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British Military Current Events

Excerpts from a post at Thin Pinstriped Line:

It Reads Like Daleks Speaking At A Management Consultancy Conference” – Thoughts On The Defence Review Paper

The MOD has published its long awaited Defence Review document, intended to support the findings of the Integrated Review, published on Mon 15 March. The new MOD document sets out the role of the armed forces in trying to deliver the Defence part of this strategy.

The document is designed to set out what Defence will do, how it will do it and with what equipment and forces against various roles. On paper this is supposed to be the biggest change to the British Armed Forces since the Cold War.

Does it work though, or is it missing something?

…why is there a sense of disappointment around the paper? It really boils down to a couple of core things that when put under scrutiny, don’t really add up.

For starters, the paper is incredibly vague on commitments, leaving the reader to wonder about what the UK’s defence goals actually are. Previous iterations of defence papers used to have ‘Military Tasks’ or other language setting out in clear precise terms what the role of the military was, and how it would be employed by HMG.

This made it easy to help determine what each service would do, how it would add value and help explain the tasks. These appear to have fallen by the wayside, replaced instead by some vague mention of ‘homeland’ or ‘persistent engagement’ and other such buzzwords. At no point in the document is there any clear statement of what the British Government believes the key military tasks are for the British Armed Forces.

Secondly, the paper doesn’t list actual force structures. There are three pages listing a wave of ‘cool things’ that each service will do, be it strike brigades or ice patrol ships, but there are no numbers mentioned anywhere.

…it is concerning that the MOD will not tell the British taxpayer how many ships it plans for the Royal Navy to have in service over the next 10 years. This is unprecedented – the previous two SDSRs had really helpful infographics showing the concept of the ‘Future Force 2020/2025’ explaining how many ships would be in service to support operations, or how the RAF would provide squadrons of aircraft to support operations.

It was easy to understand that the role of the armed forces was, in extremis, to provide a coherent force that could operate as part of a coalition and fight in major wars. This vision appears to have vanished and been replaced by vague statements of business speak…

It is frustrating to read a paper that sets out the plan for the next 10 years of the armed forces and not be able to find any actual numbers in it [emphasis added]. At its simplest, what does the plan look like – does the UK still plan a ‘Future Force 2030’ – is the aspiration to offer a brigade, a division or something else? What operations do we want to do as a nation – is it to deploy a division for 6 months, or sustain a brigade indefinitely?

This is the problem – there is just no information on what it is Defence thinks it will be capable of actually delivering as a coherent formed force. There is lots of information on individual capabilities, but no real sense on how they all come together and form a fighting force [emphasis added]

The whole problem with the paper is that it leaves you feeling incredibly unsatisfied – there is no sense of putting across a coherent explanation about how, if we cut back now, then in 10 years time the UK can then put the following really capable force in the field. Instead we’re left with vague descriptions, infographics that say nothing at all, and a lot of hints at bad news, but no sense of how the new force looks…

Most importantly, we have no idea whether it is affordable or not [emphasis added]. Even with the very substantial real terms growth, the NAO has estimated that the MOD Equipment Programme is somewhere between £8-15 billion overcommitted now for the next 10 years – and its also running enormous in year deficits too.

Has this black hole been fixed – have sufficient savings been made to deliver an affordable equipment programme, and what has been cut from it to make this happen? It remains utterly unclear what has been done to bring balance to the EP, particularly given that aside from a few Army projects, no major funded projects appear to have been cut.

It leaves the reader guessing at whether what they are reading is a genuine vision of the future, based on a fully costed, funded and genuinely affordable equipment plan, that will be delivered against the budget, or if this is a ‘well we’d like to do this if the money is given to us’ vision?..

Finally, as a strictly personal view, but the language of the paper makes it very clunky to read. Humphrey was once given a piece of advice about job applications – namely, read your written answer out loud and consider how it sounds – does it sound like buzzword bingo, or does it sound like a human being talking?

If one were being unkind, then quite a lot of the report sounds like buzzwords have been inserted for effect, not because we’d use it in a conversation. Reading the paper, there are all sorts of sentences that don’t sound like normal people speaking, they sound like Daleks debating at a management consultant conference [emphasis added].

One particular line on service recruitment stands out:

“We are determined that a career in the armed forces remains at the vanguard of career choices on offer to the UK’s most talented people”

What on earth is a ‘vanguard of career choices on offer’ when it’s at home? Why not just say “we’d like to be an employer lots of people would like to work for”? It feels in places like in the desire to sound properly doctrinal, the document has lost the humanity needed to connect with normal people and explain what it is that Defence does so incredibly well.

…its hard to see this review in as positive a way as had been hoped. There is some good material in it…But, it falls well short of explaining openly and honestly about the trade offs required to decide what Defence needs to do in order to transform, and what this means for the size and shape of the armed forces over the next 10 years.

Mark
Ottawa
 
1616511575953.png

The Army retains command of the Army Special Operations Brigade, a Special Operations Capable Ranger brigade - "seeded" in the words of the Daily Telegraph - with 4 understrength battalions. This seems to be the Army's equivalent of the Navy's SOC Marine Commandos or Future Marine Force.

The Army also retains command of the Security Force Assistance Brigade which, IMO, is an extension of the "non-kinetic" diplomatic wing of Strategic Command.
 
This, for me, is the key graphic

1616512160799.png


It doesn't assume a state of war. Nor does it even suggest a nice clean, cliff-edge division between peace and war or even a three block war. It describes the historically accurate messiness of a sliding scale where economics, diplomacy and war all continuously slide into, and out of, each other.

From that I take that the paper's distinction between "Operating" vs "War Fighting" means that the Army will have to get used to "Operating" continuously (not a particular problem for an army that has been continuously shot at for centuries) while still keeping a trained "Active Reserve" of traditional warfighting capabilities.

Most of the Army's brigades have utility in the diplomatic spectrum of Operations Other Than War.

That puts the Army into the same operational mold as the Navy and the Air Force - forces that have always had a peace time operational focus with a war-fighting capability.
 
This graphic is also instructive

Homeland defence is anchored by RN And RAF elements with Army contributing EOD, CBRN and Air Defence capabilities - It also supplies Light Infantry. The Special Forces are the Quick Reaction Force.
1616512944714.png
 
In light of our ABCANZUS connection, and Advancing With Purpose, and some kitting requests - is it too much to think that

IF JTFX is analogous to the SRR and
IF JTF2 is analogous to the Tier 1 SAS/SBS and
IF CSOR is analogous to the SFSG (1 Para)

Then

A Special Operations Capable Light Infantry Brigade under command of the Army but deployable with CanSOFCom may be in the offing?

That then leaves the LAV Battalions, the Armoured and Cavalry Regiments and the RCA Regiments as legacy warfighting capabilities.

The Canadian Combat Support Brigade seems to fit nicely into this schema as well.


CCSB is a mixed team of Regular and Reserve Force soldiers supported by civilians who operate alongside Whole of Government (WoG) colleagues, non-governmental agencies and coalition partners to support Canadian Armed Forces missions.

Formations and Units​

Influence Activities Task Force
Canadian Army Intelligence Regiment
4th Artillery (General Support)
4 Engineer Support Regiment
21 Electronic Warfare Regiment
 
Excerpts from a post at Thin Pinstriped Line:



Mark
Ottawa

Actually my take on the paper is the opposite of the TPL. What I am seeing is Situation and Intent. I am also seeing Support and Command and Control.

Atts and Dets and Execution are yet to determined - depending on current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, and budgets, and politics.

I think that this paper will stand up far longer than one that counts aircraft, hulls and boots.

Those will get managed in annual estimates.
 
I can't imagine the cost of rolling out all the new 'morale patches' to support all the "special-ness"....

Cynical bugger that you are.... :LOL:

You were squawking about retention issues - it seems to me the Army has opened up a number of new "voluntary" career paths.

In addition to a raft of new technical trades you now have the choice of staying in a "traditional" regimental brigade or volunteering for the SFAB for a relatively quiet posting overseas training some Commonwealth ally. Or you can volunteer for a two-way range somewhere with the Ranger Brigade training and fighting alongside locals - indulging your inner Glubb Pasha and Lawrence of Arabia. Or you can take your chances with P Company, or even the Beacons, if you feel so inclined.

Or you could go whole hog and take leave of absence from HM Forces to fly with the Royal Omani Air Force or teach the Sultan's pipers how to pipe.
 
Cynical bugger that you are.... :LOL:

You were squawking about retention issues - it seems to me the Army has opened up a number of new "voluntary" career paths.

In addition to a raft of new technical trades you now have the choice of staying in a "traditional" regimental brigade or volunteering for the SFAB for a relatively quiet posting overseas training some Commonwealth ally. Or you can volunteer for a two-way range somewhere with the Ranger Brigade training and fighting alongside locals - indulging your inner Glubb Pasha and Lawrence of Arabia. Or you can take your chances with P Company, or even the Beacons, if you feel so inclined.

Or you could go whole hog and take leave of absence from HM Forces to fly with the Royal Omani Air Force or teach the Sultan's pipers how to pipe.

All this travel and busyness works well... for about 3 or 4 years. For teenagers.

Then the novelty wears off, and people bail because of the disruption to their lives when they hit about 25 years of age.

We saw this alot in the PARAs/ Marines where we spent 6 months or recruit training time, and tons of money, selecting people followed by burning them out through multiple NI/Norway/Canada/Other out of country deployments that had them out of the country for about 8 or 9 out of every 12 months. Plus the workup time in the UK to prepare for these multiple deployments.

I assume that they have a complimentary recruiting plan to support this new approach, but you know what happens when one 'assumes' :)
 
Whither the Royal Artillery?

Exactor - 25 km Spike N-LOS
SPIKE-NLOS-SPARC-Trailer.jpg

GMRLS - 80 km GMRLS-ER


Precision Strike Missile from the same launcher? Maybe?



GBAD




And Finally Mobile Fires Platform (to replace the AS90)


BAE-Systems-Archer-800x445.jpg

Archer on Rheinmetall

1616518662072.png

KMW 155 on Boxer
 
All this travel and busyness works well... for about 3 or 4 years. For teenagers.

Then the novelty wears off, and people bail because of the disruption to their lives when they hit about 25 years of age.

We saw this alot in the PARAs/ Marines where we spent 6 months or recruit training time, and tons of money, selecting people followed by burning them out through multiple NI/Norway/Canada/Other out of country deployments that had them out of the country for about 8 or 9 out of every 12 months. Plus the workup time in the UK to prepare for these multiple deployments.

I assume that they have a complimentary recruiting plan to support this new approach, but you know what happens when one 'assumes' :)

Assumptions are a two-edged sword. Even assumptions based on experience.

And also, we all know what happens to plans. :)
 
And a few excerpts from a piece at RUSI on defence paper for "Integrated Review":

Requiring Perfect Alignment: The UK’s 2021 Defence Command Paper

The 2021 Defence Command Paper outlines the military’s role in achieving the Integrated Review’s ambitions, but stops short of detailing the cuts required to fund it. It marks a real change in the positioning of the UK’s armed forces, ending the era in which they could realistically describe themselves as ‘Tier One’, ‘First in Class’ or ‘Full Spectrum’…

The neutering of various capabilities across the force design may confuse some NATO Allies: a smaller armoured capability will not meet the previous UK commitment to NATO, while a straight replacement with a carrier strike group is not a worthy or desirable swap in their eyes – and for good reason. An army formation that makes Russia stand up and take notice has impact; another carrier strike group occasionally deployed in the Pacific will not have the same impact on China, nor will it exert the same level of coercive control on Russia.

Neither is it clear whether the partners with whom the new Ranger formations will interact really want the UK to be doing this task. The UK might have a high appetite to engage with those potential partners, but fomenting revolution and insurgencies requires willing partners on the ground.

And, of course, the UK has been regularly disappointed by adversaries who have not chosen to compete, challenge, or fight us in the way it wants them to…

The reality is that even if all the bets, presumptions and assumptions come to pass, and a good amount of luck comes into play, the UK will emerge in 2031 fit for some of the tasks it does now, but not all of them. Nothing more. And if just one of these factors is wrong, an assumption is overturned, a technology fails to deliver perfectly or events move out of synchronisation, then the UK will be significantly weaker and more vulnerable than it is today…

There is a considerable danger that all the Defence Command Paper’s rhetoric has been said before. Whether future leaders deliver the promised ‘jam’ of tomorrow, or agree that this paper constituted prudent decision-making, will determine the legacy of this government.”
Requiring Perfect Alignment: The UK’s 2021 Defence Command Paper

Mark
Ottawa
 
In light of our ABCANZUS connection, and Advancing With Purpose, and some kitting requests - is it too much to think that

IF JTFX is analogous to the SRR and
IF JTF2 is analogous to the Tier 1 SAS/SBS and
IF CSOR is analogous to the SFSG (1 Para)

Then

A Special Operations Capable Light Infantry Brigade under command of the Army but deployable with CanSOFCom may be in the offing?

That then leaves the LAV Battalions, the Armoured and Cavalry Regiments and the RCA Regiments as legacy warfighting capabilities.

The Canadian Combat Support Brigade seems to fit nicely into this schema as well.

Absent from the mix is a proper sustainment organization.

While we do have service battalions within the brigades, we tend to cannibalize them (as well as unit level service support elements) in order to create ad hoc combined operational service support and theatre sustainment support NSEs.

IMHO, we need to stabilize this process, retain organic support elements with their units/brigades and have a separate theatre support sustainment organization that gets added on to deployed elements commensurate with their size and missions. We need a proper sustainment brigade (and probably it should be a hybrid organization with sufficient Reg F folks to support Canada's day-to-day operations but can expand with trained and integrated reservists for major missions). In my view the primary role of such a brigade would be the formation of one or more NSEs to be the sustainment rear link (at a joint level) for all deployed missions so that the combat brigade's service support assets would be free to work with their respective supported arms.

I think that our CCSB is lacking as an entity in that it does not have a deployable headquarters component and is too diverse. It should be split at least into two entities. One should concern itself with kinetic effects such as air defence, long range fires (including drones), STA, air coordination, EW, and the like while the other should be involved in more manoeuvre support type missions like engineering, CRBN, military police, rear area security, CIMIC, military intelligence and (perhaps) higher levels of air defence and air coordination. (also a big role for reservists here) (Honestly I've got a lot of room here for how those two brigades and their respective battalions should be organized - forward v rear; shield v act; kinetic v non-kinetic etc. I just know that one all encompassing administrative headquarters ain't the answer. There needs to be a bigger capability output purpose here.)

🍻
 
And a few excerpts from a piece at RUSI on defence paper for "Integrated Review":



Mark
Ottaw


And, of course, the UK has been regularly disappointed by adversaries who have not chosen to compete, challenge, or fight us in the way it wants them to…


The options are:

Continue to bet on the same old nag we've been betting on for the last 100 years, trusting that the other guys will meet us on our preferred course.
Buy a new, untried horse for an unknown course of the other guy's choosing - probably breaking the bank in the process
Stay within the budget and refresh the stable with some affordable ponies and find out which make the running.

Putting a flutter on the nose and tail.

To change the analogy - I see the exercise as one of revamping and refreshing the toolbox - and trusting that there will be a wide enough, and useful enough selection that ad hoc forces can be cobbled together to meet the need, and then reinforced in a timely fashion.
 
Absent from the mix is a proper sustainment organization.

While we do have service battalions within the brigades, we tend to cannibalize them (as well as unit level service support elements) in order to create ad hoc combined operational service support and theatre sustainment support NSEs.

IMHO, we need to stabilize this process, retain organic support elements with their units/brigades and have a separate theatre support sustainment organization that gets added on to deployed elements commensurate with their size and missions. We need a proper sustainment brigade (and probably it should be a hybrid organization with sufficient Reg F folks to support Canada's day-to-day operations but can expand with trained and integrated reservists for major missions). In my view the primary role of such a brigade would be the formation of one or more NSEs to be the sustainment rear link (at a joint level) for all deployed missions so that the combat brigade's service support assets would be free to work with their respective supported arms.

I think that our CCSB is lacking as an entity in that it does not have a deployable headquarters component and is too diverse. It should be split at least into two entities. One should concern itself with kinetic effects such as air defence, long range fires (including drones), STA, air coordination, EW, and the like while the other should be involved in more manoeuvre support type missions like engineering, CRBN, military police, rear area security, CIMIC, military intelligence and (perhaps) higher levels of air defence and air coordination. (also a big role for reservists here) (Honestly I've got a lot of room here for how those two brigades and their respective battalions should be organized - forward v rear; shield v act; kinetic v non-kinetic etc. I just know that one all encompassing administrative headquarters ain't the answer. There needs to be a bigger capability output purpose here.)

🍻
Theatre Sustainment also merges nicely with operating overseas in "Peacetime" in diplomatic Operations Other Than War. DART on steroids?
 
Theatre Sustainment also merges nicely with operating overseas in "Peacetime" in diplomatic Operations Other Than War. DART on steroids?

I should think so.

As it stands, CFJOSG has all the back end stuff and has some functions for forward support (such as the joint sigs regt and a few others that can augment NSEs) but nowhere near what is needed for effecting proper log, maint and tn link in theatre. That always comes from elsewhere.

And don't get me wrong; I see the utility of NSEs. You need an in-theatre rear-to-front sustainment link. I just perceive that there is a weakness in their impermanence, ad hocness, and their absorption of operational forces service support agencies. I know that what I call "ad hocness" others deem "flexibility" and the "absorption" of service support elements from operational units as "economy of effort". I just think that sustainment is too important. It needs a stable doctrine, dedicated units and equipment, and thorough training that allows a seamless scaling up of theatre level support for everything from small simple, short duration missions to very major sustained conflicts and deployments; from peace time support to war time support. It's this scaling up that makes the organization ideal for a hybrid force that can work day to day on the CAF's routine missions with its organic Reg F elements and can scale for major efforts with a large pool of trained reservists. As it stands, I'm not so sure as to whether we could even scale up to support a deployed full-sized brigade much less two simultaneous ones if we had to (yes I know that's not required under SSE - and that should be a mark of shame considering how many people there are in the CAF and how much we pay for it each year)

And while I'm ranting, I'm not a fan of joint "groups". I'm a fan of battalions, brigades and divisions regardless of whether they are Army or Air (Navy is pretty much in its own field for obvious reasons). Let's face it most in-theatre service support is either army or aviation which should run through a coordinated system (but with clearly defined fields such as land equipment maintenance/parts supply and aviation maintenance/parts supply) which could easily be effected by distinct platoons/companies within the same battalion with their own unique and specialized supply chains

🍻
 
As pointed out by others, squeezing that extra range comes at quite a cost and fewer systems, I prefer a High/low set. A common chassis with a smaller number of guns (actually MLRS) optimized for long range fires getting the priority on guided munitions, along with dedicated survey and comms troop. These would do the high value target and counter battery plinking. The more conventional artillery does the traditional fire support.
 
As pointed out by others, squeezing that extra range comes at quite a cost and fewer systems, I prefer a High/low set. A common chassis with a smaller number of guns (actually MLRS) optimized for long range fires getting the priority on guided munitions, along with dedicated survey and comms troop. These would do the high value target and counter battery plinking. The more conventional artillery does the traditional fire support.


I believe that the problem is that the numbers game has shifted so that it is being questioned if conventional artillery can do traditional fire support. That is certainly my take from the publicly available information on the USMC decision.

As you point out "extra range comes at quite a cost and fewer systems". At the same time the cost of plinking those fewer systems is dropping. And if you can plink tanks you can certainly plink guns: tracked, wheeled or towed.

From the Marine Times -

A series of wargames conducted between 2018 and 2019 helped inform the Corps’ decision to divest of tanks and outmoded units and equipment that will have trouble surviving in fight with peer adversaries like China, according to a Marine Corps force redesign report

the Corps learned that the unit that shoots first has a “decisive advantage” on the battlefield and forces that can operate inside the range of enemy long-range precision fires “are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the ”weapons engagement zone,



The detail comes in a Popular Mechanic article

The Marines are eliminating all four tank battalions, including three active duty and one reserve battalion equivalent. The Marine Corps has fielded tanks for 97 continuous years, receiving six M1917 six-ton tanks from the U.S. Army in 1923. The cuts will remove approximately 200 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks from the Marines' inventory. Bridging units capable of setting up mobile bridges are also going away, as none of the islands have any rivers or streams.

The service will also eliminate three infantry battalions, each with about 800 personnel, 16 out of 21 artillery cannon batteries, two out of six amphibious companies, and four tiltrotor and helicopter squadrons. Even F-35 units will take a hit—though the Marines won’t deactivate any squadrons, each will have only 10 F-35s instead of the planned 16. Presumably that will also mean the Marines will buy fewer F-35s.

Additional eliminations include its Law Enforcement Battalions and its Bridging Companies.

Now some of this is admittedly driven by the peculiarities of the campaign the USMC sees itself fighting

If war unfortunately breaks out, the Marine Corps will almost certainly ride into the South China Sea on Navy transport ships and seize many of these islands with military bases, in order to deprive China of their ports and airfields and the ability to flex military power. None of these “islands” are very large: Fiery Cross Reef, the site of a Chinese military air base, is only 677 acres. Subi Reef, the site of another air base, is only 976 acres.

The small size of the islands limits the size of the force needed to defend them, as well as the size of the force required to take them. The Marines apparently think that 65-ton M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks won’t be needed in amphibious assaults launched to take them, especially since China is unlikely to base their own tanks on these islands. Heavy cannon artillery in the 155-millimeter range would also be unnecessary, as the islands are too tiny to utilize their range.


But it seems that the Brits are making some of the same bets.

They are reducing their tanks, soft-pedalling their AS90 replacement and emphasizing armour and connectivity in their AJAX and Boxer programmes. The Boxer is NOT a Fighting Vehicle - it is an MIV - a Mechanized Infantry Vehicle - a heavily armoured Wheeled Armoured Personnel Carrier apparently armed with an RWS mounted M2/M3. It can't be carried in the C130J but it can be carried in the A400 which the RAF is keeping while divesting of its C130Js. The AJAX is the key armoured vehicle and it is primarily an ISR asset. The rest of the Armoured Corps is actually unarmoured Cavalry.

The infantry is now predominantly Light Infantry with some of them carried in protected vehicles like the Boxer and the older Afghanistan vintage Foxhounds and Wolfhounds - primarily held in the vehicle park and issued according to operational need.


tanks and armored vehicles have had trouble surviving against the threat of precision strike and the plethora of drone and reconnaissance systems flooding conflict zones across the Middle East.

For recent evidence, a Turkish launched operation targeting Syrian regime army troops in late February decimated more than a hundred tanks and armored vehicles, dozens of artillery pieces and hundreds of Syrian forces, according to the Turkish National Ministry of Defense.

Turkey posted videos highlighting a mixed role of drones, Paladin artillery systems and aircraft pounding Syrian armor from the skies over the course of several days. The Syrian army appeared helpless to defend from the onslaught of long range systems. Even tanks camouflaged by buildings and bushes were no match for sensors and thermal imaging watching from the skies.

The problem is exacerbated by the number of sophisticated anti-tank systems flooding counterinsurgency conflicts across the globe and access to long range drones once only in control by state actors are now being operated by militia groups.

In Libya, the Libyan National Army has the upper hand in its drone war with the UN-backed Tripoli government. It’s equipped with an alleged UAE-supplied Chinese drone known as the Wing Long II that boasts a 2,000 km range through a satellite link and is reportedly armed with Chinese manufactured Blue Arrow 7 precision strike air-to-surface missiles.


“Mobility inside the WEZ [ weapons engagement zone] is a competitive advantage and an operational imperative,” the Marine Corps report reads.


The Corps instead is looking for mobile systems and units that can survive within the reach of precision fires to “attrit adversary forces," create dilemmas for the enemy and “consume adversary ISR resources,” according to the report.

“The hider-versus finder competition is real. Losing this competition has enormous and potentially catastrophic consequences,” the report reads.

Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance capabilities will be key on the modern battlefield.

The short form seems to be that no matter how big a gun you have got, if you are close enough to use it it is already too late.


Swarms aren't just for drones any more. It's also for infantry and cavalry. Small, dispersed, cheap, rapidly moving, hard to find, harder to fix and often not worth striking.
 
I believe that the problem is that the numbers game has shifted so that it is being questioned if conventional artillery can do traditional fire support. That is certainly my take from the publicly available information on the USMC decision.

As you point out "extra range comes at quite a cost and fewer systems". At the same time the cost of plinking those fewer systems is dropping. And if you can plink tanks you can certainly plink guns: tracked, wheeled or towed.

From the Marine Times -







The detail comes in a Popular Mechanic article



Additional eliminations include its Law Enforcement Battalions and its Bridging Companies.

Now some of this is admittedly driven by the peculiarities of the campaign the USMC sees itself fighting




But it seems that the Brits are making some of the same bets.

They are reducing their tanks, soft-pedalling their AS90 replacement and emphasizing armour and connectivity in their AJAX and Boxer programmes. The Boxer is NOT a Fighting Vehicle - it is an MIV - a Mechanized Infantry Vehicle - a heavily armoured Wheeled Armoured Personnel Carrier apparently armed with an RWS mounted M2/M3. It can't be carried in the C130J but it can be carried in the A400 which the RAF is keeping while divesting of its C130Js. The AJAX is the key armoured vehicle and it is primarily an ISR asset. The rest of the Armoured Corps is actually unarmoured Cavalry.

The infantry is now predominantly Light Infantry with some of them carried in protected vehicles like the Boxer and the older Afghanistan vintage Foxhounds and Wolfhounds - primarily held in the vehicle park and issued according to operational need.











The short form seems to be that no matter how big a gun you have got, if you are close enough to use it it is already too late.


Swarms aren't just for drones any more. It's also for infantry and cavalry. Small, dispersed, cheap, rapidly moving, hard to find, harder to fix and often not worth striking.

Betio island, Tarawa, wasn't too big either:

he Battle of Tarawa was a battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II that was fought on 20–23 November 1943. It took place at the Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert Islands, and was part of Operation Galvanic, the U.S. invasion of the Gilberts.[3] Nearly 6,400 Japanese, Koreans, and Americans died in the fighting, mostly on and around the small island of Betio, in the extreme southwest of Tarawa Atoll.[4]

The Battle of Tarawa was the first American offensive in the critical central Pacific region. It was also the first time in the Pacific War that the United States had faced serious Japanese opposition to an amphibious landing.[5] Previous landings met little or no initial resistance,[6][N 1] but on Tarawa the 4,500 Japanese defenders were well-supplied and well-prepared, and they fought almost to the last man, exacting a heavy toll on the United States Marine Corps. The losses on Tarawa were incurred within 76 hours.

 
Betio island, Tarawa, wasn't too big either:

he Battle of Tarawa was a battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II that was fought on 20–23 November 1943. It took place at the Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert Islands, and was part of Operation Galvanic, the U.S. invasion of the Gilberts.[3] Nearly 6,400 Japanese, Koreans, and Americans died in the fighting, mostly on and around the small island of Betio, in the extreme southwest of Tarawa Atoll.[4]

The Battle of Tarawa was the first American offensive in the critical central Pacific region. It was also the first time in the Pacific War that the United States had faced serious Japanese opposition to an amphibious landing.[5] Previous landings met little or no initial resistance,[6][N 1] but on Tarawa the 4,500 Japanese defenders were well-supplied and well-prepared, and they fought almost to the last man, exacting a heavy toll on the United States Marine Corps. The losses on Tarawa were incurred within 76 hours.


What role did artillery play versus the roles of Naval gunfire?
 
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