CBC: "An 'embarrassing' gear shortage has Canadian troops in Latvia buying their own helmets"

[KevinB]

I think there is a misconception regarding "Marius's Mules", they carried about 75lbs while on the march, not while in battle order crushing barbarians.

We expect people these days to carry more weight, and then keep the weight on while fighting.

In the 2004 era the average weight for a CA Infantryman was IVO 90lbs for fighting order.
The C9 gunners where ~120

That’s without any sort of day/assault pack, and no ruck.

Based on studies during GWOT, the heaviest load that the average Infantry soldier can handle for a continuous load and remain effective is 45lbs.

So something needs to give.

This of why my friend CSM Chuck Pressburg (USA Ret) has called the Light Infantry dead in America. Commanders are often too risk adverse to shed protection for mobility, not realizing that in some situations that the mobility of Light forces is their only true protection.

 

[Fabius]

This of why my friend CSM Chuck Pressburg (USA Ret) has called the Light Infantry dead in America. Commanders are often too risk adverse to shed protection for mobility, not realizing that in some situations that the mobility of Light forces is their only true protection.

Same is likely true in Canada if we are honest with ourselves.

 

[medicineman]

A bit late getting back into this...anecdotal, but happened nonetheless. Doing pre-deployment training with 1VP in the US, dude caused a misadventure with a grenade doing house clearing live fire in a tire house. 4 casualties - we were wearing old school steel helmets and the then "new" Israeli body armour, hard and stiff. With the exception of the RSO, whose helmet SLOWED one and stopped another casing fragment, the other three had extremity injuries - mainly the legs. Frag vests were XRayed and had a decent amount of metal in them. A few months later, we had a mine strike with a PROM-1, of the two folks that survived, one took a ball bearing through the frag vest near the shoulder flap, facial and foot wounds, the other had a casing fragment in the arm, with a number of other frags in the vest. We had nobody shot on that tour, though a Strathcona WO was shot in Bosnia during that time - lateral chest shot.

In the 2004 era the average weight for a CA Infantryman was IVO 90lbs for fighting order.
The C9 gunners where ~120

I shudder to think what the signallers and medics were at...I was (+) 75-80 lbs IIRC just in fighting order with armour/ammo/water/med kit, and that was the old school jump bag - the Blackhawk monstrosity that they started issuing that put some 3rd World ER's to shame would likely up the ante somewhat depending on how you chose to load it up. Hiking up the "Queen's Palace" hill behind Julien was interesting our first week there - me and the C-6 gunner in the platoon were a bit behind everyone, him with extra barrel and I'm not sure how much link he had.

 

[dimsum]

because generally 99.999% of manufacturers will highlight the pro’s and minimize the cons.

 

[QV]

Are we at the point that RSMs and Sgt-Maj's will actually let troops wear non-issued helmets? I remember the big gong show it was when someone tried to replace the harness in the helmet and was told that if they got injured using non-issued gear they wouldn't be covered by VAC.

So is the American jacket liner still a hard no then?

 

[Kirkhill]

I find we have ignored the Mobility, Speed, and Flexibility aspects of CoAs in favour of solely Security and Survivability when it comes to kitting folks out. Hard to maintain proper SA if you're momentarily deaf, and even harder to react to effective fire if you cannot access shit on your battle rattle.

Does that apply to vehicles as well?

 

[OldSolduer]

Risk aversion parading as prioritizing "safety".

I remember having similar conversations and the general concensus among peers was that the 15% (random statistic) chance that it saved your life due to Frag, Concussion, or SAF were great....but it shouldn't hamper your ability to move around the battle space, adopt proper firing positions, and keep the other guy's head down. Bullets being the best medicine in a TCCC scenario and all that.

It was even better hearing the Armoured folks point out that wearing the amount of PPE in the TFSO had potential to make exfil out of the vehicle extremely difficult if they needed to bail out.

Common sense doesn't factor in when you base everything on the Globe and Mail test.

An infanteer - a rifleman in a rifle section has seven battle drills - eight depending on what doctrine the Army wanted at the time.

One of them is reaction to Effective Enemy Fire - dash, down, crawl, observe, sights and fire. Once you're organized and have a plan you need to attack .

Tactical bounds - which are very short - are exhausting even to fit soldiers and will be made more exhausting when you carry excess kit.

Just a thought or two from an old guy.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

I would say yes. The Protection, Mobility, Armament triad comes to mind; you can only have 2 out of three.

Does that mean that EVERY vehicle we employ has to have the same role and function? Hell no. I have to wonder how many IED strikes could have been mitigated by a faster moving scout vehicle disrupting the implacement team before that lumbering column of vehicles came through. In that case, protection was from mobility, not uparmouring the shit out of everything. No matter how much Armour you throw on something, the enemy will just make a bigger kaboom.

Sometimes you need to have to ability to out maneuvre instead of strictly out gun or protect your own forces.

Muhamed Ali's "floating like a butterfly, and sting like a bee" often comes to mind: you can't land hits if you can't catch them, and conversely, hitting faster is better in some cases.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Not a short or simple war........

There, FTFY

 

[OldSolduer]

Muhamed Ali's "floating like a butterfly, and sting like a bee" often comes to mind: you can't land hits if you can't catch them, and conversely, hitting faster is better in some cases.

A good discussion - can we have a pilot weigh in? Is speed in a fighter life?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

In the 2004 era the average weight for a CA Infantryman was IVO 90lbs for fighting order.
The C9 gunners where ~120

That’s without any sort of day/assault pack, and no ruck.

Based on studies during GWOT, the heaviest load that the average Infantry soldier can handle for a continuous load and remain effective is 45lbs.

So something needs to give.

This of why my friend CSM Chuck Pressburg (USA Ret) has called the Light Infantry dead in America. Commanders are often too risk adverse to shed protection for mobility, not realizing that in some situations that the mobility of Light forces is their only true protection.

Even Hollywood understands the need to shed gear when going on the Assault:

Leave the heavy crap at the ORV and only bring what you need..... preferably as much HE and Ammo as possible.

 

[IRepoCans]

An infanteer - a rifleman in a rifle section has seven battle drills - eight depending on what doctrine the Army wanted at the time.

One of them is reaction to Effective Enemy Fire - dash, down, crawl, observe, sights and fire. Once you're organized and have a plan you need to attack .

Tactical bounds - which are very short - are exhausting even to fit soldiers and will be made more exhausting when you carry excess kit.

Just a thought or two from an old guy.

All of that before you toss in terrain, weather/climate, sleep/diet and how far they moved to come under contact.

It's a fun life.

I would say yes. The Protection, Mobility, Armament triad comes to mind; you can only have 2 out of three.

Does that mean that EVERY vehicle we employ has to have the same role and function? Hell no. I have to wonder how many IED strikes could have been mitigated by a faster moving scout vehicle disrupting the implacement team before that lumbering column of vehicles came through. In that case, protection was from mobility, not uparmouring the shit out of everything. No matter how much Armour you throw on something, the enemy will just make a bigger kaboom.

Sometimes you need to have to ability to out maneuvre instead of strictly out gun or protect your own forces.

Muhamed Ali's "floating like a butterfly, and sting like a bee" often comes to mind: you can't land hits if you can't catch them, and conversely, hitting faster is better in some cases.

I forget the unit that the AAR belonged to, but there was a US Army Light Infantry battalion attached to a SOTF made up of a SEAL platoon, a handful of ODAs and their enablers. They mitigated A LOT of the IED threat in their AO by making use of lightweight all terrain vehicles that could move along the foot paths or simply through the fields, granted I think CH-47s also played a key role in that mobility as they could be airlifted to different NAIs as required.

But it goes to a point I've seen a lot of, we commonly teach that speed and security are largely exclusive because of how we largely define speed. Whereas, sometimes speed could be simply optimizing the routes / means of insertion/extraction available with no subtraction from security what so ever.

But to get to the meat of what I think we're all driving towards (I hope): is that ultimately the individual infanteer is a weapon system operator that needs to be able to manouevre as unhindered by their own equipment as possible in order to achieve the desired effect with their weapon system. The problem I see we have is in quantifying that requirement, getting the equipment to support that requirement in a timely manner and then following up within a reasonable time frame to replace and/or adjust the equipment to continue to support that requirement.

I remember reading the draft comments on the SOR for the DICE chest rig/plate carrier about the amount of ammunition an individual needs to carry: some old WO going on about front line being 5 mags because that's what the tac vest carries, whereas the BGL and guys on tour state a combat load/front line is 10 mags.

 

[KevinB]

TBH a ‘basic load’ should be theatre and threat dependent.
I’ve carried 22 mags in theatre, and carried 4+1 (or 3+1 for the Mk11/SR25).

Shoot less, aim more, was something I learned eventually, and I credit Chuck Pressburg with telling me that years befor I finally took it on board.

While I think gear should be able to carry at least 10 mags, I’d argue than only 3-4 need to be in quickly accessible pouches. Very few engagements actually require more than a mag or two in rapid succession. A lot of ammo is wasted by soldiers to make them feel better - and has no negative impact on the enemy, as a knowledgeable/blooded enemy knows what is effective fire and what isn’t - and will maneuver against you if your fire isn’t effective (meaning within 6” of their vicinity).

A good 1-6x optic that allows for both good close range ability and engagement at distance and PID to me is worth much more than more mags.
I was an early (for Canada) 1-4x S&B Short Dot convert. That was a lesson learned that the CAG took onboard from TF Rangers’ Gothic Serpent in Somalia.
I was about 10 years late to the party (but apparently at least 20 years ahead for the conventional CAF). Also in a ‘high mount’ to allow better use with NOD’s for passive night operations when using a MFAL could alert the enemy.

The problem with 1x CCO’s like the EOTECH or Aimpoint, is that they are great for the close fight - but the utility dies off at ranges past 200m. While fixed optics like the ACOG or C79 Elcan limit PID or longer range engagements due to the limited power.

 

[IRepoCans]

TBH a ‘basic load’ should be theatre and threat dependent. I’ve carried 22 mags in theatre, and carried 4+1 (or 3+1 for the Mk11/SR25).

Shoot less, aim more, was something I learned eventually, and I credit Chuck Pressburg with telling me that years befor I finally took it on board.

While I think gear should be able to carry at least 10 mags, I’d argue than only 3-4 need to be in quickly accessible pouches. Very few engagements actually require more than a mag or two in rapid succession. A lot of ammo is wasted by soldiers to make them feel better - and has no negative impact on the enemy, as a knowledgeable/blooded enemy knows what is effective fire and what isn’t - and will maneuver against you if your fire isn’t effective (meaning within 6” of their vicinity).

I agree with you, you have your immediate/emergency loads ready to go and then your administrative load for bombing up your expended immediate mag pouches and stowing partials/empties during the lulls in the engagement or at the consolidation; but we need to be able to quantify a doctrinal standard to base our acquisition of a load carriage system.

While I haven't had any dealings with those like Chuck, I've been fortunate in one of my mentors before getting in was a 1/75 cat during the handful of surges to Iraq and then got some Team Merrill rotations later on in Afghanistan and he had a lot to say on what to do and look for with training, kit, and fitness.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

All of that before you toss in terrain, weather/climate, sleep/diet and how far they moved to come under contact.

It's a fun life.


I forget the unit that the AAR belonged to, but there was a US Army Light Infantry battalion attached to a SOTF made up of a SEAL platoon, a handful of ODAs and their enablers. They mitigated A LOT of the IED threat in their AO by making use of lightweight all terrain vehicles that could move along the foot paths or simply through the fields, granted I think CH-47s also played a key role in that mobility as they could be airlifted to different NAIs as required.

But it goes to a point I've seen a lot of, we commonly teach that speed and security are largely exclusive because of how we largely define speed. Whereas, sometimes speed could be simply optimizing the routes / means of insertion/extraction available with no subtraction from security what so ever.

But to get to the meat of what I think we're all driving towards (I hope): is that ultimately the individual infanteer is a weapon system operator that needs to be able to manouevre as unhindered by their own equipment as possible in order to achieve the desired effect with their weapon system. The problem I see we have is in quantifying that requirement, getting the equipment to support that requirement in a timely manner and then following up within a reasonable time frame to replace and/or adjust the equipment to continue to support that requirement.

The problem is that the Army wants everything to be a swiss army knife. Capable of being everything and anything, sometimes all at once.

That's why they have so much trouble procuring half decent gear.

I remember reading the draft comments on the SOR for the DICE chest rig/plate carrier about the amount of ammunition an individual needs to carry: some old WO going on about front line being 5 mags because that's what the tac vest carries, whereas the BGL and guys on tour state a combat load/front line is 10 mags.

Here is what I think is an embarrassing indictment for the Army:

This is a picture of me around 13 years ago, kitted out in what was our top shelf battle rattle at the time:



The thing is, I would probably be wearing almost all of the same stuff today, maybe even less if shortages of certain things like Harris Radios, PEQs and NVGs are to be believed.


This was me, just before I retired exactly two years ago on operations with the Navy:






Team Wendy Helmets, London Bridge Plate Carriers, proper harnesses, climbing gear & holsters, proper radios and best of all...... sidearms that actually work......



Now granted the #s we are dealing with are small but every Ship has been issued this equipment.

This isn't even revolutionary stuff, this kit has been available for a number of years now. How is it the Navy (who I will be the first to toss flak at for many things) can get bare minimum basic soldier gear right, with very little ease, while the Army is basically negligent at this point?!

 

[Eaglelord17]

Now granted the #s we are dealing with are small but every Ship has been issued this equipment.

This isn't even revolutionary stuff, this kit has been available for a number of years now. How is it the Navy (who I will be the first to toss flak at for many things) can get bare minimum basic soldier gear right, with very little ease, while the Army is basically negligent at this point?!

The Navy isn't the perfect example to bring up. I remember being ordered as force protection on the ship to wear those stupid vietnam era green flak vests over the water survival jacket. Literally had next to no movement, couldn't even bring my arms down to the side, and when they were telling us to try and hide behind things for cover, I couldn't even manage to effectively crouch down.

When I brought up the point I would rather not have the stupid flak vest due to the vastly limited mobility, basically being incapable of both using the rifle effectively and seeking any sort of cover, I was told I didn't know what I was talking about and just to go with it.

Mind you this was just before they stood up the full time protection units.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

The Navy isn't the perfect example to bring up. I remember being ordered as force protection on the ship to wear those stupid vietnam era green flak vests over the water survival jacket. Literally had next to no movement, couldn't even bring my arms down to the side, and when they were telling us to try and hide behind things for cover, I couldn't even manage to effectively crouch down.

When I brought up the point I would rather not have the stupid flak vest due to the vastly limited mobility, basically being incapable of both using the rifle effectively and seeking any sort of cover, I was told I didn't know what I was talking about and just to go with it.

Mind you this was just before they stood up the full time protection units.

I think you missed the point I was making.

Also, that sounds like it was ages ago. Underway Force Protection on HMC Ships is basically exclusively carried out by NTOG if embarked or the Ship's NBP nowadays.

NTOG itself is even developing a Designated Marksman capability:

I've run a number of Force Protection exercises, done a number of actual high risk transits and acted as the QRT IC on many occasions. I can assure you, as a former Infanteer, force protection was taken very seriously by me and others.

 

[Furniture]

I think you missed the point I was making.

Also, that sounds like it was ages ago. Underway Force Protection on HMC Ships is basically exclusively carried out by NTOG if embarked or the Ship's NBP nowadays.

NTOG itself is even developing a Designated Marksman capability:

I've run a number of Force Protection exercises, done a number of actual high risk transits and acted as the QRT IC on many occasions. I can assure you, as a former Infanteer, force protection was taken very seriously by me and others.

When I was sailing('12-'17) FP was a bit of a joke, but there was a push to make it more realistic and less of a check in the box. I'm glad that things have improved since I left the coast.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

When I was sailing('12-'17) FP was a bit of a joke, but there was a push to make it more realistic and less of a check in the box. I'm glad that things have improved since I left the coast.

It's all a big joke until these fellows show up a baseball throw from your port bridge wing.

 

[dapaterson]

In part, small numbers are the Navy's friend. Larger purchases for the Army are more expensive, requiring higher level approvals, and attracting more "Buy from us, we will deliver late and suboptimal, but the billing address will be in an opportune location" attention.