Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

[FJAG]

Perhaps the Army could give the Navy’s ‘Leadmark’ methodology a look to ensure that assumptions in its assessment/mission analysis have a stronger element of strategy to balance its strong sense of tactical acumen?

I think in fairness to the Army, its various transformation initiatives were also thoroughly analyzed. I quite frankly do not have enough knowledge of maritime strategy or operations to be able to tell if the Leadmark methodology is sound or better than the Army's or not.

However, when I look at "Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities" published by the Army's Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts in 2003 and the first versions of Advancing With Purpose and see their nod towards the reality of Canada needing to maintain an army capable of up to full-spectrum operations and then see the project's outcome as anything but that. One can only conclude that the builders of the system, for various reasons, became overly enamoured with the concept of the touted rapid deployability of the nascent Stryker brigades; a capability that remains mostly unfulfilled to this day.

Effectively, the strategic analysis that the Army made included a need for full-spectrum ops. The unstated assumption made by Army planners was that they would most probably not be involved in such operations and, as a result, the force today, as built, does not have many of the key enablers and capabilities needed for full spectrum operations. Right from the beginning the plan was to shed the "heavy" capabilities as unnecessary and as the years went by they continued down that rabbit hole.

I think if one tried to put that into a naval context it would be to design the CSC as stated but then as they go along start shedding the air/missile defence components and then the anti-ship components and finally the anti-submarine components until all that is left is one rapid fire gun on the foredeck. The ship can still go to sea and can still do a lot of peacetime stuff, but go to a peer war ... no.

 

[Good2Golf]

FJAG, agree with your last para. I was part
Of the writing team of FF: CFAC, and there were some of us who tried to inject some wants/needs/Pol.guidance/direction consideration, but there was still more prevailing ‘New Version of Corps 86’ thinking going on mixed with some injected way-out thought pieces that contributed subsequently into how you described CSC Ver.1.2.15.b.13…

Leadmark is more of a strategically considered ‘on the balance of things’ aim towards the future that seems to stand the test time reasonably well (and adjusts accordingly when a Govt Constraint (cough…AOPS) gets thrown into the calculus).

 

[suffolkowner]

I think in fairness to the Army, its various transformation initiatives were also thoroughly analyzed. I quite frankly do not have enough knowledge of maritime strategy or operations to be able to tell if the Leadmark methodology is sound or better than the Army's or not.

However, when I look at "Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities" published by the Army's Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts in 2003 and the first versions of Advancing With Purpose and see their nod towards the reality of Canada needing to maintain an army capable of up to full-spectrum operations and then see the project's outcome as anything but that. One can only conclude that the builders of the system, for various reasons, became overly enamoured with the concept of the touted rapid deployability of the nascent Stryker brigades; a capability that remains mostly unfulfilled to this day.

Effectively, the strategic analysis that the Army made included a need for full-spectrum ops. The unstated assumption made by Army planners was that they would most probably not be involved in such operations and, as a result, the force today, as built, does not have many of the key enablers and capabilities needed for full spectrum operations. Right from the beginning the plan was to shed the "heavy" capabilities as unnecessary and as the years went by they continued down that rabbit hole.

I think if one tried to put that into a naval context it would be to design the CSC as stated but then as they go along start shedding the air/missile defence components and then the anti-ship components and finally the anti-submarine components until all that is left is one rapid fire gun on the foredeck. The ship can still go to sea and can still do a lot of peacetime stuff, but go to a peer war ... no.

I think you pretty much summed it up however when push came to shove the army was deployed to Afghanistan anyways whether outfitted correctly or not. In fairness the RCAF and RCN have been and were pretty much run down as well. The difference seems to be that there is a plan to move forward with the other two services to maintain or reestablish basic capabilities. For all the capabilities the CAF have lost over the decades how much money has really been saved?

 

[FJAG]

FJAG, agree with your last para. I was part
Of the writing team of FF: CFAC, and there were some of us who tried to inject some wants/needs/Pol.guidance/direction consideration, but there was still more prevailing ‘New Version of Corps 86’ thinking going on mixed with some injected way-out thought pieces that contributed subsequently into how you described CSC Ver.1.2.15.b.13…

Leadmark is more of a strategically considered ‘on the balance of things’ aim towards the future that seems to stand the test time reasonably well (and adjusts accordingly when a Govt Constraint (cough…AOPS) gets thrown into the calculus).

One of my regrets--as I was still in at the time--is that I wasn't paying closer attention to what was going on in the Army at that time. I was more involved in broader legal branch issues. The closest I got was being a legal advisor to the ill-conceived and poorly executed Reserve Force Employment Project. Whatever came up to Chief of Reserves Council was heavily filtered and sanitized of controversial issues.

I always liked Corps 86, not as an organizational goal but as a framework for studying doctrine. We used it on my Command and Staff Course and it provided a viable framework for study - but that was while the Cold War was still active. I must admit, when I got to the part about "Tactical Self Sufficient Units", FF lost me because it diverged from my long standing background of tactical units that were already built and trained together as combined teams to cobbling mix and match things together like a Chinese restaurant menu - and again, the heavy capabilities were already being divested to be replaced by nebulous direct and indirect fire capabilities. To me it was obvious that any TSSU would be incapable of rapid deployment because it would require assembling and then substantial training.

I've always wondered about the Navy's constituent parts. I grew up in a time when the Navy's chief role was anti-submarine warfare and in those days our submarines were generally considered as training aids to the ASW hunters. It seems that now, however, they have a much greater warfighting role. I like that about the Navy. The main ships all have a peer warfighting role and capability even if in peacetime they are assigned less aggressive roles. That's why I find the AOPS and the MCDV somewhat out of type because they are not as well weaponized as they could be. That makes them just fine for peacetime roles but not as viable in a peer conflict unless heavily converted with better act and shield capabilities. The Army should be more like CSCs and less like AOPS.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Army should be more like CSCs and less like AOPS.

So this is how you see the army?

 

[Underway]

In my experience, the Navy was the most honest and often would provide options within its own means for addressing in-service issues. Air Force middle of the road, and the Army seemed to have a penchant for espousing ‘equal’ share of capital, notwithstanding well-regarded data that things that fly or sail are capital intensive. The irony being that the Army seemed less adept at the PY game after the Navy and Air Force endured years and years of purple “Jarmyoint” force build up (1 Cdn Div as “J”oint).

The Navy and Air Force matured their organizational make up years, even decades ago. Frankly, the Army is still out walking in a snow storm trying to figure out what it wants to be…heavy, mech, what about light, 9 BNs, 6+PRes?, symmetrical, asymmetrical, own AD or not, mortars, pioneers, combat sp pl, etc.?

YMMV

Now that I've switched to the O&M side of the house I get a bit of a behind the curtain look at how the different elements "sell" their funding.

When the meetings happen with all the bigwigs the RCN always comes out smelling like roses. The RCN has its ducks squarely in a row being able to clearly articulate the relationships between cost and impact/importance.

Despite what one might think the RCN is mostly aware of all of our maintenance issues, lifecycle management, and operational limitations and can directly draw a line between that operations and cost. This is another reason why the RCN is doubling down on inspections of equipment. It's not perfect but we are a long way away from being surprised by the 280's suddenly rusting out.

That being said the other elements are miles behind. The Airforce is excellent in its maintenance has difficulty at times drawing the relationships to the operational and cost lines, partially because they need the Army and RCN to tell them what to support for some things. The Army is even further behind that...

As such, the RCN can justify its costs, purchases, and operations financially to the government. Which means decision-makers are more inclined to say yes. The other two elements more often get a no because they have a harder time justifying the expenses.

 

[FJAG]

Now that I've switched to the O&M side of the house I get a bit of a behind the curtain look at how the different elements "sell" their funding.

When the meetings happen with all the bigwigs the RCN always comes out smelling like roses. The RCN has its ducks squarely in a row being able to clearly articulate the relationships between cost and impact/importance.

Despite what one might think the RCN is mostly aware of all of our maintenance issues, lifecycle management, and operational limitations and can directly draw a line between that operations and cost. This is another reason why the RCN is doubling down on inspections of equipment. It's not perfect but we are a long way away from being surprised by the 280's suddenly rusting out.

That being said the other elements are miles behind. The Airforce is excellent in its maintenance has difficulty at times drawing the relationships to the operational and cost lines, partially because they need the Army and RCN to tell them what to support for some things. The Army is even further behind that...

As such, the RCN can justify its costs, purchases, and operations financially to the government. Which means decision-makers are more inclined to say yes. The other two elements more often get a no because they have a harder time justifying the expenses.

I think that the AOPS will make that even better for the Navy because their operations are directly linked to very desirable political goals vis a vis the North. The Navy's flexibility to switch to a defence of Canada role on a dime also helps.

I think the Navy has done itself a good service by using well weaponized platforms for current operations. The Army on the other hand has divested itself of weapon systems and therefore must bring arguments to the table as to why the premiums on the insurance policy that it effectively is need to increase when its been good to go (presumably) for quite some time. Its hard to argue that we need to up our deterrence posture through a stronger Army.

The Navy's singular problem is the escalating costs of the CSC. That might reach the "Not on my watch" point for an LPC government. I really wish the reporting would break down the actual costs as between build the ship, arm the ship, maintain and crew the ship for its expected service life. The latter adds a very large sum, much of which is part and parcel to having a Navy at all rather than acquiring a new vessel. Its very misleading and never well reported.

 

[Underway]

I think that the AOPS will make that even better for the Navy because their operations are directly linked to very desirable political goals vis a vis the North. The Navy's flexibility to switch to a defence of Canada role on a dime also helps.

I think the Navy has done itself a good service by using well weaponized platforms for current operations. The Army on the other hand has divested itself of weapon systems and therefore must bring arguments to the table as to why the premiums on the insurance policy that it effectively is need to increase when its been good to go (presumably) for quite some time. Its hard to argue that we need to up our deterrence posture through a stronger Army.

The Navy's singular problem is the escalating costs of the CSC. That might reach the "Not on my watch" point for an LPC government. I really wish the reporting would break down the actual costs as between build the ship, arm the ship, maintain and crew the ship for its expected service life. The latter adds a very large sum, much of which is part and parcel to having a Navy at all rather than acquiring a new vessel. Its very misleading and never well reported.

You can access the PBO report. I think it's all open source. Be warned though, there are weird calculations in there.

The government won't cancel the project at least for the first seven ships (or two flights). There is no backup plan. And they know a new plan would lead to more delay and no cost savings. And vote losses in the Maritimes.

Frankly, I worry more about reduced capability than a reduced number of hulls.

 

[YZT580]

You can access the PBO report. I think it's all open source. Be warned though, there are weird calculations in there.

The government won't cancel the project at least for the first seven ships (or two flights). There is no backup plan. And they know a new plan would lead to more delay and no cost savings. And vote losses in the Maritimes.

Frankly, I worry more about reduced capability than a reduced number of hulls.

since acquisition is spread out over time it allows for a succeeding government to reverse, using those same votes as a leaver during the campaign so I don't see this as too much of a concern. All N.S. has to do is look at what happened to the St. John shipyards.

 

[Underway]

An interesting image for HDW.

Originally posted here.



It's a TRAPS installed on HDW. Payload space is already paying off apparently. Should be interesting to see the CONOPS for that addition.

 

[Weinie]

So this is how you see the army?

Cool. How do I get one of those? GC Surplus?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

CCG wanted to replace the hovercraft with this, but during trials at the base during freshet, it could not handle the current and just about got swept out to see. Really noisy inside and bit like being in a WWI tank, not to mention slooooowww.

 

[Weinie]

CCG wanted to replace the hovercraft with this, but during trials at the base during freshet, it could not handle the current and just about got swept out to see. Really noisy inside and bit like being in a WWI tank, not to mention slooooowww.

Don't care. Still want one.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Now that I've switched to the O&M side of the house I get a bit of a behind the curtain look at how the different elements "sell" their funding.

When the meetings happen with all the bigwigs the RCN always comes out smelling like roses. The RCN has its ducks squarely in a row being able to clearly articulate the relationships between cost and impact/importance.

Despite what one might think the RCN is mostly aware of all of our maintenance issues, lifecycle management, and operational limitations and can directly draw a line between that operations and cost. This is another reason why the RCN is doubling down on inspections of equipment. It's not perfect but we are a long way away from being surprised by the 280's suddenly rusting out.

That being said the other elements are miles behind. The Airforce is excellent in its maintenance has difficulty at times drawing the relationships to the operational and cost lines, partially because they need the Army and RCN to tell them what to support for some things. The Army is even further behind that...

As such, the RCN can justify its costs, purchases, and operations financially to the government. Which means decision-makers are more inclined to say yes. The other two elements more often get a no because they have a harder time justifying the expenses.

I would disagree with that; generally when we do a physical survey the actual material state is worse than the poor condition we expected it to be in. The snr mgt is usually shocked when they find out that things like no hot water, lack of heat etc are common issues. THere is also a big delta into the actual defects and what is being tracked as defects.

We used to joke that the risk assessments were a 'talk about it until it's blue' exercise (acceptable with review). It's now a talk about it until it's yellow (undesirable), and there are so many defects that most don't get actually risk assessed or included in a 'safe for sea' review. Most of the CPFs wouldn't go to sea if we applied basic SOLAS standards.

 

[Underway]

I would disagree with that; generally when we do a physical survey the actual material state is worse than the poor condition we expected it to be in. The snr mgt is usually shocked when they find out that things like no hot water, lack of heat etc are common issues. THere is also a big delta into the actual defects and what is being tracked as defects.

We used to joke that the risk assessments were a 'talk about it until it's blue' exercise (acceptable with review). It's now a talk about it until it's yellow (undesirable), and there are so many defects that most don't get actually risk assessed or included in a 'safe for sea' review. Most of the CPFs wouldn't go to sea if we applied basic SOLAS standards.

The navy has a plan, shows the plan, points to the effects, and says here how much it's going to cost and what you're going to get in operational results from that cost. Governments love that. RCN is clearly the big winner right now in Ottawa because of this. It's also why the RCN despite misgivings has fully embraced the Arctic mission. More funding.

It doesn't mean that the RCN gets everything it wants. 3rd JSS for example. That's a hard one to swallow, particularly if the Asterix doesn't stay around (or something like it).

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Grrr, painfully clear 2 AOR's is not enough, we really need 4. With some rejigging of the Federal Services model to make it more sustainable, the government wins by having another juicy contract to give out, more merchant marine spots to generate a supply of experienced ticketed personal who can become the next generation of Ships pilots. The ability to support Allied operations and exercise with minimal costs and political risk.

 

[Navy_Pete]

The navy has a plan, shows the plan, points to the effects, and says here how much it's going to cost and what you're going to get in operational results from that cost. Governments love that. RCN is clearly the big winner right now in Ottawa because of this. It's also why the RCN despite misgivings has fully embraced the Arctic mission. More funding.

It doesn't mean that the RCN gets everything it wants. 3rd JSS for example. That's a hard one to swallow, particularly if the Asterix doesn't stay around (or something like it).

I agree with that part; we're really good at tying the white paper of the day to capabilities and laying out the funding, and think the CCG learned a lot from how we justified out NSS funding.

I meant more that the RCN is not aware of the maintenance issues or the actual material state of the surface ships. They are starting to get an inkling, but it's worse than what the roll up summary portrays by a lot. There are so many individual issues that people don't even bother to understand what it means for basic safety. Even with the extended DWPs the ships are coming out with all kinds of fundamental issues.

The worse part is that we are still trying to get BOI related safety issues resolved, but QoL engineering changes for things like wifi get rammed to the top of the list.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

An interesting image for HDW.

Originally posted here.

View attachment 65814

It's a TRAPS installed on HDW. Payload space is already paying off apparently. Should be interesting to see the CONOPS for that addition.

No way! That is freaking cool!

 

[Stoker]

No way! That is freaking cool!

TRAPS was fitted just to see if it could, its never been trialed however the potential is there.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

TRAPS was fitted just to see if it could, its never been trialed however the potential is there.

I am fully aware of the potential!