battalion, especially with regards to giving them the ability to operate in complex terrain and in a complex operating environment. There are lessons for us there, and it might be an interesting experiment to play with the layout of a Canadian combat team to see how "we" could change to operate in complex terrain and in a complex environment.

 

[KevinB]

How far are the Israeli supply lines?

 

[a_majoor]

How far are the Israeli supply lines?

We operated with supply lines stretching over half the globe, and CSS units running the gauntlet from KAF to the FOBs on a daily basis, so I don't see this as an objection to reorganizing a combat team to operate in complex terrain/complex environments. Besides if we experiment with this, we may discover ways to carry out operations with fewer resources. I am advocating the experiment, and pointing out the IDF model is different enough to be an interesting point of departure.

The more likely outcome of experimentation is we will discover we need to use different resources than we do currently.

 

[KevinB]

My point was 50km is a long move for the Israelis -- exploiting with maneuver assets is not their focus, in short I do not see what the Israeli model offers to us.  They are not structured for an expeditionary model, and while they are constantly on a war time footing, they are not limited by a logistical tail and constantly changing missions.

They are quite far behind the Western Military in many areas, and I don't see them a good role model for many reasons.

Frankly Australia, and the USMC are probably our closest contemporaries for goals and roles.

 

[PanaEng]

This, imho, is also as a result of the spanking the IDF got last time in S. Lebanon - it was not the walk in the park that was expected.

 

[Mountie]

I've read in several places that sub-unit echelons were re-formed a while ago.  What exactly does this look like for a LAV mechanized infantry company?  And what does the administration company look like now?  Doctrine and in reality?

With the unit of employment seeming to be the sub-unit these days (ie. Afghanistan specifically I guess) doesn't it make sense to add echelon platoons/troops to the sub-units?  Even if it means taking some positions from the service battalion and pushing them down to the unit and sub-unit level? 

I'm thinking that in a situation like Afghanistan the administration company could be held on the FOB and the company administration platoons might be at the COP?
 

 

[dapaterson]

No, no, a thousand times no.

Robbing the Service Battalion serves nobody's interests.  And since positions were never given to the Svc Bn in the first place to replace the echelon, you shouldn't try to re-create the echelon by stripping the next level of support.

If our bdes are meant to be independent manoeuvre formations they require integral formation level support, just as units require integral unit level support.  Who resupplies the unit echelon if resources are stripped from the Svc Bn?


If we are to re-create the echelons, then may I suggest that the hundreds of staff officer positions within CJOC would be a logical place to start the quest for more positions?

 

[Mountie]

"If we are to re-create the echelons, then may I suggest that the hundreds of staff officer positions within CJOC would be a logical place to start the quest for more positions?"

Perhaps I didn't explain that well.  I didn't mean stripping the service battalions.  I just wondered if reducing them a little was an option?  According to the various unit websites each service battalion has approximately 1,000 personnel, give or take, military and civilian.  By contrast a US Army Armoured Brigade Combat Team's brigade support battalion has a 100-person maintenance company and a 174-person distribution (S & T) company.  Their version of administration companies (FSC's) have 198 personnel.  They've seemed to push a lot of CSS down to the unit level rather than the brigade level.  I was just wondering that since Canada typically deploys battle groups was pushing CSS down to the unit and sub-unit level maybe a better option.   

I was more interested in what the sub-unit echelons look like now that they've supposedly been reinstated, at least on deployment. 

 

[McG]

Your numbers for a Canadian Service Battalion are inflated, and the comparison to a U.S. bde CSS bn fails to recognize the role of the Canadian Svc Bn in providing 2nd line support not just to the CMBG but to most of the higher Div too.

And after B Fleet divestment, there are no trucks to enable building stronger echelons at lower levels.  The limited resources are at the point where they need to be pooled and shared.

 

[Mountie]

Thanks for the info.  That's all I was asking. 

Are the sub-units being formed for high-readiness task forces? 

 

[Old EO Tech]

Your numbers for a Canadian Service Battalion are inflated, and the comparison to a U.S. bde CSS bn fails to recognize the role of the Canadian Svc Bn in providing 2nd line support not just to the CMBG but to most of the higher Div too.

And after B Fleet divestment, there are no trucks to enable building stronger echelons at lower levels.  The limited resources are at the point where they need to be pooled and shared.

I agree, yes the strength of a Svc Bn is around 900 pers, but the strength of an FSG which is the unit typically used to support the Bde in the field is only approx 300-400 pers.  As MCG has stated, Svc Bn has many institutional support functions that should probably belong to the CDSG but because of infrastructure and pers issues stay with the Svc Bn, like Clothing Stores, Base Tpt, Base Supply, Garrison Maintenance etc.

As to the Ech...people are not the issue for sure.  We can barely sustain deployed sub units with the vehicles we have now.  When we deployed to the floods in southern Alberta we did so without leaning on the local support base much at all, we came self sufficient.  Compare that to southern Manitoba after B fleet divestment and it took two field units from Shilo, 17 Wing and a large part of the local reserves to do the same thing....

 

[MilEME09]

I agree, yes the strength of a Svc Bn is around 900 pers, but the strength of an FSG which is the unit typically used to support the Bde in the field is only approx 300-400 pers.  As MCG has stated, Svc Bn has many institutional support functions that should probably belong to the CDSG but because of infrastructure and pers issues stay with the Svc Bn, like Clothing Stores, Base Tpt, Base Supply, Garrison Maintenance etc.

As to the Ech...people are not the issue for sure.  We can barely sustain deployed sub units with the vehicles we have now.  When we deployed to the floods in southern Alberta we did so without leaning on the local support base much at all, we came self sufficient.  Compare that to southern Manitoba after B fleet divestment and it took two field units from Shilo, 17 Wing and a large part of the local reserves to do the same thing....

So then, that begs the question do we need a institutional shake up within the Divisions on the allocation of assets, so that for this example the Service Battalion is serving only as the service battalion, and not any extras like base maint, etc...

As for the floods, I agree personal is not a problem, barely saw any Reg force here in Calgary, and from people who i know in Manitoba it sounded like a hell of a time trying to muster everything

 

[Infanteer]

So then, that begs the question do we need a institutional shake up within the Divisions on the allocation of assets, so that for this example the Service Battalion is serving only as the service battalion, and not any extras like base maint, etc...

Maybe we can call it a GS Battalion....

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Maybe we can call it a GS Battalion....

Möbius strip reorganisation...........

 

[Mountie]

"In the interests of training as we fight, building cohesive teams and addressing the intense sustainment demands of combat operations, the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) has directed that integral echelons should be allocated to every sub unit in the BG, including the artillery battery and composite engineer squadron." - Canadian Army Journal Volume 10.4 2008

"Each battle group from Task Force 1-08 onward deployed with its infantry battalion’s administration company and all its capacity for forward supply and maintenance. Secondly, in 2009, administration companies could draw on supplies, parts and expertise from well-equipped forward support groups deployed in the major forward operating bases nearby to dispersed companies. The system went a long way to restoring agility in infantry companies and shortening response times to requests for vital stores."  - Canadian Army Journal Volume 15.2 2013

I'm just curious what these echelons and administration company looked like when deployed?  ie. How many and what kind of vehicles and how many personnel?