C3 Howitzer Replacement

[ytz]

It doesn't need to be in the RFI as the M777 is an existing capability while the RFI calls for a new capability. That said, the RFI does give a strong hint that the M777s will be divested as a consequence of this project. That's clearly something I disagree strongly with.

Comparing is difficult as there are numerous factors at play. Everything is effects based and varies with target posture. For example, the original four gun 105mm troop was based on three guns being able to effectively neutralize a platoon indefinitely at their standard rate of fire. The fourth gun was in essence a spare to allow one gun in the troop to be out of action for whatever reason. Two troops in a battery neutralized the front two platoons of a company and so on.

Yes, we practiced MRSI by hand back in the 70s, but it was more an experimental fad than something we did regularly. It has value against a target that is in an open posture where a first round volley is highly effective. I.e. the more rounds that can land simultaneously while troops are standing in the open and before they can hit the ground, the better. Six guns firing a 3-round MRSI each can deliver an 18 round simultaneous volley. But, it has little value after that. After that you either fire precision rounds to knock out small targets like a bunker or vehicle, or you deliver neutralization for whatever time interval is required. MRSI has little value in doing that.

Believe me this is not the CA field artillery shop's thinking as to the M777s. It is the army writ large and the VCDS shop that comes up with these ideas based on bean counter criteria. The countervailing issues here are: how much more would it cost per annum to run five M777 equipped batteries compared to five batteries having no equipment or equipped with 120mm or 81mm mortars versus what are the chances we'll be in deep shit at some point in the future if we do not have five M777 batteries ready to go? The VCDS solution for decades now has been to kick the lack of a capability issue down the road hoping that it never becomes time to pay the piper.

Within the gunner community, the issue is split. There are those who buy the bean counter arguments while others, like me, think that it is stupid to have serviceable guns being divested while ARes units are unequipped for war.

That's an interesting concept. I figured the LAV 700 wouldn't be brutish enough for the AGM turret. It would be interesting to see the ten-wheel one in practice as I'm still unconvinced that AGM on Boxer is a good solution. The Brits obviously think otherwise. I'd prefer a tracked chassis to properly absorb the recoil shock and provide stability (the rough terrain capability is of secondary interest to me) but if a 10-wheel LAV can handle it, and be relatively compatible to our ACSV fleet (an AGM also need a heavier engine) then I'd accept it.

I've done that in rough form and can throw out a napkin diagram in a few days. In short the RCA (RegF and ARes combined) could man all the new SPs, new air defence, new LRPR and old M777s in two brigades as follows:

A. Mech divisional Support Arty Bde:

1) 3 X SP close support regiments each with three times SP batteries (56 guns total - 18 RegF, 36 ARes) and one GS battery (appx 12 loitering munition launchers and STA - ARes) - one regiment for each of three mechanized brigades (I've notionally designated these as 7 Tor Regt [Toronto], 20 Fd Regt [Edmonton/BC] and 56 Fd Regt [London/Brandtford/Hamilton/Guelph]);

2) 1 X GS LRPR regiment of three times LRPR batteries (18 launchers total - 6 RegF, 12 ARes) and one times STA battery (MRRs, SUAVs and HALO acoustic ranging - 1/3 RegF, 2/3 ARes) - general support to any deployed field force (I've notionally designated this as 26 Fd Regt [Shilo/Brandon/Regina]);

B. General Support Arty Bde:

1) 1 X M777 close support regiment with three times M777 batteries (18 guns total - 12 RegF, 6 ARes); one GS battery (appx 12 loitering munitions launchers and STA - appx 2/3 RegF, 1/3 ARes); one VLLAD AD Bty (appx 12 launchers - 2/3 RegF, 1/3 ARes) - to support a light predominantly RegF standing quick reaction bde (I've notionally designated this as 1 RCHA [Petawawa/Ottawa/Pembroke]) ;

2) 1 X AD Regt with three times AD batteries (2 X RegF, 1 X ARes); one VLLAD battery (appx 12 launchers - 1/3 RegF, 2/3 ARes) to support, in whole or in part, an army deployed contingent in general (I've notionally designated this as 4 AD Regt [Gagetown/Halifax/St John]);

3) 1 X SP close support regiments each with three times SP batteries (18 guns total - 6 RegF, 12 ARes) and one GS battery (appx 12 loitering munition launchers and STA - ARes) one VLLAD battery (appx 12 launchers - 1/3 RegF, 2/3 ARes) - to support a predominantly ARes mechanized brigade or provide general support reinforcing to other units (I've notionally designated this as 6 Fd Regt [Valcartier, Quebec City/Shawinigan/Levis]); and

4) 1 X general support regiment with two times SP batteries and one M777 battery (12 SP guns - 6 RegF, 6 ARes, 6 M777 - ARes) one GS battery (appx 12 loitering munition launchers and STA - ARes) one VLLAD battery (appx 12 launchers - 1/2 RegF, 1/2 ARes) - to support a predominantly ARes light bde or to provide general support reinforcing to other units(I've notionally designated this 2 Fd Regt [Montreal])

C. Notes:

1) There is an additional bill for two hybrid artillery brigades (37 CAB [Montreal]) and 38 CAB [Winnipeg]) and two hybrid artillery brigade service battalions.

2) in total there are 7 X field and 1 X air defence regiments containing a total of 35 batteries as follows:

• 14 X SP batteries (84 guns total - 30 guns in 5 X RegF and 54 guns in 9 X ARes batteries) - 7 to Latvia, 7 to RCAS, 1 Tech Ref gun;
• 4 X M777 batteries (24 guns total - 12 guns in 2 X RegF and 12 guns in 2 X ARes batteries) - 7 war stock, 1 Tech Ref gun;
• 6 X general support batteries (appx 72 launchers - 12 launchers in 1 X RegF battery and 60 launchers in 5 X ARes batteries - note these batteries also contain some LCMRs, HALO and MUAVs) - none unallocated at this point;
• 3 X LRPR batteries (18 launchers total - 6 launchers in 1 X RegF and 12 launchers in 2 X ARes batteries) - none unallocated at this point;
• 1 X STA battery (appx 10 X MRR; 2 X SUAV launchers, 2 X HALO acoustic ranging systems - 1 X hybrid battery) - none unallocated at this point;
• 3 X AD batteries (appx 36 X launchers - 24 in 2 X RegF and 12 in 1 X hybrid ARes batteries) - none unallocated at this point; and
• 4 X VLLAD batteries (appx 48 X launchers - 12 in 1 X RegF and 36 in 3 X hybrid ARes batteries) - none are unallocated at this point.

3) The PY and PT numbers crunch out to roughly those of the current RegF field force PY strength of roughly 2,200 and the authorized RCA 3,200 (inclusive of assigned gunners and support trades). I need to do some more fine tuning. I don't believe in FTEs. Its not in the NDA - you're either RegF (FT/PY) or ARes (PT);

4) There is a level of expandability in the structure - for example, a single CS regiment can form the nucleus of a new CS arty brigade to be filled out with new equipment and newly recruited personnel. It has sufficient equipment and trained personnel to train newly recruited personnel until such time as newly acquired equipment arrives;

5) Note that there are no VLLAD batteries in the divisional CS regts (7 Tor, 20 Fd and 56 Fd). The intent is that in the unlikely intent that these brigades/division need to deploy in large scale, all AD resources come from 4 AD Regt. I'm still mulling this over to see if we can or should provide more organic AD resources to 1 Div.


I agree with that - 1/3 on tiered readiness status; 2/3 on tiered reserve status.

Agree with 90% of what you say except for the "packing grease" part. Some should be kept in a war reserve, but mostly guns which are kept "in reserve" should be in the hands of reserve units where they can contribute to training while still receiving maintenance and low usage rates and thus be able to be brought forward with fully trained replacement crews as needed.

That really goes without saying.

With this level of acquisition on this project (and assuming we do not divest the M777 and assuming that we give all the mortars to the infantry, there is no reason why the Cdn artillery - both RegF and ARes cannot be organized into fully equipped functioning units. Yes, it requires "sorting out" and, IMHO, to not do so and to keep the current ARes structure is simply professional negligence on the part of the army, artillery and VCDS leadership.

It's great that you have thought this through. But I'm going to bet money that an organization like this won't pass.

1) The high level of Reg/Res interdependence makes deployment above battery size difficult. Presumably, the CA will want the flexibility to rotate entire regiments.

2) High value low density assets are not going to the Reserves simply because they need to be tightly controlled with higher readiness than peers.

3) Modern information flow, including JADC2 ideas, make the concept of an artillery brigade outside division sized manœuvre obsolete (at least for us). Long range fires have to be tightly coupled with long range collectors. Moreover, long range kinetic strike is just one of the options for effects. That's why the Americans came up with this:

4) Air defence is a tough concept. Because it needs to be almost organic at every level. If it's not, then it's just some local area defence for HQs. As such, they'll have to come up with a structure where an AD platoon can easily get attached to a deploying battalion or an AD company to a brigade.

 

[KevinB]

It's great that you have thought this through. But I'm going to bet money that an organization like this won't pass.

It really should though. Hybrid Integration of the Regular Army and Reserve Forces are the only way that Canada will be able to afford a credible and functional Army -- and yes I know that there needs to be some changes to regulations and legislation to make that viable.

1) The high level of Reg/Res interdependence makes deployment above battery size difficult. Presumably, the CA will want the flexibility to rotate entire regiments.

My belief is that Canada should bite the bullet and put a Bde in Europe like what was done with 4CMBG 'back in the day". As such 1 Regiment would be overseas - made up of either Reg Force entirely (a la ROTO 0) or a mix of Regulars with Class C Reservists --
Lets call it 4 RCHA for ease of discussion - every 3 years you could rotate out a Battery (of personnel) back to Canada, and deploy another to replace it - then certain positions in batteries could be filled by Reservists on 18month, 24 month or 36 month Class C periods of service.

2) High value low density assets are not going to the Reserves simply because they need to be tightly controlled with higher readiness than peers.

Personally I see most Artillery jobs as low demand, as you generally don't need them for day to day things outside of War - so the 30/70 Concept shouldn't adversely affect the readiness, outside of PreDeployed forces.

3) Modern information flow, including JADC2 ideas, make the concept of an artillery brigade outside division sized manœuvre obsolete (at least for us). Long range fires have to be tightly coupled with long range collectors. Moreover, long range kinetic strike is just one of the options for effects. That's why the Americans came up with this:

The problem with that is the MDTF is a Corps asset - Canada has no Corps, and 99% of those assets are never going to be acquired for the CA. Realistically Canada should be able to field 2 Divisions based on authorized strength - so each Div would get a Arty Bde.

4) Air defence is a tough concept. Because it needs to be almost organic at every level. If it's not, then it's just some local area defence for HQs. As such, they'll have to come up with a structure where an AD platoon can easily get attached to a deploying battalion or an AD company to a brigade.

Agreed - I'm of the opinion each Div needs a ADA Bde, and Companies can be detached to Bde's as needed.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

With the current US approach to the world, Canada offering to build up a brigade in Europe makes both military and political sense. I suspect that Latvia is to constrained for a long term larger deployment and either Germany or Poland would be the best place to locate.

 

[Kirkhill]

With the current US approach to the world, Canada offering to build up a brigade in Europe makes both military and political sense. I suspect that Latvia is to constrained for a long term larger deployment and either Germany or Poland would be the best place to locate.

The problem I now find myself forced to confront is what happens if Trump sides with Vlad against Ukraine and JEF (Bellicose Europe) backs Ukraine.

If Bannon/Lilley is correct and Trump is fully engaged in Monroe 2.0, to the extent that he is willing to separate Greenland from Denmark, and Denmark is one of the reliable contributors to both JEF and Ukraine, then is Canada going to be given an option to join JEF? Or is Canada going to be coerced, via CUSMA renegotiation, into a more robust support of NORAD and NORTHCOM in "our" arctic?

It is entirely possible that the Donald will get what he is looking for if he wants to isolate the US.


Estonia loves the HIMARS but is asking if L-M can deliver fast enough or will Estonia have to look to other suppliers (Follow Poland and possibly Norway and go with the Korean Chun-Moo or follow the Germans and go with the Israeli PULS). Are we sure that delivery is the only reason that Estonia might be looking at non-American suppliers?

Estonia wants answers from US on HIMARS production, could turn to other options in 'months' - Breaking Defense

Dmytro Kuleba, the former Ukrainian foreign affairs minister, interrupted Breaking Defense's interview with Estonian defense minister Hanno Pevkur to praise Estonia for its willingness to donate weapons to Kyiv's aid.

breakingdefense.com

And Ukraine could look to non-American suppliers for some pretty sophisticated equipment - lots of solid Euro suppliers with Ukraine desperate to produce in volume.

Saab CEO still upbeat on prospect of Sweden sending Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine - Breaking Defense

Ideally, a long-term agreement would be struck, Saab CEO Micael Johansson told Breaking Defense, leading to a first squadron of C/D standard aircraft being delivered to Kyiv “sooner rather than later."

breakingdefense.com

And then there is this group from the Emirates (Abu Dhabi) that is gaining ground fast by investing in doing things differently - EDGE

https://edgegroup.ae/about

Teamed with General Motors Defense

With new MoU, GM Defense and EDGE Group's team-up gets more 'meat on the bone' - Breaking Defense

GM Defense President Steve duMont told Breaking Defense the company has "been looking at this vehicle for application in the Middle East region, which is very important region for us."

breakingdefense.com

And with Rheinmetall for their Skynet system (EDGE SkyKnight SAMs in a container of 60 with an ability to put 20 in the air at once and the naval version SkyKnight-NMS)

https://edgegroup.ae/solutions/skyknight-naval-missile-system-s-nms

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Trump has 4 years, 2 of them will be gone by the time you see any real effect on the ground in regards to Russia and the US opening up trade, etc. Not to mention the odds of Putin pissing off Trump in the mean time are pretty high. Putin has his own internal problems and a swift end to the war is not going to make them better.

 

[Kirkhill]

It's great that you have thought this through. But I'm going to bet money that an organization like this won't pass.

1) The high level of Reg/Res interdependence makes deployment above battery size difficult. Presumably, the CA will want the flexibility to rotate entire regiments.

2) High value low density assets are not going to the Reserves simply because they need to be tightly controlled with higher readiness than peers.

3) Modern information flow, including JADC2 ideas, make the concept of an artillery brigade outside division sized manœuvre obsolete (at least for us). Long range fires have to be tightly coupled with long range collectors. Moreover, long range kinetic strike is just one of the options for effects. That's why the Americans came up with this:

4) Air defence is a tough concept. Because it needs to be almost organic at every level. If it's not, then it's just some local area defence for HQs. As such, they'll have to come up with a structure where an AD platoon can easily get attached to a deploying battalion or an AD company to a brigade.

I tend to agree with YTZ

People in harms way are indeed an enduring sign of commitment. But having them engage is probably the last thing you want to happen.

In Canada we have been filling up the backs of LAVs with infanteers in preference to purchasing the modern tools of war and their support systems.

As I have noted before the MDTF is not a Corps asset, it is a Theater asset. A Theater may require the deployment of a Corps, or more, but a theater is principally a chunk of territory and, based on the intended range of the effectors and sensors then Canada qualifies as a Theater.

Canada's defence leans heaviest on NORAD. The MDTF, to my mind, could reasonably be seen as an extension of NORAD and, again to my mind, a Canadian MDTF, a sovereign Canadian capability co-operating with our good neighbour the US, should receive priority funding along with the F35s, RPAS and P8s.

Protection of the Continental Shelf is a joint RCAF/RCN mission

A modest SOF and Army force to manage small scale disruptions and incursions - the 11th Abn Div is my preferred model backed by a very robust National Guard / Militia system.

.....

Expeditionary Force - if we are going to have one, one that serves Canada's national interests, then we need to be really clear on the capabilities we are willing to buy and when we are willing to put those Canadians at risk.

....

Air Defence - the Expeditionary Force and every Surface Vessel needs a comparable level of protection against aerial threats.

National or Continental Air Defence needs to include the ability to defend local vital points. And that requires facing up to the ability, in a hybrid warfare environment, to transition rapidly, locally and temporarily, from peace to war and back again.

‘It’s not a war zone’: Pentagon ponders policy shifts to protect homeland bases from drones - Breaking Defense

“One of the key things about Falcon Peak is it offers not just the opportunity to look at the technology that's being tested, but also at our processes," a senior DoD official told reporters.

breakingdefense.com

 

[PrairieFella]

The problem I now find myself forced to confront is what happens if Trump sides with Vlad against Ukraine and JEF (Bellicose Europe) backs Ukraine.

If Bannon/Lilley is correct and Trump is fully engaged in Monroe 2.0, to the extent that he is willing to separate Greenland from Denmark, and Denmark is one of the reliable contributors to both JEF and Ukraine, then is Canada going to be given an option to join JEF? Or is Canada going to be coerced, via CUSMA renegotiation, into a more robust support of NORAD and NORTHCOM in "our" arctic?

It is entirely possible that the Donald will get what he is looking for if he wants to isolate the US.


Estonia loves the HIMARS but is asking if L-M can deliver fast enough or will Estonia have to look to other suppliers (Follow Poland and possibly Norway and go with the Korean Chun-Moo or follow the Germans and go with the Israeli PULS). Are we sure that delivery is the only reason that Estonia might be looking at non-American suppliers?

Estonia wants answers from US on HIMARS production, could turn to other options in 'months' - Breaking Defense

Dmytro Kuleba, the former Ukrainian foreign affairs minister, interrupted Breaking Defense's interview with Estonian defense minister Hanno Pevkur to praise Estonia for its willingness to donate weapons to Kyiv's aid.

breakingdefense.com

And Ukraine could look to non-American suppliers for some pretty sophisticated equipment - lots of solid Euro suppliers with Ukraine desperate to produce in volume.

Saab CEO still upbeat on prospect of Sweden sending Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine - Breaking Defense

Ideally, a long-term agreement would be struck, Saab CEO Micael Johansson told Breaking Defense, leading to a first squadron of C/D standard aircraft being delivered to Kyiv “sooner rather than later."

breakingdefense.com

And then there is this group from the Emirates (Abu Dhabi) that is gaining ground fast by investing in doing things differently - EDGE

https://edgegroup.ae/about

Teamed with General Motors Defense

With new MoU, GM Defense and EDGE Group's team-up gets more 'meat on the bone' - Breaking Defense

GM Defense President Steve duMont told Breaking Defense the company has "been looking at this vehicle for application in the Middle East region, which is very important region for us."

breakingdefense.com

And with Rheinmetall for their Skynet system (EDGE SkyKnight SAMs in a container of 60 with an ability to put 20 in the air at once and the naval version SkyKnight-NMS)

View attachment 91415

https://edgegroup.ae/solutions/skyknight-naval-missile-system-s-nms

Anything we can do to isolate ourselves from American military kit, the better. Our allies produce stuff just as good and it's not worth the potential risk anymore.

 

[Kirkhill]

Anything we can do to isolate ourselves from American military kit, the better. Our allies produce stuff just as good and it's not worth the potential risk anymore.

Unfortunately I find myself agreeing with you.

The NORAD/MDTF kit is likely to be US on the grounds of interoperability and trade benefits.

The Expeditionary Forces, now they are another matter. There are a lot of useful suppliers that are neither American, Russian nor Chinese.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Anything we can do to isolate ourselves from American military kit, the better. Our allies produce stuff just as good and it's not worth the potential risk anymore.

I begrudgingly agree.

I am shedding a tear watching the American supply train and industrial capacity drift under the horizon.

 

[PrairieFella]

I begrudgingly agree.

I am shedding a tear watching the American supply train and industrial capacity drift under the horizon.

Im with you on that but we simply can't trust them anymore. DJT has set a precedent and I don't expect that to change for a very long time. What happens if they decide to flip whatever switch will be inbuilt in our AEGIS destroyers?

 

[ytz]

It really should though. Hybrid Integration of the Regular Army and Reserve Forces are the only way that Canada will be able to afford a credible and functional Army -- and yes I know that there needs to be some changes to regulations and legislation to make that viable.

As a blue suiter I am not going to pretend to know the right answer for the Army. I will say that the RCAF uses the Total Force concept. But the vast, vast majority of our reservists are either ex-Reg F or persons with very specific skillsets that are appointed to cover certain skills gaps. I am not sure how this model could be applied to college students doing military stuff part-time.

My belief is that Canada should bite the bullet and put a Bde in Europe like what was done with 4CMBG 'back in the day". As such 1 Regiment would be oversea

Maybe. But we can't even begin to have that discussion till the force grows substantially. A four figure personnel deficit doesn't lend itself to having the flexibility to structure a force capable of stationing an entire brigade overseas. Let alone addressing other priorities.

Personally I see most Artillery jobs as low demand,

Tube perhaps. Those MLRS are probably going to be seen differently. Especially, if they come with the ability to launch SRBMs. That has a certain deterrent ability that the higher ups will want to keep close hold and ready to go when necessary.

The problem with that is the MDTF is a Corps asset - Canada has no Corps, and 99% of those assets are never going to be acquired for the CA. Realistically Canada should be able to field 2 Divisions based on authorized strength - so each Div would get a Arty Bde.

The Americans doing things at a certain level doesn't mean the idea is not applicable to us or that we have to do things at that level. The concept is rather basic. Put long range fires and long range sensors in a single formation with the necessary supporting assets, in a manner that tightens the kill chain into the enemy's deep rear area. You can structure that as a company, battalion or brigade. Given where JSR is going, our growing Space Wing, etc. it's entirely possible to combine existing units with a new MLRS ability into a mini-MDTF of sorts.

 

[ytz]

What's interesting to me with potential MLRS systems that can launch BMs or CMs is this:

The HIMARS can pack two PRSMs that can reach out 500 km and touch someone. Entirely possible to create even longer range weapons. That is not just a tactical asset to support a brigade anymore.

 

[FJAG]

It's great that you have thought this through. But I'm going to bet money that an organization like this won't pass.

1) The high level of Reg/Res interdependence makes deployment above battery size difficult. Presumably, the CA will want the flexibility to rotate entire regiments.

Actually the design is done the way it is in order to make the return to high level regimental operations feasible. There are two scenarios.

The first looks at a quick reaction mission for a whole regiment. It's a less likely scenario. It's accomplished by deploying one regimental HQ and its RegF CS battery, core GS battery and core FSC which are rounded out by other regiments' RegF batteries and elements. The Frankensteinian cobbling together of a RegF unit with RegF sub-units from other RegF units was a standard procedure during Afghanistan.

The second scenario is one where there is time and a major mobilization is required. In that scenario the whole regiment goes with the RegF and ARes batteries with their key RegF leadership (the 10% in 10/90) as well as either volunteers from the ARes across the board or non volunteer ARes personnel placed on active service.

Remember that the primary motivation behind the 30/70 type of system is to increase the capability of the ARes by providing them, during peacetime, with RegF leadership, equipment (or at least access to equipment) and a core framework that is in place to build on. A prerequisite for any hybrid system is that the proper organization and the proper training of the ARes personnel is both a necessity and a paramount objective.

2) High value low density assets are not going to the Reserves simply because they need to be tightly controlled with higher readiness than peers.

I think this is a misconception that has taken root within the RegF community over the years because of the vicious cycle the CA ARes is in.

The cycle starts with an existing ARes force that is underfunded, poorly led, unequipped and, in consequence, poorly trained. The ARes accordingly has a low level of capability. The RegF sees that and, in consequence says "the ARes is incapable of handling anything that is complex" and accordingly invests nothing further than the bare baseline. The cycle continues. The ARes never improves.

The real question is: "what is high value, low density?" and what is "tightly controlled with higher Readiness?"

Artillery is one of those functions that is rarely needed during peacetime but needed rapidly and in quantity when the situation demands it. The high cost of both full-time personnel and their perpetual training makes it a system that demands heavy integration with part-time personnel. The equipment needs to be in place during peacetime if one wants a reasonable readiness response. Similarly the core leadership will need to have existed full time during peacetime in order to build the doctrine necessary for effective use. On the other hand, a large bulk of the operators only need enough training and time in service to be effective. Other models show that reserve force field artillery and air defence artillery can be highly effective in operation while requiring only moderate sustainment expenditures if properly supported by full-timers who ensure equipment readiness and provide the requisite core leadership.

3) Modern information flow, including JADC2 ideas, make the concept of an artillery brigade outside division sized manœuvre obsolete (at least for us). Long range fires have to be tightly coupled with long range collectors. Moreover, long range kinetic strike is just one of the options for effects. That's why the Americans came up with this:

I disagree with your first sentence while I agree with the next two. The last sentence is irrelevant to the argument , IMHO.

The degree of fires capability is in direct relationship with the national policy as to how its military is to be used. Canada sees military operations on a continuum. At the low end we envision battlegroups (with their own artillery) integrated into a higher multinational force. Accordingly we need to have CS batteries that integrate into someone else's artillery battalion or group. Or, like in Afghanistan, where our artillery batteries and STA and coordination elements operated almost separate and apart from other folks' due to distance and the nature of operations. We need a flexible capability for that.

Our next (and currently final, level of commitment is at the brigade level (albeit a multinational one) operating as part of a multinational division. In order to do that one has to clearly understand the role of a close support artillery regiment supporting a manoeuvre brigade and the resources which are provided by higher formations and their roles.

Canada's army virtually abandoned the idea of the close support regiment in the early 00s and dismantled and rebuilt the structure into what was done in Afghanistan without any regard for a future need. The artillery itself struggled over the last two decades to keep core skills and capabilities in place in the face of funding restraints and the army's own vision of what its core capabilities were and how best to maintain them. Field and air defence artillery were low on the priority list most of the time. You talk about long range collectors and strike capabilities. Those have been on the books, within the limits of the then technology, since the 1960s when we had both radars and Honest John nuclear missiles in the inventory. Both went by the wayside by 1970 albeit there have been continuous, unfunded projects on the books for a variety of collector systems and strike systems. We envisioned UAVs, long range radars and MLRS since the 1970s but never bought any because, in its wisdom, the CAF thought those unnecessary for brigade operations as they would be provided by division and corps.

MDTF is not the solution that you think it is. It replaces neither artillery regiments nor artillery brigades. There are a total of five MDTFs under development each of which has the rough size and number of units as an artillery brigade (in fact some of them are conversions of existing artillery brigades). But don't forget that the US has five active duty and nine ARNG/USAR artillery brigades, over and above the 21 artillery brigades that exists (or will exist) in each of its 21 active and ARNG divisions.

Artillery operates in interconnected layers. That's been the major strength of artillery since WW2. The point is that as new weapon system come on line we need to understand how and where to integrate them within those layers where each different solution plays a mutually supporting role. As long as Canada decides to be engaged in multinational operations, it needs to know what its place is and how to connect in to the overall system. If we envision deploying brigades (which we already do) then we need to understand and form regiments that can do so on the modern battlefield.

This is where I make the next step that you do not want to. Canada spends its treasure on an army big enough to form two divisions and buys equipment to support one (inadequately; but mostly). There is a non-zero possibility that there may be a need to deploy a Canadian division or at least to be the lead element of a multinational division in the future. Moreover our Canadian brigades will always be employed in a divisional structure. Hell, we even designate our higher army headquarters "divisions" - five of them. It behoves us to organize our artillery into a divisional structure - i.e a divisional artillery brigade - if for no other reason than to become familiar with it and develop the appropriate doctrine. Our current IMF project would deliver enough guns which, together with our M777s, would allow us to equip some six regiments fully. The IMF is accompanied by a long range precision fires project, a GBAD project, a joint fires modernization project and a land ISR modernization project, all of which facilitate the deployment of a brigade within a divisional concept and also facilitate the ability to deploy a division with its requisite artillery brigade. We already have some of the building blocks like long range collectors by way of SUAS and MRR in place and can couple to current and developing RCAF and space resources. More are needed.

Do not forget the roles that artillery brigades outside a divisional structure can and do play in reinforcing other resources. Artillery brigades are far from obsolete. They are evolving as system technology evolves but the fundamental construct and doctrinal role remains.

4) Air defence is a tough concept. Because it needs to be almost organic at every level. If it's not, then it's just some local area defence for HQs. As such, they'll have to come up with a structure where an AD platoon can easily get attached to a deploying battalion or an AD company to a brigade.

We've already been there. In the 1970s we had air defence batteries with brigades and at times an air defence regiment in Germany. We are going back to that, albeit modified to suit the technology, with a number of projects - some by way of UOR specifically for Latvia but others of a more general nature.

Air defence is not a tough concept. There are air defenders on this forum who can explain the concepts much better than I. The problem that the army has is that it killed off the air defence occupation in 2011 and the army's expertise in it is limited to a few old salts still in uniform and some newer IGs and AIGs who attend courses on the topic in foreign countries. The army's general leadership is unknowledgeable on the topic other than in some generalities and the fact that it is dreadfully expensive and only rarely used in peacetime. The organic nature of the system layers is well known; the problem is where does the army get the money for it and what does it spend that money on when it gets it. GBAD is not an all encompassing solution for the army but it is a start.

The problem with both field artillery and air defence artillery is that, like many combat support and combat service support systems, they are not seen as an important enough core capability. In consequence, the expenditures required to keep them viable and ready for major conflict are not made during peacetime. As a result they atrophy, their true doctrinal purpose is forgotten and/or ignored until something major comes along to bite the military and political leadership in the ass. That's usually followed by a period of handwringing where everyone debates what can be done about the problem that is cheaper to do than what everyone knows must be spent.

What I've cobbled together above is one guy's ideas as to how you can meet the core objectives of providing indirect fires and air defence to the army as a whole based on anticipated commitments under the existing IMF, LRPF, GBAD, JFM, and LISRM projects coupled with the existing human and equipment capital within the CA's artillery - both RegF and ARes.

To get back to your opening line. I'll bet money as well that my proposed organization won't pass. OTOH, I think that it is exactly what is needed in order to move the yardsticks to what is necessary to maximize our resources at a sustainable cost.

 

[ytz]

To get back to your opening line. I'll bet money as well that my proposed organization won't pass. OTOH, I think that it is exactly what is needed in order to move the yardsticks to what is necessary to maximize our resources at a sustainable cost.

Sincerely appreciate the explanation and opinion. And mostly agree that probably more is needed. I also think it's not going to happen because there's now a real weariness to all these pretend large formations these days....

The cycle starts with an existing ARes force that is underfunded, poorly led, unequipped and, in consequence, poorly trained. The ARes accordingly has a low level of capability. The RegF sees that and, in consequence says "the ARes is incapable of handling anything that is complex" and accordingly invests nothing further than the bare baseline. The cycle continues. The ARes never improves.

Don't disagree. But also I don't think we'll ever see a project to acquire artillery restructure an entire army. This is definitely part of a much larger question about how CAF, and the CA in particular is organized.

The real question is: "what is high value, low density?" and what is "tightly controlled with higher Readiness?"

I sort of answered that above. I see a difference between tubes and rockets. And even AD. Tube artillery won't be high value low density. But if we just field one battalion of MLRS, or a single battalion worth of AD, those are most definitely going to be exclusively Reg F and tightly controlled.

Our next (and currently final, level of commitment is at the brigade level (albeit a multinational one) operating as part of a multinational division. In order to do that one has to clearly understand the role of a close support artillery regiment supporting a manoeuvre brigade and the resources which are provided by higher formations and their roles.

You don't need an artillery brigade to learn to work with one. That's what training, exercises, exchanges are for. There's a ton of capabilities that the CAF doesn't have, that we train to employ. And notably, to my knowledge, the CA doesn't do any regular training as a full division. I presume the CA gets those Colonels and Generals the experience they need through exchanges.

 

[KevinB]

You don't need an artillery brigade to learn to work with one. That's what training, exercises, exchanges are for. There's a ton of capabilities that the CAF doesn't have, that we train to employ. And notably, to my knowledge, the CA doesn't do any regular training as a full division. I presume the CA gets those Colonels and Generals the experience they need through exchanges.

My concern is other than Dear Leader 47, the world seems to understand it is at a tipping point, Europe seems to have reluctantly awoken to the Bear - and there most likely will be a catastrophic global war - unless Russia (and China) are deterred by credible forces.

The CA used to conduct Divisional training - I was at the last one when I was still a Gunner before becoming a Patricia - it is not just the forces getting together (as that is generally pretty boring for the troops for the majority of the time) but the logistics of getting everything to one place, and supporting the exercise that is a skill in its own - and redeploying them home after. It is not just skill for the General, Col's and Staff - but all the moving pieces working together.

If you don't have a capability, you realistically aren't training to employ it - you are theorizing on how it may work.

 

[FJAG]

I sort of answered that above. I see a difference between tubes and rockets. And even AD. Tube artillery won't be high value low density. But if we just field one battalion of MLRS, or a single battalion worth of AD, those are most definitely going to be exclusively Reg F and tightly controlled.

We're thinking more HIMARS than MLRS. Either way, the Brits have an MLRS reserve regiment and the Yanks have quite a number of ARNG HIMARS battalions. It's easily doable. Back in the 2009 timeframe when we moved the LRPF project to a near horizon we planned on several HIMARS ARes dets. Quite frankly they are technically relatively simple and their low rate of employment makes them perfect for the ARes.

Before the turn of the century, Canada's air defence branch stood at about a thousand and half of those were reservists with 1 AD Regt, 18 AD Regt and 56 AD Bty employing Javelin missiles. There were also several reservists in NB who served with the RegF 4 AD Regt on both Javelins and ADATS.

We and other have been there. It works, It's cost effective. One thing. Never underestimate the RegF penchant for protecting it's PY turf in a bid to stay relevant in the eyes of the big numbers crunchers. IMHO, the ARes is precluded from involvement in systems because to concede that an ARes organization could handle system X would result in the loss or reassignment of RegF PYs elsewhere.

You don't need an artillery brigade to learn to work with one.

Yeah. You do.

That's what training, exercises, exchanges are for. There's a ton of capabilities that the CAF doesn't have, that we train to employ.

That's nowhere near enough. You need the gear and the people to actually go into the field to work out all the bugs. And then after the annual posting cycle you need to do it again. Skill sets fade quickly.

And notably, to my knowledge, the CA doesn't do any regular training as a full division.

It did in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the RENDEVOUZ series of exercises. Even brigade-level exercises withered away under Chretien but hav slowly been brought back with the MAPLE RESOLVE exercises. The recent UNIFIED RESOLVE computer assisted exercises trained brigades within a divisional context. We actually do have a operational level divisional headquarters (1 Cdn Div) as part of CJOC and they do get involved in training, including a divisional level artillery FSCC, STACC and ASCC provided by 4 Regt (GS). But no - you are correct. We haven't fielded a full division for training in some time. While desirable, the costs are prohibitive.

I presume the CA gets those Colonels and Generals the experience they need through exchanges.

We do but there is a large gap between having a few folks trained and having a functioning force on the ground.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

My concern is other than Dear Leader 47, the world seems to understand it is at a tipping point, Europe seems to have reluctantly awoken to the Bear - and there most likely will be a catastrophic global war - unless Russia (and China) are deterred by credible forces.

The CA used to conduct Divisional training - I was at the last one when I was still a Gunner before becoming a Patricia - it is not just the forces getting together (as that is generally pretty boring for the troops for the majority of the time) but the logistics of getting everything to one place, and supporting the exercise that is a skill in its own - and redeploying them home after. It is not just skill for the General, Col's and Staff - but all the moving pieces working together.

If you don't have a capability, you realistically aren't training to employ it - you are theorizing on how it may work.

Yea I was arty divisional QM in Suffield one year and the joy of collecting a jeep from the railhead that would not start, so we lifted the hood to find it had been sent across the country with no engine.

 

[ytz]

but the logistics of getting everything to one place, and supporting the exercise that is a skill in its own - and redeploying them home after. It is not just skill for the General, Col's and Staff - but all the moving pieces working together.

I can't see how your logistics changes substantially from deploying an artillery battalion vs brigade beyond simply multiplying your scale. But when it comes to complex logistics like this, that's literally why the JOSG was created in Kingston. And why the air force created the expeditionary wing in Bagotville. Their entire focus is enabling theatre opening at scale.

It did in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the RENDEVOUZ series of exercises.

Neat. At this point, there's probably only a single digit percentage of CA members who have actually seen a live Div Ex if they haven't been done since the 90s. But also, all through the GWOT era, even the Americans did a lot less Division scale training. Not a uniquely CAF thing.

We actually do have a operational level divisional headquarters (1 Cdn Div) as part of CJOC

Yeah. But they are a plug and play unit. They don't have any brigades attached to them. Theoretically they could lead a division without any subordinate Canadian units. Also, in my experience, their real life work is more theatre activation and opening and basically being an instant task force HQ. Though I'm sure they do enough CP exercises to be able to operate a full div if called upon.

 

[ytz]

We're thinking more HIMARS than MLRS.

Fair. But with LRPF the intent isn't plain old MLRS. Whether it's HIMARS, GMARS, or Chunmoo they are all capable of firing TBMs, CMs or glide bombs (like the GLSDB). At what point do you say this isn't targeting a Division's rear anymore and it's a theatre level asset capable of delivering strategic effects? That's why they could get roped in to something more like an MDTF, which for us, is probably more like re-roling 1 Can Div HQ to be able to manage Int, EW, Info ops, space and LRPF.

 

[KevinB]

I can't see how your logistics changes substantially from deploying an artillery battalion vs brigade beyond simply multiplying your scale. But when it comes to complex logistics like this, that's literally why the JOSG was created in Kingston. And why the air force created the expeditionary wing in Bagotville. Their entire focus is enabling theatre opening at scale.

Pardon me if I snicker. You don’t have enough air movement capability to move much more than a LAV Coy.

Neat. At this point, there's probably only a single digit percentage of CA members who have actually seen a live Div Ex if they haven't been done since the 90s. But also, all through the GWOT era, even the Americans did a lot less Division scale training. Not a uniquely CAF thing.

The DIV was not viewed as a needed maneuver unit during GWOT. But now back to Corps exercises here.

Yeah. But they are a plug and play unit. They don't have any brigades attached to them. Theoretically they could lead a division without any subordinate Canadian units. Also, in my experience, their real life work is more theatre activation and opening and basically being an instant task force HQ. Though I'm sure they do enough CP exercises to be able to operate a full div if called upon.

CP Ex’s ignore all friction points. While a supplement, they are not a replacement for actually physically doing to task.