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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

And it seems even the Chinese government has gotten tired of NINE-DAY traffic jams like one from last year.


link

Want a new car in Beijing? Sorry, there's just too much traffic.

China banned all car sales in Beijing from Dec. 24 until its new lottery system comes up with the names of the 20,000 applicants who will have the right to buy license plates this month.

By By Peter Ford | The Christian Science Monitor – Wed, 5 Jan 9:41 AM EST.Beijing to Eliminate Gridlock by Cutting …
INHABITAT - Thu, 30 Dec 2:54 PM EST
....Li Wen’s Citroen car showroom was silent and deserted Wednesday, save for clumps of bored salesmen in red and blue anoraks with nothing to do.

Two weeks earlier, Mr. Li recalls, “it was packed. We were open till 3 in the morning, there were 200 people in here, and all customers could do was say whether they wanted a car or not. It took 10 minutes to sell a car that night. There was no bargaining.”

Since then, Li has not sold a single vehicle at any of the four dealerships he runs. Like every other automobile dealer in Beijing, he knows he won’t see another client for another three weeks, thanks to drastic new government rules designed to get a grip on the city’s increasingly appalling traffic.


In 2009, China overtook the US to become the world's largest consumer of cars and it's still growing rapidly. The number of cars on Beijing’s roads has nearly doubled in the past five years, making driving in the city center at almost any hour a nightmare.


The government banned all car sales in the capital from Dec. 24 until its new lottery system comes up with the names of the 20,000 lucky applicants who will have the right to buy license plates this month.

One hundred thousand wannabe car owners have so far put their names in the drawing, to be announced on Jan. 26.

The lottery system will authorize the purchase of 240,000 cars this year. Another 160,000 are expected to be bought by customers who have their existing cars destroyed, or who sell their vehicles to used car dealers – they will be allowed to keep their plates and will be exempt from the lottery.

“All in all we expect car sales in Beijing to drop this year by 50 percent from 2010,” when sales totaled about 850,000, says Li.

Announcing the new rules last month, the deputy head of Beijing’s municipal government, Zhou Zhengyu, acknowledged that “traffic management has not been able to keep pace” with the rising number of private cars on the roads, and that “rush hour traffic jams have become a major problem in certain areas.”

Even some would-be car buyers with only a slim chance of winning the lottery say they agree with the restrictions.

“The government should have done this 10 years ago,” says Wang Xinyan, a sales clerk, as her husband filled out the form to enter this month’s lottery at a government office. “It’s a bit late now, and it’s hard to say what the impact will be.”

Li, who accepts that his dealerships have contributed to there being “way too many cars in Beijing”, hopes that the new license plate limitations “will give the government two or three years to improve public transport.” The discomfort of traveling on Beijing’s slow and overcrowded buses, and its still skeletal metro network, has encouraged many to drive their cars to work despite the congestion they contribute to and suffer from.

The new regulations also increase parking fees in Beijing, and ban cars with out-of-city plates from driving in the city at rush hours. That rule is not aimed at visiting drivers, who are scarcely a problem; it is designed to stop Beijingers trying to get around the restrictions by buying their cars and plates in neighboring provinces, where there are no limits on vehicle sales.
...
 
China Has Plans For Five Carriers

ChineseCarrierVaryag-FYJS_Internet_Photo.jpg
     

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is assembling the production and basing capacity to make its aircraft carrier program one of Asia’s largest military endeavors.

A plausible near-term projection for China’s aircraft carrier ambitions was revealed in two 2009 articles in Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper, which featured rare access to Chinese military and shipbuilding sources. The sources noted that China would first build two non-nuclear medium-sized carriers similar to the 50,000-ton ex-Soviet/Ukrainian Project 1143.5 carrier Varyag being rebuilt in Dalian Harbor. These carriers would start initial construction in 2009. Beginning in 2020 or soon after, two 60,000-plus-ton nuclear-powered carriers would follow, based on plans for the Soviet-designed but never built Project 1143.7 Ulyanovsk class.

This would mean a likely fleet of five carriers by the 2020s, including Varyag, which entered a phase of accelerated reconstruction in 2009. Work surrounding this carrier is also serving to create the development and production infrastructure for future carriers. Since mid-2005, Varyag’s reconstruction has been documented by images from Chinese military fans on dozens of web pages.


In April 2009, Varyag was moved from its Dalian berth to a nearby drydock. Surrounding the drydock are large ship-component construction hangars, from which the next carriers may emerge. By April 2010, the ship was berthed outside the drydock. Since the move the hull has undergone degaussing, likely in preparation for the now-visible outfitting of a new naval electronics suite. This suite will include four arrays for Chinese-developed naval phased-array radar and new rotating-array radar. Emplacements for the electronic warfare suite are visible.

A “Sinicized” model of a Varyag-like carrier, built in 2003 by students at Harbin Technology Institute, which does carrier development work, indicated it would carry a heavy fixed armament of YJ-63 long-range antiship cruise missiles, vertically launched medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and Type 730 30-mm. close-in weapon systems (CIWS). Last November, however, Internet imagery indicated it might carry a lighter weapons suite. It will be the lead platform for the short-range FL-3000N SAM, similar to Raytheon’s SeaRAM, though it carries 24 missiles. The imagery shows that Varyag will carry four FL-3000N launchers and at least two Type-730 30-mm. CIWS.

Varyag’s air wing is becoming visible. Chinese Internet sources reported that the first flight of the Shenyang Aircraft Corp.’s copy of the Sukhoi Su-33 was in August 2009, and by early 2010 Internet imagery and a video confirmed Shenyang had copied the Su-33. Since 2005 Russian sourceshave insisted to this writer that China could not copy the Su-33, as it was a radical modification of the Su-27SK design. By 2009, these sources anticipated China would purchase an upgraded Su-33 as it developed its own version with a Chinese-designed WS-10A turbofan. In 2010, an Asian source said the PLA might not be pleased with its Su-33 copy, and would consider buying the Sukhoi-built version. Since 2005, negotiations have been held up over Russia’s insistence that China buy a profitable number, around 40.

It is now expected that Shenyang will perfect its Su-33 copy, which will feature the latest Chinese-designed active phased-array radar, and new 5th-generation air-to-air missiles and long-range antiship missiles, such as an air-launched version of the YJ-63, with a range of 600-plus km. (373 mi.). Varyag may start its service with a multirole fighter more capable in some respects than the Boeing F/A-18E/F.

In 2010, Internet images appeared of a new airborne early-warning and control radar array of the size needed for a carrier aircraft. This followed a 2005 partial image of a turboprop-powered AEW&C. In October 2009, Internet images emerged of possibly retractable AEW&C radar on a Chinese Z-8 helicopter, which may form part of the initial air wing.

The PLA is also building escort ships for its carrier fleet. In the autumn of 2009 it appeared that two Chinese shipyards were building two new destroyer classes, but their configurations and equipment are not apparent. The PLA is expected to build up to 18 modern Type-065A air-defense frigates. Two new Type-093 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have been built, and a more capable Type-095 SSN is expected.

When it enters service around 2015, the Varyag and its sisters, plus escorts, may be located at a recently constructed naval base near Sanya on Hainan Island.
 
A break from previous Chinese nuclear weapons policy?

Defense News link

TOKYO - The Chinese military would consider a pre-emptive nuclear strike if it had no other way to defend itself in a war against another nuclear-armed state, Kyodo News said Jan. 5, citing Chinese documents.

The policy, called "Lowering the threshold of nuclear threats" may indicate a shift from China's pledge not to first fire nuclear weapons under any circumstances, the report said.


It may also fan concern in the United States, Japan and other regional powers, according to the Japanese news agency which obtained the internal documents.

The Chinese military's strategic missile forces, the Second Artillery Corps, would "adjust" its policy if another nuclear state conducts air strikes against Chinese targets "with absolutely superior conventional weapons," the document says, according to Kyodo.

China would first warn an adversary about a nuclear strike, but if the enemy attacks China with conventional forces, the Chinese military "must carefully consider" a pre-emptive nuclear strike, Kyodo said.

The documents suggest that the Second Artillery Corps educate its personnel in worst-case scenarios, Kyodo said, adding that it is rare for information on China's nuclear policy to come to light.

U.S. military experts have argued since around 2007 that Beijing may have shown signs of altering its pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons, Kyodo said.

But in a sign of warming ties as the region contends with the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is scheduled to arrive in China on Jan. 9, the Pentagon announced in December.

The Pentagon said Gates will travel to China on the invitation of his Chinese counterpart, one year after Beijing broke off military relations with Washington in protest against a multibillion-dollar U.S. arms package for rival Taiwan.
 
This Reuters report, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, is not too surprising:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/france-probes-china-link-in-renault-spy-scandal/article1861034/
France probes China link in Renault spy scandal

HELEN MASSY-BERESFORD
PARIS— Reuters

Published Friday, Jan. 07, 2011

French intelligence services are looking into China’s possible role in an industrial espionage scandal at car maker Renault that a senior minister has said involved “economic warfare,“ a government source told Reuters.

Three Renault executives, including one member of its management committee, were suspended on Monday in the case, which has prompted the French government to warn of an “overall risk” to French industry.

The executives are suspected of leaking information related to the high-profile electric vehicle program, a key plank of the carmaker’s strategy in which, together with its Japanese partner Nissan, it is investing billions of euros.

The government source said French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s office had ordered the investigation. Renault, which declined to comment, is 15-per-cent owned by the French state.

“The Elysee has charged the DCRI (intelligence services) with an investigation. It is following a Chinese lead,” the source said.

Relations between France and China hit a low roughly two years ago when Mr. Sarkozy criticized Beijing’s policy on Tibet, prompting Chinese citizens to call for boycotts of French products.

But a recent visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to Paris helped forge closer ties, as France seeks to secure Chinese support for its ambitious G20 agenda to explore reforms of the global monetary system.

Bernard Carayon, a legislator for the ruling UMP party, told Reuters that France needed tougher laws against industrial espionage to defend itself in a “war” against fast-growing emerging economies hungry for new technology,

“This is a war which does not stop worsening and which has intensified even more with the emergence of industrial powers like China,” said Mr. Carayon, who is drafting a law on the protection of economic information.

He said the industries most at risk from spying in France were those with long development times like cars, pharmaceuticals and defence.

“There is a big temptation to cheat to win the race when you are behind,” he said. “That seems to be what has happened.”

This is not the first time France’s car industry has been hit by information leaks.

In 2007, a Chinese student doing a work placement at car parts maker Valeo was given a prison sentence for obtaining confidential documents from the auto maker.

A French tribunal stopped short of an industrial espionage verdict, instead finding she had “abused trust“.

China has been known since the 1980s for commercial espionage, particularly in industries where it believes it is lagging behind the West.

But one former senior British defence official, who requested anonymity, noted that France also had a reputation for pursuing industrial secrets and needed to tread carefully.

“It’s actually quite rich for France to be accusing any other country of commercial espionage given the French state’s own long and less than edifying efforts in this regard,” the official said.

“Of the major European powers, France is the only one which historically has devoted significant intelligence resources to collection against foreign commercial corporations.”

China, where auto exhaust emissions account for around 70 per cent of air pollution in major cities, is pushing green vehicles heavily as part of the development of its auto industry.

China’s output of electric vehicles is expected to reach one million units by 2020, the official Xinhua news agency said late last year.
Beijing launched a pilot program in June to hand out rebates to electric and hybrid car buyers as its stepped up its efforts to cut emissions, and it is due to present a draft plan setting out billions of yuans of investment in the sector.

Worldwide, mass-market electric vehicle production is still in its infancy. Major car makers including Nissan, Mitsubishi and PSA Peugeot Citroen have launched electric vehicles in recent months, but the numbers on the roads remain in the thousands.

The European Union’s industry chief called on Thursday for an EU body to be set up to vet foreign investment in the bloc, and possibly block deals that aim to secure valuable technologies.

French Industry Minister Eric Besson said the expression “economic warfare” was appropriate in describing what was involved in the Renault case.

The car maker has said it is examining all legal options in the case and expects to take action at some point in the future.


I suspect the French are right and the Chinese are peeking into their (and our) secret folders. But if 'turnabout is fair play' and 'karma is a bitch,' and if it’s going to happen to anyone, then France is a great target. Back in the 1980s our (Canadian) security services sent strong warnings to Canadian technology companies re: industrial espionage, specifically French industrial espionage.

Anyway, to the Chinese guy who reads Army.ca every day (probably a university student) and reports to someone in the Third Department of the General Staff (or wherever): tell your bosses to be less clumsy in the future, or organize protests outside a Le Carrefour hypermarket and boycott cheese again to distract attention.  ;)
 
An update about US SecDef. Gates' visit to China:

(Plus a related story: "Gates urges firmer military ties with China" )

By Agence France-Presse, Updated: 1/10/2011

Gates in China to shore up uneasy military ties

US Defense Secretary Robert Gates launched a series of meetings with top Chinese generals Monday in a bid to shore up rocky military ties with Beijing, amid US concern over China's advanced weaponry.



Gates in China to shore up uneasy military ties

The trip to China by Gates, his first since 2007, comes just days ahead of a crucial visit to Washington by Chinese President Hu Jintao, and both sides are keen to show some progress in defence ties.

The Pentagon chief sat down early Monday with China's defence minister, General Liang Guanglie, China's Xinhua news agency reported.

Beijing broke off military relations with the United States a year ago over Washington's sale of more than $6 billion in arms to rival Taiwan, and tentative plans for an earlier visit by Gates were called off.

US officials, including Gates, have for years appealed to China to embrace a permanent dialogue between military leaders regardless of political disputes, but the Chinese have tended to view defence relations as a bargaining chip.

China is riding an economic boom and flexing its military might, with ambitious plans to invest in sophisticated aircraft, missiles, ships and submarines.

Two weeks ago, Liang vowed to keep up investments in new weapons, saying China would "push forward preparations for military conflict in every strategic direction".

The United States, however, is under mounting fiscal strain, forced to cut back some weapons programmes even as it fights a grinding war in Afghanistan and still has tens of thousands of troops in Iraq.

Before arriving late Sunday for three days of talks, Gates said he would appeal for a reliable security dialogue with China to avoid possible miscalculations, but expressed concern over the Asian power's anti-ship missiles and a new stealth fighter jet.

"They clearly have the potential to put some of our capabilities at risk. And we have to pay attention to them, we have to respond appropriately with our own programmes," Gates told reporters travelling on his plane.

"My hope is that, through the strategic dialogue that I'm talking about, that maybe the need for some of these capabilities is reduced," he said.

Photos surfaced in recent days of what appears to be China's first stealth fighter jet -- a development that has highlighted China's military modernisation, as well as concerns in the region over its intentions.

Japan last month labelled Beijing's military build-up a global "concern", citing its increased assertiveness in the East and South China seas.

China has repeatedly insisted its military growth does not pose any threat.

Experts say the J-20 fighter will eventually rival the US Air Force's F-22, the world's only fully operational next-generation stealth fighter jet -- and Gates admitted Beijing had made more progress than previously thought.


"What we've seen is they may be somewhat further along in the development of that aircraft than our intelligence had predicted," he said.

Western military analysts say China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile -- a new version of its Dongfeng 21 missile -- that could pierce the defences of even the most sturdy US naval ships and has a range far beyond Chinese waters.

The talks were also expected to cover recent tensions on the Korean peninsula, including China's role in helping to ease a recent crisis that began after Pyongyang's deadly shelling of a South Korean island in November.

After his talks in China, Gates heads to Tokyo on Wednesday and Seoul on Friday for meetings focused on the Korean crisis.
 
Another update: the prototype mentioned in the above posts now reportedly makes its first flight.

Chinese stealth fighter makes first test flight
AP

capt.aa98450e0c0c42c791f600b124761495-aa98450e0c0c42c791f600b124761495-0.jpg

In this Friday Jan. 7, 2011, photo, a prototype of the Chinese J-20 stealth plane is seen during a runway test in Chengdu, southwest China. State media are reporting on the appearance online of photos that appear to show a prototype Chinese stealth fighter undergoing testing. (AP Photo/Kyodo News)

– 39 mins ago

BEIJING – A leading expert on the Chinese military says the country's prototype stealth fighter has made its first-known test flight.

Kanwa Asian Defense magazine editor Andrei Chang said the J-20 flew for about 15 minutes over an airfield in the southwestern city of Chengdu where it was spotted carrying out runway tests last week. Photos of the plane in flight were also posted on unofficial Chinese military websites.

The test flight comes on the second day of a visit to China by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Chang and other analysts say the test's timing is apparently intended to send the message that Beijing is responding to calls from the U.S. and others to be more transparent about its defense modernization and future intentions.

Associated Press link
 
supposed video link of J20's test flight, though one portion only shows it running to take off...

link


-----------------

Plus another update related to the border region of China and India:

By Agence France-Presse, Updated: 1/10/2011

Chinese troops 'threaten' Indians in disputed area

India on Monday said Chinese troops had threatened Indian workers in an area of the Himalayas claimed by both countries, in the latest sign of long-standing cross-border friction.


Chinese troops 'threaten' Indians in disputed area

Indian army chief General V.K. Singh told reporters that the workers were illegally building a shelter at Demchok in the Ladakh region of Indian Kashmir when the Chinese military patrol threatened them in September or October.

The borders between India and China have been the subject of 14 rounds of fruitless talks since 1962, when the two nations fought a brief but a brutal war over the issue.

The Press Trust of India (PTI) news agency said the Chinese troops told the builders to stop work and shouted at them.

"Unfortunately, some people for various local gains have pushed construction activity in that area," Singh said, dismissing PTI reports that the building was a transport shelter officially sanctioned by India.

India says China is illegally occupying 38,000 square kilometres (15,000 square miles) of its northwestern territory, while Beijing claims a 90,000-square-kilometre chunk of Arunachal Pradesh in northeast India.

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao met his Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh in New Delhi last month and reaffirmed a 1993 pledge to maintain peace in border areas and continue talks.

The Indian foreign ministry in a statement said it did not view it as an incursion by Chinese troops into Indian territory because the area is disputed.


"It will be recollected that there are differences in perception, between India and China, on the Line of Actual Control in this (disputed) area," the statement said.

"They are, therefore, not a cause for concern," it added.

Officials at the Chinese foreign ministry in Beijing were not immediately available for comment.
 
AW&ST on J-20:

What China's Stealth Fighter Means
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2011/01/10/AW_01_10_2011_p26-280386.xml

With the surprise rollout and high-speed taxi tests of China’s newest J-20 fighter, a stealth prototype, the U.S. Navy’s top intelligence official admits that the Pentagon has erred in its estimates of the speed with which Beijing is introducing new military technology.

The aircraft’s existence was not a surprise to the intelligence community, but “one of the things that is . . . true is that we have been pretty consistent in underestimating the delivery and initial operational capability of Chinese technology weapons systems,” says Vice Admiral David J. Dorsett, deputy chief of naval operations for information dominance and director of naval intelligence. Two recent examples of misanalyses have been the J-20 fighter and the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (AW&ST Jan. 3, p. 18). Moreover, there is evidence that China’s advances include high-performance engines and missiles that display a new level of technical maturity and performance.

“In terms of the [J-20] stealth photos, it’s not clear to me when it’s going to become operational,” Dorsett says. “Do we need to refine our assessments better? I think so.”

Other Washington-based intelligence officials say they are watching the J-20’s testing with interest. “They have done several high-speed taxis with the nosewheel off the ground,” says another veteran analyst. “They could still be working out some kinks before they try an actual first flight.”

There also are a lot of unknowns about the aircraft’s real importance.

“Operational impact is a tough call to make at this point, given that this plane, even if it flies, is not going to be a full-up fifth-gen [aircraft],” the analyst says. “In essence, this is going to be a novelty for the next decade before it starts to roll off the series production lines and gets to the line units in any numbers that would impact any of our mission planning. A lot of things can happen, good and bad, between now and then to either speed this up or severely put the brakes on things.

“As far as radar cross section goes, this is not [a Lockheed Martin] F-22, nor should we be thinking that they are going for low RCS right out of the chute,” he says. “We have to keep in mind that this is the first attempt and it’s also the very first prototype of that first attempt. There’s a lot of tweaking . . . before they get to the final version. I see too many people . . . making sweeping assessments. That has always been a mistake.”

Engines have been an Achilles’ heel for Chinese high-performance aircraft...

Dorsett downplays the immediate impact of the new fighter and new anti-ship missile.

“I’m more worried about Chinese game-changing capabilities in nonkinetic [areas such as information dominance, network invasion and electronic warfare],” he says. “I am most concerned about China’s focus on trying to develop [the ability] to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, to counter space capabilities and to conduct cyberactivities.

“The other concern I have is China’s ability to become operationally efficient in a sophisticated, complex, joint war-fighting environment,” Dorsett says. “I don’t see China with those capabilities now. I do see them delivering individual components and weapon systems [such as the J-20 and DF-21D], but until they acquire proficiency [with them], how competent are they really going to be?” The Chinese military’s self-proclaimed timeline is mid-century, Dorsett notes. In that context, he denies that the Pentagon is overestimating its threat...

...the evidence of the design’s sophistication is mounting. The J-20 is supposed to carry new weaponry with some of it tucked away internally. China is continuing an effort to expand the military’s air-to-air missile inventory. Although Avic officials have not discussed what comes after the PL-12A radar-guided medium-range missile, new information suggests that work is progressing on several enhanced versions. These include a combined solid-motor, ramjet-powered PL-21. The missile, with a single inlet for the ramjet, may have undergone ground tests last year.

Work may be slightly more advanced on the PL-12D, a ramjet upgrade of the basic PL-12 with more modest changes to the airframe and less endgame maneuverability than the PL-21 would feature. ­Chinese industry also appears to be working on the PL-12C with smaller aft control fins for internal carriage on the J-20. The mid-body fins are believed to be similar to the basic PL-12 and PL-12B with improved electronic counter-countermeasures.

The close-in battle would use the PL-10, whose design may resemble South Africa’s Denel A-Darter. China’s ability to increasingly use standoff weapons, also in air-to-ground and anti-ship missile roles, is already affecting planning among potential adversaries. Japanese military officials are ­showing interest in missiles with greater ranges to be able to engage Chinese threats earlier, and there are discussions in the U.S. about the need for weapons with greater engagement ­capability...

J-20 - The Dragon Gets Airborne, by Bill Sweetman
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3aada92122-076e-4e2f-894c-ccec75133760&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest

...
80034035-d3f9-4da9-a83f-fc9460c118d9.Full.jpg


What's fascinating is that, faced with the same kind of information gap that we dealt with in the Cold War, the debate has fallen into the same mold, pitting the hawks against the skeptics. This time around, however, a lot of the people arguing that the J-20 is a propaganda exercise, a preliminary prototype at best, are on the inside of the Pentagon.

If you wanted to be really, really cynical about this, you would note that a certain white-haired gentleman in the Pentagon is on record as saying that China won't have an operational stealth aircraft before 2020, and that public disagreement with said gentleman has (on occasion) turned out to be sub-optimal from a career-development standpoint.

However, belief that the J-20 is a long way off is also based on comparison with recent US program performance - and although this may produce the right answer, it will do so for the wrong reasons.

When it comes to timing, the right answer for now starts with admitting that we don't know the answer. We have no good track record for the pace of development in China because it is not that long since China's economy started to take off, and not that long since the Maoist doctrine of the PLA - favoring numbers and politics over technology - gave way to a major program of modernization. One generation of Chinese development - represented by the J-10/10B, JF-17 and J-11B - doth not a trend make.

The key pointers to the timing at this point are mostly out of sight from the West, because they are items that can be simulated or tested on the ground. They include progress with active electronically scanned array radar, passive electronic surveillance systems and (as often mentioned) propulsion. Blog photos do not tell us very much about that kind of hardware.

Still less do they say much about the other essential element of a stealth aircraft, the complex sensor fusion and threat avoidance software that allows it to track targets with minimal transmissions while flying a precise path around planned and pop-up threats.

It is probably a safe assessment that the J-20 is the first Chinese stealth aircraft (unless it has been preceded by another, covert demonstrator), so it will be a learning tool as well as a prototype in its own right. Almost regardless of the date at which it first enters service, its capabilities will evolve as the threat does.

And do not forget the other X-factor: China's unprecedented access to foreign technical data via cyberespionage, data that can be widely disseminated without putting the intelligence system itself at risk.

As for the aircraft itself: start with the size. Capability has been favored over low unit cost. And even with the in-development 33,000-pound-thrust WS-15 it may have a lower thrust-to-weight ratio than many of its contemporaries. Relative to Typhoon or Rafale, the wing appears more highly loaded and more sharply swept, favoring speed rather than ultimate agility...

What this suggests is that the Chinese expect to use this aircraft in circumstances where it can disengage, turn and run - maintaining engagement control, in short.

This isn't surprising. While the J-20's proportions may be reminiscent of the F-111, it is unlikely to have the same mission (penetrating strike). The PLA, from the antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) through air-launched cruise missiles on the 1950s-technology H-6 bomber to its Type 022 missile boats, seems happy to leave the last run to the target to the missile. Also, for the time being, the PLA is not looking at having to fight through an integrated air defense system and fight its way out again.

What the J-20 should do best is go fast, at high altitude, over a decent range - which leads to my guess is that this aircraft is primarily air-to-air, designed to cause the US really big problems with non-survivable air assets - tankers and ISR. Defending them against a rapidly developing attack by aircraft with a reduced frontal RCS would not be easy.

Range, relative positioning and initiative are the key. With a long unrefueled range and useful sustained supersonic flight (just how good it will be depends on engine data we don't have), the J-20 could hold high-value air assets too far from China to be of much use. It doesn't have to be able to mix it one-for-one with the F-22:  there are not enough F-22s to defend everything at Pacific distances...

Another longer-term possibility for the J-20 is a "baby Backfire" to threaten Aegis ships, another vital and limited asset, with an air launched, supersonic sea-skimmer missile - and you don't have to sink them, just use dispersed kinetic weapons or an EMP warhead to put the antennas out of service.

Both these missions fit with the anti-access/area denial (A2AD) theme that runs through a lot of PLA planning, including medium-range missile development. US freedom of operation inside the "second island chain" around China - running from Japan south to Guam and West Papua and encompassing the Philippine and China seas - depends on bases such as Andersen in Guam and Kadena in Japan, on tankers, airborne ISR and on carrier air power, and those assets increasingly support one another...

Mark
Ottawa

 
Meanwhile...back in Central Asia...

BBC link

13 January 2011 Last updated at 08:06 ET

Tajikistan cedes land to China

The Pamir mountains lie on the Tajik border with China and Afghanistan

China and Tajikistan say that they have settled a century-old border dispute, after the Central Asian nation agreed to cede land to China.

The Tajik parliament voted on Wednesday to ratify a 1999 deal handing over 386 square miles (1,000 sq km) of land in the remote Pamir mountain range.


The Tajik foreign minister said that this represented 5.5% of the land that Beijing had sought.

China said the move thoroughly resolved the border dispute.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei gave no details on the treaty.

But he said the dispute was solved "according to universally recognised norms of international law through equal consultations".

An opposition leader described the deal as a defeat for Tajik diplomacy and a violation of the constitution.

The Pamir mountain range stretches along the Tajik border with China and Afghanistan.

It is not clear where exactly the land to be ceded is or how many people live there.

China is the biggest investor in the Tajik economy, particularly in the energy and infrastructure sectors.
 
My, my, my:

From JAST To J-20
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a5c50cb01-bdd0-41cc-b216-fdc89354eb19&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest

Sometimes the analysis of a new design is one of those areas where you get a whack-on-the-side-of-the-head moment.

This one was induced by the discussion here of the origins of the F-35 design, wherein I suddenly realized what the J-20 reminded me of - Lockheed's immediate pre-JAST/JSF design, tested in the form of a large powered mock-up.

6d32b19e-528c-4378-a249-4240e74ab8b5.Full.jpg


8704817c-eb4f-4a83-a734-545e97616185.Full.jpg


The similarity is quite close in terms of wing/canard relationship, sweep angles, and body shaping, although the Chengdu engineers decided to align the trailing edges of the canards (and rudders) with the trailing edges of the opposite wings, giving them more sweep at the quarter-chord line.

I remember talking this over with Paul Bevilaqua at the 1993 Powered Lift Conference in Palo Alto. If I remember correctly, one reason for the canard delta was that it was good for the cross-sectional area distribution (area ruling) and hence transonic drag.

The challenge was that the shaft-driven lift fan design inevitably had a big cross-section peak well forward, where the inlets wrapped around the fan bay (it needed a large-diameter fan and lots of airflow to work). A canard delta compensated for that by moving the thickest part of the wing as far back as possible.

Somehow I don't think we're going to see a J-20 with a lift fan. However, don't be surprised if the weapons bays turn out to be more capacious (and versatile) than on other designs. It looks like the idea of the canard configuration is to get a large-volume mid-body section through the transonic zone and into supersonic flight with minimal fuss, bother and expenditure of fuel...

Mark
Ottawa
 
More on China’s naval ambitions in this article, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/chinas-naval-coming-of-age/article1871223/singlepage/#articlecontent
China’s naval coming-of-age

MARK MACKINNON
Beijing— From Saturday's Globe and Mail

Published Friday, Jan. 14, 2011

When the Soviet Union began building the aircraft carrier Varyag more than a quarter of a century ago, the 300-metre ship was expected to one day sail provocatively into the Mediterranean Sea, a Cold War challenge to American naval dominance in that part of the globe.

When it finally sets to sea under its own power some time this year or next, the Varyag will have a very different master and mission. Today, the construction project that began in 1985 in what is now the Ukrainian port of Mykolaiv is being completed in the Chinese hub of Dalian.

A world and an era away from its original intended purpose, the Varyag will instead feed fears and suspicions between the United States and China, its latest military rival.

The Varyag is far from the pinnacle of China's naval ambitions. In fact, it's not clear that the ship will ever be anything but a floating test runway for the pilots and planes that will eventually be transferred to a larger and indigenously developed aircraft carrier that China hints could be mission-ready by 2015. As many as six aircraft carriers are believed to be either planned or under construction by the People's Liberation Army Navy.

The status of the Varyag (a Cold War relic that once appeared fated to become a floating casino in Macao) is now of major concern in Washington, and among neighbours such as Japan, Taiwan and Vietnam. This fact speaks to a lingering truth about international relations: Even in a world of satellite weaponry and cyberwars, naval power remains as relevant in 2011 as it was in centuries past.

Despite all the advances in diplomacy, communications and military hardware, the way a superpower expresses its displeasure hasn't changed much since 1841, when an iron-sided British warship appropriately named the Nemesis sailed up the Yangtze River during the First Opium War, helping force the Chinese to cede Hong Kong Island to Queen Victoria's empire.

Gunboats still matter. Part of it is national pride, with aircraft carriers – the successor to the man-of-wars, ironclads and battleships of centuries past – bestowing an aura of power. But in a globalized era, where key resources and export markets are often halfway around the world, they are also vital to securing trade routes. And in disputes between nations, there remain few more effective methods of backing up an argument.

Take the recent flare-up of tensions of the Korean Peninsula. After North Korean artillery shelled a South Korean island late last year, the U.S. demanded that China rein in its ally. When Beijing didn't act, the U.S. dispatched one of its 11 aircraft carriers – the 98,000-tonne USS George Washington – to the Yellow Sea, carrying out joint exercises with the South Korean navy that were not only close to the disputed sea border with the North, but on the edge of waters that China considers within its exclusive economic zone.

America sends in the big guns

As that crisis simmers on – and with tensions between Beijing and Washington still on the rise – the U.S. is stepping up its gunboat diplomacy, simultaneously deploying three carrier battle groups (each of which also consists of a guided-missile cruiser, destroyers and smaller craft, plus a standard complement of 90 warplanes) in the western Pacific Ocean for the first time since shortly after the end of the Second World War.

The U.S. has also in recent years transferred most of its nuclear-powered submarine fleet to the Pacific, a shift driven in large part by China's efforts to upgrade and expand its naval capability. “I have moved from being curious to being genuinely concerned,” Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said last year of China's military modernizations.

For now, the U.S. still rules the Pacific. But while China's own surface fleet may not be able to challenge that for several years, if not decades, it has already developed a weapon that could at least force the carrier fleet to give the country's coast a wider berth: advanced surface-to-sea missiles, dubbed “carrier-busters” because of their supposed ability to sink the giant ships. And after years of focusing on defending its coast and preparing for a potential war over Taiwan, China's navy now talks of “far-sea defence.”

Chinese strategists see aircraft carriers as crucial to a deep-sea navy that would finally allow China to push beyond the ring of American bases in Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. As the world's largest exporter, and a major importer of oil and other resources from Africa and the Middle East, it is no longer willing to trust the U.S. and other foreign navies to protect its ships.

“We have our interests and duties all over the world and need a naval force [to protect them]. It's not a challenge to anyone, we would just like to join the carrier club,” said Xu Guangyu, a retired PLA general. “It is a natural for the Chinese navy to go beyond the first island chain, to go to the far Pacific and other oceans. No one can stop China from doing this.”

For China, it's all about the oil

Others see a simpler explanation for China's naval buildup in recent years.

“It's about oil, oil, oil. Everything they're preparing, the stealth fighter, aircraft carriers, is to protect their oil resources,” said Andrei Chang, chief editor of Kanwa Defense Review, a magazine that reports on China's military.

He pointed to the long route that tankers carrying oil from the Middle East and Africa have to take to reach Chinese ports, and the multitude of vulnerable points along the way, particularly the Strait of Malacca. Eighty per cent of China's oil imports flow through the narrow sea corridor between Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, an artery that could quickly be closed by the U.S. Navy in the event of a conflict.

“The sea chain is very long for them. That's why they say they need a huge navy,” Mr. Chang said.

Last year, a Chinese frigate and supply ship docked in Abu Dhabi, the first modern visit by warships from the Middle Kingdom to the oil-rich Middle East. Chinese vessels have taken part in anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia, and a Chinese admiral proposed building a naval base in the Gulf of Aden to support those operations. China already has warships based in Myanmar and is building a deepwater port on the south coast of Sri Lanka that could be put to similar use.

By some counts, the PLA Navy already possesses more “principal combat ships” – submarines, destroyers, frigates, etc. – than the U.S. Navy, though the American craft are considered to be technologically far superior to the Chinese ships.

“The U.S. seems to take as granted its right to exert absolute control over the world’s skies and oceans. However, the world we live in is not only vast but also changing fast. The U.S., however powerful it may be, cannot rule alone,” the Communist Party-controlled Global Times newspaper wrote this week after a visit to Beijing by U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates.

That trip – which came after China suspended military-to-military ties for a year to protest against U.S. arms sales to Taiwan – was marked by the test flight of China’s first stealth fighter, the J-20. That the J-20 prototype is so far along came as a surprise to U.S. officials, who had previously speculated that such a test flight was years away.

If the simmering tensions in the region ever develop into anything more than that, it will probably be over the resource-rich waters of the South China Sea.

Every country in the region has its own map of the sea, which ranks high among the world's busiest shipping lanes. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines all lay claim to the tiny island groups there, and more important, a share of the natural wealth (eight billion to 28 billion barrels of oil) believed to lie beneath the surrounding waters.

China's claim is by far the most expansive, encompassing islands hundreds of kilometres from its shores and thus nearly the entire South China Sea. The decades-old claim, and the disputes with its neighbours that it has fed, took on greater urgency last year when Chinese officials reportedly told their U.S. counterparts that the entire sea was now considered a “core national interest” – language previously reserved for red-line territorial issues such as Taiwan and Tibet, over which Beijing has expressed a willingness to go to war.

The statement provoked a hasty response from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who flew to Hanoi to deliver the message that the U.S. considered freedom of navigation in these waters to be a “national interest” of its own.

The hub of China's rapid naval buildup is Yalong Bay, a deepwater port on the south coast of Hainan, a tropical island in the South China Sea better known for drawing holidaymakers from colder parts of the country. A 900-kilometre stretch of coast has been converted into China's most advanced naval base, the primary launching point for its fleet of submarines, which has been growing at a pace of three a year since 1995. Hainan is also the hub of China's aircraft-carrier building activity.

Though China's leaders speak of the need for “harmonious” oceans and of using their new naval capabilities for fighting piracy and providing humanitarian assistance, its neighbours are clearly anxious. Over the next five years, regional navies will invest about $60-billion – more than the combined spending of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, excluding the U.S. – on upgrading their own surface forces and submarine fleets.

No country is more concerned about China's rapid naval buildup than the region's former dominant sea power, Japan. Relations between Beijing and Tokyo have yet to recover from a September showdown sparked by the collision of a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese coast guard boat. After China revealed the lengths it was willing to go to in the dispute, tightening exports of a key resource crucial to the Japanese high-tech industry, Japan was forced into a humiliating retreat that hasn't been forgotten.

Last month, Japan's Self-Defence Forces released a new white paper outlining a major shift in policy. The army will slash its spending on battle tanks and invest instead in new submarines and warships. The military's sharp edge will now point south and west, toward the waters between it and China.

“Rising China generally, and its naval modernization specifically, is posing an uncommon and unprecedented challenge for the region and beyond,” said Yuki Asaba, associate professor of international relations at Yamaguchi Prefectural University in Japan. “Japan needs to make it clear that further provocations will not be tolerated.”

The fishing-boat incident occurred near an uninhabited island chain in the East China Sea, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China, controlled by Japan but claimed by China. And it was far from an isolated event. The most dramatic statement of China's growing naval reach came last April, when a flotilla of two submarines and eight destroyers cruised between Japanese islands on their way to the deeper Pacific. When two Japanese destroyers were assigned to shadow them, a Chinese helicopter buzzed within 100 metres of them.

Gen. Xu, the ex-PLA officer, warned that Japan and others needed to get used to the new pecking order in the region. “When a country gets more powerful, it takes on more responsibility in the world. As China gets more powerful, its troops and ships will go out farther,” he said.

“The neighbours, especially those who bullied us in history, should calm down and adapt better to China's rise.”

Mark MacKinnon is The Globe and Mail's China correspondent.


I think is about more than just “oil, oil, oil.” China does, indeed, want to press its case for territory in the South China Seas but it also wants to project some “hard power,” globally, so that it can reinforce its extensive “soft power” offensives – which are also global.

 
This latest article reminds me of a similar arrangement I read about, that China had with Vietnam during the Vietnam War, whereby up to several thousand Chinese antiaircraft and support troops were stationed in Northern Vietnam.

From the link above:
Chinese accounts record that some 320,000 PLA soldiers served in North Vietnam, of whom 1,100 were killed and 4,300 wounded. Liberation Army antiaircraft units claimed to have shot down 1,707 U.S. planes and damaged an additional 1,608, while capturing 42 American pilots

This was of course long before the 1979 punitive Chinese invasion of Vietnam in retaliation for the occupation of Chinese ally Cambodia the year before, IIRC.

Perhaps these Chinese troops might be pivotal in a future power struggle within North Korea if the Kim Jong Il regime collapses?

China to station troops in N. Korea—report

Agence France-Presse
First Posted 15:37:00 01/15/2011

link

SEOUL—China is in discussions with North Korea about stationing its troops in the isolated state for the first time since 1994, a South Korean newspaper reported Saturday.

The Chosun Ilbo newspaper quoted an anonymous official at the presidential Blue House as saying that Beijing and Pyongyang recently discussed details of stationing Chinese soldiers in the North's northeastern city of Rason.

The official said the soldiers would protect Chinese port facilities, but the location also gives access to the Sea of Japan (East Sea), while a senior security official was quoted as saying it would allow China to intervene in case of North Korean instability.

A spokeswoman for the Blue House said she had no information.

"North Korea and China have discussed the issue of stationing a small number of Chinese troops to protect China-invested port facilities" in the Rason special economic zone, the unnamed official was quoted as saying.

"The presence of Chinese troops is apparently to guard facilities and protect Chinese nationals."


China reportedly gained rights in 2008 to use a pier at Rason, securing access to the Sea of Japan, as North Korea's dependence on Beijing continues to grow amid a nuclear stand-off with the United States and its allies.

The last Chinese troops left the North in 1994, when China withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission that supervises the truce that ended the 1950-53 Korean War.

Seoul's International Security Ambassador Nam Joo-Hong told the Chosun Ilbo that China could now send a large number of troops into the North in case of instability in the impoverished communist state.


"The worst scenario China wants to avoid is a possibly chaotic situation in its northeastern provinces which might be created by massive inflows of North Korean refugees," Nam was quoted as saying."Its troops stationed in Rason would facilitate China's intervention in case of contingencies in the North," he said.
 
Infanteer said:
I think comparing de facto and de jure notions of independance shoots that analogy down.


I think this scenario goes to pot once the US decides to revoke China‘s trading privledges (WTO, MFN, etc).  They‘ve worked too hard to bring their economy to where it is to waste it away for that island.

As for the insignia, I think it is too clutered and cheezey.  The coolest cap brass ever has to be the Lancers

 
gb%5E17th-21L.gif

Basing my assessment and observations on how French intelligence functions in Quebec an d outlying parks, I find that these moles are emboldened to carry on their missions. Why? Because France is a nuclear power. But Frence cannot have the gall to invade us in Quebec? Why? We have a defense treaty with USA and the Queen is the head of State. I wish Military intelligence and civillian spy agencies be more vigilant in stomping the activities of these emboldened moles who can easily assassinate those who can go across their way and escape to France with whom we have no extradition treatay...Provocative measures have been implemented on poets, writers, etc. who are hostile to separatism such that when we react there is a probability that we end in the morgue..

PS. I might have clicked the wrong quoted statement..which mentions Quebec..sorry
 
Another view (although how much of this is true and how much is wishful thinking is debatable):

http://www.zerohedge.com/article/guest-post-iron-fist-control-china’s-central-government-coming-unhinged

Guest Post: Is The Iron Fist Control Of China’s Central Government Coming Unhinged?
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/17/2011 15:16 -0500

First, what is China’s Central government trying to do? Second, is it working?

The PBOC is worried about asset priced inflation so they’ve attempted to reign in the credit tsunami they initiated in response to the 2008 economic crises. The outside perception is that if the Chinese government orders banks to lend, they lend. So if that’s the case, if the PBOC orders banks to reign in lending out of fear of overheating and future non performing loans, the banks should stop lending. For the past few years, the PBOC has established official loan quotas on banks, but the banks have exceeded the official thresholds each year. Unofficially, the problem is much worse, as banks have hidden another 30% or so of their loans in off balance sheet transactions, according to Fitch. Recently, the PBOC officially dropped the loan quota and decided to focus on the reserve ratio. The loan quotas failed and were not being obeyed, so issuing guidelines that are inevitably violated would merely highlight PBOC weakness.

Last week, immediately before President Hsu’s visit to the US, photos of a Chinese Stealth fighter were released. The timing was viewed as a way for China to flex its muscles and set the tone for the Obama meeting. That may have been the case, but on whose orders? Secretary of Defense Gates spoke with Hsu, who said he knew nothing of the photos. This sparked alarm from the administration that the leaders of the Chinese central government do not have control over the military. This is not the first allegation of lack of oversight. It also shows the hostility of China’s military leadership towards the US.

Food costs account for 40% of disposable income in China. To control prices, the central government has placed limits on the number of purchases on such things as cooking oil. There are rumors the central government is releasing stockpiles, yet prices continue to rise. China has 20% of the world’s population, but just 6% of the farmable land. If the central government begins to implement price controls, shortages are inevitable. A recent reported from World Economic Forum warned that shortages could “cause social and political instability, geopolitical conflict, and irreparable environmental damage.” The central government seems to have few options to control food inflation without causing a major disruption in the rest of the economy.

Chinese soldiers and their families are mostly from rural China, the majority of whom have not benefited from China’s rising economy, with 600 million still earning less than $6 a day. Indeed, in many aspects, quality of life has deteriorated for those without connections, a prerequisite for wealth in the eyes of most Chinese according to polls. Many do not view competition for material goods as healthy, pollution and waste have worsened exponentially, housing prices have skyrocketed, and now food prices surging. Businessweek reported that ordinary Chinese are increasingly yearning for a return to Mao style communism – “a more equal” society, with Conqing Party Boss Bo Xilia gaining support and pushing for membership to the inner circle.

To summarize, banks have ignored PBOC orders, the military is doing their own thing, and food prices are surging with few solutions available to the central government. They have a fixed asset bubble, a likely onslaught of bad loans in the offing, and millions of jobs tied to construction. Many Chinese are worse off and the military is more sympathetic to ordinary Chinese than the noveau riche. Inflation is nearing levels associated with social unrest. The situation is a powderkeg.
 
Mutual respect is the key phrase in the (government controlled/official) English language media here in China.

The Chinese only really wanted one thing: a public acknowledgement of the fact that China is a major, global power – they wanted the full scale “pomp and circumstance” that signifies their respected status and, again publicly, repudiates former President George W. Bush's earlier snub – non-state visit, etc. They got that. They actually got more than that; Obama not only rolled out the red carpet, he laid off most of the wholly legitimate criticisms of China's policies.

What will Obama get in return? Nothing much, I'm afraid. China has no incentives to help the USA with Korea, Central/West/South-West Asia, Iran or Africa. It already has the respect it wants and, in most other matters, the USA is overextended and China is in the “catbird seat.” Why should it do the USA any favours?

Of course, China's highly favourable position is why it might be in China's better interests to offer the USA a helping hand, here or there, but I can see little support for that in the media here, in China. But, the Chinese famously take the "long view," and, in my opinion their long term, global, interests might be best served by offering the USA some "charity" in areas where China's interests are minor.

One thing I found interesting was the front page picture on today's semi-official China Daily:

f04da2db11220ea30b330a.jpg

Source: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-01/21/content_11892224.htm
Note the positioning: Michelle Obama, who is a celebrity in China is at the centre, with Hu, seemingly looking at him in a friendly, even an admiring manner. President Obama appears to be “on the edge” and, maybe even bowing, ever so slightly. I'm sure the editors had dozens of pictures from which to choose – this one is full of subtle messages for foreigners in China and Chinese people, alike.

 
I had a long gaze at the attached picture this morning and wonder of its suggestions also.


Video:

U.S. President Barack Obama meets with Chinese President Hu Jintao in a major step to stabilize the relationship between the two countries. Global National's Eric Sorensen reports.


Story:

U.S.-Chinese tensions visible as Obama, Hu meet:
NEW YORK — U.S. President Barack Obama said Wednesday he believes China's emergence as a major power was good for the United States economically, but revealed Washington's doubts about the long-term political goals of the world's most populous country, which remains under Communist party rule.

"We welcome China's rise," Obama said at a news conference in Washington with Chinese President Hu Jintao.

"We just want to make sure that that rise is done in a way that reinforces international norms and international rules, and enhances security and peace — as opposed to it being a source of conflict within in the region around the world."

The comment reflected difficulties Washington has had in convincing China to be in sync with Washington on a series of international issues, not least with efforts to contain the threats posed by the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran.

article continues at link...

Photo:
U.S. President Barack Obama (R) and first lady Michelle Obama (L) pose for the official photo with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the Grand Staircase of the White House January 19, 2011 in Washington, D.C. Obama is hosting a state dinner for Hu this evening.
Photograph by: Alex Wong, Getty Images
                                      (Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act)
 
An interesting analysis of conditions in China, although I do take issue with the use of the word Fascist (a correctly political definition is having the State dictate the outcomes through taxation and regulation, but leaving the costs and responsibilities of notional ownership in the hands of the private sector). As Edward points out, China is an Imperial system ruled currently by the "Red Dynasty", using updated versions of the tools used by previous Empires and Dynasties in Chinese history:

URL to article: http://pajamasmedia.com/michaelledeen/2011/01/20/china-the-first-mature-fascist-state/

China: The First Mature Fascist State
Posted By Michael Ledeen On January 20, 2011 @ 7:34 am In Uncategorized | 60 Comments

For nearly ten years, I have been arguing that China may well be the first example of a mature fascism in power.  The highest praise imaginable has been bestowed on this theory, by the People’s Republic itself.  When I published an updated version of my theory (first published in the Wall Street Journal in  2002 and reprised in different form in NRO thereafter) in the Far East Economic Review in May, 2008, the entire issue was banned in China.

On the occasion of Mr. Hu’s visit to Washington, it seems appropriate to revisit this theme, which seems to me to have been abundantly confirmed by events.

May 2008
Beijing Embraces Classical Fascism

by Michael Ledeen

Posted May 2, 2008

In 2002, I speculated that China may be something we have never seen before: a mature fascist state. Recent events there, especially the mass rage in response to Western criticism, seem to confirm that theory. More significantly, over the intervening six years China’s leaders have consolidated their hold on the organs of control—political, economic and cultural. Instead of gradually embracing pluralism as many expected, China’s corporatist elite has become even more entrenched.

Even though they still call themselves communists, and the Communist Party rules the country, classical fascism should be the starting point for our efforts to understand the People’s Republic. Imagine Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead and buried, the corporate state would be largely intact, the party would be firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by professional politicians, part of a corrupt elite, rather than the true believers who had marched on Rome. It would no longer be a system based on charisma, but would instead rest almost entirely on political repression, the leaders would be businesslike and cynical, not idealistic, and they would constantly invoke formulaic appeals to the grandeur of the “great Italian people,” “endlessly summoned to emulate the greatness of its ancestors.”

Substitute in the “great Chinese people” and it all sounds familiar. We are certainly not dealing with a Communist regime, either politically or economically, nor do Chinese leaders, even those who followed the radical reformer Deng Xiaoping, seem to be at all interested in treading the dangerous and uneven path from Stalinism to democracy. They know that Mikhail Gorbachev fell when he tried to control the economy while giving political freedom. They are attempting the opposite, keeping a firm grip on political power while permitting relatively free areas of economic enterprise. Their political methods are quite like those used by the European fascists 80 years ago.

Unlike traditional communist dictators—Mao, for example—who extirpated traditional culture and replaced it with a sterile Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China’s long history. Their passionate reassertion of the greatness of past dynasties has both entranced and baffled Western observers, because it does not fit the model of an “evolving communist system.”

Yet the fascist leaders of the 1920s and 1930s used exactly the same device. Mussolini rebuilt Rome to provide a dramatic visual reminder of ancient glories, and he used ancient history to justify the conquest of Libya and Ethiopia. Hitler’s favorite architect built neoclassical buildings throughout the Third Reich, and his favorite operatic composer organized festivals to celebrate the country’s mythic past.

Like their European predecessors, the Chinese claim a major role in the world because of their history and culture, not just on the basis of their current power, or scientific or cultural accomplishments. China even toys with some of the more bizarre notions of the earlier fascisms, such as the program to make the country self-sufficient in wheat production—the same quest for autarky that obsessed both Hitler and Mussolini.

To be sure, the world is much changed since the first half of the last century. It’s much harder (and sometimes impossible) to go it alone. Passions for total independence from the outside world are tempered by the realities of today’s global economy, and China’s appetite for oil and other raw materials is properly legendary. But the Chinese, like the European fascists, are intensely xenophobic, and obviously worry that their people may turn against them if they learn too much about the rest of the world. They consequently work very hard to dominate the flow of information. Just ask Google, forced to cooperate with the censors in order to work in China.

Some scholars of contemporary China see the Beijing regime as very nervous, and perhaps even unstable, and they are encouraged in this belief when they see recent events such as the eruption of popular sentiment against the Tibetan monks’ modest protests. That view is further reinforced by similar outcries against most any criticism of Chinese performance, from human rights to air pollution, and from preparations for the Olympic Games to the failure of Chinese quality control in food production and children’s toys.

In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is worried about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist passions, feels compelled to portray the country as a global victim. Perhaps they are right. The strongest evidence to support the theory of insecurity at the highest levels of Chinese society is the practice of the “princelings” (wealthy children of the ruling elites) to buy homes in places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These are not luxury homes of the sort favored by wealthy businessman and officials from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Rather they are typically “normal” homes of the sort a potential émigré might want to have in reserve in case things went bad back home.

On the other hand, the cult of victimhood was always part of fascist culture. Just like Germany and Italy in the interwar period, China feels betrayed and humiliated, and seeks to avenge her many historic wounds. This is not necessarily a true sign of anxiety; it’s an integral part of the sort of hypernationalism that has always been at the heart of all fascist movements and regimes. We cannot look into the souls of the Chinese tyrants, but I doubt that China is an intensely unstable system, riven by the democratic impulses of capitalism on the one hand, and the repressive practices of the regime on the other. This is a mature fascism, not a frenzied mass movement, and the current regime is not composed of revolutionary fanatics. Today’s Chinese leaders are the heirs of two very different revolutions, Mao’s and Deng’s. The first was a failed communist experiment; the second is a fascist transformation whose future is up for grabs.

If the fascist model is correct, we should not be at all surprised by the recent rhetoric or mass demonstrations. Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy were every bit as sensitive to any sign of foreign criticism as the Chinese today, both because victimhood is always part of the definition of such states, and because it’s an essential technique of mass control. The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime’s popularity. Remember that European fascism did not fall as the result of internal crisis—it took a bloody world war to bring it down. Fascism was so alarmingly popular neither Italians nor Germans produced more than token resistance until the war began to be lost. It may well be that the mass condemnation of Western calls for greater political tolerance is in fact a sign of political success.

Since classical fascism had such a brief life span, it is hard to know whether or not a stable, durable fascist state is possible. Economically, the corporate state, of which the current Chinese system is a textbook example, may prove more flexible and adaptable than the rigid central planning that doomed communism in the Soviet Empire and elsewhere. … Our brief experience with fascism makes it difficult to evaluate the possibilities of political evolution, and the People’s Republic is full of secrets. But prudent strategists would do well to assume that the regime will be around for a while longer—perhaps a lot longer.

If it is a popular, fascist regime, should the world prepare for some difficult and dangerous confrontations with the People’s Republic? Twentieth-century fascist states were very aggressive. Is it not likely that China will similarly seek to enlarge its domain?

I believe the answer is “yes, but.” Many Chinese leaders might like to see their sway extend throughout the region, and beyond. China’s military is not so subtly preparing the capability to defeat U.S. forces in Asia in order to prevent intervention in any conflict on its periphery. No serious student of China doubts the enormous ambitions of both the leadership and the masses. But, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, the Chinese tyrants do not urgently need quick geographical expansion to demonstrate the glory of their country and the truth of their vision. For the moment, at least, success at home and global recognition of Chinese accomplishments seem to be enough. Since Chinese fascism is less ideological than its European predecessors, Chinese leaders are far more flexible than Hitler and Mussolini.

Nonetheless, the short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West. That is built into the dna of all such regimes. Sooner or later, Chinese leaders will feel compelled to demonstrate the superiority of their system. Superiority means others have to bend their knees, and cater to the wishes of the dominant nation.

How, then, should the democracies deal with China? The first step is to disabuse ourselves of the notion that wealth is the surest guarantor of peace. The West traded with the Soviet Union, and gave them credits as well, but it did not prevent the Kremlin from expanding into the Horn of Africa, or sponsoring terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East. A wealthy China will not automatically be less inclined to go to war over Taiwan, or, for that matter, to wage or threaten war with Japan.

Indeed, the opposite may be true—the richer and stronger China becomes, the more they build up their military might, the more likely such wars may be. It follows that the West must prepare for war with China, hoping thereby to deter it. A great Roman once said that if you want peace, prepare for war. This is sound advice with regard to a fascist Chinese state that wants to play a global role.

Meanwhile, we should do what we can to convince the people of China that their long-term interests are best served by greater political freedom, no matter how annoying and chaotic that may sometimes be. I think we can trust the Chinese leaders on this one. Any regime as palpably concerned about the free flow of information knows well that ideas about freedom might be very popular. Let’s test that hypothesis, by talking directly to “the billion.” In today’s world, we can surely find ways to reach them.

If we do not take such steps, our risk will surely increase, and explosions of rage, manipulated or spontaneous, will recur. Eventually they will take the form of real actions.


Article printed from Faster, Please!: http://pajamasmedia.com/michaelledeen
 
Playing Politics: Afstan, USA, Canada and China
Conference of Defence Associations' media round-up, Jan. 21
http://www.cdaforumcad.ca/cgi-bin/yabb2/YaBB.pl?num=1295636566/0#0

Mark
Ottawa
 
Thucydides said:
An interesting analysis of conditions in China, although I do take issue with the use of the word Fascist (a correctly political definition is having the State dictate the outcomes through taxation and regulation, but leaving the costs and responsibilities of notional ownership in the hands of the private sector). As Edward points out, China is an Imperial system ruled currently by the "Red Dynasty", using updated versions of the tools used by previous Empires and Dynasties in Chinese history:

URL to article: http://pajamasmedia.com/michaelledeen/2011/01/20/china-the-first-mature-fascist-state/


Michael Ledeen is at least two of:

1. profoundly ignorant about China; and/or

2. profoundly ignorant about Fascism; an/or

3. just plain profoundly silly.

That analysis is about the biggest load of codswallop I've seen in years.

Despite his education (a PhD, from a solid university, an accomplishment for which I have the greatest respect) and credentials (he's held some pretty impressive official jobs) I think Ledeen has drunk waaaaay too much of the American neo-con Kool-Aid; it's rotted his brain.
 
MarkOttawa said:
Playing Politics: Afstan, USA, Canada and China
Conference of Defence Associations' media round-up, Jan. 21
http://www.cdaforumcad.ca/cgi-bin/yabb2/YaBB.pl?num=1295636566/0#0

Mark
Ottawa


The CDA missed the only important Canada/China story: the one about oil and, more broadly, resources from the former to the latter. We need to build a new trans-mountain pipeline and a modern oil port on the Pacific coast to export processed oil sands petroleum to Asia - not only China. This will give us 'clout' with both China and the USA.

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P.S. The NAFTA does NOT give the USA any sort of control over Canadian oil. A handful of scaremongers convince an ignorant media to repeat that lie on a semi-annual basis but it remains a lie. See here
 
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