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British Military Current Events

Hard to do 140 PPM when the band plays 120 PPM.
Can they not slow down to 120 then?

I saw the Band of the CG (with pipers and pipe drummers) the other day and instead of slowing to 100 as per Highland pace, the pipe band just played at 120.

That being said, I'm sure some Highland Regt RSM was clutching their pearls as they "ran" by. :ROFLMAO:
 
The Summer 2023 British Army Review (How Will We Fight in 2026) is out and has quite a few good articles.



Their new format really sucks (but is oh so pretty) - luckily you can download it as a pdf.

🍻

Some observations from the text....

Hard truths
We are out of time. The war isn't 10 years from now it is now.
Every domain will be contested in the deep, close and rear.
The Close Battle matters as much as it ever did.
The Reserves are needed as much as they ever were.

Data management is key.
All data is important.
All data needs to be sorted.
That takes effort and that effort will happen well to the rear.

Taking that load off the forward elements will allow for the elimination of tent cities and for the distribution of useful data forwards.

The aim is to achieve a more lethal, more dispersed force with a lot more ability to decide actions by the application of fires of all types.

All arms efforts will be pushed down from the brigade, through the battle group to the company and the platoon.
All elements will improve situation awareness through their own UAV fleets.
All elements will improve their lethal fires, especially by immediately incorporating Loitering Attack Munitions.
Carl Gustafs, N-LAWs and Javelins will all be incorporated into the structure.
The Platoon will retain the GPMG and the 60 mm mortar.
There is consideration of bringing a Supacat mounted 105mm Recoilless into service for busting buildings and structures.
The CVR-T Swingfire system needs replacing, possibly with something like the Boxer Brimstone.

Arty will be looking for a new truck for their Light Guns with the Supacat being under consideration.
The Archer will be brought into service.
The MRLS M270s will be upgraded to be compatible with the PrSM missiles.

Boxers are likely to get the 30mm system and C-UAS needs to be widely distributed.
Scimitars are being replaced by Warriors in the Deep Recce Strike units until the Ajax comes on line.

Divisions will be expected to cover Corps areas.
Brigades, Divisions.
Battle Groups, Brigades.
Companies, Battle Groups.
Platoons, Companies.

And there seems to be a fight shaping up over the Guns.
The Battlegroups want their own.
The Arty wants to concentrate them.
Both are probably true and more guns are needed.

Especially if Battle Groups are to cover Brigade areas then 50 km guns are going to be handy.

Electronic Warfare will also be pushed down and forwards to the Company/Platoon level.

Edit to add - Night Vision for everyone.

First read, hot take.
 
Some observations from the text....

Hard truths
We are out of time. The war isn't 10 years from now it is now.
Every domain will be contested in the deep, close and rear.
The Close Battle matters as much as it ever did.
The Reserves are needed as much as they ever were.

Data management is key.
All data is important.
All data needs to be sorted.
That takes effort and that effort will happen well to the rear.

Taking that load off the forward elements will allow for the elimination of tent cities and for the distribution of useful data forwards.

The aim is to achieve a more lethal, more dispersed force with a lot more ability to decide actions by the application of fires of all types.

All arms efforts will be pushed down from the brigade, through the battle group to the company and the platoon.
All elements will improve situation awareness through their own UAV fleets.
All elements will improve their lethal fires, especially by immediately incorporating Loitering Attack Munitions.
Carl Gustafs, N-LAWs and Javelins will all be incorporated into the structure.
The Platoon will retain the GPMG and the 60 mm mortar.
There is consideration of bringing a Supacat mounted 105mm Recoilless into service for busting buildings and structures.
The CVR-T Swingfire system needs replacing, possibly with something like the Boxer Brimstone.

Arty will be looking for a new truck for their Light Guns with the Supacat being under consideration.
The Archer will be brought into service.
The MRLS M270s will be upgraded to be compatible with the PrSM missiles.

Boxers are likely to get the 30mm system and C-UAS needs to be widely distributed.
Scimitars are being replaced by Warriors in the Deep Recce Strike units until the Ajax comes on line.

Divisions will be expected to cover Corps areas.
Brigades, Divisions.
Battle Groups, Brigades.
Companies, Battle Groups.
Platoons, Companies.

And there seems to be a fight shaping up over the Guns.
The Battlegroups want their own.
The Arty wants to concentrate them.
Both are probably true and more guns are needed.

Especially if Battle Groups are to cover Brigade areas then 50 km guns are going to be handy.

Electronic Warfare will also be pushed down and forwards to the Company/Platoon level.

Edit to add - Night Vision for everyone.

First read, hot take.

And about two brigades + worth of combat arms units will continue to be wasted on public duties ;)
 
Some observations from the text....

Hard truths
We are out of time. The war isn't 10 years from now it is now.
Not to take away from the other points, because this is one of the better sets of papers that I've seen come out of the British army, I tend to focus on these two areas. (Probably because its confirmation of my own biases)

The Reserves are needed as much as they ever were.

From page Pg 08 - "it is not unreasonable to agree with S.L.A. Marshall who wrote in Men Against Fire in 1946 that there is not the slightest possibility that the issues between great nations could be settled by limited forces in a thunderclap of actions along their frontiers …to the reality that exquisite weaponry, elite formations, and Regular forces are expended first and sometimes quickly. ….we need a primary reserve …"

Ukraine has reinforced my belief that the US is the only NATO country with a viable reserve force strategy. There will, most likely, be time to train up and deploy a properly structured and moderately trained but fully equipped reserve force. It provides depth and sustainability. There will not be enough time to build a force from scratch and equip it. The concepts of filing small holes in a full-time force's establishment is solely a peacetime concept and not viable for major conflict.

And there seems to be a fight shaping up over the Guns.
The Battlegroups want their own.
The Arty wants to concentrate them.
Both are probably true and more guns are needed.
...
I have the same thought about logistics especially after the comments of the commander of the DSB and his weakness in that field.

Notwithstanding the seamlessness of the battle handoff from deep to close fight, I think 3 UK Div needs two arty brigades. One to support the close fight that can stay quiet and not be attrited during the deep fight and one to run the deep fight, the way that the DSB contemplates AND that can continue to run a deep fight after the close fight commences. That's not merely a matter of having the right battalions of guns and rockets but also becomes a question of focus. Once the close fight is joined its hard for one arty bde hq to put its attention elsewhere but the close fight ... but you need to keep focusing on the deep fight. Corps should take that up, but someone needs to do that and there is no British Corps. What with frontages it may need to be at Div. In any event I'd have a proper divisional arty brigade with the div and a DSB which covers the div's frontage and that integrates ISTAR and long range fires.

🍻
 
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There will not be enough time to build a force from scratch and equip it. The concepts of filing small holes in a full-time force's establishment is solely a peacetime concept and not viable for major conflict.

🍻

Apparently part of the Ukrainian problem is the readiness of their recently raised Corps of new assault Brigades trained by the West.

Most of the heavy going is being made by veteran brigades that have been engaged in their areas of interest for months if not years and whose losses are made up with individual replacements.

The veterans know their ground, their enemy and their game plan. They seem to find it easier to incorporate new bodies and new kit and adapt them to their fight. New units have none of those advantages.
 
We're talking apples and oranges. Replacements in veteran units vs force expansion. The former comes with a built in experienced leadership, the latter needs it provided.

🍻
 

1690776751141.png


Alternative to the towed Lt Gun?
Together with the Brimstone Wolfram,
A 105mm Recoilless Gun on a Coyote.
Jackals for Recce
Coyotes for log and support.
 

The NGCT that ETG are experimenting with is based around 2 Phalanx Platoons and a Manoeuvre Support Group. The Phalanx Platoon is built of 3 sections of 10 personnel, an anti-armour/anti-structure capability, a platoon systems operator, a platoon commander and a platoon sergeant.

The new section consists of 2 4-person fire teams and an independent command element comprising section commander and a section systems operator. This command element was shown to increase the situational awareness of the section, through the employment of drones and intelligence kit, while reducing the cognitive burden on the section commander.

The systems operator is also removed from the fire teams to focus on controlling the small uncrewed air systems (UAS) and updating the Dismounted Situational Awareness (DSA) system, providing greater situational awareness to both the section commander and platoon headquarters.

Each Phalanx Platoon has a shoulder-launched rocket team, armed with a Carl-Gustaf weapon system. This enables a rapid, multi-shot capability that can utilise different warheads dependent on the mission and does not require a specialist user to operate in the same way that Javelin does. By having this capability independent of the sections, it allows a more effective employment of these capabilities while reducing the load on the sections in both weight and cognitive burden.

The Manoeuvre Support Group consists of assets that would traditionally be found in a support company, increasing the lethality options immediately available to a company commander. The entire company will be mounted in light mobility vehicles, to offer enhanced mobility but not a platform to fight from.

ETG Lead, Col Toby Till, said:

Dstl’s science has enabled us to look at increasing the size of the sections, which increases their survivability and enables them to remain effective, even whilst sustaining casualties. This increase also enables the section commander to be removed from a fire team, allowing a better focus on commanding the section and digesting the increased levels of information being generated by the systems operator.

The Manoeuvre Support Group also has 3 Javelin detachments to provide specialist anti-tank capability at the company level, with a greater range than that offered by the Carl-Gustaf Sensor Decider Effector (SDE) Teams and Indirect Fires. The Manoeuvre Support Group has 2 SDE Teams consisting of a Patrol Commander, Systems Operator/Mortar Fire Controller and a driver who also provides security. The company is assigned 2 81mm mortar barrels as integral indirect fires assets.

The SDE Teams will operate in the same way as a Fire Planning Cell at Battlegroup HQ level but is focussed on the assets integral to the company. The company also benefits from a MEP WOLFRAM, a Coyote vehicle fitted with a modular Brimstone missile launcher, to enable precision long range fires, as well as simulated Loitering Munitions, at Platoon and Company level.
 
We're talking apples and oranges. Replacements in veteran units vs force expansion. The former comes with a built in experienced leadership, the latter needs it provided.

🍻

No argument. I wasn't suggesting that there isn't a place for the Reserves. There is. My point was that it takes time for the Reserves to come up to speed and become veterans. The Replacement plan is at least as important as the Generation plan. As you note the Replacements need to be led and better it is that they be led by experienced veterans.

If the veterans are all eliminated before the Reserves make it into the field then the Reserves are a lot less effective than they would be if they were fed into veteran units with experienced leaders.
 
Watchkeepers vs Maviks....

‘Seriously concerning’: The drone crash that has brought Army technology into question​

Initially designed to fight the Taliban, Watchkeeper is ill-suited to counter novel threats

ByGareth Corfield31 July 2023 • 6:00am

Watchkeeper drone on the runway

One in seven of Britain’s 54 Watchkeeper drones have so far crashed
Beneath the balmy November sun of New Mexico, the British soldiers were happy. They were about to show off what their £5m Watchkeeper drones were truly capable of in front of a key UK ally.
Flying under the UK military registration WK036, the French-made, propeller-driven unmanned aircraft soared over the training area’s scrubland at speeds of more than 70mph.
Its high-definition cameras beamed back footage of targets on the Fort Irwin ranges, ready for waiting artillery batteries to engage them.
Suitably impressed by Watchkeeper, the Americans treated their British guests to a helicopter tour of the local area. Official photos show grinning Royal Artillery soldiers sitting in the back of a Black Hawk.

British soldiers from the 47th Regiment Royal Artillery were in New Mexico to demonstrate the Watchkeeper drone’s capabilities
Yet disaster struck on November 10, 2022 when WK036 crashed. The loss of that drone is being publicly revealed for the first time today.
Shadow defence minister Luke Pollard says his Conservative counterparts have tried to hide the incident.
“With Watchkeeper crashes now reaching eight since 2014, it is seriously concerning why ministers covered up the latest crash and have failed to learn the lessons from previous mistakes to ensure these drones can keep Britain safe while threats increase,” says the Labour MP.
The Ministry of Defence says the accusation of a cover up is “totally baseless and shows a complete lack of understanding of what actually happened”.
The crash means one in seven of Britain’s 54 Watchkeepers, which are supposed to stay in service until the 2040s, has met an untimely end.
Anti-drone campaigner Chris Cole, whose Drone Wars group brought the November crash of WK036 to light, says there are “serious questions” to be asked “about the value for money of the Watchkeeper programme”.
Meanwhile, military commentators are warning that battlefield reconnaissance is now done by cheap consumer grade drones instead of expensive aeroplane-sized UAVs, as shown in Ukraine.
“One has to question whether these big drones have had their day, on the basis that they are too easy to interdict and take down,” says Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a former Army officer.
Battlefield experience from Ukraine shows how small, inexpensive drones such as the DJI Mavic can be used in the hands of frontline troops.
Even cheaper craft, homebuilt by frontline soldiers and not reliant on GPS or satellites to find their way, are proving just as useful.
With their built-in cameras, these DIY “first person view” drones can be used for reconnaissance or even strike missions, dropping grenades on enemy positions with pinpoint accuracy.

Originally billed as an “affordable solution” at £800m when Labour’s defence secretary John Reid ordered it in 2005, Watchkeeper’s costs have overshot that figure by half a billion pounds.
Defence minister James Cartlidge confirmed in June that Watchkeeper has cost £1.351bn, a sum that includes upgrades to airfields in Aberporth and Boscombe Down.
A whistleblower who contacted Parliament’s Defence Committee earlier this year pointed out that Watchkeeper is “exclusively procured from Thales”.
The French-headquartered company, which makes the drones at a facility near Leicester and is also contracted to maintain them, did not respond to a request for comment.
While questions hang over its costs, others are being raised about whether Watchkeeper is fit for purpose in the modern age.
De Bretton-Gordon, a retired colonel, says inexpensive drones costing a few thousand pounds each (as opposed to Watchkeeper’s £5.2m unit price tag) are proving highly capable in the Russo-Ukraine war.
“Ukraine’s artillery is so effective these days because virtually every Ukrainian artillery shell that’s fired has a drone on the other end marking its strike,” he observes.
Labour MP Kevan Jones adds: “Ukrainian forces have shown that many of Watchkeeper’s capabilities can be delivered for a fraction of the cost.”
Carrying out unarmed spotting for artillery targets is the niche that Watchkeeper was supposed to fill.

Army sources confirm, however, that the drone is unable to be flown in less-than-perfect weather.
Watchkeeper is fit for “visual meteorological conditions only”, yet wars do not wait for the sun to shine.
The drone that crashed in November was being flown from an airstrip a few miles southeast of New Mexico’s Organ Mountains.
Details of the latest crash are not being released by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which confirmed that an internal investigation is still ongoing eight months later.
“The incident resulted in no injuries or damage to infrastructure,” said an MoD spokesman.
“As is routine with any aircraft incident, an investigation is taking place. It would be inappropriate to speculate further.”
Francis Tusa, editor of the Defence Analysis newsletter, explains that Watchkeeper’s origins were intimately bound up in the inter-Service politics of the Afghanistan War era.
With the Taliban having little access to anti-aircraft missiles, operating drones was not of interest to the Royal Air Force until military thinking began favouring unmanned aircraft, he says.
Such drones could loiter for hours over a spot of interest and were supposed to be cheaper to run than the RAF’s traditional fast jets like the Tornado.
“That sort of killed Watchkeeper,” says Tusa, “because the RAF said ‘rather than spending more money on Watchkeeper, give us the money and we’ll buy [the armed MQ-1] Predator’.”
He jokes that the £1.35bn spent on the unarmed observation drone could instead have been spent buying 275,000 consumer-grade craft, similar to how both Ukrainian and Russian soldiers are using drones today.
Promises of Watchkeeper’s cost-effectiveness have not come true.
Part of the project’s original plan was for junior Royal Artillery soldiers to fly the drones, saving money on pilot training and wages.
Such penny-pinching has backfired. The artillery’s dedicated drone unit, 47 Regiment, has been short of pilots since 2019.

Recruitment efforts have failed to get 47 Regiment up to full capacity CREDIT: Corporal Anil Gurung
The Armed Forces Pay Review Body urged Army chiefs to give the regiment’s pilots a £30,000 bonus apiece to tackle the shortage.
“The MoD concluded that an increase in workforce numbers would not be achievable without additional remuneration measures,” said the APRB in its 2022 annual report.
Even as defence chiefs struggle with staff shortages, the unarmed UAV may struggle on modern battlefields.
Watchkeeper was optimised for use against enemies who couldn’t shoot it down, recalls de Bretton-Gordon, contrasting the lack of air opposition in Afghanistan with the mass of anti-aircraft weapons in Ukraine.
“You could operate pretty much unhindered in the clear skies above Afghanistan and Iraq,” he says.
“It goes back to the old British focus on counterinsurgency over the last 20 years rather than war fighting, where you were fighting an enemy that didn’t have sophisticated air defences.”
Even a lack of enemy air defences hasn’t kept Watchkeepers from being destroyed.
None of the crashes over the last nine years were caused by hostile action, or even took place in a warzone.
A token deployment to Afghanistan’s Camp Bastion in late 2014 saw three Watchkeepers flying for 146 hours over a three week period – an average of four and a half days’ operations for each machine.
Consensus is building in Westminster that the drone programme needs close public scrutiny.
“In theory, Watchkeeper is a highly capable system and an important asset for the future British Army,” says Mark Francois, a Conservative MP and chairman of a Parliamentary sub-committee on defence procurement.
“However, it was so over-specified in development that it is years late coming into service and also has an unfortunate tendency to crash; which from a military viewpoint is distinctly suboptimal.”
His committee’s whistleblower suggested that there are 1,910 individual requirements that the troubled aircraft was supposed to meet.
Lamenting how much public money has been spent on “this failing programme,” Kevan Jones, the Labour MP, says the MoD has “serious questions to answer about why Watchkeeper cannot perform its most basic requirement – flying.”
Much like crashed drone WK036, those questions are not flying away any time soon.

 
Here we go, here we go, here we go....


UK inquiry vows to get to bottom of Afghan extra-judicial killings' allegations​



The chair of a public inquiry examining "extremely serious" allegations that British armed forces carried out dozens of extra-judicial killings in Afghanistan said on Wednesday that any soldiers who had broken the law should face investigation.

The independent inquiry was ordered by Britain's defence ministry last December after a BBC TV documentary reported that soldiers from the elite Special Air Service (SAS) had killed 54 people in suspicious circumstances.


 
While I can't speak to @Happy Guy's vintage or his (or his wife's) fashion sense, I remember when white was the first (and sometimes only) choice when it came to men's underpants. Just look at an Eaton's or Sear's catalogue from the '60s or '70s. It was the requirement when I went through Cornwallis and white Stanfield's briefs were the only colour and brand available in the CANEX. Anyone who attempted to colorize their locker layout would be quickly subjected to additional attention and scorn from the NCOs.

My story of gun tape as a defence against skidmarks was from the later 1970s. While we were issued OD underwear as part of our field gear (i.e. combats), the underpants (boxers) were voluminous and notoriously ill-fitting. Some may have liked them and wore them regularly, most may have only worn them on GOC's inspection when it was not unheard of for the Bde RSM (or even the Bde C.c.c.commander) to check that a soldier was wearing issued socks and underwear.
I joined the CAF as a Sapper in 1978.

I have excellent taste - I married my beautiful wife, whereas she has horrible taste - she married me.
 
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