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All Things Air Defence/AA (merged)

Bird_Gunner45 said:
"The Soviets did it so so should we"

                            - no NATO person ever

I could be wrong, but I'm pretty sure that we dumped the 7.62 long guns in favour of the M-16/ 5.56mm weapon systems as a belated response to the Soviet AK 47 'assault rifle' family of weapons.. which they stole from the Nazis, of course.
 
:goodpost: :goodpost:
SeaKingTacco said:
And the Soviets worked on a completely different system of air land interpreting than we use. And they frankly didn't much care if the odd SU-22 got "red on red" by accident.

We (Canada, US, NATO) do care. I can state categorically that in NATO, you do not get to issue AD weapons to troops who are not effectively part of an integrated Air Defence System. Full stop. (Notice I said nothing about either cap-badge or colour of uniform. I could care less if you issue AD weapons to a Service BN, as long as the guys controlling the weapons know what they are doing and are controlled as part of the integrated AD system.

The fact that most of you here do not know this, and continue to argue for something that cannot happen speaks to the extremely poor state of knowledge on this subject matter within the CF.

Great post. Infantry controlling MANPADs doesn't make sense in terms of doctrine, training, or integration. It's a non-issue
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
:goodpost: :goodpost:
Great post. Infantry controlling MANPADs doesn't make sense in terms of doctrine, training, or integration. It's a non-issue

No, I think the point is *UNTRAINED* infantry not integrated into the AD network/system is unwise.

I have learned a bunch from this thread, and the realization that AD consists of a lot more in a land battle environment than just handing a soldier a missile is something I *should* have realized before....and do now.

NS
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
"The Soviets did it so so should we"

                            - no NATO person ever

Makes for a good stand-off weapon for things like subs, which the Soviets do...just 'cause they're Soviets doesn't make them stupid.  If they're so stupid, why are they putting Yasen's to sea with MANPADs while we have hand me downs diesel boats that probably don't have a freakin' potato gun?
 
Eye In The Sky said:
Makes for a good stand-off weapon for things like subs, which the Soviets do...just 'cause they're Soviets doesn't make them stupid.  If they're so stupid, why are they putting Yasen's to sea with MANPADs while we have hand me downs diesel boats that probably don't have a freakin' potato gun?

It was a joke. But Soviets worked their GBAD knowing they would likely be the weaker air side and they wanted to essentially create a wall o' GBAD to shoot down anything.
 
SeaKingTacco said:
And the Soviets worked on a completely different system of air land interpreting than we use. And they frankly didn't much care if the odd SU-22 got "red on red" by accident.

We (Canada, US, NATO) do care. I can state categorically that in NATO, you do not get to issue AD weapons to troops who are not effectively part of an integrated Air Defence System. Full stop. (Notice I said nothing about either cap-badge or colour of uniform. I could care less if you issue AD weapons to a Service BN, as long as the guys controlling the weapons know what they are doing and are controlled as part of the integrated AD system.

The fact that most of you here do not know this, and continue to argue for something that cannot happen speaks to the extremely poor state of knowledge on this subject matter within the CF.

Except the Artillery (and the army) failed miserably to to maintain any effective ability in the realm of AD, so you wonder why people question the "experts"? 
 
Colin P said:
Except the Artillery (and the army) failed miserably to to maintain any effective ability in the realm of AD, so you wonder why people question the "experts"?

The experts in this realm is most decidedly not Canada. There is hardly anyone in the Cdn Army left that truly understands this stuff, and they have owned the mission since the 80s. That is a failure of both the Artillery to educate and failure on the part of the rest of the Army to actually have enough intellectual curiousity to understand the roles it has been assigned.
 
Colin P said:
Except the Artillery (and the army) failed miserably to to maintain any effective ability in the realm of AD, so you wonder why people question the "experts"?

The army had an effective GBAD capability which was gradually reduced due to the artillery branches preference for guns. It was the same story with STA.

The expertise for GBAD within NATO as a whole fell off in the 1990s and in that regard Canada is certainly not unique in NATO. I was talking to British and German AD instructors in 2015 and they lamented the same issues- shifting of AD units to STA/guns due to the perceived air superiority on the fall of the Soviet Union and the need for STA/OPs for A-stan and Iraq (in the British case).

The RCAS still maintains GBAD SMEs and 4 GS still maintains the ASCC, which is the key planning/coordination element of the IAD and allows us to at least plug into a coalition IAD. In fact, Canadian AD pers established the TADL for Kuwait, so I would say that that capability has been pretty "effective".

The missing link is the shooter system, which is the easiest part of the entire IAD.

In my experience, people in the artillery question the "experts" less because of their knowledge and more because of their own pre-conceived notions of Air Defenders and the air situation. I have heard more than my fair share of field majors/LCols categorically state that we didn't need AD since we had air superiority, than be unable to explain what that meant or understand that there were systems to flew that weren't F/A jets.

 
So why do we have to reinvent the wheel ourselves?

Why can't we identify an ally and say: "Hey we see you guys are still doing this with ______ gear, and we'd like to need bring a unit up to speed asap.  Can we send a team to you to get trained up on your systems?"


???

 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
The army had an effective GBAD capability which was gradually reduced due to the artillery branches preference for guns. It was the same story with STA.

The expertise for GBAD within NATO as a whole fell off in the 1990s and in that regard Canada is certainly not unique in NATO. I was talking to British and German AD instructors in 2015 and they lamented the same issues- shifting of AD units to STA/guns due to the perceived air superiority on the fall of the Soviet Union and the need for STA/OPs for A-stan and Iraq (in the British case).

The RCAS still maintains GBAD SMEs and 4 GS still maintains the ASCC, which is the key planning/coordination element of the IAD and allows us to at least plug into a coalition IAD. In fact, Canadian AD pers established the TADL for Kuwait, so I would say that that capability has been pretty "effective".

The missing link is the shooter system, which is the easiest part of the entire IAD.

In my experience, people in the artillery question the "experts" less because of their knowledge and more because of their own pre-conceived notions of Air Defenders and the air situation. I have heard more than my fair share of field majors/LCols categorically state that we didn't need AD since we had air superiority, than be unable to explain what that meant or understand that there were systems to flew that weren't F/A jets.

And how long to provide us with the pointy sticks? Let’s say we sent our units to Africa in 6 months from now and one of the groups we are “peacekeeping” against starts dropping bombs from UAV’s and kills someone, how long before we have the ability to identify and shoot one down before they get into range? What if we suddenly found our guys facing a more sophisticated enemy with military grade UAVs and attack aircraft, much less trying to use AD against a Grad strike from system firing from behind a robust AD screen. With our current procurement system I doubt anyone has any confidence in getting anything quickly and while my firsthand knowledge is purely discussions with Blowpipe operators. Training people to be effective with Manpads takes time, even more if you want 3 or 4 detached detachments to plug into an IAD in areas with limited comms and perhaps against an enemy that will be able to reach back behind your lines and pulverize any radio transmission source. Given that the average range of a Manpad system and the need to protect the frontline, chances are your AD detachment is in range of counter battery fire. When was the last time we exercised AD detachment in a full spectrum war scenario, where radio discipline and counterbattery fire was considered, not to mention a robust enemy?
While I agree that keeping the corporate high level knowledge  alive is important, we have done it at the cost of losing the on the ground knowledge and the ability to actually do something. Where reality and the enemy will play havoc with best laid untried plans. We should have Manpad detachments out there now even with those field simulators so the day to day stuff of deploying, managing and protecting that resource can become part of the corporate knowledge.
 
Indeed, as one who was serving, albeit as a teen-aged gunner, in the regular force when 1 LAA Regiment, RCA was still on the order of battle in Camp Picton, ON, I have seen our air defence resources mostly ebb with the odd flow. It was a litany of false starts, dead-ends and missed opportunities, more often budget driven than initiated by a parochial field branch artillery.

I did have some experience in the Blowpipe program as I was the CIG in the school and air defence wing - all four or five guys - reported to me. As I recall, we began to run Blowpipe operator courses in late 74 or early 75, once the Chief of Construction and Properties lit a fire under the BCEO to get our simulator room and range constructed. (The line the Sapper MGen used was to the effect that the CDS had promised NATO we would have our airfield air defence at Lahr and Baden operational by x date and he did not want to have to tell Gen Dextraze that we could not meet that date because the BCEO in Gagetown would not get off his butt. Very effective.) Anyway, then it was running course after course, once we got a target system. Believe it or not, the first try by NDHQ failed so we used 105 mm illuminating rounds for a couple of years.

p.s. If anyone has seen the video of the first Blowpipe round fired in Canada, it is my voice that blurts after the second stage ignited and propelled the missile downrange "F... me, I thought the son-of-a-b.... had thundered in for sure."

The whole airfield AD program took several years, but at least we have some trained and experienced people to call on, unlike the early seventies when the bird gunners had not plied the craft for over a decade.

And don't get me going on the joys of small arms in air defence.
 
SeaKingTacco said:
The experts in this realm is most decidedly not Canada. There is hardly anyone in the Cdn Army left that truly understands this stuff, and they have owned the mission since the 80s. That is a failure of both the Artillery to educate and failure on the part of the rest of the Army to actually have enough intellectual curiousity to understand the roles it has been assigned.

I imagine it is hard to drum up any enthusiasm when there are no radars, launchers, guns, missiles or CPs.
 
Meanwhile, the targets....

The small, multi-prop drone can be fitted with an assault weapon, a grenade launcher or a sniper rifle mounted on a rotating gimbal. The military website Defense One says that the TIKAD has a proprietary stabilization system that compensates for recoil when weapons are fired from it remotely.

The Duke website says the “technology also allows us to shoot remotely and potentially disarm a situation without ever deploying a ground presence.”

Defense One quoted Duke co-founder and CEO Raziel Atuar as saying: “I can mount an M4, SR25, a 40-millimeter grenade launcher … I can carry up to 22 pounds and [the system] will stabilize the drone and allow me to get an accurate shot.”

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2017/07/07/New-Sniper-Drone-Could-Be-Future-Urban-Warfare


In early November, Iraqi special forces broke through to East Mosul, where the Islamic State’s resistance stiffened markedly. The use of suicide car bombs rose steadily, as did coalition airstrikes on more than 100 ISIS factories producing them.

But the advance also yielded troves of intelligence. Iraqi troops seized the TV station and began digesting new information on car-bomb factories, artillery caches and a new weapon: armed off-the-shelf commercial drones.

By 2016, many militant groups had already put consumer drones to use for surveillance and reconnaissance, but the battle for Mosul marked the first use of armed drones by a nonstate actor. And even as ISIS was pushed from East Mosul in January, their drones grew deadlier.

It was also an easy tactic to copy.

Within weeks, Iraqi federal police had armed drones of their own. Like the ISIS versions, these were rigged to drop 40mm grenades fixed to badminton-like birdies that steadied the munitions as they fell.

http://www.defenseone.com/feature/mosul-largest-battle-decade-future-of-war/

China has launched a record-breaking swarm of 119 fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles, authorities said on Sunday.

The feat broke the previous record of a swarm of 67 drones, the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) said.

The 119 drones performed catapult-assisted take-offs and formations in the sky.

According to the CETC, "swarm intelligence" is regarded as the core of artificial intelligence of unmanned systems and the future of intelligent unmanned systems.

Zhao Yanjie, an engineer with CETC, said that since drones were invented in 1917, intelligent swarms have become a disruptive force to "change rules of the game".

Reports in the Chinese official media in the recent past said Chinese military is also testing to launch mass armed drones as a new technique in battle

http://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-launches-drone-swarm-of-119-fixed-wing-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-117061100388_1.html

 
Old Sweat said:
Indeed, as one who was serving, albeit as a teen-aged gunner, in the regular force when 1 LAA Regiment, RCA was still on the order of battle in Camp Picton, ON, I have seen our air defence resources mostly ebb with the odd flow. It was a litany of false starts, dead-ends and missed opportunities, more often budget driven than initiated by a parochial field branch artillery.

I did have some experience in the Blowpipe program as I was the CIG in the school and air defence wing - all four or five guys - reported to me. As I recall, we began to run Blowpipe operator courses in late 74 or early 75, once the Chief of Construction and Properties lit a fire under the BCEO to get our simulator room and range constructed. (The line the Sapper MGen used was to the effect that the CDS had promised NATO we would have our airfield air defence at Lahr and Baden operational by x date and he did not want to have to tell Gen Dextraze that we could not meet that date because the BCEO in Gagetown would not get off his butt. Very effective.) Anyway, then it was running course after course, once we got a target system. Believe it or not, the first try by NDHQ failed so we used 105 mm illuminating rounds for a couple of years.

p.s. If anyone has seen the video of the first Blowpipe round fired in Canada, it is my voice that blurts after the second stage ignited and propelled the missile downrange "F... me, I thought the son-of-a-b.... had thundered in for sure."

The whole airfield AD program took several years, but at least we have some trained and experienced people to call on, unlike the early seventies when the bird gunners had not plied the craft for over a decade.

And don't get me going on the joys of small arms in air defence.

Ditto. I still recall that the "Air" para of every exercise Op Order stated: "We have local air superiority." It was funny then too.

When I went to the RCSA in Shilo in 69, the last of the locating, AD and missile batteries had stood down although some of their gear--launchers, erectors, radars--still littered the base.

Towards the end of my tour with 2nd Horse in Petawawa, we started standing up the regimental Blowpipe batteries which everyone was quite cynical about as we all knew that the only reason they were coming on line was so that we could get NATO money for Baden and Lahr on the promise that we would stand up air defence at those bases (which consisted of the hard-standing 40mms and the Blowpipes). Never being air defence I had no actual experience with them but anecdotally my understanding was that the batteries were not altogether fond of the weapon or their roles with it.

It was actually quite interesting to see how quickly the expertise in these specialty artillery trades diminishes. We had few people left with practical AD experience in the seventies and by the time they were resurrecting locating, I think we were down to four folks who all ended up at the school in Gagetown as IGs and AIGs.

:cheers:
 
Good point, FJAG. When I hit the school as CIG in June 1974, the regiment was trying to resurrect locating aka STA. The Commander CTC came out to a firing point to see a demonstration of sound ranging. As it happens, besides our locating IG and one AIG, I was the only other person in the school who could use the plotting board to determine a hostile battery location, and I had learned it on my IG course in the Spring of 1968.
 
Colin P said:
And how long to provide us with the pointy sticks? Let’s say we sent our units to Africa in 6 months from now and one of the groups we are “peacekeeping” against starts dropping bombs from UAV’s and kills someone, how long before we have the ability to identify and shoot one down before they get into range? What if we suddenly found our guys facing a more sophisticated enemy with military grade UAVs and attack aircraft, much less trying to use AD against a Grad strike from system firing from behind a robust AD screen. With our current procurement system I doubt anyone has any confidence in getting anything quickly and while my firsthand knowledge is purely discussions with Blowpipe operators. Training people to be effective with Manpads takes time, even more if you want 3 or 4 detached detachments to plug into an IAD in areas with limited comms and perhaps against an enemy that will be able to reach back behind your lines and pulverize any radio transmission source. Given that the average range of a Manpad system and the need to protect the frontline, chances are your AD detachment is in range of counter battery fire. When was the last time we exercised AD detachment in a full spectrum war scenario, where radio discipline and counterbattery fire was considered, not to mention a robust enemy?
While I agree that keeping the corporate high level knowledge  alive is important, we have done it at the cost of losing the on the ground knowledge and the ability to actually do something. Where reality and the enemy will play havoc with best laid untried plans. We should have Manpad detachments out there now even with those field simulators so the day to day stuff of deploying, managing and protecting that resource can become part of the corporate knowledge.

We exercised this at the battery level until 2012, while the 4th still practices those skills using the MANPAD simulator. In reality, the threat you noted at the beginning of your post, being UAS in an African scenario, would be more in line with a gun system vice a MANPAD as the MANPAD would have extreme difficulty acquiring a target smaller than a TUAS. As the future system MAY be a MANPAD, C-RAM, or medium system or a combination of the 3, MANPAD training would provide "some" usefulness, but would be akin to training field gunners on a 105mm and then throwing them into 155mm detachments or a HIMARS det and being like, "meh, close enough, you get the principles".

Further, the "need to protect the front line" may not really be that whatsoever- AD priorities are based on types of air threat, systems in the IADS, and Criticality/Vulnerability/Recuperability of the target. GBAD is part of the IADS, which is a true "system of systems" so MANPAD very well may not be the appropriate system for engaging the anticipated threat. If the Air Defended assets are more in the rear (Fd Batteries, MLRS, BSA/DSA, etc) than the true planning factor becomes "line of weapon release" AKA, where the aircraft needs to be to use the projected weaponry it has (AT missiles, guns, etc). If the Stand off of a Hinds weapons is 10 KM and the AD system has a range of 8, than the AD system needs to be 2km in front of the asset to actually defend it.

MANPADs, in and of themselves, are no magic bullet and provide in most ways a very limited capability with some significant advantages (short range relative to the line of weapon release, generally poorer TA systems, more difficult to integrate into a positive IADS vice flexibility, economy (they're cheap), and mass). As the future threats are anticipated to be 1) UAS 2) Munitions 3) aviation than it doesn't make sense to buy just a MANPAD which isn't especially effective against threat 1 and 2, but good at 3.

As for plugging into the IADS, that is done via the ASCC, so I am not entirely sure what a MANPAD system would do to change anything whether we are in a high comms or low comms environment (Positive (high comms) vice procedural (low comms). I can guarantee that both are part of the current AD WO and AD Officer courses being taught at the RCAS.
 
BG45

Could you please give us your estimate of the threat from the family of UAVs from the minis manned by the field regiments right up to the long range systems that can carry some pretty nasty stuff? How do we deal with each member of the family and which do we ignore or accept as too difficult? What are the troop safety and air space control implications of allowing the forward troops to blaze away at a UAV when it appears near them? What are the chances of this "weapons free" (to misuse a term) policy actually achieving anything?
 
And, while you're at it:

Please explain, on the spectrum of air defence systems, where Trophy/Arena type Active Protection Systems lie.

screen%20shot%202016-09-08%20at%2051722%20pm.png


http://www.businessinsider.com/us-army-tanks-strykers-and-bradleys-getting-active-protection-systems-2017-6

See, to my superannuated, molitia, ground-pounder's skull that Active Protection System looks an awful lot like a local Counter Rocket Artillery and Missile system and I find myself wondering if they can mount those things on tanks and APVs why they couldn't mount them in a UTV trailer or on a Tripod to accompany the infantry.

And the next question would be:

If they can knock an incoming RPG round out of the sky while it is moving at 295 m/s how much more difficult (or easier) is it to knock out a RadioShack drone with an underslung 40mm grenade attached to a badminton shuttlecock acting as a stabilizing drogue?

Or will the artillery give the ground pounders local air superiority against MUAVs so that they can do their job?

I can agree that $38,000 Stinger MANPADs or $78,000 Javelin MANPADs may not be cost effective against a swarm of 119 40mm grenades on auto-pilot but please tell me you have a better answer than "get used to it".
 
I think your confusing coordination levels.  Just as an M203 grenade launcher doesn't fall under the FSCC, an active defence system does not fall under an IADS.
 
No Infanteer,  I am not confusing co-ordination levels.

On the other hand co-ordination is at the heart of this discussion.

The environment is target rich in ballistic missiles, guided missiles, autonomous missiles, Micro-Mini-Maxi UAVs, vertical take of and land and fixed wing, single use and recoverable - and I haven't mentioned traditional threats like Helos and Fast Movers.

BG45s GBAD battery is going to be deployed 8 km forward of the High Value Asset that he is defending.  I hope for his sake that there is an infantry battalion between him and the ATGM gunner targeting him.  And that they can do their job rather than having to hunker down under their SKOP kits waiting for the skies to clear.

I get that life is messy but the issue is one of managing to accomplish mission in spite of alligators rather than waiting for the swamp to drain.

I don't consider it an acceptable response to say that you lot in the front line should not have an effective means of protecting yourself against threats directed your way.  Space is zero.  Time available is comparable.  Waiting for someone to prioritize the immediate threat to your mission, your men, your machines and yourself does not, on its face, appear to me to be an effective course of action.    There aren't enough Infanteers as it is.  Let alone allowing the available numbers to be attrited by smart, cheap munitions.

The reaction time needs to be reduced - and apparently the technology exists to reduce the reaction time to 0.5 milliseconds.  Can you squeeze the PTT button in that length of time?  Let alone form a complete sentence, have it acknowledged, discussed, prioritized and a decision taken as to whether to spend the money to protect you, and allow you, your machines and your men to carry on with the mission, or hold on in case the Brigade CP is actually threatened by a Fast Mover - some day.

See, I actually think that a sky clear of fast movers is infinitely more likely than a sky clear of 40mm grenades on autopilot.

At the coal face those decisions, that process of getting inside the enemy's OODA loop, demand localized decision making ability and also demand localized response capabilities. 

 
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