Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

[Kirkhill]

Operating from a remote location so can't find the appropriate links but:

I believe that Beedall had planning line drawings of the Type 45 (6000-7500 tonnes) showing a Chinook back aft athwartships.
Also seen, older model USN LPDs (tonnage unremembered - San Jacinto maybe?) embarking 2 Chinooks athwartships - and those had a conventional forward superstructure.
8000 tonne San Giorgios conduct helo ops to include Chinooks owned by Italy.

So suppose we stipulate that 4000 tonnes is too small and SS3 is too high.  What would be the minimum tonnage necessary to operate in SS1-2?
What would be the maximum SS that could support Chinook ops from a 6000 tonne vessel (AOPS, Svalbard, Absalon, Daring, Type 26, San Giorgio, CSC??).
Would there be value to the Canadian Government in having vessels that, even if they had to run for a lea or find harbour, could rapidly embark troops over long ranges?

Even if all things are not possible in all situations surely the option of maintaining a possibility in some situations has value?

If nothing else a larger vessel and a larger flight deck would seem to be likely to increase stability, safety and endurance and enhance helo ops of the smaller CH-148 (not to
mention the CH-146).

In my view the Navy's principal role is to supply little Canadian islands that the government can move around the world to project Canada into the rest of the world's
affairs and thus secure Canada's interests.  If we can't afford a dozen nuclear carriers and amphibs carrying brigades, can't we find a way to support a couple of dozen
islands from which we can bounce platoons and companies?  Maybe not in all sea states and all the time but enough to increase the options available.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Whoa whoa whoa.

Ok- helos and ships- my lane.

Ship superstructures do create turbulence issues that helicopters do have to contend with.  For the most part, it is manageable.  I admire your posts Oldgateboatdriver, but in this case, you have it exactly backwards. Helicopters with tail rotors generally have to hover and land nearly into wind, because at some point all of them become tail rotor limited- that is to say that eventually, the force exerted by the tail rotor cannot overcome the torque from the main rotor and the force exerted from the relative wind. Something has to give, so the helicopter will weathercock into the wind (which may not be what you want to happen at that moment). 

Tandem rotor helicopters, on the other hand, do not have relative wind issues.  Their main rotor blades cancel each other out from a torque perspective, because they turn in opposite directions.  A Chinook can hover in nearly any relative wind conditions (I'm sure Good to Golf will be along any second to correct me).

As for twin rotor helicopters and their supposed incompatibilty with hauldown systems- you got me.  To my knowledge, it has never been tried because no one has seriously proposed putting anything bigger than a Merlin on a small ship (where you need a HDS).  I know that in a Sea King, the Main Probe is located near the centre of gravity of the helicopter (it is probably not exact because the CG of changes somewhat over the course of a flight), so the force exerted by the HDS does go mainly through the axis created by the mast.  You might have a compelling theory about tandem rotor helos...I wonder if Baz or H3 Tacco are able to weigh in on this?

A ship's tonnage is usually a good indicator of it's ability to have enough stability to operate a large helo safely, but it is not the whole story.  For instance, a Canadian Frigate is not that far away in displacement from a Canadian Destroyer, yet due to the top-heaviness and hull form of the DDH, it is usually much harder to recover on a DHH than a FFH- the FFH tends to have a stable period that is longer and more frequent than a DDH.  Remember also- the larger the helo, the stronger the flight deck must be. That takes steel and steel adds to ship's displacement (and may create stability issues, if you are not careful about it), which is why small ships tend to carry small helos (Shipbuilding is all about tradeoffs).

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Thanks for the clarification SKT.

 

[jollyjacktar]

I did see a Sea Knight do a pintle landing on Preserver.  She took up a huge amount of territory.  You would need one hell of a flight deck to have these birds fly off of.

 

[RC]

If we could get rid of the "Arctic" in the A/OPS, would something like this be useful for us?  Enough speed?
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3ab18da1fd-82f5-4280-bb87-13cff78dd5ac

More from the builder:
http://www.damennaval.com/nl/company_product-range_holland-class-patrol-vessels.htm

Plus:
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/hollandclasspatrol/

Mark
Ottawa

Those aren't OPV's.  They are a poor man's frigate.

There has always been merit to dividing the class into an APV and OPV, but the OPV would be somewhere in the 85-90m and 1800 T displacement range.  Ship's the size of the holland class arent really going to add much to the OPV mission profile.

Plus their cost is about CAD$170 million.  Considering that the hulls are built in Romania, that puts them at a substantially higher relative cost than the AOPS, and about 3 times the price of a decent 85m OPV.

If the Canadian Navy needs overpriced, undergunned, pretend-frigates, then those will be useful.  But I'm betting they don't.

 

[RC]

Now if only we could follow the Dutch example and ditch the requirement to build the damn ships in Canada--but politics will not allow any government to do that:

I'm tempted to go into an extended rant about the dangers of commenting on something you know nothing about, but instead I'll do my best to explain.

Romanian shipyards are effectively an assembly line for yards in other European nations.  They do the steel work, which is the grunt work in shipbuilding and has low added value.  The hulls are then towed to the other European yards and outfitted.  This works well because everyone makes money and they manage to produce a competitive ship, while the other European yards maintain their strategic advantage in the important outfitting aspects. 

Naturally, since Romania is on the other side of the planet, and the shipping costs would probably be about equal to the labour savings, it probably doesn't make sense for a Canadian yard to consider this arrangement.  Simple geography dictates that we cannot do the same thing and there isn't really a viable North American alternative.

Now, you are correct that it will be more expensive to build the ships in Canada rather than to farm them out to Europe, but, minus the Romanian advantage, that really only holds true for the first few ships.  European yards have a lower labour cost per ton simply because they have some more experience.  If Canadian yards gain that experience and are able to build on it, they will be able to produce ships for Canada at a the same or lower cost than Europeans. 

So why pay the start up costs? 

The main advantage is a strategic one.  We are talking about building Naval ships.  If we go to war, do we really want to be handcuffed by the interests of another sovereign nation in order to supplement our fighting capability, or do we want to be able to maintain our independence? 

The second advantage is economic.  Obviously, importing ships means a negative against Canada's GDP.  Kind of a dumb thing for the government to do when they can keep the money circulating within the country.  I'm not sure what factor you'd have to put on the price of an imported ship to reach equivalence, but I can guarantee it's significant.

The third reason, as you've noted, is political.  Jobs in Canada for Canadians.  Makes sense that the GOC would promote that.  It's not, as you seem to suggest, the result of weak political will.

The fourth reason is the infamous industrial regional benefits (IRBs).  Shipbuilding spawns a whole support network of other companies, which, while the shipyard might go out of business, can remain globally competitive.  I have worked with dozens of people who got their start on the CPF program and are still working successfully in Canada in the industry today.

 

[MarkOttawa]

RC: What about the Aussie approach?  Are they, er, out to lunch?

Spanish armada for warship contracts
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/spanish-armada-for-warship-contracts/story-e6frg6nf-1111113785412

...
Mr Howard said about a quarter of the construction work on the landing ships [sort of big honking] would take place in Australia, generating about 600 jobs...

Mr Howard said the Navantia destroyers had been selected as the "next generation air warfare destroyer" for the Royal Australian Navy.

The three Spanish-designed ships would be delivered in 2014, 2016, and 2017, he said...

The destroyers will be assembled in Adelaide by an alliance between navy shipbuilder ASC, the Defence Materiel Organisation and mission systems company Raytheon, he said.

Australian industry will provide around 55 per cent of content and about 3000 Australians across the country will be employed...

I was referring to a general approach, not anything actually specific for Canada.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[RC]

RC: What about the Aussie approach?  Are they, er, out to lunch?

Spanish armada for warship contracts
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/spanish-armada-for-warship-contracts/story-e6frg6nf-1111113785412

I was referring to a general approach, not anything actually specific for Canada.

Mark
Ottawa

Well, you'll notice that they are still doing the outfit work, or at the very least the systems integration in Australia.  Also, Australia has an established naval construction industry, which has built and as far as I know continues to build the ANZAC frigates and numerous other naval vessels.  The decision to built part of these destroyers in Spain may simply have been a schedule and/or capacity issue.  However, Australia has recently displayed some short-term gain, long-term loss style politicking in their national naval industry that in my opinion is indeed out to lunch.

As a counter, look at the Brazilian approach to their NPa and frigate program.  They currently have no naval construction industry (though they have a burgeoning offshore construction industry).  They intend to buy offshore designs with full technology transfer and Brazilian construction.  They have a solid, long term vision of what naval capability will do for Brazil and intend to develop both the design and construction capability by pulling it in from the outside.

First of all though, we need to make a distinction between frigates/destroyers and the OPV type ships we are talking about in this thread.  In the context of the needs of most established navies they are not at all the same thing.

OPVs can be built in a commercial yard and designed to commercial standards.  One of the world leaders in the design of OPVs in this size range is a Canadian company.  It takes about 8 to 10 months to get a design and 3 years to build.  There are few barriers to designing and building this type of ship in Canada.  This applies equally to pretty much everything except combat vessels.  It will be a touch more expensive to build in Canada, but the benefits I mentioned earlier far outweigh the disadvantages.

On the other hand, frigates/destroyers are extremely complex, requiring dedicated, specialized, up to the minute knowledge.  To redevelop all of that knowledge in Canada could take years and a very large budget.  I think something along the lines of the Brazilian approach could work in this case, but it would have to be done right.  GOC buys the design, with full design and construction technology transfer to the yard, put the performance risk on the foreign yard, and build them in Canada.  Canada should never have been placed in a position that we need to be educated in how to supply our Navy, but the fact is that we are, and we need a comprehensive solution that brings us back into the position we should be in.

Simply shopping for vessels offshore will leave us with poorly adapted assets that we don't know how to support, can't replace ourselves if it comes to that, and bring no value for the money back to Canada.  It's the sort of solution employed by third world countries who just can't afford any better.  It will be a sad day for me when we join that rank and we are looking up at Brazil as they establish their own support structure, or England, France, Australia, Germany, the US, China, and so on, who all have their own capability already.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the national Post is a column about the politics of shipbuilding:

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2010/11/09/don-martin-b-c-shipbuilder-fears-eastern-bias-in-35b-deal/

Don Martin: B.C. shipbuilder fears fix is in over $35B deal

Don Martin

November 9, 2010

Canada’s three largest shipbuilders are fighting for two contracts with a estimated value of $35-billion, or roughly four times the pricetag of the F-35 jet fighter contract that’s got everybody in a lather. But with one bidder in Quebec and another just down the road from Defence Minister Peter MacKay’s home harbour in Nova Scotia, the largest west coast shipbuilder is wondering if the political fix is in.

The federal government needs frigates, coast guard vessels, Arctic patrol ships, a huge polar icebreaker and supply ships, with maintenance contracts filling in the lag times between building contracts.

Federal officials are now scouting out the eligible shipyards. To the winners will go many years of stable government contracts. To the loser, a prolonged scramble to stay afloat.

Jonathan Whitworth, CEO of Vancouver-based Washington Marine Group, eyes the competition — Irving Shipbuilding of Halifax and Davie Yards Inc. of Montreal — and wonders if he’ll be a victim of government meddling with business decisions for political purposes.

Whenever Quebec is in a crucial bidding process, the competition tends to get politically dicey. With Atlantic Canada in need of an economic boost, Halifax gets the empathetic edge. That leaves Vancouver as an early underdog at the cabinet table.

“Have we heard the rumours? Yes. Are we fearful that political answers could sway the opinion? I’ll also say yes,” admits Mr. Whitworth. “But we’re not worrying about other shipyards. We’re making sure the federal government knows what we’re doing and what we’ve done for over 50 years. If it’s an open, fair and transparent decision, we’ll have nothing to worry about.”

The clearest hint at the sensitivity of the issue was a privy council decree banning lobbyists from representing the bidding shipyards to politicians or bureaucrats. There’s to be no perception of key ministers being arm-twisted by old friends, even though plenty of background advice is now in circulation out of the lobbyist registrar’s sight.  If last week’s potash protectionism was a precedent, serious trouble is ahead for a government that continues to value its political payoff above all other considerations. It means Quebec City’s NHL hockey arena is all but guaranteed to receive federal funding to save a handful of vulnerable Conservative seats in the region, opening the vault to taxpayer handouts for all manner of professional sports venues. And it suggests the mother of all regional squabbles is in the offing as the federal government pits three electoral battlegrounds against each other in a fierce competition for its massive ship-buying spree.

What would infuriate the West, perhaps with the visceral intensity of reaction to Brian Mulroney shifting the CF-18 maintenance contract from Winnipeg to Montreal, would be to shun the West and sign the biggest contract with Montreal’s Davie Yards, a possibility considered likely in B.C., one senior MP confided to me this week.

Davie Yards has received almost $700-million in government loans or loan guarantees in the last two years, most of it from the Export Development Corp. of Canada. That is far greater than the  support given to its contract bidding rivals which, in Washington Marine’s case, amounts to zero.

Yet despite all the support at extremely favourable terms, Davie languishes in bankruptcy protection and is looking for buyers all around the world.

Davie communications vice president Marie-Christine St-Pierre declined comment on the company’s efforts to find a buyer beyond confirming interest from two potential investors she declined to name. But she insists the shipyard is ready and able to deliver any contracts it signs with the federal government.

The stakes go far beyond the health of an individual company. The  28 large ships proposed for construction over the next three decades would create two national shipyards and a sustainable economic base for the selected regions.

So far, nobody’s complaining about the preliminary selection process. Requests for proposals will roll out next spring and the contracts likely decided by the federal cabinet in the fall of 2011.

But if the selection process is anything but totally shipshape, western alienation will be back on deck.

National Post
dmartin@nationalpost.com

Several years decades back I worked for a very senior officer who had considerable responsibility for, inter alia, building/buying and refitting ships. We despised MIL Davie for inept management, shoddy work and, above all, its  irresistible political connections. But, Davie was the preferred yard because we had to do anything and everything to appease Québec.

 

[RC]

I believe it to be a certainty that Irving in Halifax will take the combattant contract.  That leaves WMG and Davie fighting for the non-combattants.

I'd much prefer to see WMG win since, as the article suggests, they have been managing under their own steam for years without government handouts.  Plus, if WMG can demonstrate some capability in big commercial ships, they might get the BCFS market back and a chunk of the eventual arctic offshore market.  But I don't think it will happen.  I think they will give it to Davie and try to appease the West Coast by throwing some of the <1000T and repair contracts that way.

And I think Davie will continue to struggle.  What else have they got?  I don't think they have have much of a natural market.

On the other hand, Davie winning may depend on an external yard taking the gamble and buying them out.  If no one is willing to take the risk, we may finally see Davie put out of its misery. 

There was an accord signed between Davie and Irving about 6 months ago.  I assume that fell through when Davie went into bankruptcy protection.  Anyone know?  The ideal might be for Irving/Davie to team up for the combattant contract.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If I recall a lab did operate briefly off the back of one of the CCGS Darby on the west coast and I think the Terry Fox or similar on the East coast, this was out of either necessity for a SAR call or trials I can’t remember which.

When the CG let the contract for the 47’ lifeboats it went to the big Quebec yard (CIL or something), they sublet it to a bunch of numnuts in Kingston that had never actually built a proper boat before (direct words from the yard manager to me). They made a complete muck up of the boat, the contract was withdrawn and given to Nanaimo shipyards which had significant experience building aluminum boats. The first boat was rebuilt there as where the subsequent hulls. The same crap happened when the 70’ Point class was being built back East, planned acquisition was 9 hulls, I think only 2 were built and required complete re-welding and the rest of the contract cancelled. Yet the same thing happened also with the 41’ cutters, first one came from back east and was rejected completely as unfit for service, remaining hulls of the class were built by Matsumoto shipyard which did stunningly beautiful work.
Other poorly built boats from Back East
SP barge/landing crafts used by CCG
42’ fiberglass Oil response boats
40’ cutters/crashboats (Black Duck, etc) (Low quality welds throughout)

Other than the barges and oil response boats, all of the above were proven designs bought under license from Europe and the US that were mucked up by shoddy workmanship. I firmly believe this can be traced to the significant patronage given to the yards back East, which the west rarely received. That’s not to say the West Coast has not had a it’s share of issues, like the Weatherships, Class 500, but those were mainly design issues as opposed to poor building techniques.

 

[Lex Parsimoniae]

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the national Post is a column about the politics of shipbuilding:

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2010/11/09/don-martin-b-c-shipbuilder-fears-eastern-bias-in-35b-deal/

Several years decades back I worked for a very senior officer who had considerable responsibility for, inter alia, building/buying and refitting ships. We despised MIL Davie for inept management, shoddy work and, above all, its  irresistible political connections. But, Davie was the preferred yard because we had to do anything and everything to appease Québec.

Interesting opening shot in the PR campaign.  What Jonathan Whitworth, CEO of Vancouver-based Washington Marine Group, fails to mention is that they were awarded the $1.5 billion submarine maintenance contract - beating out Irving - and they had the Orca Patrol Craft construction contract as well.  WMG plays just as dirty as the other shipyards and hopefully the are fully rewarded for this interview.  Just my  :2c:

 

[NavyShooter]

I'd just like to see 'em get off the pot and start DOING something.

I've got 18 years in right now.  I am "looking forward to" having to learn a completely new combat suite on the Post FELEX ships.

I do not, based on current trends, anticipate ever having to learn how a new class of ship works before I leave the CF (be that at 25 or 30 years, we'll see.)

NS

 

[FSTO]

Interesting opening shot in the PR campaign.  What Jonathan Whitworth, CEO of Vancouver-based Washington Marine Group, fails to mention is that they were awarded the $1.5 billion submarine maintenance contract - beating out Irving - and they had the Orca Patrol Craft construction contract as well.  WMG plays just as dirty as the other shipyards and hopefully the are fully rewarded for this interview.  Just my  :2c:

The difference between WMG built ships/boats and Irving or MIL Davie built ships/boats is that they come in under the time frame, under budget and they work.

 

[Edward Campbell]

The difference between WMG built ships/boats and Irving or MIL Davie built ships/boats is that they come in under the time frame, under budget and they work.

I guess it's not betraying anything to say that 15 or so years ago we used to call the Tribal Class Update and Modernization Project (TRUMP) 'one no trump'* because the status of the ship in Davie was always suspect.


----------
* A bridge player's term, for those unacquainted with it.

 

[drunknsubmrnr]

Is the rumour about Davie burning out every Ops room on the TRUMPs true?

 

[Edward Campbell]

Way beyond my ken; I just remember former RAdm (then Mr.) Ed Healy and assorted other RAdms and Cmdres storming about "F___ing Davie." My concern, then, was radar fits and electromagnetic compatibility issues and the like.

 

[cobbler]

Well, you'll notice that they are still doing the outfit work, or at the very least the systems integration in Australia.  Also, Australia has an established naval construction industry, which has built and as far as I know continues to build the ANZAC frigates and numerous other naval vessels.  The decision to built part of these destroyers in Spain may simply have been a schedule and/or capacity issue.  However, Australia has recently displayed some short-term gain, long-term loss style politicking in their national naval industry that in my opinion is indeed out to lunch.

The destroyers are being built entirely in Australia. Its the LHDs that are being built in Spain and fitted out in Australia. Due to the fact that no Australian shipyard has the capability to build 28,000 ton flat tops.

 

[Lex Parsimoniae]

The difference between WMG built ships/boats and Irving or MIL Davie built ships/boats is that they come in under the time frame, under budget and they work.

While they were on-time, the Orcas were a mess when delivered.  Corrosion and dissimilar metals issues IIRC.  Be that as it may, building cadet and navigation training boats to a proven design with no combat systems is a far cry from building complex warships and integrating combat systems from multiple suppliers.  Just my  :2c:

 

[Kirkhill]

Quick question - aside from repairs what work on major vessels (>4000 tonnes) have any of these three yards done in the last 10 years?  Civil or Military.

When was the last vessel built from the keel up by these yards? I suspect that you might want to have them build the AOPVs first with a planned buy of 8 vessels so that you can scrap the first 2 early as learning experiences and still leave you an operational fleet of 6.  CSCs to follow and JSS to run concurrently with the CSC delivery.

All of these yards seem likely to face really steep learning curves and your first vessels are equally likely to be "challenges" for their crews.

Edit: Actually - just thinking further on this issue it may be appropriate to follow the Dane's lead on the CSC and, despite the urgent need for the Air Defence Vessels, build the simplest vessels first and arguably the simplest vessel is a Command and Support Vessel which is ultimately a hull wrapped around an empty space with an inboard motor.  That vessel can be used to qualify the hull and machinery as well as the primary ships controls while still supplying a useful capability.  The Air Defence Vessels will be the most complex of the variant vessels produced over the next 30 years. They would be better built late in the cycle.  If they are needed immediately then perhaps they should be built off shore by a "practiced" yard and then plan for refits and extensions in Canadian yeards at 10 and 20 year milestones.  Then by the time the 30 year cycle repeats the Canadian yards will be fully up to speed and "practiced" themselves.

A quick question for those in the know - did the decision to outfit the AOPVs with a conventional drive train vice athe Azipod system have anything to do with a desire to have a common Bridge and control architecture across the Navy's fleet?