Afghanistan - Latest Tours

[APOLLOVet]

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would be interested to hear what people think of the most recent tours in Kandahar (vets only please - I know that everyone has an opinion, but unless you were there in the past four years you are basically relying on the news media). I know what I think based on two tours in Kandahar. Basically, what I am interested in is if other people from recent vintage believe that we are approaching this from the right direction.

 

[Trinity]

Sure..

how about you fill out your profile so the happy people here know who you are and
who they're dealing with because we've get a lot of people who come for less
than good intentions.

This thread sounds like it would be a hot bed of activity and it's best that we
are all on the level and doing it for the right reasons before starting to go down this path.

And.. of course.. OPSEC people.

 

[APOLLOVet]

Sorry,

First time forum goon.

As far as it goes, I was on Op APOLLO and also the PRT. I have two tours in Afghanistan, both in Kandahar, both under commenad of U.S. Forces. I have been badged into the 101st Abn and the 173rd Abn, so I hope that this meets your needs.

I am interested, because I have very strong opinions on this, and I want to know if I am totally out to lunch.

 

[GAP]

With your past experience and what you are hearing now, what would you change?

 

[HItorMiss]

Apollovet

Welcome to the site were always glad to have new people.

As for your proflie what Trinity meant by filling out is that there is a tab on your screen which will read "Profile" from there you can fill your particulars out like what Unit your with and how many years you have been in.

If you need anything I'm sure the Mod's can help

Again welcome.

 

[APOLLOVet]

The way that I look at this, is that I think that we are going a little too far into the combat ops world. I think that we need to strike a balance between combat ops, and reconstruction ops. The two should be complementary, rather than in competition. If we lean too far towards combat ops, we will do a fine job of killing Taliban; the only problem is that there are too many potential recruits. What we need to do is find a way to target the mid-level leadership, and hit them while still maintaining good relationships with the locals who wish to help us.

I think that this can only be accomplished over the long term, and only if we are willing to support those who support us. I have seen interpreters who have been intimidated into quitting, local help who quit rather than risk their lives over the paycheque, and too many people who are willing to look at the body count as the sole measure of success. This is true of both U.S forces and Canadians as well.    

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Folks,
I believe APOLLOVet  is what/who he says he is.............

All,lets keep a handle on the OPSEC with this one, please.

 

[APOLLOVet]

WRT what I would change -

I believe that I would focus this effort a bit more. There is no way to avoid the casualties inherent to an insurgency - if you let them pick the time an place, they will always have at least some success.

I don't mean to denigrate the exceptional efforts of the First Bn - they are doing tremendous work. I am immensely proud of what they have accomplished.

What I think we need to do a bit more is integrate our effects - First, have int (in the form of either SR, or Recce Pl, SIGINT etc) really focus our efforts. Once we have accomplished that, launch an overwhelming attack against those who require it. Once that has been accomplished, launch an aid effort crediting the local governance (particularly in terms of the local shura/police chief) with an emphasis on the fact that this aid effort was made possible due to the destruction of the local Taliban. Finally, follow it up with an additional security presence to ensure that the school/well/clinic/etc is not destroyed. You will only have success if you can show a positive improvement of the locals lives; NOT a press release from Kabul. There were so many people in 2005/6 who wanted to vote for Karzai in the NAPCE because that was who they though they were supposed to vote for that it was comical. The people in Afghanistan only know the local; they do not know anything beyond their immediate clan boundaries.

 

[APOLLOVet]

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Gotta go. That whole family thing rears it's ugly head. Thanks for taking the time to look at this.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Don't worry, we are here 24/7....

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I'm in too close and personal to give an objective answer right now.  I was in Kabul before and that was certainly a different tour and a different AO.

The Taliban are entrenched in certain areas.  If we don't go after them in their havens they burn down schools and police stations and ambush everyJingle truck on Highway 1.  I agree with your steps and would suggest that that is indeed our strategy.  The devil is in the execution sometimes.

 

[APOLLOVet]

2Bravo,

Agreed. I think that what you have described is our strategy in the global view, and you are certainly right that the devil is in the details of execution.

Don't get me wrong - I think that what we did as part of OEF (and in Kabul for that matter) was the right way to go to set the conditions (both us and the US). What I think that we need to do now is begin phasing in the Afghan security forces to a greater extent. At present I do not believe that we can remove ourselves from the intelligence gathering phase, and I think that we need to remain in the direct action phase (to exactly what extent will be determined by the ability of the ANA). Where I think we need to perhaps adjust our focus is on the follow-up.

I believe that we need to provide some tangible reward to the locals in terms of development after a DA (particularly if they had helped in terms of info gathering, or simply tacit support to Coalition forces. They would not have had to do anything overt - merely not support the Taliban/AQ). This reward would have to be in terms of economic possibility or infrastructure development. It also would have to be seen to be coming from the local government (at least the local Shura and Provincial government), rather than from the Coalition or international aid agencies.

Once this "reward" was in place, however, it would have to be protected by local security forces rather than Coalition. I believe that this is necessary in order to gradually wean the Afghan populace from dependence on the Coalition. We don't want to be there forever.

In order to accomplish this, I think that we need to place a greater emphasis on two things (while still maintaining pressure on the Taliban/AQ). These two things are the development (or cultivation) of Afghan NGOs, or governmental bodies that could either do the post-DA development themselves completely (with funding coming from the Coalition sub rosa) or with minimal Coalition oversight. The other element is professionalizing the ANSF, and in the ANSF I include ALL Afghan security elements (Highway Police, Border Police, ANP, ANA, NDS etc). One of the huge problems that I have observed is that the Afghans seemed to view the Coalition as the "never-ending source of bounty". It seemed that they were never too concerned with protecting new infrastructure, as the prevailing attitude was that we would simply rebuild it later. Also, WRT to security element, we never seem to get beyond the most elementary levels of training. This is not because the ANSF were incapable; this was because we had such a fundamentally different approach to everything.

In any event, I don't pretend to have all the answers, and again, I certainly don't intend to downplay the accomplishments of 1 VP (and all those who worked up North). My main worry is that we get trapped in a "kill the Taliban and it will all work out" mindset. What we have begun in Afghanistan is a huge undertaking that we must succeed in. We cannot afford to let Afghanistan return to failed state status and expect to retain our credibility elsewhere in the world. This will take an incredibly long time, and will require a significant amount of inventiveness and will to stay the course.

 

[captjtq]

I think that there will be a shift in mentality as we go from OEF to the NATO-led ISAF -- while we cannot ignore the pointy-end rooting out of the Taliban, AQ (etc), there will undoubtedly be an increased focus on the 'hearts & minds' of every day Afghans ultimately allowing them to run their own country. Nothing against Americans (I married one), but my perception is that the focus of their efforts over there has been to find Osama, not on nation-building. I think (hope?) that NATO taking over will change this. My $0.02 - your mileage will certainly vary. I suppose I'll have more insight into this when I'm in the Sandbox shortly...

 

[from darkness lite]

I agree with APOLLOvet.  Although the TB has to be engaged with direct actions when required, the only true way to win this fight is through the "hearts and minds" approach. Having spent time with the PRT (R0) also, I have listened to locals and sat in on some Shuras.  Overall, the PRT learned that in the grand scheme of things the locals are tired of the Taliban and want a better life for themselves and their families.  Reconstruction ultimately is the way to go with this.  Firefights will win battles, improving the local's lives will defeat the Taliban.

FDL

 

[armybuck041]

What I think that we need to do now is begin phasing in the Afghan security forces to a greater extent. One of the huge problems that I have observed is that the Afghans seemed to view the Coalition as the "never-ending source of bounty". It seemed that they were never too concerned with protecting new infrastructure, as the prevailing attitude was that we would simply rebuild it later.

I tend to agree with this statement..... But I have some concerns about the kinetic end of things.

This is my first hand experience while I was attached to the "Finishing School" last year (Armymedic can chime in here as well). When the US started to send the funds it previously spent directly on the ANA to the Afghan Defence Ministry for dispersal, paycheques started to fall months behind and the Mess Hall fell drastically short of food amongst other things. I ended up having to wait 24hrs before moving to FOB BH because of a Barracks Inspection that resulted in some ANA soldiers murdering the ANA Duty Officer conducting the inspection, followed by one hell of a riot.... All because of a Teapot   I'm sure things have progressed since then but I still wonder what would happen if they were turned loose minus their ETT. 

FWIW, remarkably the DRA and its Armed Forces managed to hang on to power for a few years after the Soviets pulled out.... I hope we will be more successful.

 

[GAP]

IMO, underneath a lot of these comments is that there still is a tremendous amount of corruption within the Afghan power structure. It starts at the top and bleeds down to the lowly police officer and/or ANA member. Unless they receive their correct pay, consistently, they are no different than you. Cut your paycheque off for months at a time, suddenly you are not concerned with the mission, you are concerned with how to feed your family.

Watch the efficiency of the unit drop dramatically within a short period.  In my time the same thing applied, to the point that we couldn't trust the ARVN at all. Even the ammo we issued them, was given to their wives who brought it back to the US bases to collect the reward money so that it did not fall into the VC hands. It didn't matter that they had little ammo to fight with, they weren't about to fight for something that was screwing them in the first place.

The Taliban will be defeated by the people, WHEN the people feel safe with the police and army. They will never feel totally safe with the coalition, because they are short time tourists, well meaning tourists, but tourists just the same. They will leave, just like the others did.

 

[from darkness lite]

GAP:

You've hit one of the problems right on the head.  Part of the PRT's mission is to "reform" the security sector.  The RCMP are doing a great job training the ANP, but without regular pay and credibility....

One of the possible solutions of the credibility issue is to "for every success credit the Afghan security forces".  This not only builds credibility with the locals, it has the added bonus of buiding up security forces confidence and pride and eventually (hopefully) they start doing ops independant of us.

Just another form of "leading from behind"

FDL

 

[APOLLOVet]

Gentlemen,

Sorry about missing last night - AFK with family.

You are all exactly right from what I have seen. The RCMP are doing great things, but there are not enough of them yet. There is also a tremendous problem with ETT and RCAG as they do not have the ability to go far enough yet with their soldiers. All the ANP and ANA that I have spoken with are in the same boat - many of them (at the lower levels) want to do the job, but either lack equipment, training, leadership, etc to do the job independently, while some (not all) of the mid-level and higher are either being paid by the Taliban or the drug warlords.

Until we can implement that first successful ANP substation/ANA Bn that can act as an example (and once we find them we better make sure that they are completely equipped and well paid so that they can serve as an example to everyone else), we will continually be putting a band-aid on a sucking chest wound. Looks nice on the surface, but we seem to have a problem with the blood coming out the exit wound...

I remember an incident where a member of a PRT Security element (not ours) was thrown off the camp for some reason, and when they cleared his locker so that he could be fires they found evidence that the security member was actually Taliban. Not good, and part of the problem was that he was getting better money from the Taliban that his "real" employers.

I also remember our patrols visiting substations to find that the officers had no boots/coats/etc with winter coming on. They also did not have ammunition for their weapons This was in spite of the fact that they were theoretically being supplied by the Ministry of the Interior as well as the German Police Reform initiative. If we don't give them the tools/incentive to develop, they never will. (Our RCMP made arrangements to provide).

 

[Teddy Ruxpin]

A huge + to ApolloVet; I think he's exactly right and echoes what I've been thinking for many months.  Further, I had similar discussions with a variety of extremely qualified individuals, all of whom express a similar level of disquiet.

I am very concerned that we've adopted an overly conservative/aggressive (a contradiction in terms) approach to force protection and operations.  A propensity to appear aggressive most - if not all - of the time and adoption of a "fortress" mentality both serve to alienate us from the locals.  On the flip side, we tend to "go kinetic" and use firepower in an attempt to minimize our casualties - a chapter right out of the US playbook1.  I believe that we are chasing our tails by engaging in rolling mechanized operations against occupied Taliban centres, winning the firefight, killing tons of enemy, then pulling out again.  As a friend of mine - with extensive experience in theatre - said last week:  it looks mighty "Soviet"...

From my POV, there are about six elements necessary for an effective COIN programme:

Actionable, reliable intelligence, gained in large part from:

• Effective rural policing
• Secure lines of communication
• A quick, decisive and effective killing force
• A widely communicated and understood acceptable political alternative
• A means of dealing with safe havens and sanctuaries

Moreover, the above needs to be integrated with an effective command and control system that encompasses a joint operations and intelligence capability.  Right now, there isn't one in Afghanistan, where we have a huge variety of often competing interests:  CFC-A, ISAF, the Afghan Government, the UN, civvy contractors (DynCorp stirring up shit and acting like idiots doesn't help) and the like, none of which are integrated.  US "NOFORN" caveats severely limit access to actionable intelligence, as does the ineffectiveness of the Afghan National Police and our own apparent inability to properly connect with the population - partially for reasons I've noted above.

If it were me (and thank God it isn't), I would set as goals:

• Reducing the force protection posture as quickly as possible without incurring undue risk to personnel.  We are in the Army, though, and the mission comes first.
• Establishment of joint national and regional operations and intelligence centres - to include all players:  US/Coalition, ISAF, ANA, ANP, NDS, etc..  These centres would control all operations throughout the country, including US "independent" operations.
• Concentration of training efforts on the ANP/ANA with a view to increasing rural presence - to include provision of on-call Coalition QRF to Afghan units via embedded personnel.
• Improved rural presence for Coalition forces - beyond PRTs and patrols
• Concentration on communicating the current political programme in a more effective way
• Creation of regional Coalition QRFs - mostly, but not always, heliborne - on call to deliver "killing blows" against enemy forces identified by intelligence.  Operations have to be intelligence-driven and controlled by the Joint Regional Operations Centres.
• An aggressive SF presence along the PK border, including inside PK if reqr.
• Cease and desist with "OGA" ops that aren't controlled by the National/Regional centres.
• An aggressive anti-corruption campaign within the Afghan government, combined with mentoring at the local level - to the point where our soldiers are living with the ANP/ANA in their installations.
• Resolution of pay and administrative issues surrounding ANA employment, along with an aggressive effort to make ANA service more attractive.  This should/must include an embedded education programme aimed at illiteracy.

I'll attach a slide that illustrates my operations centre concept and the C2 architecture at the strategic and operational levels.  Yes, I made this up.  8)

In my opinion, the key to success in Afghanistan is to ensure that the Afghan government is legitimate in the eyes of the population, is proceeding with a coherent political programme and that it is seen to be taking the lead in ensuring its own security.  To accomplish the latter, a permanent, effective presence in rural areas is absolutely essential.  Coalition "kinetic" operations should be the exception, rather than the rule.  However, when we do undertake them, they must be ruthlessly decisive and be seen to be in support of Afghan government objectives.

Of course, this is all quarterbacking from a comfy chair in Edmonton and it is hardly my intent to second-guess tactical decisions on the ground, which is why this post addresses mainly operational and strategic level decisions.  I should note, too, that I am hardly advocating a touchy-feely "soft power" approach to operations - quite the contrary.  However, I think that ApolloVet has raised some critical points, points that may have been lost recently.

Cheers,

Teddy


1  "The American way of war includes mass, power, and the use of sophisticated smart weapons."  FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations, Oct 04, US Dept of the Army, page vi. (emphasis added)

 

[APOLLOVet]

Teddy Ruxpin,

Just finished typing a long post in response to yours, and when the spell check finished, the draft disappeared. I agree with what you have said, and what I expounded upon was the need for specific timelines (with actual defined quantifiable goals), specific measures of effectiveness, and a specific road map as to how those at the tactical level are to expected to implement operational, strategic, and national direction. If you simply tell to me to focus on security secotr reform in order to extend the reach and legitimacy of the duly constituted governement of the IRoA, you may not like how I go about it. If I choose to equip one substation in each district, train one judge in each district, and embed one ETT in an ANA Bn, I will have focused on SSR, but I don't think that I will really be working towards the higher intent....

Similarly, if I focus EVERY effort in Kandahar City, I will eventually have a really secure Kandahar City, but I think that the rest of the province might have something to say...

Better post this now before it disappears into the ether as well.