C3 Howitzer Replacement

[PrairieFella]

no link but here are the screenshotsView attachment 89418View attachment 89419

Uhhh...should this be on the internet?

 

[suffolkowner]

Uhhh...should this be on the internet?

thats where I found it. a couple of times

 

[Kirkhill]

thats where I found it. a couple of times

Any sign of rocketry?

 

[markppcli]

Oh God no. That's a helluva way to kill the RCAC's augmentee pool when the vastly outnumbered crewmen inevitably become battle taxi squadron. On tanks, if we really were serious about our Armoured Corps and about manoeuvre warfare we could absolutely have reserve tankers. If other countries can so can we. We're just too apathetic and unserious to do it.

I’d see a split. Crew replacement regiments where they make logical sense - Edmonton, Quebec City, Ottawa, NB. The rest is to provide mobility. Further I’d suggest that very little, if any regular training done in the reserves helps them get crew augmentation from the reserves. Re organize and re purpose.

 

[markppcli]

Any sign of rocketry?

Not in places that are public.

 

[FJAG]

no link but here are the screenshots

Far be it from me to interrupt a discussion about armoured recce and tanks on a thread about replacing the C3 howitzer, but let me add my thoughts about these screenshots.

IFM is a high priority project for the army but, as yet, unfunded. My concern with it is the project deliberately shoots itself in the foot in its haste, to have, as a secondary objective, replacements for the C3 and LG1 for the ARes with mortars. A slide set that I received dated mid 2023 contained this statement:

Project will replace the indirect fires capability provided by the RegF and ResF Artillery Units and will likely field a mix of self propelled 155mm systems and self propelled 105mm or 120mm systems for the Army Reserve

Note two things. the first is that SP does not designate wheeled or tracked although the accompanying slides show a representative wheeled 155. Secondly note the option as between a 105 and 120 for the ARes. This is highly problematic as it shows the acquisition of either a 105mm "training gun" or a contemplated transition of ARes arty as infantry battalion mortarmen. IMHO neither option is a good one and both are short sighted.

Another slide deck, this one from mid 2024 includes the following:

The project will continue to develop two options:
a. A common fleet of medium 155mm 52 calibre self-propelled (SP) guns; and
b. A mixed fleet of medium 155mm 52 calibre guns with a light SP artillery capability (likely 120mm mortar).

Note that it presents two options. The first shows some hope that ARes units would have at least some guns of the same type as the RegF and thus be able to easily move into the augmentation role while the second option indicates a clear shift to making ARes gunners pseudo infantry and that the option for a 105mm training gun has been abandoned.

Note the indication for an L52 gun. That narrows the selection of what is currently available but at the same time indicates what, IMHO, is a critical requirement or the SP. It further posits:

8. With a UOR for this capability announced by CCA during Army Week 2023, it is possible a small quantity of self-propelled systems (as many as 20 guns) could be acquired ahead of the delivery of the full IFM project. This interim capability would not only equip the RCA with highly lethal, mobile and survivable guns, but also provide an exceptional opportunity to better develop its understanding as to how modern, automated guns can support a formation. A decision has not yet been made with respect to how or where the M777 would be redistributed.

A UOR option would speed up delivery of the guns so that, like the UK, there would be a stock of guns quickly available for current NATO missions in the Baltics. 20 guns would be sufficient for a six-gun battery in Latvia and enough training guns at each RegF regiment

Note the statement about the uncertainty regarding the existing M777 fleet. IMHO, there are only two viable options for them 1) retain appx 12 guns with the RegF for the support of a rapid deployment light battalion battle group while transferring the rest to several linked ARes units, or b) divest them all by gifting to Ukraine. Personally option 1) is the only one that makes sense to me for the Cdn army's operational needs. Neither provides for an across the board equipping of the ARes.

This brings me to your slides. The 81mm option is new to me as is the number of 40 - 90 light systems figure and the specification that they support "at least nine infantry battalions."

To adequately equip a battalion requires appx 8 tubes per battalion. That means the Cdn RegF infantry needs appx 72 mortars plus change for op stocks and training at the schools. 90 new tubes will meet the RegF requirement but not the ARes inf bns - so the "at least" is a bit of a misnomer. One could imagine that the six RegF mech bns get 120mm SPs which would total 48 plus change. 40 is inadequate and means a division between op stock and trg stock for no more than three battalions (ie one brigade) That would also require the retention of our existing 81mm tubes to support the light battalions and training.

Note that the mortar will be "manually fired" which rules out a turreted mortar.

Note that designating it a "troop" is indicative that the mortars will be an artillery role and inevitably will devolve on the ARes.

Finally note the numbers for the 155mm SPs (60-84). A properly equipped arty regiment to support a brigade needs 18 guns minimum. To fully equip the three RegF regiments would require 54 guns plus change. 60 is just enough. 84 is indicative of an additional regiment's worth of 18 being either in op stock, or the intent to equip some ARes units with them.

But, a RegF regiment does not currently have the PYs to man 18 guns (even if gun detachments are reduced from 10/gun to 4 or 5/gun). And let's not forget that there is a need to develop an LRPR and Loitering munitions capability on the boards which will also eat up PYs (and assuming GBAD does end up with additional PYs as planned). There's a definite need to use ARes to round out the establishments.

Regardless, we are looking at a Frankensteinian structure rather than a doctrinal one. I tie it to the fact that the army seems to lack a proper vision (in the absence of government direction) for what it wants to be when it grows up (besides 9 battalions) which leaves artillery (and the RCAC) to try to invent itself in a vacuum.

Long story short - rather than building a proper arty system, we appear to be heading down the road to cobble together something which will allow the plugging of several critical capability holes in the dyke with several stop-gap fingers. Since this project will likely be a once-in-a-generation one it will likely have several second and third order of magnitude negative impacts on the artillery as a whole and the ARes artillery in particular even while providing some much needed new capabilities.

 

[dimsum]

. Bonus is we can just blanket rename them all as Canadian Mounted Rifles and piss off every regimental association equally thus avoiding favouritism.

the ol’ Royal Australian Regiment strategy

 

[SeaKingTacco]

FJAG’s post above is instructive.

Far be it from me to tell the Army how to procure, but- you are doing it wrong.

Forget about Reg vs Res and even PYs for a second. Start from first principles- what are the Army’s daily peace time tasks? What are our operational commitments? What is our mobilization structure? Keeping in mind a mortars is not a gun and vice versa (they are complementary systems, not replacements for each other) and that when you buy Artillery, you ate also buying an indirect fire C2 structure that served us well in two world wars and Korea.

This should get you close to how many howitzers you need to buy (and what caibre). Same with mortars (keep them in Infantry and maybe armoured hands. Not ever the Artillery. Please.). Once you have number, you can then decide how many you need on a daily basis (probably Reg F Regiments and schools); how many need to go to Reserve units (mobilization and augmentation) and how many need to be stored (war stocks).

Stop planning with a dollar figure in mind.