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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

From last month:

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Did Taiwan Rescue a U.S. Spy Plane?

By WENDELL MINNICK
Published: 26 Jul 2011 13:14     
TAIPEI - Two Chinese Su-27 fighters penetrated Taiwan's airspace June 29 and were turned back by Taiwan Air Force fighters. The incident is believed to be the first serious Chinese fighter incursion into Taiwan airspace since 1999.
The U.S. Pacific Command did not respond to inquiries about the incident.

An MND source said it is not Taiwan's duty to protect U.S. surveillance aircraft and the incident is not considered serious.

"There is a line between the two sides, and if any Chinese aircraft flies too close, we will respond," he said. "If they cross the line, we treat it as a hostile act, but occasionally they fly close to the line, and to be honest, this happens all the time and is not a real problem."

The June 29 incident was an "unintentional" and "inadvertent" incursion by Chinese fighter aircraft, he said. "The Chinese military has no intention of antagonizing Taiwan" because relations across the Strait are "calm" and there is "no reason for trouble."

The news comes as Taipei pushes the U.S. to release 66 F-16C/D fighters. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced last week that Washington would make a final decision on the fighters by Oct. 1.

Local media reports said the Su-27s were trying to catch a U-2 spy plane conducting a surveillance mission out of Osan Air Base, South Korea. The reports said the U-2 diverted to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, to avoid the Chinese fighters.

But surveillance aircraft specialist Chris Pocock was skeptical. There are only three U-2s based in East Asia, all at Osan, to watch North Korea, Pocock said.

"They may also fly southwards along the China coast as far as Taiwan, but not on a routine basis," he said.

The aircraft might have been a U.S. Navy EP-3 Aries or U.S. Air Force RC-135, which operate at lower altitudes and have been harassed by Chinese fighters in the past.

In 2000, two Chinese J-8 fighters intercepted a U.S. Air Force RC-135 in international airspace above the East China Sea. A year later, a J-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 Aries near Hainan Island in the South China Sea.


Despite Chinese complaints, the U.S. surveillance aircraft flies regular missions along China's coastline. They stay in international airspace because straying into Chinese territory would make them easy targets for S-300PMU-1/2 and Hongqi-10 surface-to-air missiles.

During the Cold War, Taiwan's Black Bat 34th Squadron flew similar missions with three P-3A Orion signals intelligence aircraft. As well, China shot down five U-2 spy planes operated by Taiwan's Black Cat 35th Squadron over Chinese territory. Both programs were handled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Taiwan will soon take delivery of 12 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft for anti-submarine patrols. The aircraft will replace aging Grumman S-2T Tracker anti-submarine aircraft. Taiwan technically has two squadrons of the S-2T, but sources say that only a handful are still operational.

Taiwan has attempted to procure signals intelligence aircraft in the past from the U.S., but procurement problems and budget delays have hampered the acquisition. Taiwan has one EC-130 for surveillance operations, but it is limited in mission scope.
 
To the naval personnel here, would the 3 carrier requirement fit the need to constantly maintain one carrier on station? Isn't this the normal cycle? -one on station, on en route while doing workup/training while a 3rd is usually in drydock or doing refit? Isn't that the way the USN or other navies have done it?

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Chinese General: Country Needs 3 Carriers

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
Published: 30 Jul 2011 09:10
BEIJING - China needs at least three aircraft carriers to defend its interests, a general said, days after the state media broadcast footage of its first carrier in a rare public mention of the project."If we consider our neighbors - India will have three aircraft carriers by 2014 and Japan will have three carriers by 2014," Gen. Luo Yuan, a senior researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences, was quoted as saying by Beijing News.

"So I think the number [for China] should not be less than three so we can defend our rights and our maritime interests effectively."

His comments, published July 29, came after China sought to downplay the capability of its first aircraft carrier, saying July 27 the vessel would be used for training and "research."

Beijing believes that the three Japanese carriers it referred to, built for helicopter operations, could eventually be converted into full aircraft carriers.


China recently confirmed it was revamping an old Soviet ship to be its first carrier, a project that has added to regional worries over the country's fast military expansion and growing assertiveness on territorial issues.

"We are currently refitting the body of an old aircraft carrier, and will use it for scientific research, experiments and training," defense ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng told a news briefing.

Asked whether the carrier's addition to China's military arsenal would significantly raise the country's military capability, Geng said only that to "overrate or underrate the carrier's role are both incorrect."

The United States has welcomed China's mention of the carrier, calling it a step toward better transparency between the Pacific powers.

China's People's Liberation Army - the largest armed force in the world - is extremely secretive about its defense programs, which benefit from a huge and expanding military budget boosted by the nation's runaway economic growth. The PLA also operates the country's navy.
 
The potential captain of the soon-to-be-comissioned Chinese carrier SHI LANG/ex-Varyag?

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Meet the (potential) captain of PLAN carrier

Warship chief tipped to captain aircraft carrier

Major general serving with PLA's South China Sea fleet is favourite for prestigious post on the Varyag

Teddy Ng
Aug 03, 2011 SCMP.com

SHILANGpotentialCaptain.jpg


With his extensive experience in the disputed South China Sea and his knowledge of warship operations, Major General Li Xiaoyan has shown himself to be a strong candidate for the position of captain of the nation's first aircraft carrier, the Varyag.
Li, 50, who started his military career in the air force, is widely tipped by mainland media to fill the post.
Currently serving with the People's Liberation Army's South China Sea fleet, Li has long voiced his support for the nation's aircraft carrier development programme.
He said in 2002 it was necessary for China to build its own aircraft carrier when he visited the Minsk, a Soviet aircraft carrier that was turned into a military theme park in Shenzhen after being retired from service in 1995.

During the visit, he inspected the cockpit of the Minsk, familiarising himself with the components of the retired aircraft carrier, according to a report in Oriental Outlook, a magazine published under Xinhua.
On Monday, the Shanghai-based Oriental Morning Post, citing unnamed sources, reported that Li was expected to be the captain of the Varyag and would be helped by three vice-captains.
Li and seven other officers were trained at the Guangzhou Naval Academy, starting in 2008, before moving to Dalian in December of last year to work on tasks related to the new aircraft carrier, the newspaper said. Macau-based International Military Association president Antony Wong Dong said: "Li is comparatively more suitable for the top job on the Varyag because he has been the captain of some large military vessels over the past year. He is more familiar with the operation of warships."
Li, born in 1961 in Changchun , Jilin province , entered the preparatory school for the air force in 1979. In 1987, he was among 10 pilots admitted to attend a warship captaincy class in Guangzhou for three-and-a-half years.
Li was appointed in 1991 as a probationary vice-captain of a destroyer called the Nanning, and was later named vice-captain of the Nanchang destroyer.
He was appointed captain of the Jiangmen frigate in 1995 and went on to earn a master's degree at the N.G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy in Russia in 1999.
A year later, he became captain of the destroyer Shenzhen, aboard which he carried out diplomatic naval visits to overseas ports in the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic oceans.
"Li helped promote the image of the PLA during his overseas visits," Wong said. "This adds credibility to his profile."
Li became leader of a team under the South China Sea fleet in 2004.
Some analysts said the South China Sea experience was one of Li's biggest advantages, because the Varyag may be deployed to the disputed waters.

Note the error that has been underlined; the word "cockpit" was used instead of a ship's "bridge."
 
S.M.A. said:
The potential captain of the soon-to-be-comissioned Chinese carrier SHI LANG/ex-Varyag?

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Note the error that has been underlined; the word "cockpit" was used instead of a ship's "bridge."


Is cockpit < 座舱 > similar enough to bridge < 船桥 > to cause that confusion? Or did the author understand some form of "control centre" for each?
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Is cockpit < 座舱 > similar enough to bridge < 船桥 > to cause that confusion? Or did the author understand some form of "control centre" for each?

No, they're not. The character "桥" (qiao, 2nd tone rising) on its own just means the structure that spans over water. So the author just meant control centre.
 
What about the SCO?

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Chen Bingde, chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China, stressed in Moscow on Sunday that China is willing to further promote military cooperation with neighboring Russia.

Chen, who visited Russian military units from Friday to Sunday, said that China's army would like to work with the Russian forces to further advance their military ties, exchange their beneficial experience on building forces, and share with each other the achievements of military reforms.

China wants to step up its cooperation with Russia to mutually promote the army building in both countries, said Chen.

During his stay, Chen has visited several Russian units, including the 5th Guards Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade of Russia's West Command, which was seen as a representative troop in the Russian military reform.

The Chinese officer also visited the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier and the Akula-class K-317 Pantera nuclear attack submarine of 971 project in the northern Russian city of Murmansk.

Earlier, the Chinese Defense Ministry said that Chen's visit is aimed at enhancing understanding, friendship and cooperation between the armies of China and Russia.

Chen made the visit at the invitation of Russian Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Makarov.

Russia is the first leg of Chen's three-nation tour, which will also take him to Ukraine and Israel.
 
She is finally out on sea trials.

China's first aircraft carrier makes maiden sea trial

BEIJING (Reuters) - China's first aircraft carrier held its first sea trial on Wednesday morning, in a step likely to stoke patriotic pride at home and jitters abroad about Beijing's naval ambitions.

The long-awaited debut of the carrier, refitted from a former Soviet craft, marked an initial step toward China's plans to build a carrier force that can project power into the Asian region, where seas are spanned by busy shipping lanes and thorny territorial disputes.

The carrier "left its shipyard in Dalian Port in northeast Liaoning province on Wednesday morning to start its first sea trial," said Xinhua, describing the trip as only a tentative trial run for the unfinished ship.

"Military sources said that the first sea trial was in line with the schedule of the carrier refitting project and would not take a long time," said the report.

The aircraft carrier, which is about 300 metres long, plowed through fog and sounded its horn three times as it left the dock, Xinhua said on its military news microblog.

In an interview published this week, Chinese navy rear admiral Yin Zhuo said his country intended to build an air carrier group, but that task would be long and difficult.

"The aircraft carriers will form a very strong battle group," Yin told the China Economic Weekly. "But the construction and functional demands of an aircraft carrier are extremely complex," he told the magazine.

Training crew and, eventually, pilots for carriers was a big challenge, said Yin.

"An aircraft carrier requires the concerted action of a team of thousands. That's far from easy," he said.

Last month, China's defense ministry China confirmed the government was refitting the old, unfinished Soviet vessel bought from the Ukraine government, and sources told Reuters it was also building two of its own carriers.

Earlier, a Pentagon spokesman downplayed the likelihood of any immediate leaps from China's nascent carrier program.

But the carrier plan is just one part of China's naval modernization program, which has forged ahead while other powers tighten their military budgets to cope with debt The growing Chinese naval reach is triggering regional jitters that have fed into longstanding territorial disputes, and could speed up military expansion across Asia.

In the past year, China has had run-ins at sea with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. The incidents -- boat crashes and charges of territorial incursions -- have been minor, but the diplomatic reaction often heated.

Last week, Japan warned that China's naval forces were likely to increase activities around its waters, prompting Beijing to accuse Tokyo of deliberately exaggerating the Chinese military threat.

China's defense budget has shot up nearly 70 percent over five years, while Japan -- tied by a public debt twice the size of its $5 trillion economy -- has cut military outlays by 3 percent over the same period, a Japanese government report said.

A senior U.S. Navy intelligence officer earlier this year said he believed China wanted to start fielding multiple aircraft carriers over the next decade, with the goal of becoming a global naval power capable of projecting power around the world by mid-century.

The U.S. navy official said it would take years for China's navy to learn how to integrate flight deck operations and attain the sophistication needed to use them effectively.

(Reporting by Chris Buckley; Editing by Daniel Magnowski and Sanjeev Miglani)

China.org link
China.com link (Mandarin)
 
Speaking of aircraft carriers...
The United States said Wednesday it would like China to explain why it needs an aircraft carrier amid broader US concerns about Beijing's lack of transparency over its military aims.

"We would welcome any kind of explanation that China would like to give for needing this kind of equipment," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters when asked whether the carrier would raise regional tensions.

"This is part of our larger concern that China is not as transparent as other countries. It's not as transparent as the United States about its military acquisitions, about its military budget," she said.

"And we'd like to have the kind of open, transparent relationship in military-to-military affairs," Nuland said.

"In our military-to-military relations with many countries around the world, we have the kind of bilateral dialogue where we can get quite specific about the equipment that we have and its intended purposes and its intended movements," she said.

But China and the United States are "not at that level of transparency" to which the two nations aspire, Nuland added ....
Source:  AFP, 10 Aug 11

I wonder what the U.S.'s answer would be if China asked the same thing?
 
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Rumors are spreading quickly that radioactive materials were accidentally leaked from a state-of-the-art Chinese nuclear submarine moored in Dalian Port in Liaoning Province in the northeastern part of China.

The rumor was first reported on Saturday by Boxun.com, a website for overseas Chinese, before it was picked up by Sina Weibo, a Chinese microblogging site similar to Twitter.

Citing People's Liberation Army sources in Dalian, Boxun.com reported that there was an accidental leakage of radiation when engineers from a Chinese electronics company were installing equipment on the submarine.

Boxun reported that the accident happened suddenly, and that Chinese authorities had sealed off the area while an investigation was under way, while taking steps to ensure news of the accident did not spread.

The Chinese media and government have so far refrained from commenting on the rumors, which have stoked fears among netizens.

China possesses around 70 submarines. Six of them are nuclear-powered and five are part of the North Sea Fleet deployed around Bohai Bay. Only two Chinese nuclear submarine ports in the North Sea Fleet have been identified by outsiders. One is in Dalian and the other is in Qingdao.

In 2007, a U.S. spy satellite captured photos of a Chinese Jin-class nuclear submarine moored in Xiaopingdao, an island near Dalian. The submarine at the center of the latest rumor is a Jin-class nuclear sub, which measures 133 m in length and has a displacement of 8,000 tons. It is also equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 8,000 km. Two nuclear submarines have been commissioned so far, but three or four more are being made, according to military sources.


Chinese authorities earlier denied news reports that an oil leak had occurred on an offshore drilling platform in Bohai Bay in June, only admitting the leak one month later after netizens had already learned of the accident.

Boxun.com has often carried articles that are critical of Beijing, citing sources in China, as well as covering some sensitive issues that the Chinese media have been reluctant to handle. But it has also been known to make mistakes, with the latest being an erroneous report that former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin had died.
 
This sounds very much like some of the speculative technology explored by the United States in the early 1980's during the MX missile debates. The problem then was the preceived vulnerability of land based missiles to a decapitating first strike. Other ideas floated at the time included mobile basing on roads and railways, and "dense packs" of superhardened silos, as well as the Strategic Defense Initiative:

http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/08/20/chinas-underground-great-wall/

China’s Underground Great Wall
August 20, 2011By James R. Holmes

Chinese reports that the country has a vast network of tunnels for its nuclear missiles have been oddly overlooked.
Image credit:Flickr / Chinaoffseason
The impending sea trials of China’s first aircraft carrier set commentators abuzz in the West and Asia over the past couple of months. I weighed in myself. And for good reason. The cruise of the yet-to-be-officially-named flattop, which finally took place last week, heralded a decisive break with the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Maoist past as a coastal defence force. This is a development worth exploring in detail. As it happened, the Naval War College also convened its first Asian Strategic Studies Conference in Newport last week, in conjunction with the American Enterprise Institute and the Journal of Strategic Studies. My assigned topic was to determine whether there exists a common Asian culture of sea power (no, say I) and how influential the Western canon of maritime theory is among seafaring Asian nations (very, mainly by default).

To me, though, the most provocative presentation delivered at our conference related not to the sea but to the future of China’s land-based nuclear arsenal. In March 2008, China’s state-run CCTV network broke the news about a 5,000-kilometre-long network of hardened tunnels built to house the Chinese Second Artillery Corps’s increasingly modern force of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Tunnelling evidently commenced in 1995. Located in, or rather under, mountainous districts of Hebei Province, in northern China, the facility is reportedly hundreds of meters deep. That makes it an exceptionally hard target against conventional or nuclear counterstrikes.China Defense Daily, a publication of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), confirmed the CCTV account in December 2009.

What should have been a blockbuster story occasioned barely a peep in the Western press, and elicited little response even in Asia. For lack of a catchier metaphor, call it the dragon that never roared. The most prominent outlet to report on what Chinese pundits dubbed the ‘underground Great Wall’ was Chosun Ilbo, in South Korea. The Washington-based Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief covered the story shortly afterward. That was basically it for original reporting. The story isn’t so much that Beijing has constructed hardened sites to safeguard its missile force. An invulnerable second-strike capability has been the gold standard of nuclear deterrence since the early Cold War. In theory, a military able to ride out an enemy first strike with a substantial portion of its missile force intact can deter such an attack. No sane adversary would launch a first strike if it knew its actions would summon forth a cataclysmic reply.

A more survivable nuclear deterrent, then, should bolster strategic stability between China and the United States. China has long contented itself with a ‘minimalist’ deterrent posture, fielding a small, rudimentary force of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The logic of minimalism—sound in my view—is that so long as even a single missile survives to retaliate against an enemy’s homeland, that adversary will desist from actions China deems unacceptable. Estimates of the total number of Chinese warheads even today, well into Beijing’s nuclear modernization effort, generally range from 150 to 400 devices. Even in this age of renewed US-Russian arms control, this remains a modest force. But minimal deterrence could employ a more robust force than the People’s Liberation Army fielded in past decades. ‘Minimal’ is a squishy term. Furthermore, Chinese officials and pundits have taken to debating adopting a ‘limited deterrent’ strategy. ‘Limited’ too remains hazily defined.

The very scale of the underground network opens up new vistas for Chinese nuclear strategy. The presenter at our conference reported piecing together various bits of data, and concluding that China may have constructed a far larger warhead inventory than most estimates hold. He projected an upper limit of 3,600 doomsday devices and delivery platforms, namely ballistic missiles of various types. The underground Great Wall could presumably accommodate such a force with ease. At a minimum, it presents Beijing new options. Think about it. The ‘New START’ accord inked by US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev last year limits US and Russian nuclear forces to 1,550 deployed warheads apiece. Because of the fudge factor often built into international treaties, notes the Federation of American Scientists, the actual numbers permitted under New START come to over 2,000 warheads for each side.

Even so, if the PLA has covertly departed from minimal deterrence—secreting hundreds of new weapons in the Hebei tunnel complex—then it could upend the strategic balance overnight, achieving parity or near-parity with the United States and Russia in deployed weaponry. I’m not sure how much of this to credit, and the presenter freely admitted that there was a significant guesswork quotient in his figures. But then there was a significant guesswork quotient to the long-running speculation surrounding the Chinese aircraft carrier project, a project of far smaller consequence than a clandestine Chinese nuclear build-up. At a minimum it would be worthwhile to inquire into the veracity of Chinese reporting on the underground Great Wall, and to ponder the implications if reports are accurate. Let the debate begin—at last.

James Holmes is an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College and co-author of Red Star over the Pacific. The views voiced here are his alone.

http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/08/20/chinas-underground-great-wall/
 
The idea of the Sinosphere of cultural and racial ties across the planet is very similar to the idea of the Anglosphere of cultural and linguistic ties....

Lots of maps and charts; follow link:

http://www.newgeography.com/content/002397-inside-the-sinosphere

Inside The Sinosphere

Avis Tang, a cool, well-dressed software company executive, lives on the glossy frontier of China’s global expansion. From his perch amid tower blocks of Tianfu Software Park on the outskirts of the Sichuan capital of Chengdu, the 48-year-old graduate of Taiwan’s National Institute of the Arts directs a team of Chinese software engineers who are developing computer games  for his Beijing company, Perfect World Network Technology, for  the  Asian and world market.

A glossy software office in Chengdu seems a long way from the images of centrally directed, belching factories seeking to dominate the global economy. But a close examination of the emerging Sinosphere–or Chinese sphere of influence–shows an economy that is globally dispersed, multinational and increasingly focused on the high-tech and service sectors.

Yet if Tang came to China to work for Interserv, a Taiwan game developer, he would see that the future of his industry–including its creative side–lies not only in the coastal cities but, increasingly, in those stretching across the vast Chinese interior. “In ten years perhaps all these cities will follow the path of Shanghai,” says Tang, as technology allows businesses that once had to situate themselves in coastal megacities to expand into the interior.

Widely considered one of the most “livable” of China’s big cities, Chengdu seems to Tang something of an incipient Silicon Valley. The area’s software revenues increased more than tenfold over the past decade, while an estimated 200,000 people are expected to be working in the city’s software industry by 2012.

Like many of his fellow managers at the sprawling park, home to over 800 foreign-owned companies, Tang is not a citizen of China.  He’s from Taiwan and never set foot in the People’s Republic before 2001.  His wife remains in Taiwan (Tang flies there every month or two to see her).

Chinese capitalism has relied on diaspora entrepreneurs like Tang. In this sense, the rise of China represents the triumph of a race and a culture. Indeed for most of its history China’s most important export was not silk or porcelain but people. To measure the rise of the Sinosphere, one has to consider not just China itself but what historian Lynn Pan has described as the “sons of the Yellow Emperor.”

The Sinosphere’s roots lie with the Han expansion into southern China during the Tang dynasty (618-907). By the 12th century, the newly Sinofied southern Chinese had started moving south. There they created trade-oriented colonies like Vietnam, Burma, Malaya and the island of Java. In the 1600s Chinese settlers overcame the aboriginal inhabitants of Taiwan, creating another powerful base in the South China Sea.

At its height, during the expeditions of the legendary eunuch Admiral Zheng Hein in the early 15th century, China’s maritime “sphere of influence” extended all the way to the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Although ensuing Chinese regimes pulled back from expansion and all but abandoned their scattered children, the colonies, particularly in Southeast Asia, survived.  They developed business and industries suitable to their new homes, but also maintained their cultural heritage and language. After the Chinese Communist takeover of the mainland in 1949, the diaspora colonies retained their capitalist orientation. Many established trading operations and sent their children to the United States, Canada and Australia, where they enjoyed remarkable success.

Hong Kong, Singapore, Taipei, Rangoon, Bangkok and Jakarta can be seen as the original testing grounds for Chinese capitalism. In the past few decades North American regions such as Silicon Valley, Southern California, Toronto, Vancouver and New York-New Jersey have been added to the mix. Overall the entire overseas Chinese population has risen to nearly 40 million. Taiwan, which is de facto independent, is home to an additional 23 million, and Hong Kong and Macau, officially part of China but governed under different laws, boasts some 7.5 million.

Even today the ties between overseas Chinese and their home country remain close. The original diaspora countries—including Hong Kong–remain principal sources of investment into China. Among the ten largest sources for inbound investment to the PRC are Hong Kong, by far the largest investor, fourth-ranked Singapore and ninth-ranked Taiwan. Each brings more investments into China than such major powers as Germany, France, India and Russia. The United States, home to the largest overseas Chinese population outside Asia, ranks fifth.

Other investments come from places like British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Samoa, which often act as conduits for investors who do not want to be too closely monitored. This seems to include many Chinese investors, particularly in Taiwan, who may not want too much scrutiny of their outlays into the PRC. This includes even Chinese government -owned firms such as China Mobile Communication Corp., which has established an investment HUB in the far away British Virgin Islands.

As China itself has become wealthier, financial flows from the diaspora have continued to increase. Hong Kong’s investment into China grew from $18 billion in 2005 to $45 billion four years later. Singapore’s investment surged from $2.2 billion to $4.1 billion in the same years. This has occurred while new investment from such powerhouses as the United States, Japan, Korea and Germany has stagnated or even dropped.

The second phase of the Sinosphere has been dominated largely by industrial projects, many of them financed or helped technologically by the diaspora. Much of trade, initially, was targeted to the rich consumer markets of North America, Europe and Japan.  Between just 2007 and 2009 China’s share of world exports expanded from 7% to 9%.

But today the Sinosphere’s trade flow is shifting. An analysis of trade growth between 2005 and 2009 shows a significant change in focus away from advanced countries to the developing world. In the second half of the last decade, for example, trade with the United States, Japan, Germany, South Korea and the Netherlands grew by less than 50%. In contrast, commerce with key developing countries–including Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Mauretania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia Turkmenistan, Iraq and Laos–grew ten times. Trade with large emerging economies, notably Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa, increased five times during the same period.

China’s thirst for resources is a big driver of this shift. Now the world’s largest car market and consumer of energy, China is in great need of oil, gas, and other natural resources. It also requires vast amounts of foodstuffs, notably corn and soybeans, for its increasingly urbanized population.

Two of China’s new trade thrusts follow historic patterns of expansion, the first being growing investment in the Mekong Delta and Southeast Asia (Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia). For 2010, Chinese invested $7.15 billion in energy projects alone in Myanmar. On the military side, this also includes moves by China to secure offshore islands for energy development, which is a potential source of conflict with Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan.

The second big expansion is along the old “silk road” connecting eastern China to the energy and mineral rich “ stans” of Central Asia. This shift enhances the importance of inland Chinese cities, such as Xi’an, Chengdu and Chongqing, which are natural entrepots for central Asian trade. Perhaps even more important may prove the role of Kashgar, which was designated last year as the Special Economic Zone. Sitting on the western edge of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Zone near the border of Tajikistan, the Chinese envision Kashgar as the main rail and air link to the stans. Recent disturbances by the local Muslim majority, however, could threaten these ambitious plans.

As China’s economy and wealth has grown, it has moved from being merely a recipient of inbound investment into a major exporter of capital. China’s outbound investment is growing much faster, rising 21% in just the past year; its overseas investment overall has grown from 53.3 billion in 2005 to 224.4 billion in 2009.

Although still the largest destination for foreign investment, the country has vaulted into the top four in terms of outbound outlays just  behind the U.S., Japan and the U.K. It is not inconceivable that China could challenge the U.S. as the world’s top foreign investor.

The country’s investment strategy seems to be following two powerful trends.  One has to do with the acquisition of resources to feed the Chinese industrial machine and its growing consumer market. This explains the rapid growth of investment into the Middle East, South America and Africa. Four of the five fastest-growing investment areas for large scale investments–South Africa, Canada, Nigeria and Australia–are all major commodity exporters. Chinese investment in these countries has been growing from three to five times as quickly as those in the U.S. or Western Europe.

The second, less obvious, trend relates to the idea that these countries, with generally faster growing populations, represent the most lucrative future markets for Chinese exporters.  This may be best seen in the rapid growth of Chinese government grants as well as the provision of interest-free and concessional bank loans, such as those provided by the government’s Exim bank, primarily to Chinese companies seeking to invest in developing nations, especially Africa, over the past decade. PRC financial backing for companies and projects in countries such as Angola, India, Equatorial Africa, Turkey, Egypt, the Congo and Algeria have grown over 100 times since 2005. Other key developing countries such as South Africa, Ethiopia, Somalia and Ghana all saw increases of tenfold or more.

These developments tell us something of the future of the Sinosphere. It will be largely funded by the Chinese and their diaspora, less focused on the West and more on developing countries, including increasingly those outside the traditional stomping grounds of Chinese entrepreneurs.  The emerging Sinosphere is also likely to be somewhat less focused on manufacturing and more on services like real estate, finance and high-technology exports. This is partially due to the appeal, for manufacturers, of less expensive, more youthful countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam and Myanmar.  Wages for manufacturing workers in the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia are now less than half of those in China.

These shifts are already evident by looking at recent trends in inbound investment to China, much of it from the diaspora and tax havens. Between 2005 and 2009, for example, industrial investment fell from 70% to barely 50% in 2009. The total investment in industry has remained stagnant while dollars into scientific research have grown almost five-fold. We can expect more of this as China prepares to challenge America, Japan and other advanced countries in basic research. At the same time investment into real estate has tripled, while both software and financial flows have more than doubled.

All this explains the importance Chinese officials place on expatriates like the Taiwan-born Tang. In the 1980s and 1990s Taiwanese and Hong Kong firms spearheaded the development of China’s manufacturing prowess. Now the mainland leadership hopes that high-tech executives such as Tang will nurture and direct China’s leap into the first ranks of the global digital economy, with Perfect World’s Chengdu engineers epitomizing the future imagined by China’s aggressive regional officials. The fact that the company’s games are based largely on Chinese mythology makes the effort an even more natural fit. But Perfect World is not just looking at the Chinese or diaspora markets; it is also marketing aggressively to young gamesters in Europe and North America.

All this can be seen as a direct challenge to the long dominant software and entertainment industries of the West, heretofore largely unchallenged by China. In a world increasingly  ’SINOFIED’  there may be huge potential for Sinosphere companies to move beyond exporting tangible goods, and increase their trade in ideas and culture to the rest of the world.

“We are well on our way,” Tang explains from his perch in Chengdu. “China’s move into this kind of business is just beginning.”

This research was conducted with support from the Legatum Foundation.

This piece originally appeared at Forbes.com.

Joel Kotkin is executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and an adjunct fellow of the Legatum Institute in London. He is author of The ity: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010.

Sim Hee Juat is currently a research associate with the Centre for Governance and Leadership at the Civil Service College of Singapore. The maps were created by Ali Modarres, Chairman of the Geography Department at California State University, Los Angeles.

Photo by avlxyz.
 
This, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, will provide fuel for the fire:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/tech-news/chinese-state-tv-shows-military-cyber-hacking-clip/article2141196/
Chinese state TV shows military cyber hacking clip

MELANIE LEE
Shanghai— Reuters

Published Thursday, Aug. 25, 2011

china-cyber_jpg_1312000cl-8.jpg

Source: Globe and Mail

A six-second clip on Chinese state television has provided a rare glimpse into purported cyber hacking attacks launched by the country’s military, despite long-standing official denials that the government engages in such activity.

In an episode titled “The Internet Storm is Here”, CCTV-7, China’s official military channel, had experts discussing the different methods of cyberattacks and U.S. cyber operations. About halfway through the 20-minute episode, a user is seen operating a cursor on a screen that displays two options, a “www denial-of-service attack” and “distributed denial-of-service attack”. A denial-of-service attack is a basic hacking attack that brings down a website by spamming it with data.

Youtube video clip here

The screen then changes, showing a box with the words “select attack target” and “input target IP address”. A scrolling marquee at the top of the box reads “China’s People’s Liberation Army Electronic Engineering Academy”.

The user then selects Minghui.org, a website of the banned spiritual sect Falun Gong, from a dropdown menu containing a list of other Falun Gong sites and clicks the “attack” button.

It is unclear if the program on the screen shown is a mock-up, or when the clip was filmed. But China has consistently – sometimes angrily – denied having anything to do with hacking attacks.

The existence of the piece, which appears to have been shown in July, was reported on Wednesday by China SignPost website which noted it was “visual evidence” to undermine China’s official denials of involvement in hacking.

As of midday on Thursday, the page with the clip on Chinese state television’s website was no longer accessible. However, the clip was reposted on other video sharing websites, including YouTube. The United States says that many hacking attacks appear to come from China, often targeting human rights groups as well as U.S. companies.

In its annual report to the U.S. Congress on China’s military on Wednesday, the Pentagon warned that hacking attacks from China could one day be used for overt military means, rather than just trying to access data.

“The accesses and skills required for those intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks,” the report said. “Developing capabilities for cyberwarfare is consistent with authoritative PLA military writings.”

Google , the world’s largest search engine, partially pulled out of China last year after concerns of censorship and a serious hacking episode.

Google, who said the attacks originated from China, was one of the dozens of high profile companies targeted in an ultra-sophisticated cyberattack named “Operation Aurora” that took place in the second half of 2009. Yahoo, Adobe and Dow Chemical were also reportedly among the targets.

In June this year, Google said its Gmail product had suffered a cyberattack originating from China that was aimed at stealing passwords and information from high level U.S. government officials and Chinese activists.

China also says it is a victim of hacking.

The cyberattacks add to the long list of tensions between the United States and China that span trade issues, human rights, the value of the yuan and Taiwan.


Just in case anyone ever doubted that China will always try a variant of the indirect approach before it does anything overt.
 
For all you Sino-philes out there, "ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:  Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011" (~3MB PDF) - the executive summary....
China’s rise as a major international actor is likely to stand out as a defining feature of the strategic landscape of the early 21st century. Sustained economic development has raised the standard of living for China’s citizens and elevated China’s international profile. This development, coupled with an expanding science and technology base, has also facilitated a comprehensive and ongoing military modernization program. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that reinforces international rules and norms and enhances security and peace both regionally and globally.

China is steadily assuming new roles and responsibilities in the international community. In 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao articulated new guidance for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including missions extending beyond China’s immediate territorial interests. This catalyzed China’s growing involvement in international peacekeeping efforts, counter-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the evacuation of Chinese citizens from overseas trouble spots. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper asserts that China’s ―future and destiny have never been more closely connected with those of the international community.‖ Nonetheless, China’s modernized military could be put to use in ways that increase China’s ability to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes in its favor.

Although the PLA is contending with a growing array of missions, Taiwan remains its ―main strategic direction.‖ China continued modernizing its military in 2010, with a focus on Taiwan contingencies, even as cross-Strait relations improved. The PLA seeks the capability to deter Taiwan independence and influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. In pursuit of this objective, Beijing is developing capabilities intended to deter, delay, or deny possible U.S. support for the island in the event of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces and capabilities continues to shift in the mainland’s favor.

Over the past decade, China’s military has benefitted from robust investment in modern hardware and technology. Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will become operational in the next few years. Following this period of ambitious acquisition, the decade from 2011 through 2020 will prove critical to the PLA as it attempts to integrate many new and complex platforms, and to adopt modern operational concepts, including joint operations and network-centric warfare.
China has made modest, but incremental, improvements in the transparency of its military and security affairs. However, there remains uncertainty about how China will use its growing capabilities.

The United States recognizes and welcomes PRC contributions that support a safe and secure global environment. China’s steady integration into the global economy creates new incentives for partnership and cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain. Although China’s expanding military capabilities can facilitate cooperation in pursuit of shared objectives, they can also increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Strengthening our military-to-military relationship is a critical part of our strategy to shape China’s choices as we seek to capitalize on opportunities for cooperation while mitigating risks. To support this strategy, the United States must continue monitoring PRC force development and strategy. In concert with our friends and Allies, the United States will also continue adapting our forces, posture, and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure East Asian environment.
.... and some more details from the Pentagon Info-Machine here.
 
Relevant to China as well:

Economist link

The decline of Asian marriage
Asia's lonely hearts
Women are rejecting marriage in Asia. The social implications are serious


Aug 20th 2011 | from the print edition

TWENTY years ago a debate erupted about whether there were specific “Asian values”. Most attention focused on dubious claims by autocrats that democracy was not among them. But a more intriguing, if less noticed, argument was that traditional family values were stronger in Asia than in America and Europe, and that this partly accounted for Asia’s economic success. In the words of Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore and a keen advocate of Asian values, the Chinese family encouraged “scholarship and hard work and thrift and deferment of present enjoyment for future gain”.

On the face of it his claim appears persuasive still. In most of Asia, marriage is widespread and illegitimacy almost unknown. In contrast, half of marriages in some Western countries end in divorce, and half of all children are born outside wedlock. The recent riots across Britain, whose origins many believe lie in an absence of either parental guidance or filial respect, seem to underline a profound difference between East and West.

Yet marriage is changing fast in East, South-East and South Asia, even though each region has different traditions. The changes are different from those that took place in the West in the second half of the 20th century. Divorce, though rising in some countries, remains comparatively rare. What’s happening in Asia is a flight from marriage (see article).

Marriage rates are falling partly because people are postponing getting hitched. Marriage ages have risen all over the world, but the increase is particularly marked in Asia. People there now marry even later than they do in the West. The mean age of marriage in the richest places—Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong—has risen sharply in the past few decades, to reach 29-30 for women and 31-33 for men.

A lot of Asians are not marrying later. They are not marrying at all. Almost a third of Japanese women in their early 30s are unmarried; probably half of those will always be. Over one-fifth of Taiwanese women in their late 30s are single; most will never marry. In some places, rates of non-marriage are especially striking: in Bangkok, 20% of 40-44-year old women are not married; in Tokyo, 21%; among university graduates of that age in Singapore, 27%. So far, the trend has not affected Asia’s two giants, China and India. But it is likely to, as the economic factors that have driven it elsewhere in Asia sweep through those two countries as well; and its consequences will be exacerbated by the sex-selective abortion practised for a generation there. By 2050, there will be 60m more men of marriageable age than women in China and India.

The joy of staying single

Women are retreating from marriage as they go into the workplace. That’s partly because, for a woman, being both employed and married is tough in Asia. Women there are the primary caregivers for husbands, children and, often, for ageing parents; and even when in full-time employment, they are expected to continue to play this role. This is true elsewhere in the world, but the burden that Asian women carry is particularly heavy. Japanese women, who typically work 40 hours a week in the office, then do, on average, another 30 hours of housework. Their husbands, on average, do three hours. And Asian women who give up work to look after children find it hard to return when the offspring are grown. Not surprisingly, Asian women have an unusually pessimistic view of marriage. According to a survey carried out this year, many fewer Japanese women felt positive about their marriage than did Japanese men, or American women or men.

At the same time as employment makes marriage tougher for women, it offers them an alternative. More women are financially independent, so more of them can pursue a single life that may appeal more than the drudgery of a traditional marriage. More education has also contributed to the decline of marriage, because Asian women with the most education have always been the most reluctant to wed—and there are now many more highly educated women.

No marriage, no babies

The flight from marriage in Asia is thus the result of the greater freedom that women enjoy these days, which is to be celebrated. But it is also creating social problems. Compared with the West, Asian countries have invested less in pensions and other forms of social protection, on the assumption that the family will look after ageing or ill relatives. That can no longer be taken for granted. The decline of marriage is also contributing to the collapse in the birth rate. Fertility in East Asia has fallen from 5.3 children per woman in the late 1960s to 1.6 now. In countries with the lowest marriage rates, the fertility rate is nearer 1.0. That is beginning to cause huge demographic problems, as populations age with startling speed. And there are other, less obvious issues. Marriage socialises men: it is associated with lower levels of testosterone and less criminal behaviour. Less marriage might mean more crime.


Can marriage be revived in Asia? Maybe, if expectations of those roles of both sexes change; but shifting traditional attitudes is hard. Governments cannot legislate away popular prejudices. They can, though, encourage change. Relaxing divorce laws might, paradoxically, boost marriage. Women who now steer clear of wedlock might be more willing to tie the knot if they know it can be untied—not just because they can get out of the marriage if it doesn’t work, but also because their freedom to leave might keep their husbands on their toes. Family law should give divorced women a more generous share of the couple’s assets. Governments should also legislate to get employers to offer both maternal and paternal leave, and provide or subsidise child care. If taking on such expenses helped promote family life, it might reduce the burden on the state of looking after the old.

Asian governments have long taken the view that the superiority of their family life was one of their big advantages over the West. That confidence is no longer warranted. They need to wake up to the huge social changes happening in their countries and think about how to cope with the consequences.
 
From this past July:

Defense News link


HANOI, Vietnam - A Chinese warship confronted an Indian naval vessel in waters off Vietnam and demanded its identity, the Financial Times said on Sept. 1, amid regional concern over Beijing's maritime assertiveness.

The London-based newspaper reported that five people familiar with the incident said it occurred in international waters shortly after India's amphibious assault ship INS Airavat completed a scheduled port call in Vietnam.

Delhi confirmed contact was made with its ship but rejected the suggestion of a "confrontation."

On July 22 after sailing 45 nautical miles off Nha Trang, the INS Airavat was called on an open radio channel by someone identifying himself as the "Chinese Navy," the Indian government said in a statement.

"You are entering Chinese waters," the radio caller said, according to the statement. It added that no ship or aircraft was visible from the Indian vessel, which proceeded as scheduled.

"India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all," Delhi said.


A series of Chinese actions in the South China Sea have caused nervousness among regional neighbors - particularly Vietnam and the Philippines.

China says it has sovereignty over essentially all of the South China Sea, a key global trading route, where its professed ownership of the potentially oil-rich Spratly archipelago overlaps with claims by Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia.

Vietnam and China have a separate long-standing dispute over the more northerly Paracels archipelago.

The INS Airavat visited Nha Trang in south-central Vietnam and the northern port of Haiphong in the second half of July.

(...)
 
A bit of a grab bag. Notice the Chinese were running arms to Quaddafi's forces, and the discussions about China's "cyber militias":

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/china/articles/20110903.aspx

If The Government Doesn't Like It, It Must Be Good

September 3, 2011: The U.S. recently released its annual report on Chinese military power, and the main point was that growing Chinese military capabilities were being used to coerce or covertly attack other countries. Chinese neighbors agreed with this, as did more distant targets (of Chinese Cyber War attacks). China promptly denounced the American analysis as “baseless.” But the reality is otherwise. The growing Chinese navy is increasingly showing up to enforce Chinese claims over disputed islands, and large areas of (according to the rest of the world) international waters. China’s neighbors are increasing their naval capabilities (more ships, aircraft and weapons) and getting cozy with the United States (which has the largest fleet on the planet.)

During the recent fighting in Libya, the rebels complained of encountering government troops armed with new Chinese weapons. Accusations were made that China was selling weapons to the Kaddafi dictatorship despite a UN embargo. A little investigating found that this was indeed the case, and that Chinese arms merchants had approached the Libyan government earlier in the year, offering to sneak the weapons in via Algeria and South Africa. The last shipments appear to have arrived in July. Back then, there were reports of smugglers moving truckloads of weapons across the Algerian border into Libya.

In response to Chinese spy ships operating in the area, India is increasing its military forces in its Andaman (off the Burmese coast), Nicobar (near Indonesia) and Lakshadweep (off the southwest Indian coast) Islands. This means increasing maritime and electronic surveillance capabilities on the islands, as Chinese naval forces are expected to be a more frequent sight around these islands. Indian politicians are complaining about the expense of all these security measures (including creating and deploying new units on the Chinese border). But popular fear of growing Chinese military power forces the politicians to come up with the money.

The Chinese government has apparently leaned on some of the most prominent hacker groups to advise their members and followers to avoid hacking Chinese targets, and to be more discreet (don’t get caught) when attacking foreign targets. Those who are not skilled enough to avoid getting caught, are advised to not attack foreign corporations and governments at all. China has long maintained remarkable control over its own hackers, organizing many of them into a semi-official cyber-militia and permitting, and even encouraging, a lot of illegal hacking against foreign targets. The hacker organizations also served as a recruiting pool for government and military Cyber War organizations. But despite all the precautions, a lot of the subsequent Cyber War and espionage operations were traced back to China. This has caused a growing crescendo of accusations and threats from foreign nations. While China denies everything, it has now told its hackers to cool it, or else. That means something in China, where “enemies of the state” are still sent to labor camps or executed. Unfortunately, given the size and nature of the hacker underground (even in China), the cease and desist orders could not be given in secret.

It’s also recently been revealed (via wikileaks) that Apple Corporation set up a major anti-counterfeiting effort operation three years ago. One of the main targets was China, where corrupt officials tolerate massive counterfeiting, despite government promises to stamp out the practice. The Apple investigation resulted in considerable detail about counterfeiting operations in China, and the extent of official and unofficial government involvement. The U.S. government used these details to put more pressure on China to shut down the rampant counterfeiting and government approved hacking.

While the Chinese government is making a big deal about investing in North Korea, via new “free trade zones,” Chinese government controlled business publications are putting out articles detailing why such efforts have little chance of success. North Korea is still considered, even by the Chinese, as too unstable an area for any major investments. This is known from the experience of Chinese traders and businessmen who have been operating (at great risk) in North Korea for decades.

Several years of growing inflation in China is causing more unrest. Government efforts to curb the rising prices, like by restricting credit to companies, is being undermined by corruption, which makes it possible for companies to get loans from overseas lenders. This demonstrates that the widespread corruption not only creates popular unrest, but limits the ability of the government to govern.

August 29, 2011:  A court sentenced a senior Buddhist monk to 11 years in jail for his role in allowing another monk to kill himself last March. The dead monk burned himself to death as a protest against Chinese persecutions of Tibetan Buddhists. Last month, another monk burned himself to death in protest.

August 26, 2011: Chinese web portal Sina.com, following government orders, announced that it had suspended several microblogs (the local equivalent of Twitter, which is banned in China) that had spread “misinformation.” What microblogs more frequently do is spread news the government wants to control (which is why Twitter cannot operate in China.) The Sina.com move generated a lot of protest by many other microbloggers. The government seeks to control Internet use to avoid stirring up unrest. But these censorship efforts often do just that.  The government is also increasing its use of blacklists of popular culture items, like foreign (especially American) songs that cannot be available on the Chinese Internet. Recent hits by Lady Gaga and Beyonce are typical of the forbidden sounds. The stuff gets through anyway, aided by increased demand because of blacklist status. If the government doesn’t like it, it must be good.

August 25, 2011: State run TV removed a video from its web site that showed (apparently by accident) a Cyber War tool (that can launch a DDOS attack on another site and shut it down temporarily.) The government denied that the Cyber War program was government property, but refused to comment further. The video first appeared on TV in July.

August 24, 2011:  The U.S. Department of Defense released its annual review of Chinese military power. Over the next week, China denounced the implications (that all this new Chinese military capabilities might be a problem.)

August 18, 2011: For the first time, Chinese PC shipments (18.5 million for this past April-June) exceeded those of the U.S. (17.7 million) for a three month period.
 
S.M.A. said:
Relevant to China as well:

Economist link

You will note in Vancouver and elsewhere a trend of Asian women marrying Western men, but not the other way around. I think you will see more of an influx of this. 10  years ago, older East indians spat at my wife and me for being together, now I see many Western males with East indian mates. The number of mixed marriages is increasing quickly. Quite interesting i find.
 
Colin P said:
You will note in Vancouver and elsewhere a trend of Asian women marrying Western men, but not the other way around. I think you will see more of an influx of this. 10  years ago, older East indians spat at my wife and me for being together, now I see many Western males with East indian mates. The number of mixed marriages is increasing quickly. Quite interesting i find.


Anecdotal evidence only, but while I too see many Caucasian male/Asian female pairs, I, personally, know a few - a very few I hasten to add - that go the other way: Asian male/Caucasian female. In one case the Chinese man is considerably older (by 20ish years) and it is a second marriage for him, in another both are in their 50s or 60s and it is a second marriage for both. In each and every case the Asian male is prosperous. I have hear little comment amongst Caucasian mutual acquaintances. Similarly, amongst Asian friends and acquaintances there is little to no objection to Asian/Caucasian marriages but the resistance grows to marriages between Asians and other races and, especially between Chinese and non Chinese/non Caucasians.

Xenophobia and even racism are omnipresent in the Chinese culture.

But, the "excess males" bubble that is now passing through the Chinese population, because the first wave of the "one child" policy is now in adulthood (the policy came into full effect circa 1980), coupled with the growing tendency of Chinese women to eschew marriage is causing Chines men to look to e.g. Vietnam and even as far afield as Philippines to find wives. Another tendency is the influx of Han Chinese men into Xinjiang province to find Uyghur wives ~ many (most?) of whom appear to abandon their religion (Islam) and, thereby, contribute to the rapid Sinification of Xinjiang. (I heard a middle rank Chinese official rather crudely refer to China's policy towards Xinjiang as, roughly, "We will f__k them out of existence.")
 
E.R. Campbell said:
"We will f__k them out of existence."

It takes a long time, but no longer than many other plans for societal integration/normalization.

And it works. You could fill a library with successful examples.
 
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