FJAG
Army.ca Legend
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I can't put my finger on it, but I suspect that the greatest impediment comes from within the civilian side of the department. For quite a while now we equip the CAF with just enough stuff to support its peacetime roles and a small training increment rather than equip the entire force that has been authorized and which collects a pay cheque every month. That ignores the ability to surge the force to its full capability.
One needs to either a) recognize that the force needs to be fully equipped to go "all in," or alternatively b) reduce the overall size of the force to meet just the peacetime role you are prepared to equip them for.
I'll keep using the insurance analogy. You either pay for the premium that will pay out if there is a catastrophic event or assume the risk that you will never need the insurance and therefore stop paying the premiums. Only a moron would pay premiums for a policy that is incapable of paying out on any claims.
Ditto in 1965 when I first joined. Even the reserves in those days were using the same guns, trucks, radios that the regs had - just in fewer numbers. The Militia had some 27 field and medium regiments and some 14 light and medium antiaircraft regiments with enough people and operational equipment to form around 5 to 6 fully equipped field regiments and 2 to 3 AD regiments. These were in addition to four fully equipped and functioning RegF field regiments.
A year later we were down to the equivalent of 22 field regiments and no air defence. The equipment was still there but it stayed the same while the regular army's four regiments updated its guns to M109s and L5s and the vehicle fleets and the radios were updated while its numbers were drastically reduced. The Militia could still form about 3 or 4 full field regiments using older but still serviceable and operational equipment.
The ARes is now down to the equivalent of 16 field regiments but with no serviceable equipment, no capability to form operational regiments and being merely a group of office overload personnel to augment a RegF that does not have the guns to even form two full regiments. And yet, this piddling force draws tens of billions of dollars every year.
This is the typical example of the frog and boiling water analogy. This complete loss of a credible capability has come about so slowly over such a long time that the people throughout the system at this time aren't even aware of the extent of the death spiral they are in. Their fingers are raw and bleeding from merely hanging on to ever more expensive PYs while equipment has become a farce. For them, regiments with two four-gun batteries is a normal state of being. This is absolute stupidity.
The LAV, Leopard and M777 fleets are still serviceable (if properly maintained) but their deterioration will accelerate greatly if they keep being used at their current rates. All three of these systems need to be placed in reserve now in order to reduce wear and tear on them and to keep them available for operational use in the future. All three need to be replaced immediately by a fleet of IFVs, new tanks and SPs if we ever expect to be able to maintain and grow the force but of those three systems, only the SPs are being looked at realistically (and I expect in nowhere near the numbers required to grow three full regiments).
Unfortunately there is no time to react. By the time new fleets enter the system, the old equipment will be too clapped out to even put into reserve, and, as you predict, the replacement fleets (and all the novel gear that an army in 2035 will need) will come in numbers to inadequate to equip the PYs still hanging around and to form the force that the country will need.
