• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Battle of Panjwai , Legion Article

This is exactly the sort of action that would make an intriguing article if it were written by someone with the time, energy, and motivation to read the war diary, signal logs, and all other accessible associated documents of record; and to interview every involved participant humanly possible.  Otherwise, each person is like the blind man describing his part of an elephant - which isn't too embarrassing, unless you're the guy who had the bad luck to wind up at the back end.
 
As to Brad Sallows comment, yes, I agree. I spent literally months investigating this story, trying to find information, but it's not so easy to track everybody down and convince them to talk. And yes, I would love to see the radio logs. I have tried to get them, really tried, but have had no luck so far.

(I am the author of the story above, btw.)

On the topic of getting more information, I have a request. I would like to hear from anyone who was in Panjwai between Aug. 3 and Oct. 14, 2006. I'm not looking for anything controversial (the controversial part is done), I just want to hear stories from guys who were there. PM me and I can set it up through public affairs if necessary.
 
For any who are interested, I spoke with BGen Fraser at the CFC in Toronto on Friday afternoon about this, and have posted some of that conversation along with my own thoughts on the matter here:

http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/09/hindsight-on-medusa.html
 
Brooks I read your piece, You write well. But since I don't believe a word Fraser says I think it's a useless piece of damage control on his part. But again that's my opinion.
 
DB: The question is whether you were able to maximize losses to the enemy and minimize losses to yourself at the same time, and that's the question that's really being asked.

DF: A thousand to five...but quite frankly one is too many...

If thats true, then we shouldn't be there.
 
HitorMiss said:
Brooks I read your piece, You write well. But since I don't believe a word Fraser says I think it's a useless piece of damage control on his part. But again that's my opinion.

Was there any feeling among you folks on the ground that the Taliban would filter away during three days of bombardment?
 
To answer your question without violating OPSEC is not easy however I can say that were there avenues of escape available, Yes there were, could they have done so without being picked up by higer assets and then engaged by a follow on force or asset, not likely. Again IMO
 
One of the most common criticisms mounted by armchair hindsight generals is that "so-and-so should have moved sooner".
 
That Legion article had my hair standing up on the back of my neck.

Looking forward to the next part.

A whole new generation of Vets having their story told in yet another war.

Good on ya's,

Wes
 
HitorMiss, you could well be right, it could be damage control on the general's part (although I spoke to more than just Fraser on this issue).  As I said, I don't know enough to be sure.  But I'm not sure anyone other than Fraser knows enough to be sure.  I don't think we'll really know until we can look at the intel he had - and that could take years to see the light of day.

Not much comfort in that for the guys who had to go in there, though.  I really wish they could have the decision explained in a bit more detail than he's giving, but such is OPSEC, I guess.
 
The following editorial from the Ottawa Citizen of 10 September 2007, which is re-produced under the provisions of the Copyright Act, dicusses the theme of the article in general terms. It does not take sides other than to note that the comparision to the First World War is a bit much.

Warring expectations
The Ottawa Citizen
Published: Monday, September 10, 2007

Modern warfare has evolved, and so have the expectations of the people watching from home. We expect our side to win every battle, and to do it with few, if any, casualties.

And most of the time, that expectation is met, and we at home forget just how astonishing that is. How different from wars past when Canada put uniforms on civilians and sent them across the ocean to be killed. We sometimes forget that during the First World War our boys -- and they were boys -- were slaughtered en masse fighting for an inch or two of mud.

An article in the recent edition of Legion Magazine has sparked an animated discussion about a battle that happened in Afghanistan a year ago in the Taliban heartland.

It was the beginning of Operation Medusa. Coalition forces had the enemy surrounded. The Canadian general in charge could have waited a few days, ordering air strikes to "soften" the Taliban so that the final Canadian assault would be easier. Instead, he sensed an opportunity and chose to attack. Four Canadian soldiers died and 10 were wounded.

Soldiers and civilians have the prerogative to study and question battlefield decisions, to glean what lessons we can. But we must also maintain some perspective.

The writer of the Legion Magazine piece describes the battle as "an old-fashioned WWI-style assault into the guns, albeit on a smaller scale. It was the charge of Charles Company." The allusion to the disastrous Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War seems hyperbolic, as does the comparison to the First World War. It's a bit like saying the difference between a summer thunderstorm and a hurricane is only one of scale. The Canadian losses in Afghanistan do not compare with the bloodbaths -- scores and scores of soldiers dead in a day -- at the Somme, Ypres, Passchendaele.

Soldiers have always had reason to grumble and be skeptical, even in those days. The men who fought at Ypres had to put up with the eccentricities of the defence minister, Sir Sam Hughes, who defended the problematic Ross Rifle and patented a shield-shovel that was useless at either function. The worth of Dieppe, in the Second World War, will probably always be debated. The recent controversy over a display at the Canadian War Museum, about the bombing of German cities in the Second World War, shows how long these debates can last. Even hindsight cannot always discern wisdom or error in war.

The general who made the critical decision in Afghanistan has argued that Operation Medusa was a blow to the Taliban, in which Canadians showed remarkable bravery. Obviously we all would have preferred that it be won without a single Canadian casualty. Pte. William Cushley, Warrant Officer Frank Mellish, Warrant Officer Richard Nolan and Sgt. Shane Stachnik are missed.

But it's also fair to question the expectation, unspoken though it usually is, that Canadian soldiers will only die if commanders make mistakes. War is dangerous, and always has been. We are lucky to live in an age that mourns every soldier as he or she deserves to be mourned, that counts every death and remembers every face.


 
Intresting editorial....

How about this, 2 Pl's of Charles rushed across a river bed with American and ANA attachments into a heavily defended enemy strong hold with properly sighted field's of fire, from everything I have studied on WW1 and many of the hasty efforts from WW2 seems pretty much on par with going over the top or storming the beach. Mind you as the author of the article points out it was a smaller scale. Maybe the person who wrote the editoral should do a little research before trying to down play or remove the parallels in history. I know the author did.

I say the same about TF1-06 units that attacked the School house as well, sometimes you need to do something twice before you learn I guess....
 
Ok, so I have to put my two sense in here.  All I have to say about this whole scheme of talk is that I think many should be carefull talking about something that they know nothing about.  There are a few of you who do know about the ground issues (and I fully understand your issues), but there was one comment about the CO, that I will not tolerate without a comment.  There are things that you may never be privy to and I am not going to comment on them here, but please understand that 9 TF3-06 is a man who fought tooth and nail for his soldiers and I have witnessed it countless times.  He is an extremely intelligent man whom I would follow into the gates of hell armed with only a squirt gun. So, in my opinion, he is well outside the fall of shot of a couple of the comments.  To the soldiers from both C Coys commenting on here...Never Pass a Fault and as a great PPCLI WO told me once that the PPCLI reply to that was Never Admit to One.  Have a Royal Day.

 
I will keep my opinion to my self (I was NOT there). But I have talked to guys in that battle. Its interesting some of things that happened.
 
It is probably time for this thread to be locked. At least until the final installment of the article.  Names are being hauled through the mud, and for OPSEC reasons it is very unlikely that the owners of those names can be defended (at least, not in any more detail than a simple "STFU because I know better" statement ... and those never go well).

As always, appeals can be made to Mike Bobbitt for the lock to be removed early.
 
I have been reading up on Operation Medusa and was just wondering if anyone had or knew where to find (if they are open source of course) maps showing the disposition and movement of the the various units involved in the operation.

Thank you very much.
 
FascistLibertarian said:
I have been reading up on Operation Medusa and was just wondering if anyone had or knew where to find (if they are open source of course) maps showing the disposition and movement of the the various units involved in the operation.

Thank you very much.

I believe you will have a very hard time finding accurate maps depicting the battle... at least for now.  That area is still in use/occupied and a lot of the maps would/could be considered OpSec. 

There are, however, some interesting graphical maps/interpretations floating around the archives of some MSM sites.. They're not very accurate, but they're pretty close.

If you do find some maps, please let me know... I've been looking as well.  I have some maps of the area and I've marked them as to where I believe we were, but I could be wrong.  Most of my memory of those days are pretty blurry...

Good luck.
 
Any idea when the next two parts of the story are coming out????
 
That area is still in use/occupied and a lot of the maps would/could be considered OpSec. 

True. I am sure in the future it will be open source. Thanks anyways!

Stuff like this is just much easier for me to understand on a map:

Lavoie's Canadian force was Charles Company in the south, coming through Bazaar-e-Panjwai, with Bravo Company in the north, fighting southward. On one flank was Task Force 31, comprised of coalition--mainly U.S.--Special Forces and also Task Force Grizzly, an American company. With a Danish squad in position to the west and a Dutch Company patrolling the perimeter to the north, the enemy were pretty much surrounded.

Op Medusa began at first light on Sept. 2 with an attack on two axes, with the main effort being in the south. There, Sprague and Charles Company, in the main, were to seize the high features around Panjwai--Masum and Mar Ghar--and isolate the town of Panjwai itself. They would advance right up to the south bank of the Arghandab River, but not across.

 
Here is a pdf map of Panjwayi. You can magnify it quite a bit and see some detail.
http://www.aims.org.af/maps/district/kandahar/panjwayi.pdf

Midget
 
Back
Top