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C3 Howitzer Replacement


The U.S. Army is moving to establish a second production source for barrels for 155mm M777 towed howitzers in response to what it calls “unprecedented demand” from Ukraine. Only one U.S. government-owned and operated arsenal makes the barrels and that facility cannot currently meet a requirement to churn out more than 30 new ones each month.

“Funds are required for 155mm cannon tube second source in support of Ukraine. Includes procurement, factory improvements, production equipment and tooling, etc. in direct support of replenishment items provided to Ukraine. The high volume of artillery fire missions has created an unprecedented demand for M776 155mm Cannon Tubes (39 caliber), with a projected requirement of over 30 tubes per month. The current manufacturer of cannons, Watervliet Arsenal (WVA) [in New York state], a Government Owned Government Operated (GOGO) facility, has not been able to support the demand. Facilitization investment will support up to 10 cannon tubes per month, including large cannon calibers. This is a congressional special interest item. This is an emergency budget requirement.”

Would it be fair to suggest that if it is hard to keep up with the burn rate on 39 calibre barrels then it will be harder still if the fleet average goes up to 52 calibre and the higher pressures they suggest?

The U.S. Marine Corps notably highlighted having “burned out” the barrels on two of their M777s during fighting against ISIS in the Syrian city of Raqqa in 2017. The U.S. Army’s metrics for determining when the cannon on an M777 needs to be replaced are not publicly available.

It is no secret that howitzers, and 155mm types especially, have been critical in Ukraine’s ongoing fight against Russia. Issues around ensuring sufficient supplies of ammunition for those howitzers have drawn particular attention in the past year or so. The United States and several European countries have been working to dramatically step up production of those shells to help meet Ukrainian demands, as well as replenish their own stockpiles. Past Ukrainian pronouncements about the number of 155mm rounds required to meet its operational requirements – at times up to 3,000 per day – give a good sense of the rate at which the country’s forces have been firing shells from howitzers like the M777.

The Pentagon reprogramming document underscores how the matter of ammunition supplies is just one serious issue facing Ukrainian artillery units. This all also speaks to real issues that the U.S. military itself could be faced with in the future, especially high-end ones like a fight with China in the Pacific. If U.S. capacity to produce things like replacement barrels for M777s is insufficient to meet the needs of Ukraine’s armed forces, it is hard to see how it could respond to far greater demands from American forces during a major conflict.

If NATO in general, and the US in particular, can't keep up with the demands of Ukraine then what hope is there if a real war breaks out?

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We almost need an IP holding crown corp, and as part of any and all contracts a copy of everything gets purchased by DND, in the event of bankruptcy, closure etc DND then reserve the right to take your blue prints to another company to have it made.

SMP = Standard Military Pattern
CMP = Canadian Military Pattern

 
And coming soon to a battlefield, or airfield, near you?

We wouldn't want to frighten the taxpayer, would we?


 
NYTimes ?Real sources pls
There is US Army data. - and next US Army Mortar carriers will be turreted.

Additionally ARDEC/DARPA have programs going on with industry trying to attenuate/divert the muzzle blast on M109 and M777 barrels as well due to crew injuries from over pressure.

The muzzle brakes where designed to improve the life of the cannons (reducing recoil forces), but the muzzle brakes then cause excessive pressure by the muzzle - the M109 is better insulated but the pressure on crew still isn’t ideal (plus all sorts of harmonic resonance wave issues with different frequencies off the hull) and the M777 has no crew protection from the blast.
 
There is US Army data. - and next US Army Mortar carriers will be turreted.

Additionally ARDEC/DARPA have programs going on with industry trying to attenuate/divert the muzzle blast on M109 and M777 barrels as well due to crew injuries from over pressure.

The muzzle brakes where designed to improve the life of the cannons (reducing recoil forces), but the muzzle brakes then cause excessive pressure by the muzzle - the M109 is better insulated but the pressure on crew still isn’t ideal (plus all sorts of harmonic resonance wave issues with different frequencies off the hull) and the M777 has no crew protection from the blast.
Back when I was a cadet at what was the the RCSA, we trained and fired the original short-barrelled M109s. There's a hatch in the roof called the gunner's escape hatch and a hatch on the side. We usually keep both those open. On my first mission as a #3 (operating the panoramic telescope and laying for bearing, we had laid and loaded the gun just short of high angle and being particulalry lazy, I stepped back from the sight and leaned against the left rear ammo rack. Just as the # 1 ordered "fire" I looked up through the hatch and saw the muzzle brake of the gun which, when the gun went off, sent a pressure wave in that smacked me back hard against the rack and blew my helmet liner off out through the side window.

There's been more than one safety officer caught between guns when they fired and picked up and thrown around unceremoniously by the blast.

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I wonder what the planned distribution of the SPH's is? Will we fully equip the three Reg Force Regiments with 3 x 6-gun batteries (54 guns total of the 80-98 total)? How many allocated to Latvia? For the schools/technical support, spares?
 
I wonder what the planned distribution of the SPH's is? Will we fully equip the three Reg Force Regiments with 3 x 6-gun batteries (54 guns total of the 80-98 total)? How many allocated to Latvia? For the schools/technical support, spares?
8 guns or the Reserves?
 
There are some interesting points coming out of this RFI:

1) Anx A discusses the requirement for a bty of six howitzers and time required to come in and out of action - this settles the angst that the concept of a four-gun bty has taken hold. IMHO, six guns per CS bty is absolutely the right number.

2) At 80 to 96 SP howitzers we are talking 13 to 16 batteries. Allocate 1 bty to RCAS and 1 bty to ops stock leaves 11 - 14 batteries which, @ 3 per regiment, equals 3.6 to 4.6 regiments. This exceeds current RegF manning levels (equal to appx 4 x 6 gun batteries) by 50+% -> role for ResF or new PYs?

3) Anx a indicates a need for howitzers to fire and engage indirect targets on the move - very limiting. I only know of the KMW 155mm AGM mounted on the Boxer (and bought by the Brits) that would currently meet this requirement.

4) Anx A suggests fire control down to individual gun enabling widely dispersed, single gun deployments.

5) Anx states "IMF will replace existing indirect fire capabilities" -> suggests that not only the C3 and LG1 and old 81mm mortar fleets will be divested (as they should) but also the M777 fleet. IMHO, if correct, this would once again be the army being stupid and divesting good old kit to justify acquiring more new kit. I'm all for keeping the 33 x M777 fleet to equip 5 x "light" arty batteries. (as an aside I do see one point in the RFI that there should be consideration given to incorporating the existing 81mm tubes into the new light mortar capability)

6) The requirement to carry 20 rds minimum on the mortar carrier appears a low figure - that could be like one fire mission - but reload magazine in 5 minutes appears reasonable but would require an accompanying limber vehicle(s)

7) requirement for domestic munition supply source is excellent idea.

If I had my druthers, I would use this project as the foundation of a new artillery establishment based primarily on a 30/70 RegF/ResF manning establishment of two artillery brigades with a total of seven regiments as follows:

1) a CS arty brigade to support up to a mechanized division equipped with three CS SP regiments. Each CS regiment would have three x CS batteries of 155mm SPs (54 guns total) and one GS precision battery consisting of a target acquisition troop and two to three troops loitering munitions launchers.

2) a GS arty brigade to support the army as a whole with specialized regiments as follows: one x three battery AD regiment; one x light CS regiment consisting of 3 x M777 batteries and one GS battery (STA and loitering munitions as above); one x medium CS regiments consisting of 2-3 SP batteries, and one GS battery (STA and loitering munitions as above); one LRPR GS regiment consisting of three x 6 launcher HIMARS-like systems.

The current RegF arty (appx 2,100 in the field force) is capable of manning roughly nine batteries (when you include the STA one and return the OP battery personnel to the CS batteries where, IMHO, they belong. On a 30/70 basis that means that the RegF can, on average, man 1.3 batteries in each of the proposed seven equipped regiments. Similarly, the current ResF strength in the 16 ResF regiments (38 batteries - appx 3,200 allocated positions) are sufficient to man the remaining 2/3 of the force required plus hold a pool of BTL pers for additional augmentation/replacement. Seven equipped regiments (with a total of 25-26 fires batteries) with 2 x bde hqs&sigs would need approximately 5,000 all ranks plus another 1,000 in two hybrid 30/70 service battalions - so lets say 2,300 RegF and 3,700 ResF in total in very rough figures. It's doable.

As to mortars.

For the 120mm mortars, I favour giving them to the infantry albeit there are folks who see this as a ResF arty regiment role. Regardless, 99 x 120mm SPs can be considered as a six-mortar platoon; an eight-mortar platoon (two groups of four); or a 10-mortar platoon (as per US SBCT with a two-tube section per each of the three rifle coys plus a four-tube bn platoon). I prefer the latter option with 120mm SP mortars. That provides the ability to field seven platoons to equip seven mech battalions plus one for ops stock, one for the RCIS (or RCAS) and spares. We currently have a need for six mech battalions and I'm of the view we could build a total of nine fully manned and equipped mech battalions if the infantry went to a hybrid concept as well. That would require a reconsideration of the basic platoon makeup probably built around eight tubes per battalion.

For the 81mm mortars, I favour an eight-tube, two-group mortar platoon structure because of the weight of fire requiring more than two tubes. 72 x 81mm light vehicle systems equates to 9 platoons (again with 1 to the RCIS (or RCAS), one for ops stock w no spares) leaving seven platoons for the line units. The need is for 3 RegF battalions plus a host of ResF ones. Coincidentally, in a reorganized army hybrid structure, I could see the infantry fielding seven fully manned light battalions (over and above their proposed nine hybrid mech bns)

Mortar platoons vary in size from roughly 40 to 70 personnel. 16 platoons should therefore require roughly 650 to 1,150 personnel and IMHO could be manned primarily with a 10/90 RegF/ResF structure.

Let me repeat two points:

1) while it is reasonable to see the bean counters point of view that we should divest the M777, IMHO it would be aBIG mistake comparable to the divestment of the M109 two decades ago. The M777 is a highly useful gun and I can see a dozen scenarios where we would put it to use. It's an option well worth keeping as long as the parts supply stay's viable which should be for a long time considering how many are still in service.

2) I generally do not favour giving mortars to the artillery because they do not integrate well into the massed fires concept that artillery brings to the table and because if they were artillery it would be too enticing for an arty commander to allocate them to other efforts in the brigade and thus lose a bn comd his organic intimate fire sp. It's a headspace thing rather than a technical solution issue. We are developing fire support technology that makes full integration of mortars, guns and UAVs a possibility. However, If I had my way I'd turn a mortar platoon and an anti armour platoon into one entity utilizing mortars, ground based heavy AA weapons and loitering munitions as an all encompassing fire support capability for a bn - maybe even add recce into the mix to beef up the MFC and forward UAV controller capabilities. IMHO that requires leaving them all with the bn and to let the infantry sort out how best to manage their own organic support functions. The artillery should add a further layer which bridges the bn with the bde.

My fear is that - like with all shiny things - the 155mm SPs will go to the three RegF arty regiments, the RCAS and the odd arty regional training centre (Shilo, Meaford, Valcartier) - while the ResF arty regts gets mortars to play with and the M777s are divested (probably to Ukraine). IMHO, this does not move the yard sticks anywhere near as far as they could and should be.

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I wonder what the planned distribution of the SPH's is? Will we fully equip the three Reg Force Regiments with 3 x 6-gun batteries (54 guns total of the 80-98 total)? How many allocated to Latvia? For the schools/technical support, spares?
See my thoughts above as to what I would propose, but it really is problematic isn't it to put out a requirement for 80 - 98 guns. With a difference of 18 are you saying we might form an additional regiment? Or are you saying we might send 6 each to three regional schools? Effectively that means you do not have a solid plan but several possible courses of action that you might follow.

I know money plays a role in these things but if you do not lay down a solid and convincing plan that can be defended, then some bean counter will always undercut you from your optimum solution to your minimal one.

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See my thoughts above as to what I would propose, but it really is problematic isn't it to put out a requirement for 80 - 98 guns. With a difference of 18 are you saying we might form an additional regiment? Or are you saying we might send 6 each to three regional schools? Effectively that means you do not have a solid plan but several possible courses of action that you might follow.

I know money plays a role in these things but if you do not lay down a solid and convincing plan that can be defended, then some bean counter will always undercut you from your optimum solution to your minimal one.

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Eight gun batteries, just for you ;)
 
The requirement to mount 81 on LTV tells me these will probably go to the light battalions and the resf mortar platoons. Makes sense logistically since that's who will be operating the vast majority of LTV. I wonder if some will be kept for cavalry squadrons? They're desperately needed in our orbats.
 
"1) while it is reasonable to see the bean counters point of view that we should divest the M777, IMHO it would be a BIG mistake comparable to the divestment of the M109 two decades ago. The M777 is a highly useful gun and I can see a dozen scenarios where we would put it to use. It's an option well worth keeping as long as the parts supply stay's viable which should be for a long time considering how many are still in service."

What role would M777 play that you find critical to keep? It seems a lot of the footage coming out of Ukraine is if it does not have wheels/ tracks its dead. I gladly take 98 SPH guns at the cost of divesting the M777 personally. Considering they are limited role in conventional conflict or limited compared to SPH. I am not opposed to your argument, I am just not a gunner so maybe I don't a have wholesome understanding of the M777 uses.

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