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Great discussion here. I have been involved in both the Light Forces Working Group when it was a grassroots infantry initiative and after the Army took it over. I was involved in drafting the initial cut of the definition in the first post that has since gone through the mill several times by the staff in Kingston. A key part of this definition regarding platforms has been addressed by MCG and Dave. The intent is not to define light forces in terms of any one platform (i.e. LAV unit) or insertion method (para unit, etc), but to give them the inherent flexibility to use whatever vehicle or insertion method the task calls for. One task they could be in trucks, the next on helicopters, and then on foot. It is what they do on the ground that is vital.
The other key part of the definition is 'optimized for military operations in complex environments.' Complex environments entail not only complex terrain (mountains, jungles, etc) but also complex population and information aspects. High-density populations with a multitude of actors (joint, interagency, and multinational) all present challenges. Extrapolating here a bit, this definition points light forces (in my opinion) towards our greatest contemporary challenge â “ counter-insurgency â “ a task that has historically fallen to light forces.
As a bit of a SITREP, light forces development is being guided by the Army's Combat Development process, and is in fact, I think, one of the first initiatives to be put through the process. Those interested in tracking it can find the LFWG on the DLSC site on the DIN (I don't have the address now as I'm at home).
The biggest difference between light and medium forces in my mind is not equipment but training. Much like in a LAV battalion where the individual training is greatly focussed on LAV qualifications, I believe that every light soldier should be qualified Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Urban Ops (course forthcoming), and, depending what we do with the para capability, Basic Para qualified. As available and necessary, jungle ops should be included. As well, reflexive shooting, familiarity with airmobile ops, HUMINT gathering, and a mastery of patrolling are all a must.
The three critical shortfalls, as I see it, that we have in light forces now are firstly training (see above paragraph â “ we're not there yet and Dave touched on some of the problems), firepower, and transport. Quick hits for firepower involve some of the new inf weapons systems on the books, adopting the new light rifle coy structure with a weapons platoon, enhancing our sniper capability, and better integrating non-integral fires (close air, etc). We need to get light direct fire support back at the unit level as well. A quick hit for transport is a light patrol vehicle, perhaps based on the special ops variant of the G-Wagon (but this could be problematic in a high-density IED environment). We have to fix our helicopter situation, but this will not be a quick hit.
On the subject of donkeys, by coincidence currently elements of B Coy, 3 PPCLI, are undergoing mule training at the USMC Mountain Warfare Training Centre. Don't laugh, it might be useful some day.
The other key part of the definition is 'optimized for military operations in complex environments.' Complex environments entail not only complex terrain (mountains, jungles, etc) but also complex population and information aspects. High-density populations with a multitude of actors (joint, interagency, and multinational) all present challenges. Extrapolating here a bit, this definition points light forces (in my opinion) towards our greatest contemporary challenge â “ counter-insurgency â “ a task that has historically fallen to light forces.
As a bit of a SITREP, light forces development is being guided by the Army's Combat Development process, and is in fact, I think, one of the first initiatives to be put through the process. Those interested in tracking it can find the LFWG on the DLSC site on the DIN (I don't have the address now as I'm at home).
The biggest difference between light and medium forces in my mind is not equipment but training. Much like in a LAV battalion where the individual training is greatly focussed on LAV qualifications, I believe that every light soldier should be qualified Basic Mountain Ops, Basic Urban Ops (course forthcoming), and, depending what we do with the para capability, Basic Para qualified. As available and necessary, jungle ops should be included. As well, reflexive shooting, familiarity with airmobile ops, HUMINT gathering, and a mastery of patrolling are all a must.
The three critical shortfalls, as I see it, that we have in light forces now are firstly training (see above paragraph â “ we're not there yet and Dave touched on some of the problems), firepower, and transport. Quick hits for firepower involve some of the new inf weapons systems on the books, adopting the new light rifle coy structure with a weapons platoon, enhancing our sniper capability, and better integrating non-integral fires (close air, etc). We need to get light direct fire support back at the unit level as well. A quick hit for transport is a light patrol vehicle, perhaps based on the special ops variant of the G-Wagon (but this could be problematic in a high-density IED environment). We have to fix our helicopter situation, but this will not be a quick hit.
On the subject of donkeys, by coincidence currently elements of B Coy, 3 PPCLI, are undergoing mule training at the USMC Mountain Warfare Training Centre. Don't laugh, it might be useful some day.
