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Army Reserve Restructuring

I think at the junior levels, there are 3 categories of soldiers that leave after a few years.

- Those who had lives compatible with militia life who all of a sudden got a life that wasn’t compatible. This probably happens mostly with students who graduate and have to move for employment or the academics become more challenging and need more time for study, or those whose family lives or employment changes.

-then there are those who are able to stay in longer, get the training up to and including junior leadership, then stagnate and get bored as more advanced training opportunities become harder to get and regular training becomes routine.

-those who for whatever reason can’t get loaded onto basic or trades training in a reasonable time and never feel like a “full” member, whether their fault or the army’s. Doesn’t matter.

In my limited experience, very few stayed long enough for a CD.

Related to the cohorts I remember seeing, caveat that I’m speaking about what I saw in an urban infantry regiment that was heavily students:

- The one to two year crowd. They try it out, get through DP1, then for whatever reason drop out. Maybe a fifth to a quarter of the troops. I consider the time and investment in them to be overhead.

- The four to six year crowd. These are the ones who join in high school, stay through college or university, then release when they graduate and find grown up life too busy or they relocate. This is most of the troops. The more motivated and proficient ones get streamed onto their NCO training and hopefully provide one to two years of summer teaching. This is where we recoup most of our investment. A modest but useful proportion of them deploy operationally if they have a chance.

- The post-schoolers. Those of us who stick it out after graduation. Some are the lifers, some will make it another four or five years, or anything in between. These are the ones who stick around and get succession planned into senior leadership roles. Some are quite good, some just keep showing up and periodically become available for a career course.
 
Related to the cohorts I remember seeing, caveat that I’m speaking about what I saw in an urban infantry regiment that was heavily students:

- The one to two year crowd. They try it out, get through DP1, then for whatever reason drop out. Maybe a fifth to a quarter of the troops. I consider the time and investment in them to be overhead.
I think that you're bang on in all three of your evaluation. Your first crowd is the one I target for a period of obligatory service with a limited number of mandatory collective training days. The only purpose for them is to provide the mass you need to 1) make good collective training possible; and 2) to be there if you need to "mobilize" for an emergency. Add a period of supplementary reserve to their terms of service (maybe two or three years) to provide you with even more depth.
- The four to six year crowd. These are the ones who join in high school, stay through college or university, then release when they graduate and find grown up life too busy or they relocate. This is most of the troops. The more motivated and proficient ones get streamed onto their NCO training and hopefully provide one to two years of summer teaching. This is where we recoup most of our investment. A modest but useful proportion of them deploy operationally if they have a chance.
These will give you your junior leaders and people who go more broadly in their training than just DP1 - your drivers and gunners and diesel mechanics. If you are looking at university students who complete their NCM DP 1 in the pre university summer and their first university summer then you have two more summers that they want full employment and you can train the hell out of them in those two summers of six to eight months. They should be qualified to sergeant and captain by the time they finish university. These folks will give you the company level leadership.

- The post-schoolers. Those of us who stick it out after graduation. Some are the lifers, some will make it another four or five years, or anything in between. These are the ones who stick around and get succession planned into senior leadership roles. Some are quite good, some just keep showing up and periodically become available for a career course.
You keep these around afterwards by minimizing the demands you put on them, by giving them decent collective training and equipment to work with and by offering retention bonuses for additional terms of obligatory service.

I can't emphasise enough that in a full battalion of 6-700, you only need around 5 officers of the rank of major and above and around 35 NCMs of the rank of WO and above. Some of those should be RegF positions. All of them could easily be RegF but its also desirable to have many of those as reservists for simple local community reasons and to provide career goals for those reservists who want to go the full course (that's why I prefer a RegF coy 2i/c and a RegF CQMS at the coy level rather than a coy comd and CSM).

I'm very much for the formation of 30/70 battalions where there is: mostly RegF battalion leadership; one complete and fully equipped 100/0 RegF company; and two or three 10/90 ResF companies. The 10% RegF at the company level provide one or two people who provide full-time admin for the company and the other 8 to 10 provide a full-time training cadre for the whole battalion (RegF and ResF together) That's around 20 to 25 folks in the battalion that provide full-time training support for the battalion year round. The aim here is to let the ResF officers and NCOs do collective training with their sections, platoons, and companies year round while the training cadre provides all administration and all individual training for the battalion (with a little summer augmentation).

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- The four to six year crowd. These are the ones who join in high school, stay through college or university, then release when they graduate and find grown up life too busy or they relocate. This is most of the troops. The more motivated and proficient ones get streamed onto their NCO training and hopefully provide one to two years of summer teaching. This is where we recoup most of our investment. A modest but useful proportion of them deploy operationally if they have a chance..
(emphasis mine)

How effective is the ARes (and PRes generally) at moving members between units when life happens?
 
That would be desirable but in my view is impractical.

The start point is that most ResF recruits join up in high school or at the end of high school before university or community college. Basically they have at max eight weeks of training which barely covers BMQ.

I'm a proponent that the DP1 training for ResF and RegF should be near identical for both NCMs and officers.
Yes in the ideal world I would agree.
But I went from teaching on a RegF ISCC that was 3.5 months long to being a candidate at the PPCLI BSL for QL3 Infantry that was 4 months long — neither of those time frames really fits for PRes training.

Sure a bunch of that could be chipped down - but years ago Recruit was 2 months and Basic was 2 months — the reserve equivalent of that was half.

The QL3/TQ1 whatever they are now where generally 4 months for most Reg Force Cbt Arms, the PRes was 1/4 of that.

Obviously the length of DP1 training varies between trades and classifications but generally for NCM, 20 weeks is about the minimum. I break training into one month (or 25 day) modules. 20 weeks equates to 5 modules - that's where my 14 months come in - 2 summer modules, one winter module and 2 or more summer modules in the second summer - that's 20 to 25 weeks which should cover every NCM trade except for some very high technical skills one (which I think should be done in large measure with community colleges). IMHO, we should be able to redesign all NCM DP1 training to make it viable in a 14 month cycle.

You could push the winter training to two weekends per month and two nights per week as many units do now but that breaks my rule on minimal demands during periods where there are conflicting responsibilities - work, family, school.
Are you counting DP1 to be all courses needed to bring a soldier to Occupational Proficiency?

Not too dissimilar from my own experience. Back in the late sixties we ran a student summer recruit course at the armouries which lasted six weeks followed by a concentration. In the winter, my battery - 130 Battery - paraded every Saturday morning. (other batteries on weekday evenings). During that winter I took my basic gun numbers course (so basically some 30 half days or 15 days in total. That qualified my the equivalent of DP1. For those who wanted, there was a driver wheeled-arty course on Saturday afternoons which I also took. Again, with 15 days equivalent I was now qualified to drive jeeps, 3/4 tons and 2 1/2 tons towing a gun.

I took my two week junior NCO course in Pet and did a two week concentration. Now I'm a DP2 equivalent and promoted bombardier (the equivalent of MBdr these days) My (2 week equivalent) sigs course the next winter and became the Bty CP sig. In my last course before going to the RegF was a two-week arty tech course in Pet and a concentration.

The point here is that I was able to do the job with minimal training (Hell in my third month while still a recruit I was flown to Shilo for our regiment's annual competition at the RCSA and with a half hour of instruction was made the #3 on a 105 and a year later, while still a gunner taking my gun number training I was made a #1 on a live fire exercise in Meaford because none of the sergeants and only two bombardiers showed up. That's not right though. I was way undertrained for many of the jobs that I did as a reservist. The RegF on the other hand overtrains and wastes a lot of training time. There should be a happy medium where both ResF and RegF meet the same levels of qualification.

I agree there should be something of a happy medium - I’m just not sure 2 years to occupational employability it’s feasible for either candidate or system.

It was the same for the guns. 2 RCHA in Pet had lots of interaction with the ResF regiments in Ontario, 3 RCHA in Shilo had very little. At most it was some summer augmentation to the NRQS/ARTS run in the summers at Shilo.

(y)

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Well no one really wants to go to Shilo ;)
 
(emphasis mine)

How effective is the ARes (and PRes generally) at moving members between units when life happens?
What he said:
Fantastic or terrible, with no middle ground.

There’s no reason for it not to be shit simple in nearly all cases. I started in one unit in high school and moved to another in university. I was simply attached to my new unit to start, and the paperwork processed my transfer within a few months. No hiccups. Now, I was reserve infantry, and my gaining unit obviously had line serials for a DP1 qualified troop in its core trade.

It can be trickier if your trade doesn’t exist in your new city, but really it just takes a receiving unit to say “sure, attach them”, and they can do what we do and maybe we milk them for some out-of-trade knowledge.” Say, a PRe armoured or artillery soldier or officer attaching to an infantry unit. Maybe there’s a unit out there sitting so flush that they can afford to turn away free and competent trained bodies, but I haven’t heard of that unit.

Sometimes orderly rooms or chains of command suck and screw this up.
 
Are you counting DP1 to be all courses needed to bring a soldier to Occupational Proficiency?
For DP 1 the system consists of basic military qualification, basic environmental qualification, and basic military occupational qualification. At that point an individual achieves the operationally functional point (OFP).

By my way of overview, a rifle section of let's say ten men needs four qualified higher than DP1 - its commander, 2i/c driver and gunner. The other six can get by with just DP1. Above section you need an even higher ration of folks with some DP2 training either completed or ongoing.

It's the same for officers. While DP 1 qualifies you for promotion to captain, that's fine for the three rifle platoon commanders and maybe the LAV captain but a FOO or coy 2 i/c needs additional DP2 training to do the job properly.

What I look for from the DP1 training is that mass of young lt and captain platoon commanders and those section riflemen.
I agree there should be something of a happy medium - I’m just not sure 2 years to occupational employability it’s feasible for either candidate or system.
I'm not quite sure what you meant by this.
Well no one really wants to go to Shilo ;)
Shilo is a bit of an acquired taste. You're looking at a guy who turned down a three-year tour in Germany as BK for three years as a BK in Shilo so his kid could stay with the same surgeon for a course of treatments. You learn to love the place. :giggle:


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(emphasis mine)

How effective is the ARes (and PRes generally) at moving members between units when life happens?
Based on my limited experience in the 90’s, it was pretty good if you attached or transferred to another unit of the same trade, but stickier if the unit was a different trade. I would hazard it would still be about the same now. YMMV
 
I imagine the second biggest release point for the Reserves isn’t 15 years, rather 12 years after you get the CD. Its a good point for people to re-evaluate what they are doing and they have something to show for all that service.
The decision point is 5 years of WO/ sgt. If someone is there for the CD, there in for the long run.
 
There are two issues in what you say.

The first is that losing "that many people is not necessarily a bad thing." It is. If you waste resources - both pay and instructor time and training resources - on people who leave immediately after a summer, then you might as well just burn the money in a big bonfire rather than running a recruit course. Any company that gets only a 5 - 10% return on investment in an activity would drastically change the activity immediately.

I agree that there needs to be something that holds people, but job satisfaction isn't the only thing. Yes. You definitely want to make things so that people are motivated to stay - and I suggest many ways to do that in the book - but you also have to retain the people who aren't thrilled by the army if for no other reason than to fill out the ranks during training (and if necessary war) for a reasonable period of time. In my view, if you concentrate on students, and full summer employment, then you can train NCMs to DP1 status in 14 months (essentially two summer sessions of two to four months each and a winter session of 10 x 2.5 days. After that you demand 24 months of obligatory service consisting of mandatory collective training of 41.5 days per year (ten monthly weekend sessions of 2.5 days and a summer exercise of 16.5 days). For officers it would be four summer sessions (2 months for the first, three months for three subsequent ones) and 10 2.5 day weekends during the winter prior to and during university in order to complete their DP1. The obligatory years of service would be at least three years (and one could stretch that to 4 or 5 if one included the military paying tuition and related costs.) Similarly we could pay for tuition costs for desirable trades training for community college students (mechanics, food services, health services, transport, etc)

What's killing the reserves right now is that with the voluntary attendance format you cannot have viable collective training above platoon, if that. In order to take the next step, a certain, minimal amount of mandatory training is necessary. This is why the KR&O have a section on "ordered to train" which DND doesn't use. The law is there. The will is missing. It's the same for releases. The NDA says you serve until released. Enrolment contracts use terms of service - clean those up and rigorously police attendance.

Conversely, the mandatory training needs to be as little as absolutely necessary and should be rigorously scheduled well in advance so that families and employers can easily fit in. (Yes, Canada needs much better employment protection legislation). One needs to take conflicting priorities and make them meshing priorities.

In addition to mandatory training you open up additional voluntary training opportunities for those with more time and desire to progress beyond the basic DP 1 standard. Add to that reenlistment bonuses for those who are prepared to extend their terms of service. In my book I've coined three different Classes of Reserve service. Class M is attendance for the initial DP 1 training and thereafter on any attendance at the 41.5 days of mandatory training. Class V is voluntary training or employment of any duration which could be additional individual days at the armouries, additional summer training or what we now consider Class B contracts. Finally, Class C is what it is now - a contract for an operational deployment and predeployment training and post-deployment employment.

The second issue, the 15 - or 12 - year issue is solvable in several ways. The first is to have enough RegF staff to take up all administrative functions including the planning of training. ResF leaders should be left entirely to the 41.5 days of collective training. Similarly the rank level for ResF NCMs and officers should generally peak within the company level. Battalion (real battalions of 6-700 consisting of several RegF and ResF companies) should be run primarily by RegF personnel - again with the aim of managing all admin and training organization planning (not to mention equipment maintenance). ResF personnel wishing to rise to the ranks of CWO or LCol and above should be limited to those with the desire to take the necessary training to be able to function at those ranks (and generally be oriented to brigade and above staff jobs rather than battalion command).

Effectively there is no burning need to keep people beyond 12 or 15 years. The CAF should be happy if a ResF member stays for 12 to 15 years and never advances beyond the rank of major or MWO. In a battalion there is only one LCol and one CWO. That's two out of 6-700. If we aim to develop five majors and five MWOs out of 6-700 reservists as a steady state on a 12 to 15 year cycle then it is a manageable task. Much easier than generating 1 LCol, 1 CWO, 3 majors and 3 MWOs out of a pool of 60-100 .

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Hey boy! That’s a long one lol!

I was talking in the current way it work. Now, if you put a 2 years contract like you says, that would be different and yea the wast would stop. It’s a concept that I like very much and since a long time.

I disagree that after 15 years a reservist is a waste. IF we had bigger units (5-600) even decentralised, the stress and the headache to build a Lcol/CWO would be way different. Do you realise the impact on a ARes member if he can’t go beyond WO? Your attrition your try to stop will just continue, for other reasons.

Give them real units, real support and the will do good.
 
Hey boy! That’s a long one lol!

I was talking in the current way it work. Now, if you put a 2 years contract like you says, that would be different and yea the wast would stop. It’s a concept that I like very much and since a long time.
My thought goes by months actually. The contract starts July 1st, when the first day of DP1 starts for a high school student. The first waypoint is on Aug 31st of the following year when DP1 should be complete. All subsequent contracts run from Sep 1 to Aug 31 to coincide with the annual training cycle. Whether those contracts are for 24 or 36 or whatever months is flexible but IMHO should be no less than a 24 month contract.
I disagree that after 15 years a reservist is a waste.
I didn't say it was a waste. I said DND should be really happy if 15 years is all that they get out of a given reservist.

IF we had bigger units (5-600) even decentralised, the stress and the headache to build a Lcol/CWO would be way different. Do you realise the impact on a ARes member if he can’t go beyond WO? Your attrition your try to stop will just continue, for other reasons.
Again my aim is for major and MWO. People should be able to go beyond that if they are prepared to put in the time and effort to learn the job. One mustn't forget that the building of a CO or RSM includes not only a series of courses but also the experience they get in doing the job of the position they already hold. That's the weak point for your average Class A. The experience is generally 1/6th of the time of their RegF counterpart and at a level of difficulty far below of their RegF counterpart.

Give them real units, real support and the will do good.
I think the concept of give them "the people to work with and the equipment and a good training support and they'll be great" is a bit of a fallacy these days. There may have been a time in 1939 where reservists could, with a level of competency, do the job of a battalion commander but we tend to forget that for much of Canada's army had several years of full-time training in England to learn their craft.

The role of a combat team commander or even a FOO or a logistician is so much more complex these days than it was 50 years ago. I was a shit hot RegF FOO/FAC in the seventies but the newest RegF FOO course graduate these days would eat my lunch. Higher rank needs a good training foundation and a high level of experience to get it right. Class A's just don't get enough of either right now nor would they even if resources were increased. 30-60 days a year isn't enough.

I think if you radically change the system of reserve service, then in a generation you might be able to get to a point where you have ResF COs and RSMs that could deploy in that role operationally. The emphasis here is on "radically change" and "might".

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@FJAG I was meaning for the PRes that 2 years (or summers at least) for OFP on the NCM side is a little excessive. Because there isn’t much one can do with a PTE(R) that they would enjoy.

OCdt’s where a 3 year wait, but after Phase 2 could at least do some OJT / shadowing, and IIRC P 1 and 2 where the first summer (it’s been a while I may be wrong).
 
My thought goes by months actually. The contract starts July 1st, when the first day of DP1 starts for a high school student. The first waypoint is on Aug 31st of the following year when DP1 should be complete. All subsequent contracts run from Sep 1 to Aug 31 to coincide with the annual training cycle. Whether those contracts are for 24 or 36 or whatever months is flexible but IMHO should be no less than a 24 month contract.

I didn't say it was a waste. I said DND should be really happy if 15 years is all that they get out of a given reservist.


Again my aim is for major and MWO. People should be able to go beyond that if they are prepared to put in the time and effort to learn the job. One mustn't forget that the building of a CO or RSM includes not only a series of courses but also the experience they get in doing the job of the position they already hold. That's the weak point for your average Class A. The experience is generally 1/6th of the time of their RegF counterpart and at a level of difficulty far below of their RegF counterpart.


I think the concept of give them "the people to work with and the equipment and a good training support and they'll be great" is a bit of a fallacy these days. There may have been a time in 1939 where reservists could, with a level of competency, do the job of a battalion commander but we tend to forget that for much of Canada's army had several years of full-time training in England to learn their craft.

The role of a combat team commander or even a FOO or a logistician is so much more complex these days than it was 50 years ago. I was a shit hot RegF FOO/FAC in the seventies but the newest RegF FOO course graduate these days would eat my lunch. Higher rank needs a good training foundation and a high level of experience to get it right. Class A's just don't get enough of either right now nor would they even if resources were increased. 30-60 days a year isn't enough.

I think if you radically change the system of reserve service, then in a generation you might be able to get to a point where you have ResF COs and RSMs that could deploy in that role operationally. The emphasis here is on "radically change" and "might".

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Putting my thought shortly in english is not always easy lol!

I agree with your last. I pushed hard the idea that you can't be a good unit leader only by doing your typical Class A stuff even if you thing you were the greatest thing since the invention of the sliced bread. You have not depth and no knowledge of the word. A good civilian joob can cover some part but absolutely not everything. I would even got to the extent (depending of the circonstances) that to be in a unit CT, you need to have at least done a LANTUS/DOMOPS position at sub-unit level.

Same with the ressources and support. I don't believe in magic. IOT be ok in managing all those ressources, you need to do something with it. Since the hyper centralisation of the collective training, most coy level staff don't go out in the field because they are not task/budgeted to do so, even less unit leadership. We are at a point that when a not tasked unit or coy Comdt Team who are out in the field in FFO, the troops (from other units) are at first looking at them with a ''what are you doing here''. I have a couples of story on that becauxe we refuse that way of thinking. My point was that if you give ARes, a proper unit size and equipment and proper direction on training, etc, they will achieve good. Not CAPOP good but enough to at least be able to not look like fools.

Sadly, some are stuck at the romantic Fienians Raids part of history. What we need unit is big ARes units (capable of training, etc), not cap badge for each 150 pers.

The people who stay in the ARes more than 10 years and going up in ranks are holding the system together fully aware of that the system is deeply flawed. They know, they are handcuffed.

I don't think we are that far appart, I just put short answer that in my head have a lot of implied meaning. Bad habit I guess.
 
Sadly, some are stuck at the romantic Fienians Raids part of history. What we need unit is big ARes units (capable of training, etc), not cap badge for each 150 pers.
You have touched on something here that is actually quite important and probably one of the biggest barriers to reforming the reserves. It became a very major issue in the late 1990s and since then most RegF leaders have shied away from restructuring the reserves.

Back in the 1960s we had 6 infantry regiments in the RegF and hundreds in the ResF. Under Pearson's Liberal government there was a restructuring of the reserves with the Militia reduced from somewhere near 51,000 to 30,000. A retired gunner by the name of Suttie was set up to run a commission to suggest how to do that. In the end 114 armouries were closed and dozens and dozens of units were amalgamated, reduced to nil strength and paid strength cut. While some units grew in strength from this temporarily, the manpower reductions quickly took hold and units ended up being no bigger than before - generally under 200 all ranks for a battalion. Turning many units to "national survival" units (something like todays LUSAR) was a great dissatisfier and many quit). a few years later the RegF was also reorganized cutting three regiments - the QOR, Black Watch and Cdn Gds concentrating everyone into the remaining three - the RCR, PPCLI and R22R and, for a while the Cdn Airborne Regiment.

RegF tend to get on with the program after some whining, but reservists carry grudges for a long time. When word came of possible amalgamations of units into single larger units in the 1990s there was a revolt which went to the political level which put a stop to that. It's actually not hard to see it their way. Many of these units have longer histories, predating confederation, and greater war time service than the RegF units.

Both the US and UK have reserve units that approximate RegF battalions in size. IMHO that's necessary if you ever intend to get reserve units to the point of being capable of training and at deploying at unit strength which should be a goal. Simple augmentation as practiced these days will never grow a force in time of need.

Many units are unofficially amalgamating into tactical groups. battalions that can field platoons get together with other battalions in their brigade to form a company or a rump battalion for exercises. IMHO that's still inadequate and a sign of systemic failure that needs correcting.

There is a way of increasing the quality of the reserves and retain much of the history. I've toyed with an idea called a 30/70 battalion which is based on the following: A given RegF battalion is split into three parts - with each part consisting of roughly 2/3 of a bn headquarters, one full rifle company and about 1/3 of the combat support company with all their equipment. It's moved to an urban centre where it takes on 3-4 ResF battalions. One battalion forms the rest of the headquarters and the combat support company and gives its name to the entire battalion. The other 2-3 battalions each form a 10% RegF/90% ResF rifle company but the company retains the affiliation to its original battalion and keeps its own buttons and bows. The whole shebang is commanded by a RegF CO and the RSS staff (and additional RegF staff gleaned from reducing the number of brigade headquarters and division headquarters join the battalion and form the 10% component of the rifle companies and become the entire battalion's RegF training cadre.

The advantage is that there are sufficient RegF personnel in the battalion (roughly 200) structured in such a way that career progression can continue and training can continue or its RegF elements on a day-to day basis. In addition there is a large enough RegF component for the ResF elements that they can take on both routine administrative functions and training support and even some leadership roles. In addition there is unit equipment that the ResF elements can train on on a time sharing basis until newer more plentiful equipment is acquired.

Why keep the unit designators and links for the companies? In part to get buy-in from the ResF communities and local support. In addition for the ability in the future if mass mobilization is ever needed again, to be able to split the battalion back into 4 or 5 battalions each with a core of trained RegF and ResF staff who can absorb a large number recruits and train them. Each of these would already have all of the heritage and unit title of the former battalion. It's simply part of the army's national mobilization plan. In effect, a brigade could grow into a division in relatively short order. (Obviously that also needs an equipping plan - but that's a different but related mobilization plan issue)

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I agree with much of what your propose in terms of groupings of units but would go a couple of steps further:
1) Break the current Reg F units into separate badged units. No more of being one of 3 Infantry mind sets but now expand the units to allow for a wider means of thinking.
2) Group the ResF units under a provincial/regional unit name. I look at the British Army and the Royal Regiment of Scotland...which in turn has 6 distinct subunits referencing their history. There is a large number of un-manned or historical units that could be activated and the cluster each grouping under a geographically appropriate unit including units for the YK, NWT and Nunavut. Frankly if domestic response is going be an ongoing thing I'd rather the British Columbia Regiment be deployed to wildfires there than compromising RegF ops...and show the CAF is supporting the home areas first.
3) A serious look at grouping of roles and functions. Does it make sense to have Service Battalions, Inf, and Armour all in the same city? Or re-task them all to a common mission for better alignment/mobilization? This is something I don't have a good handle on though due to the geographic spread of units/mission taskings (both current and desired)/ brigade structure and equipment maintenance specifics so any critic is welcome to shoot holes in this idea.
 
I agree with much of what your propose in terms of groupings of units but would go a couple of steps further:
1) Break the current Reg F units into separate badged units. No more of being one of 3 Infantry mind sets but now expand the units to allow for a wider means of thinking.
Get rid of the Regiments period.
CDN INF Corp 1st Bn - 150th (whatever) Reg and Res all the same.
Same for Armoured: RCAC 1st Reg't - 87th (whatever)
The Engineers, Arty etc are #'rd already

Sure there will be complaints, but at the end of the day it streamlines things.

2) Group the ResF units under a provincial/regional unit name. I look at the British Army and the Royal Regiment of Scotland...which in turn has 6 distinct subunits referencing their history. There is a large number of un-manned or historical units that could be activated and the cluster each grouping under a geographically appropriate unit including units for the YK, NWT and Nunavut. Frankly if domestic response is going be an ongoing thing I'd rather the British Columbia Regiment be deployed to wildfires there than compromising RegF ops...and show the CAF is supporting the home areas first.
See my comment above.
3) A serious look at grouping of roles and functions. Does it make sense to have Service Battalions, Inf, and Armour all in the same city? Or re-task them all to a common mission for better alignment/mobilization? This is something I don't have a good handle on though due to the geographic spread of units/mission taskings (both current and desired)/ brigade structure and equipment maintenance specifics so any critic is welcome to shoot holes in this idea.
It depends on the size of the City, but generally the more varied types of units you have, you will appeal to more potential recruits. Some will want to be something that may not be offered if you dump all the Inf somewhere, and the Armoured elsewhere and you end up losing potential recruits.
 
I agree with much of what your propose in terms of groupings of units but would go a couple of steps further:
1) Break the current Reg F units into separate badged units. No more of being one of 3 Infantry mind sets but now expand the units to allow for a wider means of thinking.
2) Group the ResF units under a provincial/regional unit name. I look at the British Army and the Royal Regiment of Scotland...which in turn has 6 distinct subunits referencing their history. There is a large number of un-manned or historical units that could be activated and the cluster each grouping under a geographically appropriate unit including units for the YK, NWT and Nunavut. Frankly if domestic response is going be an ongoing thing I'd rather the British Columbia Regiment be deployed to wildfires there than compromising RegF ops...and show the CAF is supporting the home areas first.
3) A serious look at grouping of roles and functions. Does it make sense to have Service Battalions, Inf, and Armour all in the same city? Or re-task them all to a common mission for better alignment/mobilization? This is something I don't have a good handle on though due to the geographic spread of units/mission taskings (both current and desired)/ brigade structure and equipment maintenance specifics so any critic is welcome to shoot holes in this idea.

Or just pull their Reg F support and let 'the militia' wither on the vine while you stand up a series of numbered battalions/regiments across Canada called 'the Reserves' with the people, resources and mandate to integrate more effectively with the Reg F.

They can wear the same livery as the Reg F units to which they are affiliated.

Call it the 'CEF Strategy', and have riot control troops on standby to deal with the regimental senates ;)

 
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