A huge + to ApolloVet; I think he's exactly right and echoes what I've been thinking for many months. Further, I had similar discussions with a variety of extremely qualified individuals, all of whom express a similar level of disquiet.
I am very concerned that we've adopted an overly conservative/aggressive (a contradiction in terms) approach to force protection and operations. A propensity to appear aggressive most - if not all - of the time and adoption of a "fortress" mentality both serve to alienate us from the locals. On the flip side, we tend to "go kinetic" and use firepower in an attempt to minimize our casualties - a chapter right out of the US playbook1. I believe that we are chasing our tails by engaging in rolling mechanized operations against occupied Taliban centres, winning the firefight, killing tons of enemy, then pulling out again. As a friend of mine - with extensive experience in theatre - said last week: it looks mighty "Soviet"...
From my POV, there are about six elements necessary for an effective COIN programme:
Actionable, reliable intelligence, gained in large part from:
- Effective rural policing
- Secure lines of communication
- A quick, decisive and effective killing force
- A widely communicated and understood acceptable political alternative
- A means of dealing with safe havens and sanctuaries
Moreover, the above needs to be integrated with an effective command and control system that encompasses a joint operations and intelligence capability. Right now, there isn't one in Afghanistan, where we have a huge variety of often competing interests: CFC-A, ISAF, the Afghan Government, the UN, civvy contractors (DynCorp stirring up shit and acting like idiots doesn't help) and the like, none of which are integrated. US "NOFORN" caveats severely limit access to actionable intelligence, as does the ineffectiveness of the Afghan National Police and our own apparent inability to properly connect with the population - partially for reasons I've noted above.
If it were me (and thank God it isn't), I would set as goals:
- Reducing the force protection posture as quickly as possible without incurring undue risk to personnel. We are in the Army, though, and the mission comes first.
- Establishment of joint national and regional operations and intelligence centres - to include all players: US/Coalition, ISAF, ANA, ANP, NDS, etc.. These centres would control all operations throughout the country, including US "independent" operations.
- Concentration of training efforts on the ANP/ANA with a view to increasing rural presence - to include provision of on-call Coalition QRF to Afghan units via embedded personnel.
- Improved rural presence for Coalition forces - beyond PRTs and patrols
- Concentration on communicating the current political programme in a more effective way
- Creation of regional Coalition QRFs - mostly, but not always, heliborne - on call to deliver "killing blows" against enemy forces identified by intelligence. Operations have to be intelligence-driven and controlled by the Joint Regional Operations Centres.
- An aggressive SF presence along the PK border, including inside PK if reqr.
- Cease and desist with "OGA" ops that aren't controlled by the National/Regional centres.
- An aggressive anti-corruption campaign within the Afghan government, combined with mentoring at the local level - to the point where our soldiers are living with the ANP/ANA in their installations.
- Resolution of pay and administrative issues surrounding ANA employment, along with an aggressive effort to make ANA service more attractive. This should/must include an embedded education programme aimed at illiteracy.
I'll attach a slide that illustrates my operations centre concept and the C2 architecture at the strategic and operational levels. Yes, I made this up. 8)
In my opinion, the key to success in Afghanistan is to ensure that the Afghan government is legitimate in the eyes of the population, is proceeding with a coherent political programme and that it is seen to be taking the lead in ensuring its own security. To accomplish the latter, a permanent, effective presence in rural areas is absolutely essential. Coalition "kinetic" operations should be the exception, rather than the rule. However, when we do undertake them, they must be ruthlessly decisive and be
seen to be in support of Afghan government objectives.
Of course, this is all quarterbacking from a comfy chair in Edmonton and it is hardly my intent to second-guess tactical decisions on the ground, which is why this post addresses mainly operational and strategic level decisions. I should note, too, that I am hardly advocating a touchy-feely "soft power" approach to operations - quite the contrary. However, I think that ApolloVet has raised some critical points, points that may have been lost recently.
Cheers,
Teddy
1
"The American way of war includes mass, power, and the use of sophisticated smart weapons." FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations, Oct 04, US Dept of the Army, page vi. (emphasis added)