CAN Enhanced (Permanent?) Fwd Presence in Latvia

[PrairieFella]

Forward makes sense - under JTAC/FOO/MFC control for targeting and whomever is running the airspace these days…

I think a particular focus should be the brigade recce. Perfect weapons for deep strikes to attrite the enemy before the main body shows up.

 

[KevinB]

I think a particular focus should be the brigade recce. Perfect weapons for deep strikes to attrite the enemy before the main body shows up.

Start thinking more defensively. That formation isn’t going anywhere but backwards…

 

[PrairieFella]

Start thinking more defensively. That formation isn’t going anywhere but backwards…

The goal of the defensive is to...

In all seriousness, its a prfect weapon for the delay to attrite the enemy before the main body shows up.

 

[markppcli]

I think a particular focus should be the brigade recce. Perfect weapons for deep strikes to attrite the enemy before the main body shows up.

LRPF will likely go to the artillery. It’s a 10k range on the 300 and 40k on the 600. That’s probably outside the scope most maneuver commanders want to work in, and Bde recce doesn’t need it organic to call it in, never mind have the capacity to clear air space for it.

 

[PrairieFella]

LRPF will likely go to the artillery. It’s a 10k range on the 300 and 40k on the 600. That’s probably outside the scope most maneuver commanders want to work in, and Bde recce doesn’t need it organic to call it in, never mind have the capacity to clear air space for it.

If it goes to the arty we run into the very real problem of who uses it? The arty only has so many dudes and new guns, missiles, AD, STA, potentially mortars and now drones are a heck of a lot of kit. Good problem to have for the Arty let me tell ya.

 

[markppcli]

If it goes to the arty we run into the very real problem of who uses it? The arty only has so many dudes and new guns, missiles, AD, STA, potentially mortars and now drones are a heck of a lot of kit. Good problem to have for the Arty let me tell ya.

You can say the same about any trade at this point. The artillery has a full battery of gunners (W) assigned to the school. You could thin that out to man LRPF in 4 GS, or just give them the task to man the troop in Latvia.

What new guns does the artillery have? They moved the mortars back to the infantry years ago.

 

[PrairieFella]

You can say the same about any trade at this point. The artillery has a full battery of gunners (W) assigned to the school. You could thin that out to man LRPF in 4 GS, or just give them the task to man the troop in Latvia.

What new guns does the artillery have? They moved the mortars back to the infantry years ago.

I'm talking the RFI that came out today. I recognize it's years out but I'm just thinking mid-term here, where are these dudes going to come from in the next few years.

 

[markppcli]

I'm talking the RFI that came out today. I recognize it's years out but I'm just thinking mid-term here, where are these dudes going to come from in the next few years.

Mortars to the infantry, enough guns to man 3 x 18 gun regiments. LRPF in 4 GS. Ideally there’s some mixed reserve manning but the C3s are dead, and M777s are already close to twenty years old they’ll be close to clapped out by the time new SPGs come online.

 

[FJAG]

I'll leave the mortars issue to the C3 replacement thread but in short - leave them with the infantry as organic to battalions.

I think one has to look at the loitering munition situation in layers. Some, which can be easily handled and managed and used within the battalion's area of influence, should clearly belong within the battalion. I'll leave it to the infantry to decide if they should be a rifle company or CS company assets or both.

Beyond that we're looking at two sets of long range fires. First, something along the HIMARS line which can be both precision or area and, IMHO, should be div general support (possibly allocated down to bde in given circumstances. Definitely an arty resource.

The other is loitering precision munitions (I'll include Switchblade 600). These longer, but not very long range, munitions are very useful for degrading precision targets - primarily vehicles - in depth.

We have a conundrum here. Precision direct fires used to be split between the armoured corps (tanks) and arty (anti-tank regiments). Post WW2 and with the advent of such things as missiles, the CA in its infinite turf war wisdom decided to make the primary anti-tank weapon the tank and ash-caned all the anti-tank regiments. The infantry was allowed to keep 106mm recoilless rifles and early anti-tank missiles (like the SS 11).

The question now is: who will own heavier, longer range loitering precision munitions?

We're probably into another PY fight for relevance but quite frankly my gunner heritage is showing. IMHO the best solution is to convert the existing STA battery in each close support regiment to have an STA troop for radar and acoustic target acquisition and two to three loitering munitions launcher troops. STA batteries already have much of the organizational knowhow to handle, coordinate and execute target acquisition and control engagements

I see two sets of "pilots" one set with forward operators such as JTACs and techs in existing FOO parties to fly UAVs and identify targets within a certain band and to guide strikes. A second set that works from the rear where the munitions are launched from to fly the munition to the target and execute the strike. Most of the launcher work is ripe for ResF personnel. There is potential to crossover these roles.

Effectively, when recce squadrons are sent forward, FOOs should be accompanying them (in my day it was common for a bty to be in DS of a bde screen or guard and transition to being with the reserve once the screen or guard is collapsed). Additional short range munitions could be organic to the recce elements and even additional "recce pilots" could fly recce UAVs and call in heavier strike munitions launched by a GS launcher battery.

 

[Infanteer]

Or take the Ukrainian approach and essentially create a new occupation - Uncrewed System Operator.

 

[markppcli]

Or take the Ukrainian approach and essentially create a new occupation - Uncrewed System Operator.

Perhaps as a platoon at Bde. And then with a Pl Comd at the Bde who can manage drone operations ? Got to speak to Ukrainian TACP / UTACs last month and they had some interesting air space insights for sure.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

Perhaps as a platoon at Bde. And then with a Pl Comd at the Bde who can manage drone operations ? Got to speak to Ukrainian TACP / UTACs last month and they had some interesting air space insights for sure.

Perhaps we integrate them down to the Coy level (TACON), but they're centrally managed within a Bde ISR formation (OPCON)?

 

[markppcli]

Perhaps we integrate them down to the Coy level (TACON), but they're centrally managed within a Bde ISR formation (OPCON)?

I think ISR and Strike need to be managed very differently. Everyone is going to be operating ISR UAS on some level down to company and possibly below. That should be managed low level and at the discretion of local commanders. Strike probably needs more blue PA and support to be effective.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

I think ISR and Strike need to be managed very differently. Everyone is going to be operating ISR UAS on some level down to company and possibly below. That should be managed low level and at the discretion of local commanders. Strike probably needs more blue PA and support to be effective.

There is a lot of overlap in the Blue PA and C2 realm between ISR and Strike. RAP and Sensor to Shooter relay being two of them.

My suggestion was based mainly on maintaining a foot in both spheres rather than try to create 2 channels sharing the same info.

Its definitely a tough nut to crack, as we have very little existant doctrine to pull from. Drones becoming combat effects is definitely not something I had on my Bingo card for PACE planning.

 

[FJAG]

Or take the Ukrainian approach and essentially create a new occupation - Uncrewed System Operator.

I've been mulling that over since you first mentioned it and I guess the question that I come back with is what advantage, if any, is there in a new occupation of uncrewed system operator rather than making it a specialty within an existing classification.

I look at this from the point of view of the operators, the command and coordination system, and the logistics system. Ukraine, I think, is a special case where the specialty has developed from the ground up, by necessity, in an organic manner with an indirect fire arm that was, in typical Soviet style, unimaginative.

I see two general uncrewed system uses - strategic - which I think should remain an RCAF function once they get on board (and I don't mean just MQ-9s but a host of cheap but deep strike systems; and tactical uses which are essentially a wide variety of army systems at all operational levels.

I think the operator is the least challenging part of the problem. By all means have a single source of training operators that teaches the skills of drone operation from rifle platoon operator to the division but it should not be its own occupation. At the basic level, operators exist throughout the brigade/division and need the fundamental understanding of army operations at whatever level they are employed as - as part of a rifle platoon or a FOO party or a cavalry troop. They have to properly understand the way their supported organization functions so that they can properly employ their system operator skills to maximum effect.

A more complex issue is the coordination of indirect fires regardless of how delivered. From what I understand, Ukrainians have deployed a fairly slick software solution to compensate for their relatively basic fires coordination capabilities. "Kropyva" is described as an Uber system for indirect fires - plug in a target location and the system finds and recommends the best available response unit to deliver gunfire or rockets or a UAV. The US field artillery has done that for a half a century and NATO has some good solutions for integrating disparate systems in the works. But at the end of the day, coordinating guns, rockets and UAVs is basically a fire support coordination function concentrated at a single source. Observers, regardless as to whether a FOO, JTAC or a pilot of an STA drone or platoon drone, find a target, engage it with resources that they have pre-allocated to them or let the coordination function assign an appropriate effector to engage the target. It doesn't matter if its a gun battery or a drone that engages. It doesn't matter if the FOO or the JTAC engages or a pilot of an armed drone that connects with the original observer and steers his weapon onto the target. What matters is that once you get above the platoon level, the various effects resources are coordinated. Our current bn, bde and div level FSCC and STACC system already functions for that. Where airspace is an issue ASCCs can be plugged in and where greater strategic air resources are required the TACP plugs in. I would argue that we do not need another coordinating centre just the appropriate skills for the folks who already work there.

On the side of logistics, armed drones are basically munitions and the artillery already has logistics channel to deal with these heavier natures. Heavier loitering and armed UAVs can be easily handled through that system while lower echelon units can have theirs handled in the same way that mortar rounds and ATGMs are currently handled.

By all means create a centre of excellence within the RCAS that standardizes tiered training and equipment but let's not create a new occupation that needs to be incorporated into structures that already exist and function well.

 

[Infanteer]

I've been mulling that over since you first mentioned it and I guess the question that I come back with is what advantage, if any, is there in a new occupation of uncrewed system operator rather than making it a specialty within an existing classification.

I look at this from the point of view of the operators, the command and coordination system, and the logistics system. Ukraine, I think, is a special case where the specialty has developed from the ground up, by necessity, in an organic manner with an indirect fire arm that was, in typical Soviet style, unimaginative.

I see two general uncrewed system uses - strategic - which I think should remain an RCAF function once they get on board (and I don't mean just MQ-9s but a host of cheap but deep strike systems; and tactical uses which are essentially a wide variety of army systems at all operational levels.

I think the operator is the least challenging part of the problem. By all means have a single source of training operators that teaches the skills of drone operation from rifle platoon operator to the division but it should not be its own occupation. At the basic level, operators exist throughout the brigade/division and need the fundamental understanding of army operations at whatever level they are employed as - as part of a rifle platoon or a FOO party or a cavalry troop. They have to properly understand the way their supported organization functions so that they can properly employ their system operator skills to maximum effect.

A more complex issue is the coordination of indirect fires regardless of how delivered. From what I understand, Ukrainians have deployed a fairly slick software solution to compensate for their relatively basic fires coordination capabilities. "Kropyva" is described as an Uber system for indirect fires - plug in a target location and the system finds and recommends the best available response unit to deliver gunfire or rockets or a UAV. The US field artillery has done that for a half a century and NATO has some good solutions for integrating disparate systems in the works. But at the end of the day, coordinating guns, rockets and UAVs is basically a fire support coordination function concentrated at a single source. Observers, regardless as to whether a FOO, JTAC or a pilot of an STA drone or platoon drone, find a target, engage it with resources that they have pre-allocated to them or let the coordination function assign an appropriate effector to engage the target. It doesn't matter if its a gun battery or a drone that engages. It doesn't matter if the FOO or the JTAC engages or a pilot of an armed drone that connects with the original observer and steers his weapon onto the target. What matters is that once you get above the platoon level, the various effects resources are coordinated. Our current bn, bde and div level FSCC and STACC system already functions for that. Where airspace is an issue ASCCs can be plugged in and where greater strategic air resources are required the TACP plugs in. I would argue that we do not need another coordinating centre just the appropriate skills for the folks who already work there.

On the side of logistics, armed drones are basically munitions and the artillery already has logistics channel to deal with these heavier natures. Heavier loitering and armed UAVs can be easily handled through that system while lower echelon units can have theirs handled in the same way that mortar rounds and ATGMs are currently handled.

By all means create a centre of excellence within the RCAS that standardizes tiered training and equipment but let's not create a new occupation that needs to be incorporated into structures that already exist and function well.

At least you're not shy of letting your RCAS anchoring bias show. Is there an advantage to teaching people one complete set of skills (indirect fires) and then teaching them a completely different set of skills (uncrewed system operations) and then having them try to retain both in a career path? If the jobs and tasks between the two are discrete enough, and viable, specialized units and sub-units are required, then the argument for a separate occupation to manage is valid.

You argue UAS should remain an artillery system because of operators, C2, and logistics, but these are the reasons that could be used to justify a separate branch/occupation. In terms of operators and planning, the nature of UAS employment that CA units manage now as compared to AFU Unmanned Systems operations is like comparing a bicycle to a Bugati racing bike. Anyone can hop on and pedal a bicycle, but there are additional factors that take things to the next level.

From an operator and C2 perspective, the average UAS operation in Ukraine takes multiple teams conducting discrete tasks to accomplish a mission. There is the commander who considers site selection and mission parameters, multiple pilots, technicians running ancillary skills like battery and payload management, as well as significant EM spectrum management. Some drones fly as ISR, while other fly in a rebroadcast role to extend the range of other platforms, while others fly in an EW role. ISR approaches vary, with some drones hover around to get information, while FPV drones are used in 100km "pass-by" reconnaissance on pre-set routes to avoid EW jamming. Attacks range from dropping munitions, seeding minefields, to one-way "suicide" attacks. Unmanned systems also include ground vehicles. We are now seeing sophisticated drone ambushes and coordinated unmanned air/ground attacks. Unmanned systems are also used in sustainment roles, from casevac to replenishment. Drone elements are also technically capable of adapting the software and hardware of their systems, as well as fabricating components through 3D printing.

Do we really want to take an artillery officer whose job is to determine how to apply weight of fires to suppress or neutralize the enemy and put this on his or her plate as a side gig?

The logistics argument you provide boils down to "artillery have trucks to move ammo, so they are better suited to manage UAS sustainment." Your example - mortars and ATGMs - aren't even things artillery regiments conduct replenishment on and could be used to justify the Infantry Corps taking on the task.

If one simply views UAS as "armed drones are basically munitions" then the argument to give them to an existing branch could hold, but an uncrewed system (ground, land, or maritime) is not a munition but a battlefield electronic tool which can be employed to a degree requiring sophisticated, unique planning and employment considerations. The Ukrainians have moved beyond the pedal bike and to the Bugati. We may want to consider it as well.

Do combat arms units need UAS to conduct their tasks? Yes - give them the training course so they can use the device to help them achieve their task. But there exists a compelling argument that a discrete mission set exists with uncrewed system employment that could justify a new, specialized branch/occupation.

 

[PrairieFella]

At least you're not shy of letting your RCAS anchoring bias show. Is there an advantage to teaching people one complete set of skills (indirect fires) and then teaching them a completely different set of skills (uncrewed system operations) and then having them try to retain both in a career path? If the jobs and tasks between the two are discrete enough, and viable, specialized units and sub-units are required, then the argument for a separate occupation to manage is valid.

You argue UAS should remain an artillery system because of operators, C2, and logistics, but these are the reasons that could be used to justify a separate branch/occupation. In terms of operators and planning, the nature of UAS employment that CA units manage now as compared to AFU Unmanned Systems operations is like comparing a bicycle to a Bugati racing bike. Anyone can hop on and pedal a bicycle, but there are additional factors that take things to the next level.

From an operator and C2 perspective, the average UAS operation in Ukraine takes multiple teams conducting discrete tasks to accomplish a mission. There is the commander who considers site selection and mission parameters, multiple pilots, technicians running ancillary skills like battery and payload management, as well as significant EM spectrum management. Some drones fly as ISR, while other fly in a rebroadcast role to extend the range of other platforms, while others fly in an EW role. ISR approaches vary, with some drones hover around to get information, while FPV drones are used in 100km "pass-by" reconnaissance on pre-set routes to avoid EW jamming. Attacks range from dropping munitions, seeding minefields, to one-way "suicide" attacks. Unmanned systems also include ground vehicles. We are now seeing sophisticated drone ambushes and coordinated unmanned air/ground attacks. Unmanned systems are also used in sustainment roles, from casevac to replenishment. Drone elements are also technically capable of adapting the software and hardware of their systems, as well as fabricating components through 3D printing.

Do we really want to take an artillery officer whose job is to determine how to apply weight of fires to suppress or neutralize the enemy and put this on his or her plate as a side gig?

The logistics argument you provide boils down to "artillery have trucks to move ammo, so they are better suited to manage UAS sustainment." Your example - mortars and ATGMs - aren't even things artillery regiments conduct replenishment on and could be used to justify the Infantry Corps taking on the task.

If one simply views UAS as "armed drones are basically munitions" then the argument to give them to an existing branch could hold, but an uncrewed system (ground, land, or maritime) is not a munition but a battlefield electronic tool which can be employed to a degree requiring sophisticated, unique planning and employment considerations. The Ukrainians have moved beyond the pedal bike and to the Bugati. We may want to consider it as well.

Do combat arms units need UAS to conduct their tasks? Yes - give them the training course so they can use the device to help them achieve their task. But there exists a compelling argument that a discrete mission set exists with uncrewed system employment that could justify a new, specialized branch/occupation.

To your point, if we really want to use the "trucks to move ammo" angle, no one is better suited than the RCAC in that regard. The armoured squadron echelon is a beast of an organization itself. Realistically I agree it should be a separate occupation. They should be masters of drone warfare. Not masters of artillery who conduct drone ops.

 

[Infanteer]

To your point, if we really want to use the "trucks to move ammo" angle, no one is better suited than the RCAC in that regard.

At least your not shy of letting your RCAC anchoring bias show. Logisticians in second line sustainment organizations move all ammunition, and generally artillery ammunition is about 80% of a fighting organizations load. So an RCAC echelon is peanuts.

Regardless, trying to determine whom is better at moving ammunition and then using it for some sort of logical argument to UAS employment is silly....

 

[Halifax Tar]

At least you're not shy of letting your RCAS anchoring bias show. Is there an advantage to teaching people one complete set of skills (indirect fires) and then teaching them a completely different set of skills (uncrewed system operations) and then having them try to retain both in a career path? If the jobs and tasks between the two are discrete enough, and viable, specialized units and sub-units are required, then the argument for a separate occupation to manage is valid.

You argue UAS should remain an artillery system because of operators, C2, and logistics, but these are the reasons that could be used to justify a separate branch/occupation. In terms of operators and planning, the nature of UAS employment that CA units manage now as compared to AFU Unmanned Systems operations is like comparing a bicycle to a Bugati racing bike. Anyone can hop on and pedal a bicycle, but there are additional factors that take things to the next level.

From an operator and C2 perspective, the average UAS operation in Ukraine takes multiple teams conducting discrete tasks to accomplish a mission. There is the commander who considers site selection and mission parameters, multiple pilots, technicians running ancillary skills like battery and payload management, as well as significant EM spectrum management. Some drones fly as ISR, while other fly in a rebroadcast role to extend the range of other platforms, while others fly in an EW role. ISR approaches vary, with some drones hover around to get information, while FPV drones are used in 100km "pass-by" reconnaissance on pre-set routes to avoid EW jamming. Attacks range from dropping munitions, seeding minefields, to one-way "suicide" attacks. Unmanned systems also include ground vehicles. We are now seeing sophisticated drone ambushes and coordinated unmanned air/ground attacks. Unmanned systems are also used in sustainment roles, from casevac to replenishment. Drone elements are also technically capable of adapting the software and hardware of their systems, as well as fabricating components through 3D printing.

Do we really want to take an artillery officer whose job is to determine how to apply weight of fires to suppress or neutralize the enemy and put this on his or her plate as a side gig?

The logistics argument you provide boils down to "artillery have trucks to move ammo, so they are better suited to manage UAS sustainment." Your example - mortars and ATGMs - aren't even things artillery regiments conduct replenishment on and could be used to justify the Infantry Corps taking on the task.

If one simply views UAS as "armed drones are basically munitions" then the argument to give them to an existing branch could hold, but an uncrewed system (ground, land, or maritime) is not a munition but a battlefield electronic tool which can be employed to a degree requiring sophisticated, unique planning and employment considerations. The Ukrainians have moved beyond the pedal bike and to the Bugati. We may want to consider it as well.

Do combat arms units need UAS to conduct their tasks? Yes - give them the training course so they can use the device to help them achieve their task. But there exists a compelling argument that a discrete mission set exists with uncrewed system employment that could justify a new, specialized branch/occupation.

What is the RCAS ?

 

[Infanteer]

Royal Canadian Artillery School. I should have actually used RRCA - Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery.