C3 Howitzer Replacement

[FJAG]

So would we be able to mount that on the M119 if we adopted it?

My guess is that we could. It's really just a matter of finding or making the right mounting brackets and selecting the right mounting points to attach it to. The L118 is very close in many of its components to the M119 so there is already a model there for mounting Linaps/DGMS.

And why would we do that?

ResF units currently do not have DGMS but do have the same command post Indirect Fire Control Computer System. The army has a funded Joint Fires Modernization project to digitally link "sensors" to "effectors." In short that means, especially in an adaptive-dispersed environment, that there be a digital chain from the sensors to the gun platform. The most obvious one would be from FOO through CP to Gun (There are some practical reasons why the CP - either a physical CP or a virtual CP - stays as an intermediary).

JFM will have very real effects on how the artillery processes operate and ResF training should, if not must, be in line with the RegF one in all aspects even if we are looking just at augmentation RegF units and providing just a "training" gun to the ResF.

A DGMS on a reserve gun is the starting point. Then there will have to be the JFM equipment with the FOO, and all the linkages in between the two.

I don't think that's incompatible with asking that the ironmongery be done well, or that the FCS as hardware be reasonably field-proof, and perhaps amenable to easy swapping out.

I guess the term "easy swapping out" is flexible. Pretty much anything can be swapped out in the right circumstances. Back in 2006 some of the DGMS systems were initially installed in the field at Sperwan Ghar in between fire missions while the guns were in action. On one occasion one of the gunner SMEs who was there for the TAV doing the installation "took post" on an 81mm mortar for a mission.

I think more than anything else, the "easy swapping out" is dependent on the maintenance/manufacturing system having enough spare components available to do that. There are numerous other issues on "modern" guns that need specialized care and feeding. For example the M777 has many components made of Titanium. That requires specialized welding equipment and skills to deal with. It's not at the level of rocket science but some add on training for welders is needed as I understand it.

I just want to add a comment about the complexity of modern guns and the availability of reservists to be trained on it and reserve units to maintain it on Class A service. For me the proof is in the pudding with the USAR and ARNG. The M109A6 (and A7) both use a DFCS while command posts have computer systems and the radios are digital secure systems. US reservists routinely served 1 weekend per month and a two week session in the summer (39 days per year) and doing this maintained basic proficiency albeit there was always a train-up period before an operational deployment (like Canada but much shorter). their brigades were trained and maintained. Under Guard 4.0 the 39 days remains the standard albeit selected units/formations designated for deployments have a cycle that can add on collective training sessions (such as NTC rotations) that extends the annual training to 63 days in the final year so as to increase collective training and, as a result, readiness and to decrease the "train-up" predeployment training.

The question is never one of can this be done on Class A service. Of course it can. The whole aim of the reserve force is to build a larger more relevant army but to do so at the significantly reduced personnel costs that reservists offer. (Once initial training is completed, a reservist costs 1/6 of an active army soldier in pay and benefits - the annual cost of a reserve formation after things like ammunition, fuel, facilities etc is factored in is appx 1/3 of an active army one) The issue is always one of whether the will is there to build a reserve system that is capable of delivering. The US Army, like Canada, has factions which don't see eye to eye. The fact that the ARNG has a state guard role is a red herring because the USAR, which doesn't, delivers much of the same output quality (albeit focused in the combat support and combat service support roles)

Like the US, Canada has enough ResF positions in the ARE to approximately double the size of the RegF army. BUT. It has neither the structures nor the equipment to do that. Canada's mental processes - both within the GoC and senior military leadership - is focused on 1) equipping the deployed forces reasonably and structuring it sparingly; 2) equipping the rest of the RegF poorly (or barely adequately) and structuring it adequately for most capabilities and 3) equipping the ResF not at all and structuring it horribly.

There are answers there to fix the issue for anyone who wants to listen and learn.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

When I was in we had a parade on Thursday evening and full day Saturday, along with weekend exercises and week long gun camps. That should be the goal of the Reserve to be able to fund that level of training.

 

[Maxman1]

And why would we do that?

To replace the C3.

 

[markppcli]

To replace the C3.

Okay let me rephrase that:

What is the purpose of a 105mm towed howitzer in the Canadian Army?

 

[markppcli]

When I was in we had a parade on Thursday evening and full day Saturday, along with weekend exercises and week long gun camps. That should be the goal of the Reserve to be able to fund that level of training.

You paraded every Saturday? When I was in it was one night a week and an exercise weekend every month. I think two weekends is much much much preferable in terms of wages to time but tomato tomato.

 

[dapaterson]

Okay let me rephrase that:

What is the purpose of a 105mm towed howitzer in the Canadian Army?

Salute gun?

AvCon?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You paraded every Saturday? When I was in it was one night a week and an exercise weekend every month. I think two weekends is much much much preferable in terms of wages to time but tomato tomato.

I think when we were Ops Tasked that we got more funding. Not everyone paraded both days, but it certainly helped as you could do paperwork, course prep in the evening and then get into it for the full day. Earlier on there was "pink paysheets" which were a "Hope and prayer that you get paid for this, if there are any funds left over"

 

[markppcli]

My guess is that we could. It's really just a matter of finding or making the right mounting brackets and selecting the right mounting points to attach it to. The L118 is very close in many of its components to the M119 so there is already a model there for mounting Linaps/DGMS.


ResF units currently do not have DGMS but do have the same command post Indirect Fire Control Computer System. The army has a funded Joint Fires Modernization project to digitally link "sensors" to "effectors." In short that means, especially in an adaptive-dispersed environment, that there be a digital chain from the sensors to the gun platform. The most obvious one would be from FOO through CP to Gun (There are some practical reasons why the CP - either a physical CP or a virtual CP - stays as an intermediary).

JFM will have very real effects on how the artillery processes operate and ResF training should, if not must, be in line with the RegF one in all aspects even if we are looking just at augmentation RegF units and providing just a "training" gun to the ResF.

A DGMS on a reserve gun is the starting point. Then there will have to be the JFM equipment with the FOO, and all the linkages in between the two.

I guess the term "easy swapping out" is flexible. Pretty much anything can be swapped out in the right circumstances. Back in 2006 some of the DGMS systems were initially installed in the field at Sperwan Ghar in between fire missions while the guns were in action. On one occasion one of the gunner SMEs who was there for the TAV doing the installation "took post" on an 81mm mortar for a mission.

I think more than anything else, the "easy swapping out" is dependent on the maintenance/manufacturing system having enough spare components available to do that. There are numerous other issues on "modern" guns that need specialized care and feeding. For example the M777 has many components made of Titanium. That requires specialized welding equipment and skills to deal with. It's not at the level of rocket science but some add on training for welders is needed as I understand it.

I just want to add a comment about the complexity of modern guns and the availability of reservists to be trained on it and reserve units to maintain it on Class A service. For me the proof is in the pudding with the USAR and ARNG. The M109A6 (and A7) both use a DFCS while command posts have computer systems and the radios are digital secure systems. US reservists routinely served 1 weekend per month and a two week session in the summer (39 days per year) and doing this maintained basic proficiency albeit there was always a train-up period before an operational deployment (like Canada but much shorter). their brigades were trained and maintained. Under Guard 4.0 the 39 days remains the standard albeit selected units/formations designated for deployments have a cycle that can add on collective training sessions (such as NTC rotations) that extends the annual training to 63 days in the final year so as to increase collective training and, as a result, readiness and to decrease the "train-up" predeployment training.

The question is never one of can this be done on Class A service. Of course it can. The whole aim of the reserve force is to build a larger more relevant army but to do so at the significantly reduced personnel costs that reservists offer. (Once initial training is completed, a reservist costs 1/6 of an active army soldier in pay and benefits - the annual cost of a reserve formation after things like ammunition, fuel, facilities etc is factored in is appx 1/3 of an active army one) The issue is always one of whether the will is there to build a reserve system that is capable of delivering. The US Army, like Canada, has factions which don't see eye to eye. The fact that the ARNG has a state guard role is a red herring because the USAR, which doesn't, delivers much of the same output quality (albeit focused in the combat support and combat service support roles)

Like the US, Canada has enough ResF positions in the ARE to approximately double the size of the RegF army. BUT. It has neither the structures nor the equipment to do that. Canada's mental processes - both within the GoC and senior military leadership - is focused on 1) equipping the deployed forces reasonably and structuring it sparingly; 2) equipping the rest of the RegF poorly (or barely adequately) and structuring it adequately for most capabilities and 3) equipping the ResF not at all and structuring it horribly.

There are answers there to fix the issue for anyone who wants to listen and learn.

I more meant why buy a reserve gun, we should has a single artillery system. If that means two types of howitzers and a LRPF system fine, but full time / part time should be the distinction.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I more meant why buy a reserve gun, we should has a single artillery system. If that means two types of howitzers and a LRPF system fine, but full time / part time should be the distinction.

But that is contrary to the CAF tradition of banishing the junk to the Island of Misfit Toys

 

[PrairieFella]

But that is contrary to the CAF tradition of banishing the junk to the Island of Misfit Toys

And don't forget taking the rare good pieces of kit they get

 

[KevinB]

But that is contrary to the CAF tradition of banishing the junk to the Island of Misfit Toys

And don't forget taking the rare good pieces of kit they get

Both of those issues depict an Us/Them mentality which needs to be abolished like most Res positions above the rank of captain…

 

[markppcli]

Both of those issues depict an Us/Them mentality which needs to be abolished like most Res positions above the rank of captain…

Exactly this, it’s one army. The fact that the army moved Grizzly’s from 38 Bde to 1 CMBG shouldn’t be seen as “they took our cars!” But rather the reassignment of equipment to meet an operational need.

 

[FJAG]

I more meant why buy a reserve gun, we should has a single artillery system. If that means two types of howitzers and a LRPF system fine, but full time / part time should be the distinction.

Absolutely agree. I'm just expanding it to the possibility that if a "training gun or mortar system" is bought by some less enlightened bureaucrat then the DGMS system and the entire JFM system should be incorporated.

Both of those issues depict an Us/Them mentality which needs to be abolished like most Res positions above the rank of captain…

That's an idea that I keep mulling over. At the moment I'm of the view that we maintain maj as the coy level command rank and that we have 10/90 coys/sqns/btys commanded by ResF majors. That needs a coy level commanders course for each specialty which needs to be equal to the RegF one at least from the tactical side. I'm a fan of unloading administrative functions on full-timers.

In the same way, I think there should be a limited number of LCol staff positions that can be occupied by ResF majors who have taken the requisite training. Believe it or not there are reservists who are smart enough to handle the "stress" of rank and whose ResF experience will help. All of that, however, depends on a workable 30/70 system. If you stay with the current system and just cut ranks then watch the fur fly. You need a concept that's sellable to all sides.

 

[KevinB]

That's an idea that I keep mulling over. At the moment I'm of the view that we maintain maj as the coy level command rank and that we have 10/90 coys/sqns/btys commanded by ResF majors. That needs a coy level commanders course for each specialty which needs to be equal to the RegF one at least from the tactical side. I'm a fan of unloading administrative functions on full-timers.

In the same way, I think there should be a limited number of LCol staff positions that can be occupied by ResF majors who have taken the requisite training. Believe it or not there are reservists who are smart enough to handle the "stress" of rank and whose ResF experience will help. All of that, however, depends on a workable 30/70 system. If you stay with the current system and just cut ranks then watch the fur fly. You need a concept that's sellable to all sides.

Honestly I didn’t think it should matter - the good of the country argument should be enough to satisfy any grumbling, at least publicly
You will notice I said most - not all.

 

[RangerRay]

But that is contrary to the CAF tradition of banishing the junk to the Island of Misfit Toys

I thought the tradition was to scrap any old but serviceable equipment so the ARes can’t use it?

 

[dapaterson]

I thought the tradition was to scrap any old but serviceable equipment so the ARes can’t use it?

No, we drive it into the ground, long past any OEM support, then scrap it because it is unsustainable.

 

[PrairieFella]

Exactly this, it’s one army. The fact that the army moved Grizzly’s from 38 Bde to 1 CMBG shouldn’t be seen as “they took our cars!” But rather the reassignment of equipment to meet an operational need.

I don't disagree but that only ever seems to go one way. It's idealistic to take that view in an obvious dog-eat-dog environment that the GoC creates with the Army. I'll remain cynical about these sorts of things until the reserves is actually respected. Just my two cents that doesn't count for shit anyways.

Both of those issues depict an Us/Them mentality which needs to be abolished like most Res positions above the rank of captain…

Who cares which rank is in charge. It's such a non-issue when there are ten thousand other issues glaring at the ARes. At the end of the day it doesn't make a difference if a squadron/company is led by a major or captain and any attention diverted from what actually matters is just window dressing.

 

[markppcli]

I don't disagree but that only ever seems to go one way. It's idealistic to take that view in an obvious dog-eat-dog environment that the GoC creates with the Army. I'll remain cynical about these sorts of things until the reserves is actually respected. Just my two cents that doesn't count for shit anyways.

The problem is seeing it as a respect thing. That has nothing to do with equipment allocation - we allocated equipment to meet operational needs. The FG / FE units for operations are by and large in the CMBGs.

 

[PrairieFella]

The problem is seeing it as a respect thing. That has nothing to do with equipment allocation - we allocated equipment to meet operational needs. The FG / FE units for operations are by and large in the CMBGs.

I disagree, this is fundamentally a respect issue. To keep it on topic, if the GoC respected the reserves, they wouldn't be having reservist artillerymen using ancient guns which are so decrepit that members of this forum are only half joking when they say it'll take a gun exploding and killing and maiming its crew before anything is done. If the reserves were respected as full members of the defence team this conversation wouldn't exist. This is all grading on a curve by the way, since the GoC obviously doesn't respect the Regs much more, since many of the same issues apply.

Operational redistributions are fine, but what's the plan to backfill that which was taken? There never is a plan because the reserves are not respected and the GoC/CAF institutional leadership has no intention of doing so, if they did there would have been a plan and funding scheme to make the reserves semi-useful beyond an augmentee here or there (although this does seem to be changing with the manpower crunch).

 

[markppcli]

I disagree, this is fundamentally a respect issue. To keep it on topic, if the GoC respected the reserves, they wouldn't be having reservist artillerymen using ancient guns which are so decrepit that members of this forum are only half joking when they say it'll take a gun exploding and killing and maiming its crew before anything is done. If the reserves were respected as full members of the defence team this conversation wouldn't exist. This is all grading on a curve by the way, since the GoC obviously doesn't respect the Regs much more, since many of the same issues apply.

Operational redistributions are fine, but what's the plan to backfill that which was taken? There never is a plan because the reserves are not respected and the GoC/CAF institutional leadership has no intention of doing so, if they did there would have been a plan and funding scheme to make the reserves semi-useful beyond an augmentee here or there (although this does seem to be changing with the manpower crunch).

What you’re describing is underfunding. The army didn’t intend for the C3 to last this long or for it to be the reserve gun. The M109s were clapped out so everyone was on the C3, with some LG1s. Then Afghanistan and a UOR that let us slide into USMC M777 production for 37 guns. Who would you have given them to? The guys generating batteries for deployments is probably the right answer I think. It has nothing to do with no respecting reservists and everything to do with limited availability, budget, and operational commitments. The lack of respect that caused this was frankly the lack of respect for fires, and the lack of understanding where future conflicts would go.

The Government doesn’t give two shits about reserve or regular. They just want bodies to deploy. The Army cares, sure, but they are primarily worried about meeting commitments. Yes the reserve structure is fucking absurd and makes it difficult to fill tasks. Who’s the organization standing in the way of that being fixed though?