Forming task-tailored FSGs for the provision of integrated Integral, Close and General (eg. 1st, 2nd and 3rd-Line) CSS support to high-readiness TFs is an ill-advised "flavour of the day" solution to the problem of sustainability within the highly stressed CSS trades. It is intimately tied to the "plug and play" Army Managed Readiness Plan, which we all know was proven to be untenable before the ink was even dry on those fancy posters. The inherent shortcomings associated with abandonning historically and operationally-validated CSS structures in favour of forming "all singing, all dancing" FSGs for operational deployments is a related, but separate subject best discussed in a split thread. The point to hoist aboard in considering whether or not combat arms unit's still require integral Adm/HQ/Svc companies is that the task-tailored FSGs currently in vogue are designed
soley to support their affiliated high-readiness TF. Which begs the question of who supports the the reconstition and continuation training of the majority of units/sub-units not assigned to a particular high-readiness TF at any given time? Remember that there are currently only three TFs formed per year, including the strategic reserve "Surge TF" (formerly the 2nd line of operations). The remaining majority of the field force is either in reconstitution or continuation training mode, all of which requires CSS to make happen.
Further to the above, under the MRP selected combat arms units are typically tasked to force-generate a single sub-unit for high-readiness TF employment under a different unit HQ. That leaves the typical force generating unit with two of its three "line" companies/batteries/squadrons. Those sub-units must conduct reconstitution and continuation training, and must therefore be adequately supported. The sub-unit earmarked for TF employment will
eventually be supported by the TF FSG,
but not until the organization comes together for final validation training (eg.at CMTC). Let's not forget that the FSG must conduct its own work-up training, a critical and labour-intensive necessity given that the FSGs are themselves task-tailored sub-units cobbled together from resources drawn across the Brigade. This leaves combat arms units responsible for coordinating and supporting the initial pre-deployment training of their tasked high-readiness sub-unit - usually for a period of between 4 and 6 months before they are placed OPCOM to the TF HQ. Concurrent with the responsibility to train their designated high-readiness sub-unit, combat arms units must conduct (and therefore support) the aforementioned reconstitution and continuation training of the remaining 2/3 of their personnel.
Now let's consider what happens to a brigade's Service Battalion when that formation is tasked to force-generate the FSG for a high-readiness TF. In effect, it is gutted of the majority of its operationally fit personnel. To the extent that the Service Battalion must invariably seek CSS augmentation from the Adm/HQ/Svc companies of the brigade units in order to fill the FSG TO&E. This seriously degrades the ability of the Brigade Service Battalion to provide adequate Close (2nd line) CSS to the bulk of the formation that is not tasked to the high-readiness TF. Forming one or more FSGs (or "Close Support Companies") with the "left-overs" to provide combined Integral and Close CSS for the balance of the formation is a total non-starter. Already stressed, the Service Battalions are simply in no position to assume Integral (1st line) support responsibility for the formation's units, even if the unit Adm/HQ/Svc companies were all rolled into the Service Battalion.
So why can't the unit Adm/HQ companies provide enough combined CSS manpower with the remnants of the Service Battalion to form Canada-based FSGs with integrated Integral and Close support capability? After all, it would only make sense to have our Canada-based CSS structures mimic those of our operational deployements, right? Well, that's the next problem. The sad truth of the matter is that succesive Army Support Reviews have severely gutted unit Adm/HQ/Svc company structures and resources over the past several years. As a result, unit Adm/HQ/Svc companies are now capable of providing only garrison-based, day-to-day Integral CSS. They are no longer able to support their units in the field without substantial augmentation from the brigade's Service Battalion to flesh out missing Integral support capabilities. As a result, every time a unit now deploys to the field, the Adm/HQ/Svc company must be task-tailored to provide the minimum CSS resources required to support whatever training is planned. As OC Adm Coy 3 PPCLI, I am currently "living this dream", cobbling together a different ORBAT for every field deployment based on the minimal "garrison-focused" integral resources that I have available, plus required augmentation from 1 Svc Bn. In effect, the onus for orchestrating both Integral and Close support for unit training activities now falls to the unit OC Adm/HQ/Svcs Company, not the brigade Service Battalion. I'm sure you can appreciate the additional work involved in developing a unique task-tailored CSS TO&E for each and every unit training activity, begging/borrowing the external augmentation required to flesh it out, and then trying to square away a sub-unit cobbled together at the last-minute, in the field, while simultaneously trying to support training......
If the above all sounds ass-backwards and jury-rigged, that's because it is. Our Army CSS structures and systems (both operational and Canada-based) are seriously dysfunctional and highly stressed.
The bottom line is that units require integral Adm/HQ/Svc companies because those sub-units are essential to sustaining the unit both in garrison and the field. Canada-based FSGs with integrated Integral and Close support capabilities
may be a desireable notion if we determine that our current CSS construct for operational deployments is indeed the way to go (rather than a stop-gap solution). Unfortunately, the creation of permanent Canada-based FSGs is a pipe dream given the limited CSS resources currently available. There simply aren't enough Integral and Close CSS assets available to form domestic FSGs. And the problem of limited CSS resources within our brigades becomes critical whenever they are tasked to force-generate a high-readiness FSG for overseas deployment.
There are numerous other challenges and considerations associated with Army CSS. It is a convoluted subject that has been the focus of much consternation and hand-wringing within the CSS community for years. Believe it or not, I've only just touched upon the tip of the iceberg with this post, and my observations are unit-centric in nature. I am sure that someone working at the Service Battalion or Brigade HQ level could provide you with a whole other set of problems and challenges to consider.
At the end of the day? Units require their Adm/HQ/Svc companies, even in their current minimal form, to sustain essential day-to-day operations and training. For the various reasons stated above, there are simply no viable alternatives at the present time. And even if there were (in terms of available CSS resources), I remain far from convinced that there is any reason to change our historically and operationally validated CSS doctrine of fielding integral unit 1st Line CSS sub-units supported by 2nd Line Brigade Service Battalions. The current "all singing, all dancing" FSG construct is nothing more than a stop-gap measure for providing the minimal level of essential CSS support to deployed operations. It is not even close to optimal in terms of resources and capability. Of course, that is just my limited perspective from the "coal-face", and I would sincerely welcome any substantiated views to the contrary.
As a final aside, the infantry Administration Company is correctly abbreviated as "Adm Coy". "Admin" is the short form for "Administrative". A common mistake - it just happens to be one of those petty things that annoys me to no end given my current appointment....