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The forthcoming Afghan elections will generate much hope, worry, fear and propaganda – and, yes, that is how I classify the Government of Canada’s information - but little else.
Elections, while rarely bad things, are not terribly important. In our system of electoral democracy, elections are the way we validate the process – they prove thatthe one definition of democracy (government with the free consent of the governed) is actually applicable.*
What elections do not do, in any way, is equate to democracy, itself.
Thomas Jefferson believed that America’s democratic experiment was something of a “hot-house flower” that needed constant “tending” and that would not export well – not even to native (aboriginal) Americans. He saw this because he was well aware that democracy – of any and all stripes – requires two things:
1. Strong social capital; and
2. Independent and trusted institutions.
Dambisa Moyo in her recentpolemic best seller Dead Aid gives an clear, concise and accurate definition of social capital:
So, at the “most elemental level” people in a democracy must trust one another and the institutions they create for themselves. I argue that this trust, this strong social capital, is an absolute precondition for democracy and that elections are quite meaningless in its absence.
Institutions are of two sorts:
1. Organizations – like law courts, parliaments, fire departments and securities commissions; and
2. Ideas – like ”respect” for the rule of law and for fundamental rights like life, liberty, property and privacy.
The “most elemental” level of “trust” has been building slowly but surely in human society, all of human society, for millennia. Its roots, most elementally, are found in the “watch” that watched the fire and protected the camp or village from wild animals or intruders. Many of us did this most elemental thing when we stood fire piquet or a standing patrol.
Some people, notable George W Bush,‡ believe that democracy is a gift from God. I reject this notion: even if there are gods, democracy and freedom are not the sorts of things they “give” to mankind. Democracy is a totally human construct that arises, now and again, when the conditions – the “hot-house” are suitable.
When we think of counter-insurgency we always do well to remind ourselves that we cannot, nor would we wish to, duplicate everything Field Marshal Templer accomplished in Malaya in the ‘50s, but we would do well to remember that he rebuilt and fortified “institutions” that still, more than a half century later, have value to Malaysians, and he created a climate in which “trust,” the essence of strong social capital, could develop. Democracy – not always a perfect democracy – followed.
It is on social capital and institutions that we should focus, in Afghanistan. We cannot impose democracy; we can support elections but they are not to be equated with democracy. Natan Sharansky, who has given some thought to the issue, said, in The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror that elections
So, elections in Afghanistan are welcome but they are of little significance. They are, in and of themselves, signs of nothing except the ability to conduct elections. Until Afghanistan has in place the strong social capital and the necessary institutions upon which democracy can grow it will remain just another weak, illiberal state with a poor facade of elections hiding a corrupt oligarchy. In that it will resemble 165 of the UN's 200± members that, like Afghanistan, lack the social capital and institutions that will allow democracy to arise and flourish.
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* This presupposes that there is some acceptable alternative to electoral democracy. I suggest there can be, just as a conservative democracy (e.g. Japan) is an acceptable alternative to a liberal democracy (e.g. Australia). It is difficult for us to imagine an alternative to an electoral democracy, in part, at least, because we are so accustomed to the idea of elections. But that – a failure to imagine – does not, cannot mean that no alternative is possible.
‡ See Kaplan, “Daydream Believers,” Hoboken, NJ, 2008, pps. 141 and 161-167
Elections, while rarely bad things, are not terribly important. In our system of electoral democracy, elections are the way we validate the process – they prove that
What elections do not do, in any way, is equate to democracy, itself.
Thomas Jefferson believed that America’s democratic experiment was something of a “hot-house flower” that needed constant “tending” and that would not export well – not even to native (aboriginal) Americans. He saw this because he was well aware that democracy – of any and all stripes – requires two things:
1. Strong social capital; and
2. Independent and trusted institutions.
Dambisa Moyo in her recent
(See also: http://www.infed.org/biblio/social_capital.htm and there is a quite clear Wikipedia article.) (Am I the only person who habitually misspells it as Wikipaedia? Is that just an ago thing?)
So, at the “most elemental level” people in a democracy must trust one another and the institutions they create for themselves. I argue that this trust, this strong social capital, is an absolute precondition for democracy and that elections are quite meaningless in its absence.
Institutions are of two sorts:
1. Organizations – like law courts, parliaments, fire departments and securities commissions; and
2. Ideas – like ”respect” for the rule of law and for fundamental rights like life, liberty, property and privacy.
The “most elemental” level of “trust” has been building slowly but surely in human society, all of human society, for millennia. Its roots, most elementally, are found in the “watch” that watched the fire and protected the camp or village from wild animals or intruders. Many of us did this most elemental thing when we stood fire piquet or a standing patrol.
Some people, notable George W Bush,‡ believe that democracy is a gift from God. I reject this notion: even if there are gods, democracy and freedom are not the sorts of things they “give” to mankind. Democracy is a totally human construct that arises, now and again, when the conditions – the “hot-house” are suitable.
When we think of counter-insurgency we always do well to remind ourselves that we cannot, nor would we wish to, duplicate everything Field Marshal Templer accomplished in Malaya in the ‘50s, but we would do well to remember that he rebuilt and fortified “institutions” that still, more than a half century later, have value to Malaysians, and he created a climate in which “trust,” the essence of strong social capital, could develop. Democracy – not always a perfect democracy – followed.
It is on social capital and institutions that we should focus, in Afghanistan. We cannot impose democracy; we can support elections but they are not to be equated with democracy. Natan Sharansky, who has given some thought to the issue, said, in The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror that elections
So, elections in Afghanistan are welcome but they are of little significance. They are, in and of themselves, signs of nothing except the ability to conduct elections. Until Afghanistan has in place the strong social capital and the necessary institutions upon which democracy can grow it will remain just another weak, illiberal state with a poor facade of elections hiding a corrupt oligarchy. In that it will resemble 165 of the UN's 200± members that, like Afghanistan, lack the social capital and institutions that will allow democracy to arise and flourish.
--------------------
* This presupposes that there is some acceptable alternative to electoral democracy. I suggest there can be, just as a conservative democracy (e.g. Japan) is an acceptable alternative to a liberal democracy (e.g. Australia). It is difficult for us to imagine an alternative to an electoral democracy, in part, at least, because we are so accustomed to the idea of elections. But that – a failure to imagine – does not, cannot mean that no alternative is possible.
‡ See Kaplan, “Daydream Believers,” Hoboken, NJ, 2008, pps. 141 and 161-167
