Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[Brad Sallows]

Can't quite square all the criticism of senior Res F leadership with the idea that they become sage advisors after retirement.

 

[quadrapiper]

Wondering how spineless a Res F CO has to be to take direction from outside the CoC. Even well before that time I understood that the only response to any kind of direction from an "Old Boy" was "thank you for your advice".

To throw an additional note in, it's not too many generations of long-service Class A-type reservists from armouries and units bankrolled by local magnates to now, with years of community and regimental family (or Family) engagement working its way into the DNA, including instances where former members might have been able to exercise significant influence on behalf of the unit.

Likely the only thing that would shift that in a wholesale manner is something akin to FJAG's concept.

 

[GR66]

That's a tad heavy assessment. It's hardly ever direction as much as it is sage advice. Most honouraries are either former COs who've "been there and done that" or other community leaders who have the best interests of the unit and community at heart.

When we talk about the difference in ways between the ResF leaders and RegF leaders its principally because of the sum of the military experiences of each of them brings to the table. A decision or dicta set down from above may be seen as a 'No-brainer" to a RegF officer who is conditioned (mostly) to accept it but can easily be seen as more equivocal or problematic by a reservist whose natural inclination will be to consult with others who he considers his peers. For many RegF officers their relationships with others is fleeting at best while sharing postings and then moving on and possibly reconnecting down the line. For most ResF officers the relationships can be life-long often having lived in the same community and unit for decades.

When the CoC is only one that exists short-term and part-time one has to expect that it will not be stronger than life-time connections.

This is an interesting comment and raises some questions. Reservists are essentially CA members that are permanently posted to a single unit. With that long term attachment it's really only human nature that loyalty to the unit would tend to conflict with Reg Force leaders that are only temporarily posted in to the organization. The long-term Reservists would naturally develop a greater sense of "ownership" than someone just rotating through (for better or for worse).

That might not bode well for a proposed "Total Force" 30/70 or 10/90 type of structure. Are you potentially setting the system up for cohesion issues?

It's interesting that in the US the National Guard has a more "separate but equal" type of relationship with the Active Service Army. Army and National Guard units mirror each other in structure, training and equipment, but have their own separate chains of command within individual units rather than having one organization provide leadership for the other's personnel. I believe it's the same with the US Army Reserve (Reserve officers rather than Active Duty officers leading Reserve units), although I may be mistaken.

The US of course has the benefit of a greater pool of former full-time officers and NCMs leaving the Active Duty force to draw on as a source of experience for the NG/Reserve units than we have in Canada.

How does all of this potentially factor in to how we think about reforming the Reserves?

 

[FJAG]

Key point being the ‘unit and community’, not necessarily the CAF or PRes as a whole.

IMHO most Militia units act like a Fiefdom, that only pays lip service to those above.

All I can say is that experiences vary. I've been fortunate in dealing with mostly good folks. A few clunkers sure but, in general, folks who were trying their best but who weren't handed much to work with in the way of training or resources.

Can't quite square all the criticism of senior Res F leadership with the idea that they become sage advisors after retirement.

I think most do well up to captain, okay at major, and some start to lose focus at lieutenant-colonel. I think much of the problem at LCol and above is the fact that there is too much to do and keep on top of on a purely part-time basis with a mostly part-time staff. It gets worse the higher that you go. Once you get out from under all that noise you do get time to reflect and become a "sage". Whether anyone listens to you is a whole different question.

... The long-term Reservists would naturally develop a greater sense of "ownership" than someone just rotating through (for better or for worse).

That might not bode well for a proposed "Total Force" 30/70 or 10/90 type of structure. Are you potentially setting the system up for cohesion issues?

It's interesting that in the US the National Guard has a more "separate but equal" type of relationship with the Active Service Army. Army and National Guard units mirror each other in structure, training and equipment, but have their own separate chains of command within individual units rather than having one organization provide leadership for the other's personnel. I believe it's the same with the US Army Reserve (Reserve officers rather than Active Duty officers leading Reserve units), although I may be mistaken.

The US of course has the benefit of a greater pool of former full-time officers and NCMs leaving the Active Duty force to draw on as a source of experience for the NG/Reserve units than we have in Canada.

How does all of this potentially factor in to how we think about reforming the Reserves?

You're absolutely right and it does concern me as well. The RegF and the ResF has a long history of separateness based in inequality and bordering on animosity.

I'm very pessimistic that there could ever be a "separate and equal" force in Canada even if you could up the education requirements for ResF officers and provide them with the requisite training experience and equipment to their units.

I feel quite confident that if we can up ResF manning into full battalions, whether by 30/70 or amalgamated tactical groups, then they need a full-time CO to properly direct and oversee training and administration.

I'm more ambivalent about whether ResF officers can be company commanders on a part-time basis based on truncated courses and limited experience. I could see it happen with a full-time Coy 2i/c and staff.

I've actually lost touch with what the comparative education requirements for CA ResF officers and US ARNG and USAR officers are. I've been unsuccessfully looking for a comprehensive guides as to the prerequisites for both company and battalion command vis a vis the US and CA armies. (which is complicated by the fact that in the US a company is a captain's command.) Many of the US ARNG courses used to be (and might still be) shortened models of the Active Army ones the way our MITCP ones were.

Equipment will probably also be a continuing challenge requiring a high degree of integration so that critical equipment and personnel capable of managing it and teaching others in its use become more widely available to the ResF.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I was MGen Vernon's ADC during that period. On no less than three occasions, I witnessed Reserve CO's stating that Hon Col's forbid Reserve units from following LFCA direction. It wasn't MGen Vernon's arrogance, it was a complete frustration from how much influence that former members, no longer serving, but affiliated with those units, had ( and in my opinion, still have)

And BTW, MGen Herb Pitts was extensively consulted, as were other Honorary Colonels and LCol's. The other side had more influence, and won the day.

So if a currently serving CO, who was an amazing bully amongst other deep character flaws, was employed in civvy street by a previous (and now retired CO), and ran a few exercises in a way that the 'retired bubbas network' magically became part of those exercises, and the Brigade Commander knew about it and ignored it, then how would you suggest an issue like that should be addressed?

 

[GR66]

Which goes to what I wrote in an earlier post:

• the reserves need to be given a mandate to force generate X (I suggested platoons) to a deployable standard
• the structure of the reserves needs to be built around that. Ie what can assess that level of training and group that in catchment areas that can support it.
• training needs to be designed in a way that allows those units to mass for effective training. I don’t see much value in a three hour parade night and it’s less cost effective to do for of those than 2 days on a weekend anyways.

Barring some magical kumbaya moment that sees the Army actually making the commitment to completely re-organize itself into an integrated "Total Force" and the Government totally abandoning decades of neglectful funding of the military I think that this (above) is a reasonable and realistic goal for the Reserves.

Here are two articles from the Urban Warfare Project of West Point's Modern Warfare Institute website:
THE SCHOOL OF STREET FIGHTING: TACTICAL URBAN LESSONS FROM UKRAINE

URBAN OPERATIONS IN UKRAINE: SIZE, RATIOS, AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

I'm a firm believer that in an increasingly urbanized world much of our future potential combat is likely to take place in built up areas. Combat in cities requires combined arms, but it also requires large numbers of dismounted infantry as well. The Reg Force has tanks, APCs and artillery (all of which require serious upgrades) but with only 6-7 dismounts per LAV likely doesn't have the dismounted strength to be successful in urban combat.

The Reserves have that extra manpower available. Let's say that 1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions (6 Infantry Companies), 5e Brigade is Medium with 3 x LAV Battalions (9 Infantry Companies) and 2 Brigade is Light (another 9 Infantry Companies). That's a total of 24 Infantry Companies. With 51 Reserve Infantry Regiments if each can augment with 1 x fully trained Platoon then that would be two additional Platoons of dismounts per Reg Force Infantry Company.

They wouldn't require their own APCs/IFVs as they would be fighting dismounted in support of the Reg Force armoured vehicles. They would only need a vehicle with protection enough to get them to the area of the fight.

Still lots of questions about how to best make something like this work, but may be much easier (and more achievable) than some of the much more ambitions proposals.

 

[FJAG]

They wouldn't require their own APCs/IFVs as they would be fighting dismounted in support of the Reg Force armoured vehicles. They would only need a vehicle with protection enough to get them to the area of the fight.

Interestingly that is exactly the doctrinal purpose of the Stryker. Stryker brigades manoeuvre under armour but are supposed to fight dismounted. That is the fundamental difference from the IFV of the infantry in the combined arms battalions.

That begs the question: Should our model light infantry manoeuvre in an unprotected GM ISV or GM LUV or the LAV 6.0 or an ACSV-TCV before assuming its dismounted fight. Currently we have none of the above.

That is also the current situation of the US IBCTs whose rifle companies are basically unmotorized. Not all IBCTs are currently destined to receive ISVs but will continue to rely on shanks mare.

Maybe we need to sort out our doctrine for the motorization (if any) of our light infantry and then determine if that is a universal doctrine or one split on a RegF / ResF basis.

 

[McG]

You don’t want to use ACSV. It is a Queen Marry. Even the TCV will be taller than a LAV 6.

 

[IKnowNothing]

They wouldn't require their own APCs/IFVs as they would be fighting dismounted in support of the Reg Force armoured vehicles. They would only need a vehicle with protection enough to get them to the area of the fight.

Vehicle that comes to mind is the the Protolab MiSu. Assuming it lives up to its billing you've got a nice combo of all-weather mobility, low maintenance cost, protection (they claim STANAG level 4- I'm skeptical at 14 tonne), and payload (10 fully kitted troops).

Basically an attempt to field an MRAP upgraded Pasi equivalent to cheaply protect their hordes of reservists and territorials. Mobility platoon of 2x TAPV (3per), 17x MiSu (2per), 19 veh, 40PY's turns a light Inf Coy into a Heavy Protected Mobility Coy in a heartbeat

Protolab PMPV 6x6

Protolab PMPV 6x6 highly protected high mobility multipurpose vehicle / armored personnel carrier APC with highest level of ballistic, blast, IED and mine protection and with extensive high payload capacity.

www.protolab.fi

Protolab Misu - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[KevinB]

Interestingly that is exactly the doctrinal purpose of the Stryker. Stryker brigades manoeuvre under armour but are supposed to fight dismounted. That is the fundamental difference from the IFV of the infantry in the combined arms battalions.

That begs the question: Should our model light infantry manoeuvre in an unprotected GM ISV or GM LUV or the LAV 6.0 or an ACSV-TCV before assuming its dismounted fight. Currently we have none of the above.

I’m of the opinion that perhaps none of the above is a better answer.
Create a Mobility Support Bn that has:
Snowmobile/ATV/AGMV for individual drawing - as needed, and LAV 6.0 and/or Bv206 type with crew for support when needed.

The units can be then vehicle agnostic, and receive vehicles as needed.

That is also the current situation of the US IBCTs whose rifle companies are basically unmotorized. Not all IBCTs are currently destined to receive ISVs but will continue to rely on shanks mare.

Outside of the ARNG every IBCT has some mode of transport, be it ISV, Hummer, MeTT, UH, or Aircraft. While they may reside in separate transport entities from the Battalion , they are available at the Bde level, which may change to Div level for some - but most have some sort of integral vehicles.

Maybe we need to sort out our doctrine for the motorization (if any) of our light infantry and then determine if that is a universal doctrine or one split on a RegF / ResF basis.

I remain committed that Light Infantry isn’t practical to simply be Infantry without Vehicles.
One should have a primary and secondary role: Airborne, Airmobile, Mountain, Arctic or Amphibious, and equipment and supported as such.

For the reserves, it’s much simpler to focus them on being GIB’s as opposed to actual Light Infantry - as the training requirements are significantly lower.

 

[GR66]

I’m of the opinion that perhaps none of the above is a better answer.
Create a Mobility Support Bn that has:
Snowmobile/ATV/AGMV for individual drawing - as needed, and LAV 6.0 and/or Bv206 type with crew for support when needed.

Personally I'm a fan of the Bv206 type vehicle. Suitable for both domestic and overseas operations (including the arctic), high carrying capacity (full 10 member Section or gear/support weapons), amphibious, tracked (useful in urban rubble vs wheeled?) with STANAG 2 (upgradable to STANAG 4) protection for the BvS10.

The units can be then vehicle agnostic, and receive vehicles as needed.

US Army Reserves are primarily focused on CSS units including Support and Sustainment Battalions. No reason some of our many Reserve Regiments couldn't be re-roled as Transport Companies.

Outside of the ARNG every IBCT has some mode of transport, be it ISV, Hummer, MeTT, UH, or Aircraft. While they may reside in separate transport entities from the Battalion , they are available at the Bde level, which may change to Div level for some - but most have some sort of integral vehicles.


I remain committed that Light Infantry isn’t practical to simply be Infantry without Vehicles.
One should have a primary and secondary role: Airborne, Airmobile, Mountain, Arctic or Amphibious, and equipment and supported as such.

For the reserves, it’s much simpler to focus them on being GIB’s as opposed to actual Light Infantry - as the training requirements are significantly lower.

My thought is the Reserve infantry units act as extra dismounts available to support the existing Mech Battalions. Our Reg Force Light Brigade can be our Airborne/Mountain/Arctic/Amphibious force.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Or increase the meagre man days allotment from 37 annually, up to half of which gets siphoned off for anything except preparing platoons for battle, so that troops can train two weekends a month, which they will do if the training has meaning and is well organized and supported with ammo and other enablers.

CPCC Staff Officers reading your post…

 

[daftandbarmy]

CPCC Staff Officers reading your post…

I know, right?

I believe that's what ARes 'paysheet days' are still called, aren't they?

 

[daftandbarmy]

I’m of the opinion that perhaps none of the above is a better answer.
Create a Mobility Support Bn that has:
Snowmobile/ATV/AGMV for individual drawing - as needed, and LAV 6.0 and/or Bv206 type with crew for support when needed.

Or just give our Loggies enough of the right trucks...

 

[Remius]

I know, right?

I believe that's what ARes 'paysheet days' are still called, aren't they?

I believe it’s up to 80 days days now that reservist can work and can go over with permissions required set at over the 80 then 120.

 

[markppcli]

Barring some magical kumbaya moment that sees the Army actually making the commitment to completely re-organize itself into an integrated "Total Force" and the Government totally abandoning decades of neglectful funding of the military I think that this (above) is a reasonable and realistic goal for the Reserves.

Here are two articles from the Urban Warfare Project of West Point's Modern Warfare Institute website:
THE SCHOOL OF STREET FIGHTING: TACTICAL URBAN LESSONS FROM UKRAINE

URBAN OPERATIONS IN UKRAINE: SIZE, RATIOS, AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

I'm a firm believer that in an increasingly urbanized world much of our future potential combat is likely to take place in built up areas. Combat in cities requires combined arms, but it also requires large numbers of dismounted infantry as well. The Reg Force has tanks, APCs and artillery (all of which require serious upgrades) but with only 6-7 dismounts per LAV likely doesn't have the dismounted strength to be successful in urban combat.

The Reserves have that extra manpower available. Let's say that 1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions (6 Infantry Companies), 5e Brigade is Medium with 3 x LAV Battalions (9 Infantry Companies) and 2 Brigade is Light (another 9 Infantry Companies). That's a total of 24 Infantry Companies. With 51 Reserve Infantry Regiments if each can augment with 1 x fully trained Platoon then that would be two additional Platoons of dismounts per Reg Force Infantry Company.

They wouldn't require their own APCs/IFVs as they would be fighting dismounted in support of the Reg Force armoured vehicles. They would only need a vehicle with protection enough to get them to the area of the fight.

Still lots of questions about how to best make something like this work, but may be much easier (and more achievable) than some of the much more ambitions proposals.

1. Lots of sources in Ukraine citing the effectiveness of automatic cannons in urban warfare.

2. Your expecting a company to absorb two extra platoons when they go to urban environments? Where are these reserve units sitting until then? In the Bde depth per my description ? If that’s the case then it probably doesn’t make sense to have it integrated into the Bn itself, rather it can push through and conduct a forward passage once the ifv equipped Bns culminate on the initial break in.

 

[GR66]

1. Lots of sources in Ukraine citing the effectiveness of automatic cannons in urban warfare.

I assume that this comment is in relation to my suggestion that the Reserve units don't need to be equipped with IFVs?
I'm making the cynical assumption that the GOC is not going to be purchasing cannon-equipped IFVs for the Reserves and that the current situation of the Reserves being unable to adequately maintain and train on complex armoured vehicles is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

2. Your expecting a company to absorb two extra platoons when they go to urban environments? Where are these reserve units sitting until then? In the Bde depth per my description ? If that’s the case then it probably doesn’t make sense to have it integrated into the Bn itself, rather it can push through and conduct a forward passage once the ifv equipped Bns culminate on the initial break in.

My comment about 2 x Reserve Platoons potentially able to be generated per existing Reg Force Company is only meant to show the scope of what is capable as opposed to a proposed force employment model.

More likely I'd see groupings of Reserve "Regiments" task grouped together into "Battalions" capable of force generating a complete motorized Infantry Company (one Platoon coming from each Reserve Unit). This could be attached as a 4th Company to each Mechanized Battalion. Lots of tasks that an extra Infantry Company can undertake in support of the Battalion/Brigade besides dismounted support in urban ops.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Or just give our Loggies enough of the right trucks...

You could buy proper SMP vehicles for the Reserve Combat arms and support arms and rerole the MVSV's into B echelon vehicles which they likely be good at.

 

[markppcli]

I assume that this comment is in relation to my suggestion that the Reserve units don't need to be equipped with IFVs?
I'm making the cynical assumption that the GOC is not going to be purchasing cannon-equipped IFVs for the Reserves and that the current situation of the Reserves being unable to adequately maintain and train on complex armoured vehicles is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

My comment about 2 x Reserve Platoons potentially able to be generated per existing Reg Force Company is only meant to show the scope of what is capable as opposed to a proposed force employment model.

More likely I'd see groupings of Reserve "Regiments" task grouped together into "Battalions" capable of force generating a complete motorized Infantry Company (one Platoon coming from each Reserve Unit). This could be attached as a 4th Company to each Mechanized Battalion. Lots of tasks that an extra Infantry Company can undertake in support of the Battalion/Brigade besides dismounted support in urban ops.

It was more about “mechanized unitscant so urban” I probably over reacted. In general I agree with what you’re saying, but structurally including reservists in sections was already something we did in force 2013, with 2 per section.

 

[daftandbarmy]

You could buy proper SMP vehicles for the Reserve Combat arms and support arms and rerole the MVSV's into B echelon vehicles which they likely be good at.