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C3 Howitzer Replacement

Meanwhile in Spain...

Spain adding additional AD Artillery as well...

 
What I'm asking is if a Bde can successfully validate with it's Bn's each at a different stage of MRP.

Couple thoughts.
First, most all Bde validation is done via CAX. Having units at different levels of readiness inside the Bde doesn’t preclude the Bde staff from being validated.

Second, we have been validating all our CS and CSS units via CAX as well. Allowing those units to actually specialize in supporting a specific type of manoeuvre units would likely be good. We also need to actually start validating them as units in actual FTXs I believe.

Third, readiness at the Bde level can likely look different than at the unit levels due to the size of force Canada typically commits quickly. Aligning Bde CT events with the Army Posting Season and Command tour lengths along with equipment fielding so that personnel, commanders and equipment come together for a three year cycle would likely lead to as much readiness at the Bde level as now, likely better.

Having Bde formations trained and used to working together in their respective role, armoured, mech, airmobile etc. would likely offer more readiness to the Army in more scenarios on the same timeline as today even though we may have to rapidly shift resources to spool up a needed Bde type that was not validated.

The validation at Bde level would not necessarily be for a specific timeframe or msn but rather a tool to maintain proficiency in the army overall.

Key question is how long do we need to train a new Bde Comd and Staff? Likely 4 months, but if we adopted some of the items above the baseline readiness would likely be better for specific roles.
 
Like this?
4-m119a1-howitzer.jpg
Exactly that. Is it handier to have a 105 and an extra ~2000 kg of capacity to do other things with, or a 155?
 
What I'm asking is if a Bde can successfully validate with it's Bn's each at a different stage of MRP.

Having each Bde running their Bns through MRP would drive the army into the ground in all likelihood. WRT to the Light Bn readiness, we essentially already do rotate them through readiness so I don’t really know what would be achieved.
 
There would be no need for a Bde to run the CT validation for their Bns. CMTC should do that still, but the CA could adjust the model to adopt the US CTC model in that they rotate multiple Bdes though a year. We could rotate 4 Bns through each year, three reg and one reserve.

A Light Bde might not offer much change to the three Inf Bns but it offers a very very significant amount to the Bde Staff, HQ and Sigs Sqn, the CER, the Arty Regt, the Svc Bn, the aviation Sqns as well as the Field Amb. Those elements are being pulled in conflicting directions by having the Light Bns inside the Mech Bns with the mech and light elements being on different cycles.
 
Exactly that. Is it handier to have a 105 and an extra ~2000 kg of capacity to do other things with, or a 155?
Range and terminal effects matter.

The former makes a very important difference as to what you are able to do in any given tactical scenario. Range becomes even more important when you think in terms of the size of an AO rather than just a linear distance. We couldn't have provided the fire support needed in Afghanistan - especially the early years - with 105s unless we had deployed three or four times the number of guns. A 105mm with a range of 17 kilometres covers an area of 908 square kilometres. A 155mm with a range of 30 kilometres covers an area of 2,827 sq km or three times the area of a 105mm.

In airmobile operations this gives you the ability to position your guns further away from the operational area providing a higher degree of security - and therefore availability - of the guns. In counter insurgency type of operations it means that the guns can settle into an FOB and provide a high degree of 360 degree availability to the force throughout its AO.

The 155mm is now the Western go-to round. It's a bigger round and type for type - ie HE v HE, WP v WP etc - you can deliver a bigger effect. In addition, there is not much development going into improving 105mm types as compared to 155mm. Newer 155mm rounds are significantly more effective than the Cold War standard rounds and development - particularly n the nature of precision munitions - is ongoing.

So this -

15720091474_6c2fab5734_b.jpg


Having each Bde running their Bns through MRP would drive the army into the ground in all likelihood.
I doubt that there would be a significant difference. I'm of the view that MRPs in and of themselves are a sign/symptom of an army already run into the ground. The MRP system is used to compensate for understrength units and insufficient equipment which is serviceable. Reorganizing into a light brigade and two mech brigades would not change that.
WRT to the Light Bn readiness, we essentially already do rotate them through readiness so I don’t really know what would be achieved.
The entire structure of the army at present is designed to facilitate brigade by brigade rotational battle group generation. Canadian brigade groups, in and of themselves, are not doctrinal tactical elements. Under the concepts created by Advancing with Purpose, they are flexible structures that are designed to be ad hoc organized for a mission using a building block system. It goes back to that old trope that when you are a jack of all trades then you are a master of none.

Reorganizing into a light brigade and two mech brigades would simplify logistics and training within each brigade. More importantly the brigades themselves would be able to develop their own expertise in either light or mech operations and become entities that could be deployed as an doctrinal entity without reconfiguration.

In our current mission set, the light brigade would generate the fly-over light battalion required for Latvia and be responsible for having a constantly ready Global Response Task Force.

The two mech brigades would have the responsibility for generating the mech components of the Latvia-based brigade.

I'm of the view that there should be no rotation of the brigade headquarters into Latvia. That should be a new brigade headquarters staffed by the posting in of the core of both the brigade headquarters and core signals squadron and logistics staff, supported by either rotational augmentees or, IMHO preferably, fly-over surge personnel.

It's not changing the Canadian brigade structure that will burn out the Canadian army. It is Latvia and continuing on with the current structure that will burn it out and prevent our brigades from becoming efficient tactical entities rather than just force generators.

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Range and terminal effects matter.

The former makes a very important difference as to what you are able to do in any given tactical scenario. Range becomes even more important when you think in terms of the size of an AO rather than just a linear distance. We couldn't have provided the fire support needed in Afghanistan - especially the early years - with 105s unless we had deployed three or four times the number of guns. A 105mm with a range of 17 kilometres covers an area of 908 square kilometres. A 155mm with a range of 30 kilometres covers an area of 2,827 sq km or three times the area of a 105mm.

In airmobile operations this gives you the ability to position your guns further away from the operational area providing a higher degree of security - and therefore availability - of the guns. In counter insurgency type of operations it means that the guns can settle into an FOB and provide a high degree of 360 degree availability to the force throughout its AO.

The 155mm is now the Western go-to round. It's a bigger round and type for type - ie HE v HE, WP v WP etc - you can deliver a bigger effect. In addition, there is not much development going into improving 105mm types as compared to 155mm. Newer 155mm rounds are significantly more effective than the Cold War standard rounds and development - particularly n the nature of precision munitions - is ongoing.

So this -

15720091474_6c2fab5734_b.jpg
Thank you for that!
 
If you have fewer guns because they have longer range means it is easier for the enemy to take out those targets. Smaller guns more dispersed means harder target for the enemy.
A blended force of 105, 155, various mortars and the potential 120 coming out might be better for the overall missions.

But if everyone is on the 155 bandwagon then I guess we follow along. Even though they all operate various systems.
 
If you have fewer guns because they have longer range means it is easier for the enemy to take out those targets. Smaller guns more dispersed means harder target for the enemy.
The fact that they cover more area and you can have fewer guns in a counter-insurgency type operation does not mean that you will have fewer guns. Doctrine for us is still a six gun battery and three gun batteries per regiment plus an STA battery and a tactical battery for the FOOs/JTACs.

(If I had my druthers, I'd change the establishment by grouping the FOOs/JTACs with STA in one battery as combined they are the sense function. I'd also add a general support launcher battery to provide for all brigade-level precision missile/armed UAV handling - bns should have their own UAVs)
A blended force of 105, 155, various mortars and the potential 120 coming out might be better for the overall missions.
I'm a great fan of mortars - both 81 and 120 but as battalion resources. Giving mortars to the artillery back in the 00s was one of those finance/PY cutback compromises that we've grown use to. IMHO this is more than a mere cap badge issue as to who mans the mortars. For me there is a very real difference between guns and mortars. Bns need their own guaranteed fire support. Mortars give them that. Artillery needs to mass fires across a broad front. Guns with their longer ranges and comms networking provide that. Yes, some 120mm can range out to 13,000 metres but that is still far short of what a 155 (even with an L39 barrel) will do. If you think adaptive dispersed operations then the ranges all need to match the task. Mortars are still more suited to a bn while guns are suited to the division (regardless of how small our army is, combat support systems must fit into a NATO structure)

But if everyone is on the 155 bandwagon then I guess we follow along. Even though they all operate various systems.
They do and most ammunition is interchangeable as long as your computers have the right firing tables. Different systems do have issues. Some of the newer longer range rounds have charges that are more powerful than what older barrels are stressed for. The proliferation of different rounds can be problematic for what is already a complex logistics system for NATO. The fewer different natures that you have the easier logistics get. 105s, while not without their uses, are an unnecessary complication and while we still train on them, no one realistically sees an operational role for them.

The Americans still have 105mm M119s in their light divisions (2 x M119 batteries & 1 x M777 battery per battalion) That's not about to change for a long while until they get an SP for their Stryker BCTs and thus freeing up around 160 x M777s (I'm not sure what they did with all their Marine ones. They had 481 guns, gave around a 108 to the Ukraine and retain around 50-60 or so in use. There should still be some 850 or so in the combined army and marine M777s inventory either in use or storage - that's enough to equip 50 battalions. The Marines equip 2 or 3 battalions with M777s and the army only has 20 battalions in 20 IBCTs (i.e. 120 x M777s total) and 9 battalions in 9 BCTs (162 x M777 in total) and a few battalions in arty brigades so there are plenty to go around.

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