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Chinese Military,Political and Social Superthread

In my view there is no strategic rationale for China to attack Taiwan; It will, in due course, fall into China's lap of its own accord. Equally, there is no reason for Taiwan to provoke a Chinese attack by declaring independence – it gains nothing but an inevitable military defeat because the USA will not come to its aid, certainly not with ships or troops, probably not even with materiel.

Apologies for being repetative but I think you're debating someone's pipe dreams.
 
tomahawk6 said:
The odds are just as good that the PRC will fall apart.

I disagree.

Even during bloody invasions and civil wars China has not, for the past 1,500 years or so, "fallen apart."  Even in periods of great disunity - e.g. between dynasties - China remains China in the minds of the Chinese people. Even during the last civil war, 1927-1950, there was always a cohesive China. During the 1919-1927 era there were two (sometimes more) national governments in China - all at war with the others but China still existed, just as America existed from 1861-1865.

The current dynasty may, indeed, fail and fall and if that happens there will, certainly, be another period of trouble and strife but it is highly unlikely that the Chinese, themselves, or the world, will see anything but a cohesive China - even if it has a wholly ineffective central government and even if provinces and regions act as quasi-independent states.

I think you're letting hope prevail over experience.



Edit: typo - "... just as America ..."
 
I respect your opinion immensely,however I have found through the years that nothing is absolute and anything is possible. China may prove to be ungovernable without some form of dictatorship or it may break up into smaller pieces.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
In my view there is no strategic rationale for China to attack Taiwan; It will, in due course, fall into China's lap of its own accord. Equally, there is no reason for Taiwan to provoke a Chinese attack by declaring independence – it gains nothing but an inevitable military defeat because the USA will not come to its aid, certainly not with ships or troops, probably not even with materiel.

Apologies for being repetative but I think you're debating someone's pipe dreams.

Campbell,

You make a point there about it not being in the USA's interest to come to Taiwan's aid, though you forgot about the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). While it does not require the United States to necessarily to any action against the PRC in the event of a Taiwan invasion, it still...

requires the United States "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character", and "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."

http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html

And the United States has just done that so far, with the sales of new equipment to Taiwan such as F16s in the 1990s and those ex-USN Kidd class destroyers. While the Nanjing and Guangdong Military Regions' forces of the PLA still outnumber the total paper strength of the ROC/Guo Min Jun forces, I doubt that such an invasion will happen in the next decade or so, partially because the superior quality of the ROC forces' equipment, though their training is another matter since they haven't seen action since the 1950s, save for a few air-to-air skirmishes over the Taiwan Strait and the artillery bombardments of Kinmen, Quemoy and Matsu up until the 60s and 70s. However, if the PRC govt. is still in power a few decades from now and the Taiwan question is STILL an issue that far into the future, who knows what kind of capabilities a the PLA will have then?

My point is that I agree with you that it's against the PRC/CCP's interest to make a risky invasion of Taiwan with the PLA's limited amphibious capabilities FOR NOW, but if the Deng/CCP dynasty is going to last, it has to demonstrate that it is willing to crackdown on dissent and stretch its muscles from time to time, as other ascendant world powers have done in the past. Maintaining the economy and internal political unity/stability are and will probably always will be the PRC's foremost interests, but from how I see it, the latter interest will be theatened if Taiwan's benshengren continue on their course to outright independence and any inaction by the CCP if the Taiwanese achieve that will be interpreted as a sign that the regime is weak and only concerned for the economy, which may signal to other Chinese minorities- Tibetans/Xi Zhang Ren, Xinjiang people/Hui Ren/Uighurs- that the time for self-determination is ripe, though past such resistance has been easily been put down.

I respect your opinion immensely,however I have found through the years that nothing is absolute and anything is possible. China may prove to be ungovernable without some form of dictatorship or it may break up into smaller pieces.

Furthermore, Campbell, while I have disagreed with T6 before because I pointed out unifying centrality of mainstream Chinese culture, which you reiterated just now by saying...

Even in periods of great disunity - e.g. between dynasties - China remains China in the minds of the Chinese people. Even during the last civil war, 1927-1950, there was always a cohesive China.

...I must however disagree with you now that I think of how the Soviet Union and the Yugolsav Federation broke up; all those former satellite republics within the USSR, such as Kazakhstan, still sought self-determination though all spoke Russian and had been influenced by the Russians since the rule of the Czars, I assume. Tito's Yugoslavia stressed unity through diversity and any outright nationalism by the Croats, Albanians, Slovenians, Bosnians and even the Serbs would have been quashed; Yugoslavia did not last more than a decade after Tito died, resulting in the mess that plunged that region of the Balkans into ethnic conflict in the 1990s, which included the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts.

I agree that the notion of one China is so ingrained into the minds of all Chinese on a level that is deeper than Russian culture had appeal or influence among Kazakhs or Ukrainians and deeper than Yugoslavia had on Croatians and Bosnians, even in those periods of disunity such as the Three Kingdoms' period and the 1945-49 Continuation Civil War, BUT from how I see it, that notion is losing appeal and strength among Taiwan's benshengren to the point that eventually, they may become the first minority within the greater China proper sphere that will seperate from that mainstream Han Chinese culture. The notion of Hong Kong becoming the first sovereign city-state on the mainland- which may also absorb neighboring Macao partially because of their proximity and commonality of Cantonese culture- may also be possible if Taiwan achieves independence and encourages the people there to follow the Taiwan and Singapore examples.

I do not see any other regions of China seperating though; the other Han minorities such as the Hakka, Fukienese and the Shanghainese have not experienced long periods of Western colonial rule, as those in Hong Kong have, or Japanese colonial rule, as the Taiwanese, for them to have developed any sense of regional identity seperate from mainstream Chinese culture yet. It may be possible for Tibet (called Xi Zhang province in Mandarin, not to be confused with Xin Jiang province), in spite of the large numbers of Han settlers the PRC has encouraged to settle in Tibet and the amount of development these settlers have brought with them that the local Tibetans may not see any economic benefit in self-determination.

Going back to the TRA, the United States also continues to fulfill other provisions of the TRA by maintaining "quasi-diplomatic relations" with the ROC/Taiwan in spite of its "One-China Policy"; the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is a quasi-embassy in Taiwan which employs US State Dept. personnel and handles all consular/trade relations between the two nations such as visa applications. The AIT is also probably the only US Embassy in the whole world (it's bigger than a mere consulate and it's definitely an embassy in spite of what China thinks) not guarded by USMC sentries, since having Marines there would make the AIT more than "quasi-official" to the chagrin/annoyance of China.  ;D
 
Tibet would go in a NY minute - not that Tibet is crucial to the future of China.
 
I disagree on Tibet not being critical to China.  I think it is highly important to China.  I alluded to the dessication of China over the last 9000 years or so. 

During the Holocene Optimum of 6000 years ago China actually became very humid up to the Northwest.  China benefited from the Global Warming of the Period (perversely, if the Global Warming Theory is true, that means that China has a vested interest in burning as much coal as possible  ;D )

http://www.episodes.org/backissues/213/152-158%20Zheng.pdf

Since that time the Yellow River valley has been drying out.  By about 2-3000 years ago the Tarim Basin seems to have dried out and changed from steppes to desert.

China doesn't have any ancient lakes that predate the ice ages.  The closest ones are Baikal, Balkash and Issykul in Siberia and the Stans.  All the water that comes down the rivers seems to be remnants of the last ice age.    Tibet holds those last remnants in a field of glacial lakes.  If you look at China on Google Earth and take a look at the Tibet region you will see what I mean.

I wonder if China needs Tibet to secure its water supply.

Even that, in geological and possibly Chinese time scales might only be a stop gap measure.  If the primary water source is glacial water that has been steadily disappearing over the last 20,000 to 5,000 years then China may have to weight for the next cold snap to rebuild the ice reservoirs in the Himalayas AND THEN wait for it to warm up again long enough to start melting that ice.  Energy intensive desalination is probably not an option given that China is already struggling with finding energy to meet its other needs.

All of this traditionally I would suggest, would put outward pressure on the Chinese population causing it to migrate to find water by heading south to the rain forests, up river to whatever water remains, possibly North to the Steppes and also, possibly, across the seas.

A bit of a tangent here:

Genetically I find it interesting to note from McDonald's Haplogroup maps that the males of the nation seem to be much more homogeneous in origin (as represented by the dominance of Blue on the Y Map) than the females.  The females seem to be much more mixed as seen in the MTDNA maps.  In the rest of the world the same pattern can be seen (reds in NW Europe - violets in the Americas).  This is often construed as the results of a dominant male culture slaughtering the competition while being "equal opportunity employers" when it comes to procreating with the local ladies. 

The Male grouping of the Han seems to have much in common with the coastal nations and the south.  The polyglot female line seems to be fairly consistent in the interior in terms of being uniform in its diversity (they all share a similar array of colours in a similar pattern).  The male group also seems to bisect a gene pool that connects Tibet with Japan suggesting to me a later incursion.  Taiwan also exhibits its own highly unique aboriginal gene pool.

My question then becomes: which China are we talking about?  The Yellow River cultures seem to me to be a combination of an indigenous female population and a newer (within the last few thousand years like the O'Neils and Genghis Khan) Male, if you will excuse the expression, overlay.

The reason I bring all of this up is because if, as we regularly give credit, the Chinese do see themselves on a continuum of thousands of years and engage in long term planning, is it possible that these types of considerations enter into the discussion?  Does CougarDaddy or does Edward see any element of planning for race survival on very long horizons?

I know that the PRC, like a lot of other people to be sure, seem to be spending a lot of money on understanding this type of stuff.





 
Part 1 of 3

Here is more grist for the mill in the form of another article, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the Jan/Feb 08 issue of Foreign Affairs. This one is by John L. Thornton of Tsinghua University:

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87101/john-l-thornton/long-time-coming.html
Long Time Coming
The Prospects for Democracy in China

By John L. Thornton

From Foreign Affairs , January/February 2008
________________________________________

Summary: Is China democratizing? The country's leaders do not think of democracy as people in the West generally do, but they are increasingly backing local elections, judicial independence, and oversight of Chinese Communist Party officials. How far China's liberalization will ultimately go and what Chinese politics will look like when it stops are open questions.

JOHN L. THORNTON is a Professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management and its School of Public Policy and Management, in Beijing, and Director of the university's Global Leadership Program. He is also Chair of the Board of the Brookings Institution.

China's leaders have held out the promise of some form of democracy to the people of China for nearly a century. After China's last dynasty, the Qing, collapsed in 1911, Sun Yat-sen suggested a three-year period of temporary military rule, followed by a six-year phase of "political tutelage," to guide the country's transition into a full constitutional republic. In 1940, Mao Zedong offered followers something he called "new democracy," in which leadership by the Communist Party would ensure the "democratic dictatorship" of the revolutionary groups over class enemies. And Deng Xiaoping, leading the country out of the anarchy of the Cultural Revolution, declared that democracy was a "major condition for emancipating the mind."

When they used the term "democracy," Sun, Mao, and Deng each had something quite different in mind. Sun's definition -- which envisioned a constitutional government with universal suffrage, free elections, and separation of powers -- came closest to a definition recognizable in the West. Through their deeds, Mao and Deng showed that despite their words, such concepts held little importance for them. Still, the three agreed that democracy was not an end in itself but rather a mechanism for achieving China's real purpose of becoming a country that could no longer be bullied by outside powers.

Democracy ultimately foundered under all three leaders. When Sun died, in 1925, warlordism and disunity still engulfed many parts of China. In his time, Mao showed less interest in democracy than in class struggle, mass movements, continuous revolution, and keeping his opponents off balance. And Deng demonstrated on a number of occasions -- most dramatically in suppressing the Tiananmen protests of 1989 -- that he would not let popular democratic movements overtake party rule or upset his plan for national development.

Today, of course, China is not a democracy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a monopoly on political power, and the country lacks freedom of speech, an independent judiciary, and other fundamental attributes of a pluralistic liberal system. Many inside and outside China remain skeptical about the prospects for political reform. Yet much is happening -- in the government, in the CCP, in the economy, and in society at large -- that could change how Chinese think about democracy and shape China's political future.

Both in public and in private, China's leaders are once again talking about democracy, this time with increasing frequency and detail. (This article is based on conversations held over the past 14 months with a broad range of Chinese, including members of the CCP's Central Committee -- the group of China's top 370 leaders -- senior government officials, scholars, judges, lawyers, journalists, and leaders of nongovernmental organizations.) President Hu Jintao has called democracy "the common pursuit of mankind." During his 2006 visit to the United States, Hu went out of his way to broach the subject at each stop. And Premier Wen Jiabao, in his address to the 2007 National People's Congress, devoted to democracy and the rule of law more than twice the attention he had in any previous such speech. "Developing democracy and improving the legal system," Wen declared, "are basic requirements of the socialist system."

As with earlier leaders, what the present generation has in mind differs from the definition used in the West. Top officials stress that the CCP's leadership must be preserved. Although they see a role for elections, particularly at the local level, they assert that a "deliberative" form of politics that allows individual citizens and groups to add their views to the decision-making process is more appropriate for China than open, multiparty competition for national power. They often mention meritocracy, including the use of examinations to test candidates' competence for office, reflecting an age-old Chinese belief that the government should be made up of the country's most talented. Chinese leaders do not welcome the latitude of freedom of speech, press, or assembly taken for granted in the West. They say they support the orderly expansion of these rights but focus more on the group and social harmony -- what they consider the common good.

Below the top tier of leaders (who usually speak from a common script), Chinese officials differ on whether "guided democracy" is where China's current political evolution will end or is a way station en route to a more standard liberal democratic model. East Asia provides examples of several possibilities: the decades-long domination of politics by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, the prosperity with limited press freedom of Singapore, and the freewheeling multiparty system of South Korea. China might follow one of these paths, some speculate, or blaze its own.

In a meeting in late 2006 with a delegation from the Brookings Institution (of which I was a member), Premier Wen was asked what he and other Chinese leaders meant by the word "democracy," what form democracy was likely to take in China, and over what time frame. "When we talk about democracy," Wen replied, "we usually refer to three key components: elections, judicial independence, and supervision based on checks and balances." Regarding the first, he could foresee direct and indirect elections expanding gradually from villages to towns, counties, and even provinces. He did not mention developments beyond this, however. As for China's judicial system, which is riddled with corruption, Wen stressed the need for reform to assure the judiciary's "dignity, justice, and independence." And he explained that "supervision" -- a Chinese term for ensuring effective oversight -- was necessary to restrain abuses of official power. He called for checks and balances within the CCP and for greater official accountability to the public. The media and China's nearly 200 million Internet users should also participate "as appropriate" in the supervision of the government's work, he observed. Wen's bottom line: "We have to move toward democracy. We have many problems, but we know the direction in which we are going."

FREE TO CHOOSE

Given the gap between the democratic aspirations professed by leaders such as Hu and Wen and the skepticism that their words elicit in the West, a better understanding is needed of where exactly the process of democratization stands in China today. Chinese citizens do not have the right to choose their national leaders, but for more than a decade, peasants across the country have held ballots to elect village chiefs. What is happening in the vast space between the farm and Zhongnanhai, the CCP's leadership compound in Beijing? Some answers can be gleaned by examining the three pillars of Wen's definition: elections, judicial independence, and supervision.

The Chinese constitution calls for a combination of direct and indirect polls to choose government leaders. In practice, competitive popular elections occur widely only in the country's 700,000 villages. With over 700 million farmers living in these villages, this is not an insignificant phenomenon, but the details tell a complex and at times contradictory story.

The original impulse behind village elections, which began in the early 1980s, was to promote competent local leaders who would grow the rural economy and implement national priorities such as the one-child policy. With the abandonment of collectivization at the end of the Cultural Revolution, a power vacuum emerged in the countryside. By most accounts, at first elections enjoyed the central government's active support and were generally conducted fairly. But in the early 1990s, authorities were reportedly taken aback by figures showing that only 40 percent of elected village chiefs were CCP members. Beijing eventually instructed local officials to ensure that the "leading role" of the Communist Party was maintained. Today, the majority of village chiefs are again party members, although the size of that majority can vary widely by region. Over 90 percent of the village heads in the provinces of Guangdong, Hubei, and Shandong belong to the party, but the figure drops to 60-70 percent in Fujian and Zhejiang. And even these figures overstate the actual percentage of village chiefs who were elected as party members: when nonparty candidates are elected, the CCP nearly always recruits them so as to ensure that it remains in charge while giving farmers the leaders they want.

Village elections have serious problems, including nepotism, vote buying, and the selection of incompetent or corrupt leaders. Proponents nonetheless maintain that the polls serve as a grass-roots training ground for democratic habits. In fact, the most fervent opponents of village elections in China tend to be the township officials whose own jobs would be in danger if the central government decided to expand direct voting to the next level up.

Some of the more intriguing electoral experiments in China over the past decade have in fact taken place in townships. Burdened with administering the numerous social programs and benefits on which many citizens depend, township governments are often the focus of antigovernment sentiment and social unrest. Effective leadership there is thus critical to preserving social stability, a top priority for Chinese leaders. A few competitive township polls took place as early as 1995-96; the boldest experiment occurred in 1998 in Buyun, in a remote corner of Sichuan. The local Buyun government conducted a competitive, direct election in which some 6,000 eligible adults cast votes. The process received wide media coverage inside China and was criticized in the official press for violating the constitution, which grants the local People's Congress authority to choose the township leader. But to the surprise of many, the central government neither approved the Buyun results nor nullified them, and the elected mayor, Tan Xiaoqiu, remained in office. In 2001, the CCP Central Committee reaffirmed that directly electing a township head was unconstitutional. Buyun responded by tweaking its election process to bring it in line with the letter of the law but not its spirit: in the next election, citizens elected a candidate for township head, who was then recommended by the local party committee and elected unopposed by the People's Congress.

Perhaps in part due to Buyun's legal troubles, most townships that have experimented with elections have chosen the less radical model called the "open recommendation and selection" system, under which any adult resident can run for township head, a council of community leaders then narrows the candidate pool to two finalists, and the local People's Congress makes the final selection. This is not a direct ballot but a way of introducing a measure of competition and transparency in the selection of local leaders. By 2001-2, there was some form of competitive ballot in almost 2,000 township elections, five percent of the national total.

The significance of township elections should not be overstated. Townships are at the lowest administrative rung in the Chinese government structure, and even election supporters acknowledge that the process is still in its infancy. Nonetheless, when conducted successfully, such electoral experiments can give township leaders a degree of popular legitimacy. They introduce competition among cadres and, to a lesser extent, between party and nonparty members where absolutely none existed before. The expectation is that competition, even if controlled, will raise the quality of governance. Some Chinese scholars also find it notable that some township heads are conducting themselves with greater confidence because they know they enjoy a popular mandate and are therefore more willing to challenge the local party secretaries. This can create headaches for the CCP, one central government researcher noted, but it may also be the first seed of a culture of checks and balances.

Authorities in Beijing, for their part, are closely watching the experiments. In an echo of the dynamic that initiated market reforms in the 1980s, the center now encourages governance experimentation at the local level, albeit within boundaries. A senior official at the Central Party School told me, for instance, that in the prosperous province of Jiangsu, a pilot program would soon have all of the townships conducting competitive polls. As different localities try different things, he said, the Central Party School will study the results.

Electoral experiments at the county level -- one administrative rung up from a township -- have also attracted attention. Since 2000, 11 counties in Hubei and Jiangsu have conducted "open recommendation and selection" polls for the position of county deputy chief. This represents less than half a percent of the counties and county-level cities nationwide, but any reform of leadership selection in counties, which have an average population of about 450,000 each, would be significant news.

Limited experimentation has also occurred in urban areas. In 2003, 12 private citizens stood as independent candidates for district People's Congresses in the city of Shenzhen, with two of them winning seats. A handful of independent candidates have also run for the People's Congress of the Haidian district in Beijing, home to China's top universities. Almost all independent candidates for people's congresses fail in their bids, yet the number of such candidates is exploding: from fewer than 100 nationwide in 2003 to more than 40,000 in 2006-7, according to Li Fan, a former government official who is now a leading election-reform advocate. Li predicts that the number of independent candidates will reach the hundreds of thousands in 2011-12 and thinks popular demand for political participation will continue to grow as Chinese society diversifies and opens up.

In recent years, China's leaders have also made an effort to expand competitive selection within the CCP. Some experts believe that the development of "intraparty democracy" is even more significant for China's long-term political reform than the experiments in local governance. They consider a CCP that accepts open debate, internal leadership elections, and decision-making by ballot to be a prerequisite for democracy in the country as a whole. President Hu and Premier Wen routinely call for more discussion, consultation, and group decision-making within the CCP. Intraparty democracy was a centerpiece of Hu's keynote address to the CCP's 17th Party Congress last fall. Not long after the meeting, Li Yuanchao, the newly appointed head of the Party Organization Department, published a 7,000-character essay in the People's Daily elaborating on Hu's call for further reform in the party. The fact that Hu himself does not wield the personal authority of Mao, Deng, or his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, and relies on consensus within the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, is itself noted as progress in unwinding the overcentralization of power at the national level.

One of the ways the CCP has begun to introduce intraparty democracy is by putting forward multiple candidates for positions. Fifteen percent of the nominees for the 17th Party Congress were rejected in party ballots. In the 2006-7 national election cycle, the official media reported, 296 townships in 16 provinces chose local party leaders through direct voting by party members as part of a pilot project. In a handful of localities, one government scholar told me, county party secretaries were also being elected through a direct vote.

If intraparty democracy takes hold, some scholars predict a trend in which like-minded cadres will coalesce to form more distinct interest groups within the CCP. A senior official of the Central Party School told our Brookings delegation that "interest groups" were no longer taboo within the party, although organized "factions" were not permitted. Still, some analysts predict that the CCP may one day resemble Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, within which formal, organized factions compete for senior political slots and advocate different policy positions.

In a major speech at the Central Party School in June last year, Hu exhorted the CCP's top leadership to "perfect the intraparty democratic system and bring into full play the party's creative vigor." Then, seemingly in a demonstration of the very intraparty democracy Hu was advocating, a nonbinding straw poll was conducted among the several hundred senior leaders present to gauge their preferences for candidates to the next Politburo and its Standing Committee -- in other words, for who should rule China over the next five years.

Some Chinese analysts believe that Hu, in his remarks at the Central Party School, may have been foreshadowing a new policy approach. "Emancipating the mind, an essential requirement of the party's ideological line and a magic weapon of ours in dealing with all kind(s) of new situation(s) and problems lying on the road ahead of us and in our continuous efforts to create a new phase in our cause, must be upheld firmly," Hu told his audience. In asking his colleagues to unshackle themselves from rigid thinking, he was understood to be encouraging them to be more pragmatic in their thinking as China evolves politically. More specifically, Hu was thought to be both indicating to orthodox party thinkers that Mao's was not the only way to define "democracy" and signaling to more reform-minded members of the Central Committee that simply copying Western models was not necessarily the answer either.
 
Part 2 of 3

Long Time Coming
The Prospects for Democracy in China

By John L. Thornton

From Foreign Affairs , January/February 2008  cont

THE RULE OF LAW

Of Wen's three pillars of democracy -- elections, judicial independence, and supervision -- judicial independence is in some ways the most striking. The question of whether the CCP serves the law or vice versa has always made judicial independence a delicate subject in China.

The Chinese judicial system has made great strides over the past three decades, but it still has far to go. In 1980, when the judicial system was just starting to rebuild itself after the devastation of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese courts nationwide accepted a total of 800,000 cases. By 2006, that number had jumped tenfold, reflecting the transformation of the place of law in society. China has passed over 250 new laws in the past 30 years and is in the midst of creating an entire national code from nothing.

Until the mid-1980s, the majority of Chinese judges and prosecutors were former military personnel with little formal education of any sort, let alone legal training. Judicial independence was not the goal of such a system; if anything, it was something to be guarded against. Unsurprisingly, given that the purpose of the courts was to carry out the party line, judges and prosecutors were highly ideological. But starting in the mid-1980s, university graduates were assigned by the state to become judges and prosecutors. By the late 1990s, a master's degree in law was considered an unwritten prerequisite to becoming a senior judge.

Paralleling the rise in the quality of judges and prosecutors has been the change in the status of China's lawyers. Before the late 1980s, all lawyers were employees of the state; private practice did not exist. The first "cooperative law firms" appeared in 1988-89, and today China has 118,000 licensed lawyers practicing in 12,000 firms. (To compare, the United States has more than eight times as many lawyers for a population one-fourth the size of China's.) The growth of private practice has propelled the further professionalization of the system as a whole, partly because lawyers need to win cases (or at least lighter sentences) for their clients in order to prosper. Prosecutors still win over 90 percent of their cases, but as the quality of lawyers has improved and arguments have grown more intricate, prosecutors -- and judges -- have had to improve their own competence. Party bosses still interfere in the judicial process, and the central government still decides politically sensitive cases, but most observers agree that with disputes becoming more complex, the frequency and degree of such interference are declining.

China has adopted a number of major statutes intended to protect citizens from government wrongdoing. The Public Servants Law of 2005 sets a high standard for conduct by officials. The State Compensation Law of 1994 is meant to make amends for government failures. Perhaps most significant, the Administrative Litigation Law, adopted in 1989, enables citizens to sue the state; some 13,000 suits were filed in the law's first year. Today, more than 150,000 cases are filed annually against the government, and several successful ones have been hailed in the media.

Still, Chinese officials acknowledge that the judicial process remains rife with problems. One of the most serious obstacles to impartial verdicts is the web of personal relationships known as guanxi -- bonds forged over years by the exchange of favors and assistance -- on which so many decisions in China are based. These ties can have an especially constraining effect on prosecutorial and court decisions. Judges in China routinely talk to the parties in a case privately, creating situations in which guanxi and corruption can readily contaminate the process. Some experts have suggested raising judges' salaries and taking other steps to create a judicial elite distinct from other government officials in order to address this endemic weakness.

China's main challenge is no longer the lack of a comprehensive legal code but the chasm between what is on the books and its implementation, especially at the local level and in politically sensitive cases. Rights guaranteed by the landmark Criminal Procedure Law of 1996, such as timely access to counsel and exculpatory evidence, are often denied or simply ignored. A small but growing group of private lawyers -- sometimes referred to as "rights defenders" -- take on sensitive cases and unjust prosecutions, in part to highlight instances in which the judicial system itself violates the law. Although they rarely win and are sometimes themselves harassed or even jailed, these activist lawyers believe that insistently pointing out the discrepancy between the official goal of a fair judicial system and the reality on the ground can over time narrow the gap.

Another major obstacle is the sway that local officials continue to hold over the courts. Local CCP committees are integrally involved in the appointment of judges and prosecutors, and local governments have discretion over salaries and budgets throughout the judicial system. The situation shares some similarities with the Chinese banking system a decade ago, when the influence of local officials over bank branches resulted in a vast pool of so-called policy loans. The explosion in nonperforming debt eventually forced Beijing to spend $60 billion from central government coffers to bail out the banks, after which then Premier Zhu Rongji pushed through a reorganization that transferred final authority over personnel and loan decisions to the banks' headquarters. Banking reform may offer a promising model for the restructuring that the judicial system needs.

According to the 1999 amendment to the constitution, China is now officially a "country governed according to law." But the CCP, not the government, holds ultimate power. An increasing number of scholars argue that what the country needs, therefore, is a party and party members who unambiguously understand that they are not above the law. One proponent of this view, Professor Zhuo Zeyuan, of the Central Party School, last year gave a two-hour talk on his ideas to all 24 members of the Politburo. A Central Party School leader told me later that the proper relationship between the ruling party and the constitution was unambiguous: the CCP should be governed by the law. As with so many things in China today, the rub is the gap between theory and practice.

The CCP firmly maintains the levers that control the courts and manipulates them when necessary. In addition, it operates a separate, parallel system for dealing with errant party members that includes the use of detention and interrogation and in some cases is more draconian than the regular legal system. Recently, there have been signs that the party may be starting to see the need for more due process in its practices. Professor Jerome Cohen, of New York University Law School, one of the West's foremost experts on the Chinese legal system, has noted that local party organizations in at least 20 provinces have established a disciplinary system for CCP members that includes guarantees such as a notice of alleged wrongdoing, the opportunity to defend oneself against charges (including the right to call supporting witnesses), a statement of reasons for a final decision, and an opportunity to appeal. Some of these rights have long been in the CCP charter but were never implemented seriously.

Chinese leaders appear to realize that the China of 2008 is far too complex to be ruled entirely by fiat from Beijing and has to be governed by laws through a competent legal system enjoying the public's confidence. Lack of faith in the courts is one reason people take to the streets, and official figures show that tens of thousands of public protests occur in China each year. It is not surprising then that leaders such as Premier Wen want the party and the state to stop interfering in routine judicial matters. But the leadership still insists on controlling sensitive cases and the judicial system at the macro level. The question is whether the CCP can succeed in building a fair and independent judicial system while maintaining control at the very top.

OVERSIGHT

The Chinese system does not lack for institutions meant to keep officials honest. The oldest of these is the traditional petition system, dating to the imperial era, which allows people to take their grievances directly to higher authorities. Each ministry in Beijing has an office that handles such complaints. But the petition is seen as a last resort, and few cases are satisfactorily resolved: the process is opaque and depends on the goodwill of the anonymous officials evaluating the appeals.

Another oversight institution, the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, staffed by eight deputies and 120 senior members and headed by a Politburo Standing Committee member, is charged with fighting corruption and other misconduct by party members. Its counterparts on the government side are the Ministry of Supervision and the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, responsible for prosecuting errant government officials. One of the functions of the official Xinhua News Agency, finally, is to gather information on corruption nationwide and produce internal reports for the central leadership.

Yet despite these multiple mechanisms, the problem of official corruption remains serious, and leaders routinely cite moral turpitude as one of the party's main challenges. As the economy has surged for more than two decades, so have opportunities for graft. High-profile cases such as that of Zheng Xiaoyu, the former head of the State Food and Drug Administration executed this past July for taking bribes from pharmaceutical companies, feed the perception of endemic rot. According to the CCP, over 97,000 officials were disciplined in 2006, of whom 80 percent were guilty of dereliction of duty, taking bribes, or violating financial regulations. "The formal [supervision] system on the whole has failed," one government researcher told me. At lower levels, a basic structural flaw in the supervision system mirrors that of the courts: the heads of the discipline inspection commissions are appointed by local leaders, who predictably tend to select relatives, friends, protégés, or colleagues. It was only in 2006 that a rule was implemented requiring that commission heads at the provincial level be appointed by the central government.

President Hu and Premier Wen face a basic dilemma. They know that rooting out corruption, which makes citizens cynical about one-party rule, must be their top governance priority. But they must act while maintaining the loyalty of local officials, through whom the CCP governs the country. To augment the formal mechanisms of supervision, the government is increasingly turning to alternative channels. In Beijing, some districts are using public opinion polling to gauge satisfaction with individual government offices, and Beijing's Urban Planning Commission has retained a consulting firm to help it take better account of public opinion in assessing redevelopment projects.

Another promising trend is the rapid commercialization of the Chinese press. The government still exercises extensive control over the media through government ownership of outlets and censorship. The redlines that journalists cannot cross still exist. But changes are taking place. As independent Chinese publications seek readers and advertisers, they pursue stories that people want to read; like their counterparts in the West, they have discovered that investigative journalism sells. In one widely discussed case, a veteran reporter for the China Economic Times wrote an in-depth account in 2002 of the Beijing taxi-licensing system. Due to alleged collusion between company owners and the government supervisory body, drivers were being forced to work shockingly long hours for low wages. The newspaper sold out almost immediately. The Central Propaganda Bureau responded by banning other publications from reporting on the story. The city's Transportation Bureau ordered drivers not to read the article. Some of the taxi drivers quoted in the article received death threats, and the author had to be protected by bodyguards for three months. The public uproar mounted, however, as the news spread to the Internet. Eight days after the story was printed, then Vice Premier Wen Jiabao issued an official statement supporting the taxi drivers and directing that a report on the situation be prepared for then Premier Zhu Rongji.

One experiment that has caught the attention of many Chinese is the government's decision to allow foreign journalists to travel and report freely throughout China (with the exception of Tibet) from January 2007 through the 2008 Beijing Olympics. "It's clearly a test," a Chinese newspaper editor said, "to see how the foreign press uses its new freedom. Unless something goes terribly wrong, it's hard to see how the government can reimpose the old system when the Olympics are over." Not surprisingly, there have been numerous teething problems: in July, several foreign journalists covering an antigovernment demonstration held by an international human rights group were detained for several hours. Still, foreign correspondents in Beijing report that, in general, restrictions on their movements and activities have been relaxed noticeably since the new policy was announced.

In the past several years, the Internet and cell phones have started to challenge traditional media by becoming channels for the expression of citizen outrage, at times forcing the government to take action. One celebrated instance was the "nail house" incident in the sprawling metropolis of Chongqing, in central China. For three years, a middle-class couple stubbornly refused to sell their house to property developers who, with the municipal government's permission, planned to raze the entire area and turn it into a commercial district. The neighbors had long ago moved away. The developer tried to intimidate the couple by digging a three-story canyon around their lone house, but the tactic backfired spectacularly. Photos of their home's precarious situation were posted on the Internet, sparking outrage among Chinese across the country. Within weeks, tens of thousands of messages had been posted lambasting the Chongqing government for letting such a thing happen. Reporters camped out at the site; even official newspapers took up the couple's cause. In the end, the couple settled for a new house and over $110,000 in compensation. The widely read daily Beijing News ran a commentary that would have been inconceivable in a Chinese newspaper a decade ago: "This is an inspiration for the Chinese public in the emerging age of civil rights. . . . Media coverage of this event has been rational and constructive. This is encouraging for the future of citizens defending their rights according to the law."

In another example of the marriage of new technology and citizen action, last May angry residents in the southern coastal city of Xiamen launched a campaign to force the city government to stop the construction of a large chemical plant on the outskirts of the city. Their weapon was the cell phone. In a matter of days, hundreds of thousands of text messages opposing the plant were forwarded, spreading like a virus throughout the country. Xiamen authorities, who had ignored popular opposition to the plant before, suddenly announced that construction would be suspended until an environmental impact study could be completed. Dissatisfied with this half measure, citizens again used message networking to organize a march of some 7,000 people to demand a permanent halt to the construction. Although local party newspapers blasted the protest as illegal, it was allowed to proceed without incident, marking one of the largest peaceful demonstrations in China in recent years.
 
Part 3 of 3

Long Time Coming
The Prospects for Democracy in China

By John L. Thornton

From Foreign Affairs , January/February 2008  cont

DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

Recent progress in elections, judicial independence, and oversight is part of the transformation of Chinese society and the expansion of personal freedoms that have accompanied three decades of breakneck economic reform and development. The government remains intrusive in many areas but much less so than before.

In the past 20 years, several hundred million Chinese have migrated from the countryside to the cities -- the largest wave of rapid urbanization in history. Until a decade ago, the government enforced stringent controls on internal migration. Today, officials cite the additional 300 million farmers expected to move to cities over the next two decades as a positive force that will help alleviate China's urban-rural income gap. The state once assigned jobs and housing to every urban resident. Now, urban Chinese enjoy overseas travel to study, work, or play. Ten years ago, a Chinese citizen needed to get permission from his supervisor, his work unit's party secretary, and the local police just to apply for a passport, a process that could take six months, assuming the passport was approved at all. The entire procedure takes less than a week today, and approval is nearly as automatic as it is in the United States. Less than two decades ago, all foreigners in Beijing were forced to live in designated locations, such as hotels or compounds guarded by military police. Today, foreigners and Chinese live side by side. When Chinese are asked about the democratization of their society, they are as likely to mention these sorts of changes as they are elections or judicial reform. They may be confusing the concept of liberty with that of democracy, but it would be a mistake to dismiss the expansion of their personal freedom as insignificant.

A senior Communist Party official I know marveled privately that ten years ago it would have been unimaginable for someone in his position to even be having an open discussion about democracy with an American. Now, the debate in China is no longer about whether to have democracy, he said, but about when and how. One thing the party should do immediately, he felt, was reform the National People's Congress so that it does not become a "retirement home" for former officials; the National People's Congress should be populated by competent professionals and eventually become a true legislative body. The government should also implement direct elections up to the provincial level, he argued, not Western-style multiparty elections but at least a contest involving a real choice of candidates.

The chair of one of China's largest corporations, who is also an alternate member of the CCP Central Committee, told me that better corporate governance in companies listed on overseas stock exchanges (and thus held to international norms), such as his, was another example of the expansion of "democratic habits" in China. Although corporate governance in China remains a work in progress, this chair said, the general trend among state-owned enterprises, especially those listed abroad, is toward greater transparency, stronger and more independent boards of directors, and management by mutually agreed rules. Over time, working in such an environment is likely to inculcate more democratic patterns of thinking in China's business elite, as well as in senior government officials who sit on the boards of state-owned enterprises.

Over the last century, no one has thought more about the promise of democracy in their country or been more dismayed by its elusiveness than the Chinese themselves. Again and again, they have witnessed a native democratic impulse surge and crash or be crushed prematurely. The empress dowager Cixi quashed the 1898 "hundred days of reform" initiated by advisers to the emperor Guangxu. The optimism that surrounded Sun's inauguration as provisional president of the Chinese Republic on January 1, 1912, was soon extinguished by the military ruler Yuan Shikai, who tried to crown himself as the first emperor of a new dynasty in 1915. Progressives within both the Nationalist and the Communist Parties espoused democratic forms of government in the 1930s before the onslaught of wars with Japan and then with each other. The establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 augured an era of self-determination, prosperity, and democracy. But that hope was crushed under the foot of Mao's relentless political campaigns, culminating in the Cultural Revolution. Before the tragedy of Tiananmen in 1989, the 1980s were a period of intense political ferment, when democracy was debated inside the government, think tanks, universities, and intellectual salons.

Compared to in those periods, the way in which China's leaders talk about democracy today may seem cautious. Critics argue that this reflects the government's lack of real commitment to political reform. Optimists believe that gradualism will make the current liberalization last longer than the euphoric, but ultimately failed, experiences of the past. One of China's elder statesman -- who has known personally all of the country's top leaders since Mao -- insisted to me that democracy has always been the "common aspiration" of the Chinese people. They are determined to get it right, he argued, but they require patience from the West. "Please let the Chinese experiment," he said. "Let us explore."

Where that exploration will lead is an open question. There is a range of views among Chinese about how long will be required for democracy to take root, but there is also some agreement. One official put it this way: "No one predicts five years. Some think ten to 15. Some say 30 to 35. And no one says 60." Others predict that the process will take at least two more generational changes in the CCP's leadership -- a scenario that would place its advent around the year 2022.

In 2004, a survey was conducted among nearly 700 local officials who had attended a provincial training program. More than 60 percent of the officials polled said that they were dissatisfied with the state of democracy in the country then, and 63 percent said that political reform in China was too slow. On the other hand, 59 percent of them said that economic development should take precedence over democracy. And tellingly, 67 percent of the cadres supported popular elections for village leaders and 41 percent supported elections for county heads, compared with only 13 percent for elections for provincial governors and just 9 percent for elections for China's president.

Some Chinese like to point out that it took the United States almost two centuries to achieve universal suffrage. In the first several American presidential elections, most states restricted voting to white male landowners -- no more than ten percent of the adult U.S. population at the time. Women had to wait until the twentieth century, and blacks in effect until the 1960s. "This is one issue," a Beijing newspaper editor joked, "about which we Chinese may be less patient than you Americans."

Last spring, an article provocatively titled "Democracy Is a Good Thing" caused a small sensation in China. Published in a journal closely linked to the CCP, the article was authored by Yu Keping, the head of a think tank that reports directly to the CCP Central Committee. Although hardly blind to democracy's drawbacks (it "affords opportunities for certain sweet-talking political fraudsters to mislead the people"), Yu was forthright and specific in his approval of it: "Among all the political systems that have been invented and implemented, democracy is the one with the least number of flaws. That is to say, relatively speaking, democracy is the best political system for humankind."

Yu did not predict an easy road to democracy in China. "Under conditions of democratic rule," he observed, "officials must be elected by the citizens and they must gain the endorsement and support of the majority of the people; their powers will be curtailed by the citizens, they cannot do whatever they want, they have to sit down across from the people and negotiate. Just these two points alone already make many people dislike it. Therefore, democratic politics will not operate on its own; it requires the people themselves and the government officials who represent the interests of the people to promote and implement [it]."

Clearly, some people at the center of the Chinese system are thinking actively about these fundamental questions. The issue is whether and how these ideas will be translated into practice. China must now complete the transition begun in recent years, from a system that relies on the authority and judgment of one or a few dominating figures to a government run by commonly accepted and binding rules. The institutionalization of power is shared by all countries that have successfully made the transition to democracy. China's ongoing experiments with local elections, reform of the judicial system, and the strengthening of oversight are all part of the shift to a more rule-based system. So are the ways in which Chinese society continues to open and diversify, incrementally creating a civil society.

Institutionalization may progress the most over the next few years in an area that could be decisive in determining China's political evolution: leadership succession. How a country manages the transfer of power at the very top sends an unmistakable signal to all levels below. On this point, China has already come some way. To be chosen as Mao's successor was the most perilous position one could be put in. Deng had his own problems anointing a durable successor; he remained the most powerful man in China for nearly a decade after relinquishing all his official posts in 1989. It was his successor, Jiang, who saw the first peaceful transfer of power in modern Chinese history, when he gave up his positions to Hu. Jiang has remained a power behind the scenes, but no one would suggest that he holds the influence that Deng did.

One senior leader told me that the issue of succession can no longer be managed effectively in the ad hoc manner of the past. Both China and the world have changed too much; the process of selecting the country's leaders needs to be institutionalized. The problem, he explained, was that an acceptable new process has yet to be put in place, and until one is, it would be impractical to jettison the old system. China finds itself in an ambiguous transition at the moment. For his part, this leader believed that progress might be seen by the time of the Third Plenum of the 17th Party Congress, in 2009. Some party members have even suggested that Hu's heir as general secretary of the CCP could be chosen through a vote of the entire Central Committee when Hu retires in 2012. The method by which Hu's successor is selected will be an unmistakable indicator of the political future China's current generation of leaders envisions -- signaling whether they believe, as Sun did a century ago, that democracy can best deliver the prosperity, independence, and liberty for which the Chinese people have struggled and sacrificed for so many years.

Those who follow my ramblings on Army.ca will know that I disagree with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s definition of democracy as having three components: “elections, judicial independence, and supervision based on checks and balances.” While I agree that elections and judicial independence are necessary, the second is only a subset, as Thornton later discusses, of the rule of law and I believe that respect for the rule of law is, even above elections, the sine qua non of democracy. I agree with Thornton that this is a delicate matter in China. For us liberals (real liberals, not what the lazy, ill-educated US media means when it misuses the term) there is no question that the law – all laws and regulations must apply equally and consistently to all, governed and governors alike; there is no law unless it binds both citizen and sovereign.

It may be of interest to know that I am not worried by Wen’s last attribute: “supervision.” As I have said before, there are three kinds of democracies:

1. Liberal democracies – such as we find in e.g. Australia, America, Britain and Canada, however retarded Canada’s democracy may be as we retain appointed legislatures and grotesquely unequal representation by population in the chambers we do elect;

2. Illiberal democracies – which are the norm in most of the world, including, I suggest throughout some (most?) of Europe; and

3. Conservative democracies – which, as Thornton also points out, are rather common in East Asia.

It is not or, at least, ought not to be surprising that deeply conservative societies (cultures) like those in Japan and Singapore adopt highly conservative forms of democracy ion which form of oversight is maintained in a way which is acceptable to the very conservative citizens. Singapore is a full, functioning democracy despite the fact that a whole array of Western commentators don’t like how the society and the political culture operate. What is surprising, to me, is that there is a such a vibrant multi-party system in Korea. (I am less surprised in about the multi-party system in Taiwan because there, I think there is a very real, open, political disagreement between the reunification and sovereignty parties.) My guess is that the Korean, too, have some basic, unresolved issues, unlike Japan and Singapore,  in both of which, I think there is a broad and deep socio-cultural consensus about the direction those nations ought to be taking.

Therefore, I think I should say I guess that China will, slowly but surely, adopt a variant of the Singapore model in which a single national party controls an increasingly democratic (as we tend to understand the word) federal system. The real democracy will be most evident at the local level and in the selection of delegates to provincial party congresses. In some respects this will look rather like an idealized form of democracy about which I have mused, now and again, in which local people, in their neighbourhoods, villages and districts, elect some representatives from whom local, regional, provincial and finally national legislators are selected. I would prefer that the people, themselves, select everyone for every post but I am prepared to accept that in deeply conservative societies some will want a higher (more trusted, perhaps remote) body to oversee selection for higher level offices to ensure a harmonious outcome – social harmony being one of the mainstays of the conservative value system.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Those who follow my ramblings on Army.ca will know that I disagree with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s definition of democracy as having three components: “elections, judicial independence, and supervision based on checks and balances.” While I agree that elections and judicial independence are necessary, the second is only a subset, as Thornton later discusses, of the rule of law and I believe that respect for the rule of law is, even above elections, the sine qua non of democracy. I agree with Thornton that this is a delicate matter in China. For us liberals (real liberals, not what the lazy, ill-educated US media means when it misuses the term) there is no question that the law – all laws and regulations must apply equally and consistently to all, governed and governors alike; there is no law unless it binds both citizen and sovereign.

It may be of interest to know that I am not worried by Wen’s last attribute: “supervision.” As I have said before, there are three kinds of democracies:

1. Liberal democracies – such as we find in e.g. Australia, America, Britain and Canada, however retarded Canada’s democracy may be as we retain appointed legislatures and grotesquely unequal representation by population in the chambers we do elect;

2. Illiberal democracies – which are the norm in most of the world, including, I suggest throughout some (most?) of Europe; and

3. Conservative democracies – which, as Thornton also points out, are rather common in East Asia.

It is not or, at least, ought not to be surprising that deeply conservative societies (cultures) like those in Japan and Singapore adopt highly conservative forms of democracy ion which form of oversight is maintained in a way which is acceptable to the very conservative citizens. Singapore is a full, functioning democracy despite the fact that a whole array of Western commentators don’t like how the society and the political culture operate. What is surprising, to me, is that there is a such a vibrant multi-party system in Korea. (I am less surprised in about the multi-party system in Taiwan because there, I think there is a very real, open, political disagreement between the reunification and sovereignty parties.) My guess is that the Korean, too, have some basic, unresolved issues, unlike Japan and Singapore,  in both of which, I think there is a broad and deep socio-cultural consensus about the direction those nations ought to be taking.

Therefore, I think I should say I guess that China will, slowly but surely, adopt a variant of the Singapore model in which a single national party controls an increasingly democratic (as we tend to understand the word) federal system. The real democracy will be most evident at the local level and in the selection of delegates to provincial party congresses. In some respects this will look rather like an idealized form of democracy about which I have mused, now and again, in which local people, in their neighbourhoods, villages and districts, elect some representatives from whom local, regional, provincial and finally national legislators are selected. I would prefer that the people, themselves, select everyone for every post but I am prepared to accept that in deeply conservative societies some will want a higher (more trusted, perhaps remote) body to oversee selection for higher level offices to ensure a harmonious outcome – social harmony being one of the mainstays of the conservative value system.

Campbell,

Didn't I already point out that China is seriously considering the Singapore model, as well as recognizing the importance of "Rule of Law" according to Dr. Pan Wei when he elaborates on the "Rule of Law Regime" in this previous post of mine:

With all due respect, you probably mean "they are NOT YET a superpower", but from the current rate their economy is growing, they will be a superpower within the next 50 years, provided the Chinese Communist Party can keep stability. During my study abroad program in Beijing, a  Bei Da professor named Dr.  Pan Wei once lectured to us that he foresaw Chinese GDP per capita and standard of living reaching on par with US incomes and standard of living by the mid 2020s. And mind you, this guy is considered to be more of a moderate. He advocates that in order to keep power without sacrificing economic growth, that the Beijing govt. must follow a system similar to that of Singapore, which also has a One-Party System as well as a prosperous economy. Dr. Pan Wei advocated what was called a "Rule of Law Regime", which called for the following features:

1.) A one party-system which had  a civil service which advanced through Merit
2.) an independent anti-corruption agency like those agencies both Singapore (the CPIB) and Hong Kong (the ICAC) has
3.) though it was a one party system, there was a separate judiciary

Singapore's CPIB info
http://www.cpib.gov.sg/aboutus.htm

Hong Kong's ICAC
http://www.cpib.gov.sg/aboutus.htm

Dr. Pan Wei's "Rule of Law Regime"
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/content/qy59mu0p3fpfqx3j/

Source: Pan, Wei (2003). Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China
In Journal of Contemporary China, 12(34), pp. 3-43.
Location: Journal of Contemporary China

Thus China's CCP wanted to use Singapore's People Action Party as an example of how a one-party regime could survive in a modern world where the trend was thought to be going toward multiparty, liberal democracies.

Thus, the CCP is observing and adapting, while ensuring that nothing interferes with the nation's continuining economic prosperity. The large amount of corruption in China's govt. may indeed make that govt. a "house of cards", but if the CCP consolidates like Singapore's PAP did under all those decades of prosperity under Premier Lee Kuan Yew, then the CCP may yet survive and make China a superpower.  The fact that the Chinese also makes a large portion of Singapore's current population makes their system more attractive to Beijing, since it proves it can work with Chinese people.

(One more thing...Dr. Pan Wei obviously profits from his political consultation to the govt., since he drove an Mercedes SLK to class)

As for your and Thornton's definitions of the "Conservative Democracies" of East and Southeast Asia, perhaps a better term would be the Conservative Tiger Economy Democracies, since those that fit those characteristics would be the 4 Asian Tigers: Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore- as well as Japan.

I do agree that the CCP may want a variant of the Singapore system, but you've probably already noticed that its appeal among them lies primarily in the fact that it is pretty much a one-party system- with the PAP in power- in Singapore.

You've also yet to comment on my response in the previous page about how PRC needs to periodically demonstrate its power as one precondition to maintaining to the internal stability its economy also relies upon, as well as my comments regarding how the Taiwanese/benshengren is distinct enough for them to seek independence and seperation from that mainstream Chinese culture which the PRC is trying to represent not only to Taiwan, but to all overseas Chinese. (I mean the particular long post of mine towards the bottom of page 17, just before the post of Kirkhill at the bottom of the page)

Kirkhill,

As for your comments on those glacial lakes, so you mean to tell me you haven't even looked at Sichuan province downriver down the Yangtze/Chang Jiang from Tibet/Xi Zhang province? So what is Sichuan? Chopped Tofu?  ;D Chinese civilization did begin along the Huang He/Yellow River, but the more recent incarnations of China- including the Ming, Qing, the 1927-1949 ROC of Chiang, and the PRC, have also depended on the Pearl River and the Yangtze as water sources; the Pearl River Delta is in fact surrounded by at least five Chinese major cities in that region: Guangzhou, Macao (called Aomen in Mandarin), Hong Kong, Zhuhai and Shenzhen. You may have a point that Tibet would be important because its glacial lakes feed the Yangtze, but I would not completely overlook the importance of the other two rivers, in spite of the pollution from the water traffic and other sources that plague sections of all 3 rivers today.

Of course, there is some long-term planning element in Chinese society- there should be one in any society. An element of this planning you should not overlook is the Grand Canal waterway built by the Sui Dynasty (though at least one section predates that), which flows through Beijing and ends in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province (that's 6 provinces it crosses!), of which parts are still usable by boats today! ;D

You also have Lake Dongting which borders both Hubei and Hunan provinces, (the former means the North of the Lake, while the latter means South of the Lake  ;D ); while Dongting is filled by the Yangtze and obviously does not date back to any ice-age or glacial period, it is one of the many lakes of China and a probable source of freshwater, aside from the rivers.

As for which China we are talking about, we can go off all day about which China we are talking about- the Huang He or Yellow River ancient civilization or the PRC or the Han Chinese mainstream Culture- but the ones of interest to Canada should be the latter two, with the former because of how we deal with Beijing in our foreign policy, and the latter because it will better help other Canadians understand Canadians of Chinese descent, whether they are new immigrants or were born here.

 
CougarDaddy - 1 Billion into Sichuan would be a pretty tight fit - and the water there still has to come from someplace (Tibet). 

I agree every society SHOULD engage in long term planning. 

Or do I?  With long term planning you get long term answers, or Truths, and Monocultures which are very susceptible to the Unforeseen and Random Events anyway.... We in the west don't do long temp planning. Full Stop.  Perhaps that's the reason we're still here.  Some go left. Some go right. One side guesses wrong and dies.  The other side guesses right and survives.  If everybody did the same thing perhaps we would all die.....

Nope.  I don't like long term planning.  Bad for the health.  ;)

I think I do finally see where Edward and the CCP are heading though, given my Anglo-Centric blinders.  Our democracy didn't develop out of a group of people sitting around a table one day having a vote on democracy and writing a constitution.  It happened in a controlled environment with a power aristocracy that fought amonst itself supplying a negative feedback control loop.  Unfettered democracy results in a runaway positive feedback system with no limits.  The CCP is setting itself up as the House of Lords.

 
Kirkhill said:
CougarDaddy - 1 Billion into Sichuan would be a pretty tight fit - and the water there still has to come from someplace (Tibet). 

I meant Sichuan as one of the alternative water sources other than Tibet, but the point is now moot because it's apparent that most of the water in Sichuan(a name that translate to the land of "4 river gorge systems") also flows from Tibet.  :-\
 
CougarDaddy said:
I meant Sichuan as one of the alternative water sources other than Tibet, but the point is now moot because it's apparent that most of the water in Sichuan(a name that translate to the land of "4 river gorge systems") also flows from Tibet.  :-\

As does the Mekong of Indo-China, the Irrawaddy of Burma and the Brahmaputra of Bangladesh. 

Maybe all Beijing really needs is a good waterless toilet and some drip agriculture systems.... ;D 
 
Waterless toilets? I'm sorry, I gave up squatting toilets that you don't sit on when I left Asia.  ;D

BTW, who taught English to people nowadays in the PRC??? The English on some bilingual signs is not just bad, it's ludicrous! 

For example, a train station is not called a "CHOO-CHOO" station"- but there it was printed in English on a Beijing terminal, right below the Chinese translation. SHEESH!   (A train is called huo che in Mandarin, for those of you who are wondering, not CHOO-CHOO, either, hehehe)

;D

And who came up with the term "water closet"? (A lot of bathrooms/washrooms in mainland China have the English letters "W. C." printed on them, which obviously stands for "water closet") It's a freaking bathroom/ce suo or washroom/xi shuo jian! I guess those Olympic/tourism planners figured every North American tourist/European tourist would know what "W.C." stands for. Hehehe...

;D
 
I did say a "good" waterless toilet.  Not a longdrop.
 
Kirkhill said:
I did say a "good" waterless toilet.  Not a longdrop.

Who said anything about the squatting toilet/long drop having any water?  ;D

You go past the W.C. sign and behind the door is just a frigging pit! Well, as you would expect, this would be more common as you travelled Westwards through China. Toilet and Pepto-Bismal will be your close friends the next few weeks if you come with an appetite.

 
CougarDaddy said:
...
You've also yet to comment on my response in the previous page about how PRC needs to periodically demonstrate its power as one precondition to maintaining to the internal stability its economy also relies upon, as well as my comments regarding how the Taiwanese/benshengren is distinct enough for them to seek independence and seperation from that mainstream Chinese culture which the PRC is trying to represent not only to Taiwan, but to all overseas Chinese. (I mean the particular long post of mine towards the bottom of page 17, just before the post of Kirkhill at the bottom of the page)
...

I’m not really ducking your question, CougarDaddy, it’s just that it touches on yet another of that humungous range of topics on which I have no useful or informed opinion.

With specific regard to the benshengren vs waishengren issue and Taiwan’s future, I said, a couple of pages back, that I expect the waishengren to prevail because, in my reading of history, the dominant ethnic group in a region (i.e. China, proper, rather than just the islands of Taiwan) tends to prevail in, at least, the short and medium terms – although the Balkans may (as they so often do) confound that analysis.

I think the idea that any country must “periodically demonstrate its power as one precondition to maintaining ... internal stability” is popular but not too well founded. There are certainly examples, going back as far as 2,500 years or so and as recently as today (North Korea), which appear to demonstrate that such is the way of totalitarian governments facing domestic/economic difficulties, but, once again, my reading is somewhat different.

I’m sure there were/are some rulers who did/do exactly as you suggest – Vladimir Putin comes to mind. But, in the main, I think aggressive demonstrations of power are usually the result of a desire to grow and expand in order to increase the commonweal and, consequently, the ruler’s share thereof. I see these as positive aggressive acts or postures – designed to accomplish something, rather than negative acts or postures – designed to hold the line or distract the people from the government’s deeper, domestic problems. There is, at least, an even chance my analysis is quite wrong – but it’s mine, and absent any better arguments than I’ve heard to date, I’ll stick with it.

Caveat lector:The closer we get to Chinese specifics the less firm my ground becomes – my knowledge of China, poor as it is, is organic rather than systemic: informed by people close to me and others with whom I have been fortunate enough to discuss issues that interest me.

My main interests are in the nature of democracy and how (and why) it works or, too often, doesn’t work. That has led me to thinking about culture and how they (because there are many) lead people towards (or away from) democracy. That, in turn has led me to consider (ever since I read Fareed Zakaria’s The Rise of Illiberal Democracy about ten years ago) the idea that our idea of a liberal democracy à la America, Britain, Canada and Denmark, might not be the only possibility. Unlike Zakaria, I have come to believe that illiberal democracies can and do work in illiberal societies and that there are, also, conservative democracies (albeit few in number) that work in conservative societies. Thus my (other than personal) interest in China: It is a deeply conservative society that understands, intuitively (I think) at a societal level, that (some form of) democracy is the handmaid of a sound economy and the essential (for conservatives) social harmony. I’m guessing – but I hope it’s an educated guess- that China will opt for some form of a conservative democracy.

I am fortunate to know a few forty-something educated, ambitious Chinese people who are, right now, approaching or entering the senior ranks of academe, business and government and they have been generous in telling me their views and, now and again, arranging for me to meet their superiors and discuss ideas with them – but that doesn’t replace solid, supervised academic research. I have, simply, sought to learn a bit about how some Chinese look at some of the ideas that animate my thinking.
 
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