Bring Back The Battleship ?

[Colin Parkinson]

It's impressive what damage some ships took and stayed afloat

 

[tomahawk6]

Not many modern ships could survive a modern torpedo or a couple of anti-ship torps. The key is to avoid being hit in the first place because of countermeasures and escort protection.

 

[Lumber]

Not many modern ships could survive a modern torpedo or a couple of anti-ship torps. The key is to avoid being hit in the first place because of countermeasures and escort protection.

By that, do you mean cannon fodder?

Just an idea I've had...

;D

 

[Colin Parkinson]

So strap some Kingston's to the each side and off ya go, the new "reactive armour"  [lol:

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Anyone can get in the way of a torpedo ... once!

On a serious note, however, please consider that the matter has more than just the "modern" torpedo to it.  Submariners, for ones, take into consideration their target on determining the best course of action.

Large ships (aircraft carriers, cruisers, etc) get contact detonation; "soft" escorts (destroyers, frigates, corvettes) get under hull detonation. Boomers get contact detonation, opposing diesel subs and attack subs get near side detonations to crush the ballast system, etc. etc. That, BTW is why the USNS concord is shot for contact detonation in the bow. She is a tanker in design and therefore, the idea is to cause as much flooding forward, in one of the tank, with the contact explosion causing crush damage to the bulkheads located between the various forward tanks. Watertight compartments then don't matter: the main fuel tanks are filling up, one after the other and she is doomed. The fact that the process would be quick when the tanks are empty or slow when they are full (unless she just bursts into flames) is irrelevant: you can't go down into the tanks to plug the breach and she will sink in the end.

Also, for those who think BB's can take torpedoes, consider the following names: USS ARIZONA, USS OKLAHOMA, USS UTAH  and HMS PRINCE OF WALES - all sunk by torpedoes during WWII (doesn't matter that the torpedoes were air launched).  Also, think about the BISMARCK: disabled by a single torpedo from a WWI Swordfish plane that lead to her final demise, this final demise included some other torpedoes from HMS DORSETSHIRE (a cruiser).

 

[Colin Parkinson]

For the Bismarck

2 torps from swordfish

16 torps fired from destroyers –all missed
A total of 2,876 shells were fired at Bismarck from 0847-1019, most at relatively close ranges (see Table 4).  During that time, it is possible that as many as 300-400 shells hit the German ship.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck_p2.htm

 

[YZT580]

The swordfish was not a WW1 aircraft but was developed in the 30's.  It has the distinction of having sunk more German naval vessels than any other aircraft.  Unfortunately, the survival rate of aircrew was very low since the ideal release point for the torpedoes was only 1000 yards and the aircraft was barely doing 100 knots at the time. 

 

[Navy_Pete]

Don't forget about some of the big bad boys of ASM like this guy;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BrahMos

Even if you shoot it down, you have 3 tonnes or shrapnel coming in your general direction at mach 3 (or 7-8 if they get the hypersonic version working).

I'm sure the 'semi armour piercing' warhead would punch through at that point, regardless of armour.  I think that's where you need the screen to extend your detection range and give you some reaction time.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Also, for those who think BB's can take torpedoes, consider the following names: USS ARIZONA, USS OKLAHOMA, USS UTAH  and HMS PRINCE OF WALES - all sunk by torpedoes during WWII (doesn't matter that the torpedoes were air launched).  Also, think about the BISMARCK: disabled by a single torpedo from a WWI Swordfish plane that lead to her final demise, this final demise included some other torpedoes from HMS DORSETSHIRE (a cruiser).

OGBD,

Using the happenings of Dec 7 1941 and the fate of Force Z on Dec 10 1941 doesn't really support your position. 

The BBs moored at "Battleship Row" that morning were at a relaxed state of readiness, on what we would consider Sunday routine, stationary and attacked by surprise while a state of war didn't exist.

Force Z, was simply out manned, out classed and sent on a mission of no return, unknowingly, by the British government of the day.  You have to remember this was at the time of IJN supremacy in the pacific where there able to just about sink anything that didn't fly the flag of the rising sun.

If we look at Yamato she its said to have taken 11 torpedos and 6 bombs.  Taking that kind of damage and sinking while at action stations and fighting a battle is a truer showing of the amount of damage a BB can endure.  Imagine if was properly escorted and protected. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

For the Bismarck

2 torps from swordfish

16 torps fired from destroyers –all missed
A total of 2,876 shells were fired at Bismarck from 0847-1019, most at relatively close ranges (see Table 4).  During that time, it is possible that as many as 300-400 shells hit the German ship.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck_p2.htm

Scharnhorst took a pounding from a torpedo as well:

"The torpedo hit caused serious damage; it tore a hole 14 by 6 m (15.3 by 6.6 yd) and allowed 2,500 t (2,500 long tons; 2,800 short tons) of water into the ship. The rear turret was disabled and 48 men were killed. The flooding caused a 5 degree list, increased the stern draft by almost a meter, and forced Scharnhorst to reduce speed to 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph).[24] The ship's machinery was also significantly damaged by the flooding, and the starboard propeller shaft was destroyed.."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Scharnhorst

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I wasn't planning on being exhaustive. For instance, no one mentioned the RN Fleet Air Arm attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto.

I simply wanted to indicate that even when Battleships were at their summum, torpedoes had successfully been used against them. So, draw your own conclusions on how a WWII Battlewagon would stand up to current torpedoes ...

 

[dimsum]

draw your own conclusions on how a WWII Battlewagon would stand up to current torpedoes ...

Probably like this:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Would it be fair to say that modern torpedo are basically the same as their WWII brethren, but the targeting and guidance is significantly improved, leading to a far greater chance of a hit on the ship vitals?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

No, it wouldn't be fair.

And I must leave it at that.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Getting back to the BB's, and possible uses for them (past); does anyone have access to mid70's-early 80's copies of USNI's Proceedings? 

As I understand it, there was a very serious plan put forward by the US Marines (who were running out of Amphib options) to convert at least 2 of the 4 Iowa's to a class of vessel known as the Heavy Assault Ship. Essentially, a combination of the A and B mountings, removing everything aft of the rear funnel, and installing a huge helicopter flight deck with 4-6 landing spots, installing an elevator and below deck storage for up to 30 helicopters (mix of Sea Knights and Cobras). Room for about 800 marines, plus air crew.

However, the US Navy opposed this and had the ships reactivated as modest Tomahawk platforms, upgraded the sensor suites and radars, installed more space and features for command and control, and this was eventually undertaken as a less expensive measure to reactivate all 4 of the vessels instead of a radical conversion.  As a result, the USN then had requested to build 4 additional  Tarawa class, which was approved and then cancelled as well.  Trick, bait and switch, cancel... seem familiar?


 

 

[a_majoor]

The more recent "Proceedings" article [colour=black]"Think outside the Hull"[/color] advocates for a far different model.

The Marines could benefit by having many small fire support ships carrying boxes of missiles roaming around potential landing zones and confusing the enemy as to where, exactly, the landing was supposed to take place. With sufficient range, each ship could use its missiles to cover multiple potential LZ's, or during a landing, strike distant targets to disrupt the enemy response (essentially an very updated version of Soviet "Deep Battle" theory).

As far as naval gunfire is concerned, the future seems to belong to high energy rail guns with ranges of up to 200 km, which would require an entirely different class of ship (and maybe small aircraft carriers full of UAV and UCAV's to spot targets for the railguns and do BDA on the results).

 

[Kirkhill]

Point and counter-point Jane.  ;D

Why America's Battleships Will Never Make a Comeback
By James Holmes

June 18, 2017U.S.

There’s a mystique to battleships. Whenever inside-the-Beltway dwellers debate how to bulk up the U.S. Navy fleet, odds are sentimentalists will clamor to return the Iowa-class dreadnoughts to service. Nor is the idea of bringing back grizzled World War II veterans as zany as it sounds. We aren’t talking equipping the 1914-vintage USS Texas with superweapons to blast the Soviet Navy, or resurrecting the sunken Imperial Japanese Navy superbattleship Yamato for duty in outer space, or keeping USS Missouri battleworthy in case aliens menace the Hawaiian Islands. Such proposals are not mere whimsy.

Built to duel Japan in World War II, in fact, battleships were recommissioned for the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War. The last returned to action in 1988. The Iowa class sat in mothballs for about three decades after Korea (except for USS New Jersey, which returned to duty briefly during the Vietnam War). That’s about how long the battlewagons have been in retirement since the Cold War. History thus seems to indicate they could stage yet another comeback. At this remove from their past lives, though, it’s doubtful in the extreme that the operational return on investment would repay the cost, effort, and human capital necessary to bring them back to life.


Numbers deceive. It cost the U.S. Navy $1.7 billion in 1988 dollars to put four battlewagons back in service during the Reagan naval buildup. That comes to about $878 million per hull in 2017 dollars. This figure implies the navy could refurbish two ships bristling with firepower for the price of one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. One copy of the latest-model Burke will set the taxpayers back $1.9 billion according to Congressional Budget Office figures. Two for the price of one: a low, low price! Or, better yet, the navy could get two battlewagons for the price of three littoral combat ships—the modern equivalent of gunboats. Sounds like a good deal all around.

But colossal practical difficulties would work against reactivating the dreadnoughts at low cost, despite these superficially plausible figures. First of all, the vessels no longer belong to the U.S. Navy. They’re museums. New Jersey and Missouri were struck from the navy list during the 1990s. Engineers preserved Iowa and Wisconsin in “reactivation” status for quite some time, meaning they hypothetically could return to duty. But they too were struck from the rolls, in 2006. Sure, the U.S. government could probably get them back during a national emergency, but resolving legal complications would consume time and money in peacetime.

Second, chronological age matters. A standard talking point among battleship enthusiasts holds that the Iowas resemble a little old lady’s car, an aged auto with little mileage on the odometer. A used-car salesman would laud its longevity, assuring would-be buyers they could put lots more miles on it. This too makes intuitive sense. My old ship, USS Wisconsin, amassed just fourteen years of steaming time despite deploying for World War II, Korea, and Desert Storm. At a time when the U.S. Navy hopes to wring fifty years of life out of aircraft carriers and forty out of cruisers and destroyers, refitted battleships could seemingly serve for decades to come.

And it is true: stout battleship hulls could doubtless withstand the rigors of sea service. But what about their internals? Mechanical age tells only part of the story. Had the Iowa class remained in continuous service, with regular upkeep and overhauls, they probably could have steamed around for decades. After all, the World War II flattop USS Lexington served until 1991, the same year the Iowas retired. But they didn’t get that treatment during the decades they spent slumbering. As a consequence, battleships were already hard ships to maintain a quarter-century ago. Sailors had to scavenge spares from still older battleships. Machinists, welders, and shipfitters were constantly on the go fabricating replacements for worn-out parts dating from the 1930s or 1940s.

This problem would be still worse another quarter-century on, and a decade-plus after the navy stopped preserving the vessels and their innards. Managing that problem would be far more expensive. An old joke among yachtsmen holds that a boat is a hole in the water into which the owner dumps money. A battleship would represent a far bigger hole in the water, devouring taxpayer dollars in bulk. Even if the U.S. Navy could reactivate the Iowas for a pittance, the cost of operating and maintaining them could prove prohibitive. That’s why they were shut down in the 1990s, and time has done nothing to ease that remorseless logic.

Third, what about the big guns the Iowa class sports—naval rifles able to fling projectiles weighing the same as a VW Bug over twenty miles? These are the battleships’ signature weapon, and there is no counterpart to them in today’s fleet. Massive firepower might seem to justify the expense of recommissioning and maintaining the ships. But gun barrels wear out after being fired enough times. No one has manufactured replacement barrels for 16-inch, 50-caliber guns in decades, and the inventory of spares has evidently been scrapped or donated to museums. That shortage would cap the battleships’ combat usefulness.

Nor, evidently, is there any safe ammunition for battleship big guns to fire. We used 1950s-vintage 16-inch rounds and powder during the 1980s and 1990s. Any such rounds still in existence are now over sixty years old, while the U.S. Navy is apparently looking to demilitarize and dispose of them. Gearing up to produce barrels and ammunition in small batches would represent a nonstarter for defense firms. The navy recently canceled the destroyer USS Zumwalt’s advanced gun rounds because costs spiraled above $800,000 apiece. That was a function of ordering few munitions for what is just a three-ship class. Ammunition was simply unaffordable. Modernized Iowas would find themselves in the same predicament, if not more so.

And lastly, it’s unclear where the U.S. Navy would find the human expertise to operate 16-inch gun turrets or the M-type Babcock & Wilcox boilers that propel and power battleships. No one has trained on these systems since 1991, meaning experts in using and maintaining them have, ahem, aged and grown rusty at their profession. Heck, steam engineers are in short supply, full stop, as the navy turns to electric drive, gas turbines, and diesel engines to propel its ships. Older amphibious helicopter docks (LHDs) are steam-powered, but even this contingent is getting a gradual divorce from steam as newer LHDs driven by gas turbines join the fleet while their steam-propelled forebears approach decommissioning.

Steam isn’t dead, then, but it is a technology of the past—just like 16-inch guns. Technicians are few and dwindling in numbers while battleship crews would demand them in large numbers. I rank among the youngest mariners to have operated battleship guns and propulsion-plant machinery in yesteryear, and trust me, folks: you don’t want the U.S. Navy conscripting me to regain my proficiency in engineering and weapons after twenty-six years away from it, let alone training youngsters to operate elderly hardware themselves. In short, it’s as tough to regenerate human capital as it is to rejuvenate the material dimension after a long lapse. The human factor—all by itself—could constitute a showstopper for battleship reactivation.

Battleships still have much to contribute to fleet design, just not as active surface combatants. Alfred Thayer Mahan describes a capital ship—the core of any battle fleet—as a vessel able to dish out and absorb punishment against a peer navy. While surface combatants pack plenty of offensive punch nowadays, the innate capacity to take a punch is something that has been lost in today’s lightly armored warships. Naval architects could do worse than study the battleships’ history and design philosophy, rediscovering what it means to construct a true capital ship. The U.S. Navy would be better off for their inquiry.

Let’s learn what we can from the past—but leave battleship reactivation to science fiction.

James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific. The views voiced here are his alone.

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/06/18/why_americas_battleships_will_never_make_a_comeback_111616.html

 

[a_majoor]

No, if any gun armed battlewagons return to the fleet, it will be a totally new class armed with modern weapons, ranging from 64MJ railguns to massive batteries of hypersonic missiles. They will be powered by nuclear reactors (to feed the insatiable power demands of their weapons and sensors), and send their ordinance at targets up to 1000 km away with the missile battery, and over 200 km away with the railguns. Much more likely than a huge surface platform will be a swift attack sub armed with long range weapons like the USS Virginia class or the Indian Navy's Arihant class submarines, SSN's carrying strategic weaponry.

Anyone foolish enough to go to sea with a WWII era battleship will see their expensive museum piece slip beneath the waves in very short order.