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AOR Replacement & the Joint Support Ship (Merged Threads)

Does anyone here believe that we will see new AOR's/JSS or what ever you want to call it approved anytime the foreseeable future. With an election on the horizon and with the current government with a 50/50 shot of winning. It seems to me we are looking at another MHP!!!
 
Kirkhill said:
Or you can build a Trawler Bridge.  Bridge forard with glass fore and aft so that the fishing master can direct  both navigation and net operations on the trawl deck.



Edit - OK, I give up.  Could somebody please link to the image above and post it properly?

Thanks.

Take the url and place it between the insert image place holder like so (remove the extra space after img) [ img] url goes here[/img]
 
Canada’s C$ 2.9B “Joint Support Ship” Project Sinks
26-Aug-2008 18:49 EDT
Article Link

HMCS Protecteur, and HMCS Preserver have contributed to humanitarian aid missions in Florida and the Bahamas, peace-making off Somalia and East Timor, and have been poised for the evacuation of non-combatants from Haiti, to name but a few.

As part of its spate of military modernization announcements issued just before Canada Day (July 1) 2006, the Canadian government issued an RFP that began the process of defining and building 3 “Joint Support Ships.” The aim was to deliver 3 multi-role vessels with substantially more capability than the current Protecteur Class oiler and resupply ships. In addition to being able to provide at-sea support (re-fueling and re-supply) to deployed naval task groups, the new JSS ships were envisioned as ships that would also be capable of sealift operations, as well as amphibious support to forces deployed ashore.

This was expected to be a C$ 2.9 billion (USD $2.58 billion) project. DID describes the process, the 4 pre-qualified industry teams participating, and some of the issues swirling around Canada’s very ambitious specifications.

Specifications that ultimately sank the whole project, in a manner that was predictable from the outset. Leaving Canada’s navy with a serious problem…

JSS: The Procurement Process
JSS: Contracts and Key Events [updated]
Appendix A: DID Op-ed/Analysis – June 30, 2006
Appendix B: Additional Readings [updated]
JSS: The Procurement Process

Here’s how the three-step process announced by Paul Martin’s Liberal Party government in 2006 was expected to work:

Four industry teams have been pre-qualified to compete for the contract. A request for proposals, to be issued shortly, will trigger the process to select two industry teams for the project definition phase.

The second phase, Project Definition, will see two qualified consortia selected from among the qualifying proposals. These two consortia will each be awarded a C$ 12.5 million contract to produce and deliver an implementation proposal consisting of a preliminary ship design, a project implementation plan, and an in-service support plan. These proposals will be evaluated on the basis of compliance and the proposal demonstrating the best value, taking into consideration technical merit and total ownership cost, will be selected as the winner.

The final phase, Project Implementation, will see the winning bidder awarded two separate but inter-related contracts. The first will be for the completed design for and construction of the Joint Support Ships. The second will be for the in-service support for the life of the vessels. Delivery of the first ship is targeted for 2012.

The expected overall project cost for the JSS includes a base cost of C$ 2.1 billion (USD $1.87 billion), plus an estimated C$ 800 million (USD $712 million) in contracted in-service support over 20 years. Industry teams are led by:

Irving Shipbuilding
BAE Systems (Project) Limited (BAE Systems Naval Ships)
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AG
SNC-Lavalin Profac Inc.
A list of the required capabilities can be found in the Canadian government’s detailed release. Supply functions, medical care, repair facilities, self-defense, roll-on roll-off, lift-on lift-off helicopter operation, ice capabilities, deck space for vehicles…. the list goes on.

All in a 200m/28,000t ship.

The new Conservative Party government kept the JSS program, and followed the competition procedure to narrow the contest down to just 2 bidders: ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AG, and SNC-Lavalin Profac Inc.

In the end, however, the specifications, design, and budget simply could not be made to agree. The JSS project is currently in limbo. A solution is required, and soon, but successfully executing one will demand a rethink of the project’s main premises.

JSS: Contracts and Key Events


HMCS Protecteur
(click to view larger)Aug 22/08: The End. Canada’s Ministry of Public Works and Government Services announces the termination of the JSS program:

“After receiving and evaluating the mandatory requirements for the Joint Support Ship Project from the bidders, the Crown has determined that the proposals were not compliant with the basic terms of the Request for Proposals (RFP). Among other compliance failures, both bids were significantly over the established budget provisions…. The Department of National Defence and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans are currently considering the next steps. The government is committed to procure, repair and refit vessels in Canada according to the government’s Buy Canada policy.”

The Hill Times was blunt, as it offered more background details:

“According to industry insiders, both design teams were unable to come up with a ship design under-budget. Although details are tight, officials say one team submitted a blueprint for two vessels [instead of 3], while the other sent in a plan for three, which was way over budget. In other words, industry has sent a strong signal to Ottawa – either increase the funding or scale down the project.”

The government’s decision leaves the Canadian navy’s future ability to operate independently at risk. HMCS Preserver and HMCS Protecteur were expected to reach the end of their service life between 2010- 2012, but the failure of the JSS concept means that it will be very difficult to build replacement ships before that date. Meanwhile, HMCS Preserver is headed into dock to have its boiler system repaired, just 2 years after the last repair. Those systems are an ongoing risk, as the Canadian Press explains:

“An undated briefing note, leaked to The Canadian Press over the weekend, show the navy was bracing for the blow…. “If the Protecteur and Preserver are going to be needed longer than expected, we will also determine what needs to be done to keep our supply ships safe, operational and available until they can be replaced…. Many of their systems are nearly obsolete, such as the boilers they use to generate steam for main propulsion. As you might expect, it’s becoming increasingly difficult and costly to maintain these ships. Spare parts are no longer readily available, and the skills needed to operate and maintain systems that were already mature in the 1960s are becoming increasingly rare.”.... Beyond basic mechanics, marine engineering designs and environmental laws have become more complex over the last 40 years. The navy’s two supply ships are single hull designs…”

See also: The Hill Times | Globe & Mail | Canwest News Service | Canadian Press | CBC.

Aug 3/08: The National Post reports that discussions have begun with Dutch shipbuilders, in the wake of serious problems with the JSS bid. The Netherlands builds the highly-regarded Rotterdam Class LSDs – but political friction is building around the prospect of contracting for shipbuilding outside Canada. Even though…

“This year, the federal government determined that proposals from two Canadian consortiums earmarked to build the new fleet were “noncompliant.” Defence officials were told the Joint Support Ship budget was not enough to build the three vessels envisioned and attempts to obtain more funding from the government have been unsuccessful.”

See Apendix A, which discusses why this outcome could have been, and was, predicted long in advance. Meanwhile, Conservative Party Defence Minister Peter MacKay’s press secretary Jay Paxton is attempting to douse the flames of controversy regarding the Netherlands visit:

“Although the director-general of major project delivery land and sea was in Europe on other business, he had a chance to meet with government representatives from the Netherlands who are undertaking a similar project and they compared best practices in the context of an update on their project.”

May 19/08: The Ottawa Citizen reports problems with the JSS program:

“The $2.1 billion set aside for buying three Joint Support Ships is not enough, defence officials confirm. They point out that part of the problem is the new vessels would conduct missions far beyond the scope of re-supplying warships at sea, the role now done by the decades-old Protecteur-class ships…. There is no similar type of ship in the world, as most navies use two types of vessels to perform the distinct roles.

Defence officials have heard from industry that the money set aside by the government might be enough for two ships, not three.”
More on link
 
Defence officials have heard from industry that the money set aside by the government might be enough for two ships, not three.”

By the time construction was complete, if this goes on much longer, the money set asside would probably be enough for just 1
 
Canada's Navy dodges a bullet
Posted: August 27, 2008, 5:30 PM by Kelly McParland
Full Comment, Matt Gurney
Article Link
The unexpected press release announcing the termination of procurement processes for two new types of ships for the Canadian Coast Guard and Navy was no doubt a heavy blow. And for the perennially underfunded Coast Guard, the indefinite delay for the twelve new patrol ships they’d been counting on must be a bitter thing indeed.

The Navy, however, might just have dodged an expensive bullet. The Joint Support Ship (JSS) program was never a good idea. It is no surprise  that the program could not be afforded at the desired cost, since it is a typically Canadian attempt to reinvent the wheel with a homegrown “Made in Canada” solution. Canadian shipwrights are as gifted as any in the world, and our technology is first-class. All that matters not, however, when the very concept of the ship itself is fundamentally flawed.

The two Protecteur-class Auxiliary Oil Replenishment (AOR) ships possessed by the Canadian Navy today are almost forty years old. These large ships serve a vital role in the fleet, serving as mobile pit crews for our warships at sea. They can sail alongside a frigate or destroyer and refuel its tanks while underway, and have enough storage space aboard to maintain a stockpile of spare parts and ammunition to help keep those ships fully functional while deployed. These vital supplies, along with well-equipped medical and dental facilities, allow our warships to stay on station longer, free of the need to return to port for fuel and provisions. The Protecteurs are, however, starting to show their age, with operating costs climbing as they break down and spare parts become harder to find. After four decades of honourable service, these fine ships should be retired and replaced with alacrity.

The JSS concept should have been just that – a modern replacement to an already proven class of vessels. While retaining the storage space, health care facilities, and fuel bunkers, they could have been fitted out with more modern engines, powerful defensive weapons with the computers to match, and would have benefited from decades of experience at how to make ships easier to maintain, harder to detect, and more environmentally friendly. These hypothetical new AOR ships would have made a substantial contribution to improving the Canadian Navy’s effectiveness while having the undeniably appealing fringe benefit of helping sustain Canada’s struggling shipbuilding industry.

The JSS’s, however, were doomed by the bureaucratic realities of “capability creep.” Canada is in the enviable position of being secure within its own borders; our military is mainly for use abroad. In recent years, there have been several embarrassing incidents where the Canadian Forces have been unable to move troops and equipment to where they were needed. The ability to pick up a unit and drop it somewhere else in the world, with everything it needs to function along with it, is known as strategic lift, and Canada has chronically lacked it. The Air Force has recently taken delivery of four giant C-17 transport aircraft that are ideal for moving troops and equipment, whether this means infantry and tanks to Afghanistan or our DART team to disaster areas around the globe. These planes give the Canadian Forces strategic airlift, and the Navy wants a way of providing strategic sealift.

The men at the top of the Navy are of course realists, and they know that even the most hawkish Canadian government is ultimately answerable to a notoriously gun-shy electorate. The need for new AORs is obvious and palatable to any political party; they are, after all, support vessels, not mean, scary warships. Therefore, the AOR replacements are a near-sure thing, insofar as much as any Canadian military expenditure can ever be considered certain. Given that, and the Navy’s desire to grab a piece of the strategic lift pie, a decision was made to incorporate as much troop carrying capacity as possible into an AOR design.

This was a mistake for any number of reasons. Fundamentally, it comes down to the fact that a compromise between an AOR and a troop ship capable of supporting an amphibious landing is exactly that: a compromise that does neither job well or economically. An AOR is already a large vessel; it has to be in order to hold enough fuel to do its job. Trying to shoehorn in enough empty space to carry troops, vehicles, equipment and the communications gear necessary to serve as a floating headquarters is unrealistic, as the inability of either received bid to come in at the three billion dollar budget for the program attests. You can have a good ship on budget or a totally new kind of hybrid ship for lots of money, but reinventing the wheel costs, and the Canadian military can’t afford it.

Then there is the problem inherent to packing too many vital functions onto one platform. It would be rather embarrassing for Canada if we ever found ourselves needing to send troops abroad to one place while fueling a task force somewhere else. Not even the fastest ship can yet be two places at once, and if Canada truly believes that it needs to be able to support squadrons at sea while putting troops ashore, it is incumbent upon us to try and ensure we can do both of those jobs simultaneously.

On top of these very real limitations is the sheer absurdity of the idea. Does anyone at National Defence Headquarters really think  it would be a good idea to approach a potentially hostile shore in a ship that is essentially a sluggish gas can packed with ammunition?
More on link
 
This article points out everything I have been saying about JSS for years.
 
FSTO said:
This article points out everything I have been saying about JSS for years.

The requirements set forth in the JSS project represent the minimum essential requirements, which are both realistic and achievable.

Yes, the JSS concept is innovative – but no more than was HMCS Provider when she was built in the mid-60s.  Provider combined capabilities into a single hull that no other navy had attempted before, and we benefited enormously for 40 years as a result.  In the same way, the Joint Support Ship is essential to address Canada’s future needs.

The JSS is not an amphibious ship and was never intended to deliver an amphibious capability. While sealift and support to forces ashore capabilities have been included in the ship, the JSS would provide a very different capability. First and foremost, the role of JSS is to support operations by enabling a naval task group to deploy and to remain on station anywhere in the world. The unique capability requirements of Canada’s Navy are not addressed by the differing capability needs and projects of other countries, and therefore a direct comparison cannot be made.

The JSS is a project that the Navy supports these ships will fulfill a critical role in the conduct of naval operations at home and abroad. The ships were intended to provide a broad range of capabilities and options to future governments for the next half-century.   


 
Problem is - we need new ships for the AOR / Provider/Preserver role.....
can we wait for the additional $$ needed for the JSS... watcha ya gonna do ???
 
Build 2.....order the 3rd as soon as $$$ can be budgeted....
 
gwp said:
The requirements set forth in the JSS project represent the minimum essential requirements

No it does not. It provided the "that what we want" solution, not the "what we need " solution. There is a difference.

the Joint Support Ship is essential to address Canada’s future needs.

Sealift is essential.........not JSS.


The ships were intended to provide a broad range of capabilities and options to future governments for the next half-century.   

....and it did this at a rice that was unaffordable for the government therefore it provided zero capability.
 
I will throw myself on the altar with the following suggestion(food for thought):

===============================================================
TGSS(Task Group Support Ship) = AOR+

number in class=4 or 5 (order 2 or 3 now with follow-on option for 1 or 2)

complete flat-top except for 2 island towers(port, starboard) with (replenishment gear, cargo sling) engine exhaust+Radar/Comm structures

10,000 tons light, 28,000 tons full load
flight deck = 200m long, 30m wide
Speed = 20 knots sustained
Range = 12000 km at 15 knots
Crew = 160-180(ship crew)
              80 (aircraft)
              10(medical)
              30(HQ team)

Armament
2 Goalkeeper Dual Purpose (fore and aft)
4 x RAM-21 (2 on each island tower, 1 fore and aft)
6 x 12.7 mm HMG mountings(3 on each side)
passive decoy systems

Aviation

2 elevators from hangar deck to flight deck
4 - 6 large naval helicopters
8-12 UAH(CL-327) for surveillance, ASW sonobouy dipping,....
Under-deck Hangarspace  for 6 large naval helicopters

Survivability:
Damaged Stability Enhanced Two Compartment

Ice Capability
First year Ice Capabiity

Task Group Command Facilities with Naval and Shore communications

Underway support

Fuel 10,000 - 12000 tonnes
JP-5 1500 -  2000 tonnes
Ammunition  1500 tonnes
Dry Stores  2000 tonnes

Medical support

30 bed and 2OR hospital capable of modular expansion
dental facilities
===============================================================

This ship would look similar to some of the Japanese carriers or WWII. 
 
Great.......as if AOR + Sealift wasnt enough

you want AOR + CV + LCC + Hospital ship


8-12 UAH(CL-327) for surveillance, ASW sonobouy dipping,....

WTF is that ?
 
No Sealift above---basically an AOR + enhanced helicopter capacity.

CL-327 is a unmanned surveillance helicopter developed in Canada----USN did some tests on it in the
late 1990's. It has quite a bit of potential provided you "think out of the box". As we may be getting back into the ASW business in the future they may well be useful for that type of work.
Canada has really missed the boat by not developing these----there are several " out of the box" land applications which could be very handy for small units.  I am sure we are waiting for the US to do it first then clamor to pay 10-20 times what we should for them.

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/cl-327.htm


No hospital ship---As I understand it the current AORs supply enhanced medical facilities now---I do not know what size.  Personally I would not put extensive hospital facilities on a tanker for obvious reasons but with the enhanced enclosed space under a flight deck you have the space to do many things.

CV??---I am not advocating a small aircraft carrier----just a large simple flight deck---no catapult, arresting gear.

LCC???--not sure what this is.
 
Bearpaw said:
No Sealift above---basically an AOR + enhanced helicopter capacity.

What you described above is well beyond even an AOR +

CL-327 is a unmanned surveillance helicopter developed in Canada----USN did some tests on it in the

I'm aware thanks.....
It has quite a bit of potential provided you "think out of the box". As we may be getting back into the ASW business in the future they may well be useful for that type of work.

I live and eat ASW, i'm aware of whats in or out of the box

No hospital ship---As I understand it the current AORs supply enhanced medical facilities now---I do not know what size. 

30 beds and 2 ORs is well beyond a simple capability to support.

CV??---I am not advocating a small aircraft carrier----[/quote]

6 large naval helos and UAVs with hangar space below decks .........thats not an AOR plus.

LCC???--not sure what this is.

Well......
Task Group Command Facilities with Naval and Shore communications

Thats at least the role of our current destroyers and if you mean shore cooms for supporting land ops then thats the job of an LCC.

Too many jobs for a single ship.....too much money $$$

Exactly what was wrong with JSS.
 
Bearpaw said:
I will throw myself on the altar with the following suggestion(food for thought):

===============================================================
TGSS(Task Group Support Ship) = AOR+

number in class=4 or 5 (order 2 or 3 now with follow-on option for 1 or 2)

complete flat-top except for 2 island towers(port, starboard) with (replenishment gear, cargo sling) engine exhaust+Radar/Comm structures
So you are going to put your RAS Stations with everything else....hot engine exhaust being expelled the same area as fuel for ahips and aircraft...not to mention ammunition. Heat and those items don't mix, you would be putting both ships and the crews at risk.

10,000 tons light, 28,000 tons full load
flight deck = 200m long, 30m wide
Speed = 20 knots sustained
Range = 12000 km at 15 knots
Crew = 160-180(ship crew)
              80 (aircraft)
              10(medical)
              30(HQ team)
Where are you getting these numbers....what are they based upon?

Armament
2 Goalkeeper Dual Purpose (fore and aft)
4 x RAM-21 (2 on each island tower, 1 fore and aft)
6 x 12.7 mm HMG mountings(3 on each side)
passive decoy systems
Why are you arming a ship with weapons no other ship uses beyond the .50 cals? What about active countermeasures? Why are you positioning the weapons fore and aft and not port and stbd?

Aviation

2 elevators from hangar deck to flight deck
4 - 6 large naval helicopters
8-12 UAH(CL-327) for surveillance, ASW sonobouy dipping,....
Under-deck Hangarspace  for 6 large naval helicopters
Again your numbers for an air det I think are way too small....

Survivability:
Damaged Stability Enhanced Two Compartment
Can you explain what this means?

Ice Capability
First year Ice Capabiity

Task Group Command Facilities with Naval and Shore communications
Giving your AOR flagship duties in a huge mistake....for all the communications and data that are fed to it from other units...you make it too much of a prime target. Thats why we in the Navy have destroyers as our AAD and Flagships.

Underway support

Fuel 10,000 - 12000 tonnes
JP-5 1500 -   2000 tonnes
Ammunition  1500 tonnes
Dry Stores   2000 tonnes
Again curious where these numbers are coming from

Medical support

30 bed and 2OR hospital capable of modular expansion
dental facilities
numbers...numbers and numbers...

As we may be getting back into the ASW business in the future
Ummm..hello.....while our skill set got rusty we never got out of it....the last couple of years I have been doing CASEXs up the ying yang.

 
I got some of the numbers from the JSS requirement as published on the DND site (size,....)
For the crew I looked at the information available on the web for the Protecteur class and tried to make reasonable estimates.  The Protectuer class has about 45 or 50 listed for it air detachment--for 3 Sea Kings---for the new helicopters (4-6) I estimated 80---perhaps it should be more.

Your comment about the RAS risk is something I was worried about----perhaps move the gear for or aft as needed.

If you have better choices of air defence systems then fire away.

I agree with you about the HQ function----since it was in the JSS requirements it may well need to be included to have the political will to proceed with such an idea----in fact I would be hesitant about having the ammunition on a tanker as well!

There real point of this is that something is going to have to be cut from the JSS requirements.  In my opinion, the JSS is really a conglomeration of 3 ship-types.  Just calling for AOR will probably not cut it with the bureaucrats---so what do YOU cut and still make the concept appealing to the bureacrats??
A single purpose ship will likely be still-born.

For the numbers on the Underway support----just look at the Protecteur class for its numbers---recall I have taken sealift out and this ship is 4000 tons more(at full load).

As I said this is food for thought---I would hate to see the next class of new ships to be "ice-breaking kayaks armed with a C6".
 
Do you have a model built from LEGOs so I can get a better picture of the thing?
 
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