CAN Enhanced (Permanent?) Fwd Presence in Latvia

[KevinB]

When I become God Emperor, I shall correct the current Liberal travesty and return Tac Hel to its original, historical, and rightful place.

MH as well.

But will they be funded by the new parents ?

 

[Loachman]

I'll move the funding over as well.

 

[McG]

I think we assume we respond to their build up in kind. We watched them build up for Ukraine for months, I assume they’ll need similar time for a war with NATO.

Okay. But they will also watch our build-up. We cannot assume they will passively watch our build-up, and we must be prepared that they will use leather means to interdict that build-up. Theatre ingress must be tactical operation. This will be the most vulnerable moment for the LIB.

Who says the LIB needs to fly into Latvia?

It could fly into Spain or France or Norway or any of a dozen much safer places and take buses or a train over as long as their equipment and supplies are prepositioned.

Planning to administratively drive through the Suwałki Gap in highway busses is probably also a bad plan. Russia can interdict that with fires. The LIB’s kit will be in Latvia so it cannot operate tactically until it is in Latvia. Someone needs to tactically deliver that LIB into Latvia, because assuming Russia will allow us space to administratively build-up is setting conditions for catastrophic loss before the line of departure.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Okay. But they will also watch our build-up. We cannot assume they will passively watch our build-up, and we must be prepared that they will use leather means to interdict that build-up. Theatre ingress must be tactical operation. This will be the most vulnerable moment for the LIB.


Planning to administratively drive through the Suwałki Gap in highway busses is probably also a bad plan. Russia can interdict that with fires. The LIB’s kit will be in Latvia so it cannot operate tactically until it is in Latvia. Someone needs to tactically deliver that LIB into Latvia, because assuming Russia will allow us space to administratively build-up is setting conditions for catastrophic loss before the line of departure.

I assume these are slower than you desire for a LIB ?

 

[IKnowNothing]

I assume these are slower than you desire for a LIB ?

Commercial ferry from Stockholm to Riga quotes an 18-19 hour transit- I don't suppose that's near the fastest the crossing could be made. Nynasham to Ventspils is listed under 10 hours

 

[McG]

I assume these are slower than you desire for a LIB ?

Maritime delivery of a LIB still has to penetrate Russian interdiction zones, so still requires a tactical operation to achieve.

 

[markppcli]

Okay. But they will also watch our build-up. We cannot assume they will passively watch our build-up, and we must be prepared that they will use leather means to interdict that build-up. Theatre ingress must be tactical operation. This will be the most vulnerable moment for the LIB.


Planning to administratively drive through the Suwałki Gap in highway busses is probably also a bad plan. Russia can interdict that with fires. The LIB’s kit will be in Latvia so it cannot operate tactically until it is in Latvia. Someone needs to tactically deliver that LIB into Latvia, because assuming Russia will allow us space to administratively build-up is setting conditions for catastrophic loss before the line of departure.

What you’re suggesting would be that Russias opening act of war is the destruction of a troop transport. I don’t know if that would be my go to.

Given that you’ve had issues with a sea based crossing, moving them by highways, or flying them in, what would your suggestion for moving them be?

 

[McG]

What you’re suggesting would be that Russias opening act of war is the destruction of a troop transport. I don’t know if that would be my go to.

No. I am not suggesting Russia will single out a Canadian CC-330 for its opening act. Its opening act will be a much broader employment of its long range fires to disrupt NATO preparations, and this will include interdicting forces being moved through its AAAD zones. It will also include striking major transport nodes supporting the build-up. Before troops clash in epic battles on the ground, a conflict with Russia will a war of long range fires, including AAAD. And Kalingrad will remain capable of threatening ingress to Latvia until at least sometime after the epic land battles have started.

Given that you’ve had issues with a sea based crossing, moving them by highways, or flying them in, what would your suggestion for moving them be?

My objection is not with land, air, or sea. As I have stated, the theatre ingress must be executable as a tactical operation, not just a pair of CC-330 that take a single bound from Ottawa strait into Riga … nor busses from Warsaw or ferries from Denmark.

 

[markppcli]

No. I am not suggesting Russia will single out a Canadian CC-330 for its opening act. Its opening act will be a much broader employment of its long range fires to disrupt NATO preparations, and this will include interdicting forces being moved through its AAAD zones. It will also include striking major transport nodes supporting the build-up. Before troops clash in epic battles on the ground, a conflict with Russia will a war of long range fires, including AAAD. And Kalingrad will remain capable of threatening ingress to Latvia until at least sometime after the epic land battles have started.


My objection is not with land, air, or sea. As I have stated, the theatre ingress must be executable as a tactical operation, not just a pair of CC-330 that take a single bound from Ottawa strait into Riga … nor busses from Warsaw or ferries from Denmark.

The tactical operation is going to be either a) moving them before hostilities commence or b) a full sead pack backed with fighter and naval escorts. Likely if it’s B then the Baltics aren’t the ingress point and the utility of that LIB is going to be minimal. The whole LIB fly over plan is a cost and personel saving measure not the best tactical option.

 

[FJAG]

No. I am not suggesting Russia will single out a Canadian CC-330 for its opening act. Its opening act will be a much broader employment of its long range fires to disrupt NATO preparations, and this will include interdicting forces being moved through its AAAD zones. It will also include striking major transport nodes supporting the build-up. Before troops clash in epic battles on the ground, a conflict with Russia will a war of long range fires, including AAAD. And Kalingrad will remain capable of threatening ingress to Latvia until at least sometime after the epic land battles have started.


My objection is not with land, air, or sea. As I have stated, the theatre ingress must be executable as a tactical operation, not just a pair of CC-330 that take a single bound from Ottawa strait into Riga … nor busses from Warsaw or ferries from Denmark.

I would sincerely hope that Canada would deploy its LIB long before open hostilities occur. And yes flying into a distant secure area and moving by buses or trucks would be an option at that time.

Assuming the situation is more threatening or hostilities have broken out then other movement would be necessary and yes, even tactically through what is left of the Gap. Quite frankly if things have gotten to the shape you are contemplating with fires interdicting transport nodes and build ups then my guess would be that Kaliningrad would have ceased to exist as a viable military installation.

Regardless, the LIB would be part of a much, much larger repositioning and reinforcing of NATO resources and would hardly merit notice by the Russians amongst everything else going on.

 

[FJAG]

The whole LIB fly over plan is a cost and personel saving measure not the best tactical option.

I had the same cynical view but the more I look at what's been happening in Ukraine, the more I think that a properly equipped and supported LIB, integrated into a broader defence could be effective assuming a comprehensive plan and preparations are in place. I think much of that depends on how well manned, trained and equipped the four Latvian National Guard brigades become.

I do think it would have been better for the Cdn MN bde to have three mech BGs but I note that the Latvian mech bde is also currently established with two mech and one light bns. Maybe there is a concept, beyond mere lack of resources, that I'm missing.

 

[McG]

The tactical operation is going to be either a) moving them before hostilities commence or b) a full sead pack backed with fighter and naval escorts. Likely if it’s B then the Baltics aren’t the ingress point and the utility of that LIB is going to be minimal. The whole LIB fly over plan is a cost and personel saving measure not the best tactical option.

I agree these may be the CoA we are stuck with, but Russia will pick its own H Hr and that may mean our LIB is stuck out of the fight because we were overly optimistic about the duration of early warning prior Russia wielding lethal effects.

Assuming the situation is more threatening or hostilities have broken out then other movement would be necessary and yes, even tactically through what is left of the Gap.

But our LIB is not going to move itself tactically through the gap because it will not have its equipment until after it is through the gap and completed marry-up.

Quite frankly if things have gotten to the shape you are contemplating with fires interdicting transport nodes and build ups then my guess would be that Kaliningrad would have ceased to exist as a viable military installation.

Kaliningrad fires will be a threat until Kaliningrad is occupied.

Regardless, the LIB would be part of a much, much larger repositioning and reinforcing of NATO resources and would hardly merit notice by the Russians amongst everything else going on.

That is a hope CoA. I am sure many targets of opportunity thought they weren’t important enough to draw fire in decisions leading up to their being ended.

 

[GR66]

But our LIB is not going to move itself tactically through the gap because it will not have its equipment until after it is through the gap and completed marry-up.

That's why we're purchasing enough equipment for the Latvia LIB to have at least a full duplicate set of kit in Canada in case we have to ship both the kit and personnel to Europe and fight our way through. Right? Right???

 

[dimsum]

I'll move the funding over as well.

Sure, but will the CA and RCN specifically earmark that for flying things, or “hey that’s more $ for tanks/ships”?

 

[FJAG]

But our LIB is not going to move itself tactically through the gap because it will not have its equipment until after it is through the gap and completed marry-up.

Canada isn't the only organization that could provide a troop lift.

Kaliningrad fires will be a threat until Kaliningrad is occupied.

Or its various systems destroyed. You're insisting that the situation will be too hot to move a light battalion. If things have degenerated to that point, Kaliningrad will be neutralized.

That is a hope CoA. I am sure many targets of opportunity thought they weren’t important enough to draw fire in decisions leading up to their being ended.

No its not. We're basically looking at moving the LIB into Latvia. That comes under one of two scenarios. Either Russia has moved into positions of threat but not yet fired a shot, in which case there are numerous options for how to move the LIB in as part of NATO's occupying forward defensive positions in response; or hostilities have started in which case NATO will respond and not timidly either. Kaliningrad will be a major target in that case. No one in NATO is going to give Russia a chance to repeat a Donbas scenario.

If Canada has been stupid enough not to deploy the LIB in a timely manner then it will have to come up with an alternate plan which may need to include the assistance of troop lift from another country - we do help each other out. We can speculate ad infinitum as to which plans will work but to settle it we should just throw a 12-sided die to settle the issue.

 

[Fabius]

I will only add that it’s not just the LIB that needs to fly over. Significant portions of all the FLF Bde support units and the Bde HQ itself need to deploy from Canada to bring the FLF Bde up to full operational capability.
There should be key indicators and warnings monitored by both NATO and Canada that would trigger the deployment of those elements.

 

[McG]

Or its various systems destroyed. You're insisting that the situation will be too hot to move a light battalion.

No I am not. I am saying that we must be ready to do a tactical ingress or be prepared to fight the land battle without fly-over capability. Having a plan for the land battle that is dependent upon the light battalion and assuming the light battalion can arrive administratively is a path to catastrophic failure.

The current scenario is not the same as Cold War days where it was possible to fly all the way to West Germany and conduct administrative ground movement without entering Soviet air defence and MLRS range. The lines of communication for reforger were much more secure.

If things have degenerated to that point, Kaliningrad will be neutralized.

Unless you think NATO is going nuclear from the start, it is probably bold and over confident to assume Kaliningrad can be neutralized or suppressed before there are NATO boots in the city.

 

[Fabius]

Canada is not prepared to conduct a joint force entry independently. Canada is not prepared to be the lead nation in a multinational joint force entry operation.
It’s not even on the radar as a capability or capacity that the GoC wants.

We will go in very much left of bang or we will go in as a select niche element inside a NATO JFE led by someone else.

I would be more concerned with the I&W and getting the cabinet comfortable with actively committing forces based on those I&W.

 

[PuckChaser]

We need decades of stable 2% GDP funding to be able to self-sustain as the lead nation of a multinational force, let alone conduct a forceable theatre entry.

 

[FJAG]

No I am not. I am saying that we must be ready to do a tactical ingress or be prepared to fight the land battle without fly-over capability. Having a plan for the land battle that is dependent upon the light battalion and assuming the light battalion can arrive administratively is a path to catastrophic failure.

The current scenario is not the same as Cold War days where it was possible to fly all the way to West Germany and conduct administrative ground movement without entering Soviet air defence and MLRS range. The lines of communication for reforger were much more secure.

I'm not saying these aren't concerns. But I really think that CJOC has a planning staff that is tasked with creating the plans for a series of contingencies which might not be open for presentation on an open forum like this. We can spit ball problems and solutions to our hearts content here but that really doesn't move the goal posts of reality.

Unless you think NATO is going nuclear from the start, it is probably bold and over confident to assume Kaliningrad can be neutralized or suppressed before there are NATO boots in the city.

If Russia goes hot - which I think is less likely than you do - leaving Kaliningrad active would be a strategic mistake by NATO. It's a knife in the back of any defence against thrusts from Belarus. It doesn't need to be a nuclear strike but Kaliningrad simply can't be left and, IMHO, there will be enough forces available. Germany is putting Panzerbrigade on permanent posting into Lithuania. That's a fairly solid line in the sand when combined with the US and Polish forces on the other side of the Gap.