USAF Missing Nukes
- Thread starter tomahawk6
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Er let me see?
Was it not a mix up of live ammo with training ammo?
But in this case it's Nuke's !!
We are all trained not to mix ammo,live with dummy(training)right?
Yup all from the top down should be hanged,no one looked at the colour codes of the weapon's"
I don't know the colour code of a Nuke but I bet there is one for H.E. which is yellow which may or may not be on the weapon.
This is a lesson again of not mixing training rounds with live rounds.
Was it not a mix up of live ammo with training ammo?
But in this case it's Nuke's !!
We are all trained not to mix ammo,live with dummy(training)right?
Yup all from the top down should be hanged,no one looked at the colour codes of the weapon's"
I don't know the colour code of a Nuke but I bet there is one for H.E. which is yellow which may or may not be on the weapon.
This is a lesson again of not mixing training rounds with live rounds.
- Reaction score
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Hmmmm, lucky to still have careers.
In my little civilian world I've heard tell of whole teams being fired for a bad batch
of electronic assemblies. That way the employer is sure to to get to the cause.
Personally I think that civilian example is a little extreme but it is becoming an
accepted standard.( In electronics assembly anyway )
Once they get past all the recriminations it would be interesting to know what the
process error actually was. And would the result be the same if the errors had the
opposite effect. ie. Some nukes need to be moved and someone sends HE instead.
I'm sure we'll never know...
In my little civilian world I've heard tell of whole teams being fired for a bad batch
of electronic assemblies. That way the employer is sure to to get to the cause.
Personally I think that civilian example is a little extreme but it is becoming an
accepted standard.( In electronics assembly anyway )
Once they get past all the recriminations it would be interesting to know what the
process error actually was. And would the result be the same if the errors had the
opposite effect. ie. Some nukes need to be moved and someone sends HE instead.
I'm sure we'll never know...
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 410
Flip,
WRT the four senior officers.... there is a good chance that their careers have ended - though they will keep their pensions.
Process errors? They did not check each and every unit. They are supposed to check every single last one of them. They did not.... they ARE the process error.
WRT the four senior officers.... there is a good chance that their careers have ended - though they will keep their pensions.
Process errors? They did not check each and every unit. They are supposed to check every single last one of them. They did not.... they ARE the process error.
- Reaction score
- 63
- Points
- 530
Update to the original story.Its not any better now than when I first posted it. 
Nuclear deficiencies
Records show Air Force let safety standards slip for many years before Minot
By Michael Hoffman - mhoffman@militarytimes.com
Posted : February 25, 2008
Before airmen at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., lost track of six nuclear warheads in late August, nuclear security there had eroded to such a level that instead of using orange cones and multiple official placards to distinguish racks of non-nuclear missiles from nuclear-tipped ones, the 5th Bomb Wing was using 8-by-10-inch sheets of paper placed on the pylons.
That all changed Aug. 30, when Air Force officials discovered a B-52 Stratofortress bomber had mistakenly flown the six warheads from Minot to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., and the glare of the national spotlight returned to America’s nuclear stockpile for the first time since the end of the Cold War.
Over the past four months, Air Force leaders have scrambled to review the nuclear program. On Feb. 11 and 12, they announced 132 recommendations to improve the service’s ability to protect the world’s most lethal weapons, the result of two internal reviews and a Defense Department investigation.
Four Air Force generals who testified about the Minot incident and nuclear security before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 12 said the service has lost its focus on the nuclear mission.
However, internal Air Force reports and safety records dating to 1992 show service officials received regular and consistent warnings about the erosion of nuclear safety standards. But there was no thorough examination of vulnerabilities until after the incident at Minot.
The intent of the late August mission was to fly a dozen Advanced Cruise Missiles from Minot to Barksdale to be decommissioned. But instead of loading two pylons, each containing six non-nuclear missiles, under the B-52’s wings Aug. 29, the 5th Bomb Wing airmen rolled out one pylon loaded with nuclear warheads and strapped it onto one of the wings.
All six warheads sat on runways for close to 36 hours — first at Minot and then at Barksdale — without the appropriate nuclear security until a 2nd Bomb Wing airman at Barksdale discovered the mistake Aug. 30.
Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak warned 16 years ago when Air Combat Command took over the nuclear mission from Strategic Air Command “about the worsening practices regarding the safe handling and storage of nuclear weapons and directed commanders at every level to review surety programs,” according to a 2005 Natural Resources Defense Council report, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels and War Planning.”
That sentiment was echoed in the Air Force’s most recent reviews of its nuclear program.
The review, done by a Defense Science Board task force upon the request of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and headed by former Air Force Chief of Staff retired Gen. Larry Welch, was particularly critical of the erosion of the nuclear program and the systemic Air Force problems that allowed it to occur.
“The task force and several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable,” the report read.
Last October, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, Air Combat Command produced a list of 237 reported “safety deficiencies” — known in the nuclear community as Dull Swords — over the past six years, three months.
Dull Sword is a term the Air Force uses to describe and report a discrepancy or problem with certified nuclear equipment or with the processes for handling nuclear weapons, said Col. Billy Gilstrap, ACC safety director. The more serious incident at Minot is described as a Bent Spear.
The records Kristensen received in response to his FOIA request went back only as far as June 2001, because the Dull Sword ACC digital database was not created until 2005 as part of a mishap prevention effort, Gilstrap said. Before that, Dull Sword records were deleted once the problem was fixed, or two years after the initial report, he said.
The list of Dull Sword records provided by the Air Force includes a short description of each safety discrepancy: From failures in the Personnel Reliability Program — which is used to determine which airmen can handle nuclear weapons — to broken towing vehicles used to transport warheads from the storage units to the bombers, to unexplained problems with the equipment designed to carry the nuclear weapons on the aircraft and other deficiencies.
The 509th Bomb Wing, which operates the B-2 Spirit bomber at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., alone recorded 111 of the 237 safety deficiencies, by far the most for one wing. However, Gilstrap said he looks at those records as a positive, not a negative.
“We’re proud of those guys,” he said. “We really encourage Dull Swords as much as possible. If we don’t know about it, we can’t fix it.”
Since the Minot and Barksdale mishap, top Air Force leaders have had a fix-it-now attitude, but back in 2003, an Air Force inspector general report warned that pass rates for nuclear surety inspections — which nuclear units receive every 18 months — had “hit an all-time low.”
Historically, Air Force units had a 79 percent pass rate on NSIs, but that year, it dipped to 50 percent. Five of 10 units tested that year failed, with only one unit test left, the report stated.
“The poor performance can be rationalized many ways: the NSI sample size is dramatically smaller in recent years, ... conventional operations tempo is higher than ever before ... or the failures are attributable to complex regulatory guidance,” wrote Lt. Col. Lynn Scott, deputy director of inspections for the IG in 2003.
“While there is some shred of truth to [these rationalizations], the bottom line is that each one offers a convenient excuse to avoid accepting responsibility for failure — and failure is not something that is acceptable when it comes to the safety, security and reliability of our nuclear weapons.”
Ten years before, nuclear units in Europe faced a similar nuclear surety failure rate. U.S. Air Forces in Europe tested 12 units in 1993, and only seven passed, according to a partially declassified Air Force report, “History of United States Air Forces in Europe, Calendar Year 1993.”
But the inspection issue goes beyond pass-fail rates.
High marks?
Last year, Minot’s 5th Bomb Wing passed its NSI and received “outstanding” ratings in certain subareas of the test, such as the Personnel Reliability Program.
“Our report found that the problem with the inspections is the scope is just too limited,” Welch told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 12. “Over time, the scope has been more and more limited, to the point where they really don’t demonstrate operational readiness.”
The Air Force also is taking its most comprehensive look yet at the breadth and depth of the nuclear surety inspection process, said Maj. Gen. Polly Peyer, who directed the Air Force’s blue ribbon review into the incident, which produced an internal report Feb. 12.
Lt. Gen. Daniel Darnell, deputy chief of staff for air, space and information operations, told senators that now nuclear units might receive less warning before an NSI takes place.
“We think that there may be some value to a limited-notice inspection for units,” he said.
An executive summary of the blue ribbon review report, obtained by Air Force Times, said Peyer’s team of 30 airmen visited 29 locations and interviewed 822 people. The report criticized the inspection process, the waning focus on the nuclear mission, the lack of experience in the ranks and the aging equipment used to maintain the nuclear stockpile.
“We did see a diminished focus on the nuclear mission,” Peyer said in an interview. “You can kind of trace it back to 1991 and the end of the Cold War.”
The Air Force referenced the blue ribbon review’s 36 recommendations as justification for adding 11 items, totaling $99.5 million, to the unfunded requirements list it sent to Congress. These requests, designed to shore up nuclear security, include nuclear test equipment, intercontinental ballistic missile transporters, UH-1N helicopters to monitor missile fields and nuclear munitions storage trailers.
Service officials said they could not fit the requests into the regular fiscal 2009 budget because it was due before the report from the blue ribbon panel.
Aging infrastructure is a problem, Peyer told senators at the Feb. 12 hearing. “For example, nuclear weapons test equipment is 25 to 30 years old, and so [we’re] definitely [looking] at recapitalizing that,” Peyer said.
Sen. John Thune, R-S.D., said he didn’t understand how updating nuclear weapons security could be put on the back burner over the years.
“How do you think we got to where we didn’t allocate enough to ensure nuclear weapons surety and safety, even in an environment where we’ve got constrained resources?” he asked.
Fair warning
But the problem is not new. A decade ago, security systems used to monitor nuclear weapons storage areas at bases such as Minot, Barksdale and Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., had exceeded their “useful life cycle” by 12 years and were in danger of failing, according to a partially declassified report, “History of Air Combat Command: 1 January — 31 December 1998.”
The Air Force installed the Advanced Entry Control System that year at all three bases, narrowly avoiding a dangerous sensor failure, ACC Security Forces officials said in the report.
Peyer said the service also is looking into procuring new technology to monitor its nuclear stockpile.
For example, portal monitors that can detect sources of radiation entering or leaving a weapons storage area are being considered. Such an advance could have prevented the mistake at Minot by warning airmen that radiological munitions were exiting the storage structure.
Peyer, a senior logistics officer, said she has seen technological advances used in the logistics field and would like to see them transferred to tracking nuclear weapons, especially an information system that could “tie together scheduling functions.”
Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, ACC’s director of air and space operations, told senators three major scheduling mistakes by the 5th Bomb Wing led to the mix-up at Minot.
But, Peyer warned that technological upgrades can’t make up for airmen’s lack of expertise in handling nuclear munitions. Along with the loss of focus on the nuclear mission has come a waning experience level within the ranks.
“The decline is characterized by embedding nuclear mission forces in non-nuclear organizations, markedly reducing levels of leadership whose focus is the nuclear enterprise, and a general devaluation of the nuclear mission and those who perform the mission,” according to the report by the Defense Science Board task force led by Welch.
Interviews with B-52 crews showed they typically spend only 5 percent to 20 percent of their time on the nuclear mission. Air Force leaders understand that the conventional mission is still the primary role of most bomber units, but they stressed that airmen need to spend more time training.
“We need to look at our exercise and inspection programs,” Peyer said. “What you can’t get from practical experience you have to supplement through your training and your exercise program. We can’t go back to where we were in 1991. We don’t live in the same world.”
By acting on the 132 recommendations of the various reviewing agencies, Air Force leaders hope to rebuild the nation’s faith in its ability to secure nuclear weapons, but Thune and Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., voiced the concern many people still have: How could the Air Force have ignored the warnings and let the program erode to this point?
“The sloppiness and the lack of discipline and the lack of respect for the process didn’t just happen overnight,” Nelson said.
The spotlight on the Air Force’s nuclear program will eventually dim, Thune warned.
“While I have every confidence in the system while this subject is very much at the forefront of our minds, my concern would be that as we get farther away from the time of this incident that we’ll have the same loss of focus and perhaps erosion of procedures,” he said.
Nuclear deficiencies
Records show Air Force let safety standards slip for many years before Minot
By Michael Hoffman - mhoffman@militarytimes.com
Posted : February 25, 2008
Before airmen at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., lost track of six nuclear warheads in late August, nuclear security there had eroded to such a level that instead of using orange cones and multiple official placards to distinguish racks of non-nuclear missiles from nuclear-tipped ones, the 5th Bomb Wing was using 8-by-10-inch sheets of paper placed on the pylons.
That all changed Aug. 30, when Air Force officials discovered a B-52 Stratofortress bomber had mistakenly flown the six warheads from Minot to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., and the glare of the national spotlight returned to America’s nuclear stockpile for the first time since the end of the Cold War.
Over the past four months, Air Force leaders have scrambled to review the nuclear program. On Feb. 11 and 12, they announced 132 recommendations to improve the service’s ability to protect the world’s most lethal weapons, the result of two internal reviews and a Defense Department investigation.
Four Air Force generals who testified about the Minot incident and nuclear security before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 12 said the service has lost its focus on the nuclear mission.
However, internal Air Force reports and safety records dating to 1992 show service officials received regular and consistent warnings about the erosion of nuclear safety standards. But there was no thorough examination of vulnerabilities until after the incident at Minot.
The intent of the late August mission was to fly a dozen Advanced Cruise Missiles from Minot to Barksdale to be decommissioned. But instead of loading two pylons, each containing six non-nuclear missiles, under the B-52’s wings Aug. 29, the 5th Bomb Wing airmen rolled out one pylon loaded with nuclear warheads and strapped it onto one of the wings.
All six warheads sat on runways for close to 36 hours — first at Minot and then at Barksdale — without the appropriate nuclear security until a 2nd Bomb Wing airman at Barksdale discovered the mistake Aug. 30.
Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Merrill McPeak warned 16 years ago when Air Combat Command took over the nuclear mission from Strategic Air Command “about the worsening practices regarding the safe handling and storage of nuclear weapons and directed commanders at every level to review surety programs,” according to a 2005 Natural Resources Defense Council report, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels and War Planning.”
That sentiment was echoed in the Air Force’s most recent reviews of its nuclear program.
The review, done by a Defense Science Board task force upon the request of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and headed by former Air Force Chief of Staff retired Gen. Larry Welch, was particularly critical of the erosion of the nuclear program and the systemic Air Force problems that allowed it to occur.
“The task force and several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable,” the report read.
Last October, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, Air Combat Command produced a list of 237 reported “safety deficiencies” — known in the nuclear community as Dull Swords — over the past six years, three months.
Dull Sword is a term the Air Force uses to describe and report a discrepancy or problem with certified nuclear equipment or with the processes for handling nuclear weapons, said Col. Billy Gilstrap, ACC safety director. The more serious incident at Minot is described as a Bent Spear.
The records Kristensen received in response to his FOIA request went back only as far as June 2001, because the Dull Sword ACC digital database was not created until 2005 as part of a mishap prevention effort, Gilstrap said. Before that, Dull Sword records were deleted once the problem was fixed, or two years after the initial report, he said.
The list of Dull Sword records provided by the Air Force includes a short description of each safety discrepancy: From failures in the Personnel Reliability Program — which is used to determine which airmen can handle nuclear weapons — to broken towing vehicles used to transport warheads from the storage units to the bombers, to unexplained problems with the equipment designed to carry the nuclear weapons on the aircraft and other deficiencies.
The 509th Bomb Wing, which operates the B-2 Spirit bomber at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., alone recorded 111 of the 237 safety deficiencies, by far the most for one wing. However, Gilstrap said he looks at those records as a positive, not a negative.
“We’re proud of those guys,” he said. “We really encourage Dull Swords as much as possible. If we don’t know about it, we can’t fix it.”
Since the Minot and Barksdale mishap, top Air Force leaders have had a fix-it-now attitude, but back in 2003, an Air Force inspector general report warned that pass rates for nuclear surety inspections — which nuclear units receive every 18 months — had “hit an all-time low.”
Historically, Air Force units had a 79 percent pass rate on NSIs, but that year, it dipped to 50 percent. Five of 10 units tested that year failed, with only one unit test left, the report stated.
“The poor performance can be rationalized many ways: the NSI sample size is dramatically smaller in recent years, ... conventional operations tempo is higher than ever before ... or the failures are attributable to complex regulatory guidance,” wrote Lt. Col. Lynn Scott, deputy director of inspections for the IG in 2003.
“While there is some shred of truth to [these rationalizations], the bottom line is that each one offers a convenient excuse to avoid accepting responsibility for failure — and failure is not something that is acceptable when it comes to the safety, security and reliability of our nuclear weapons.”
Ten years before, nuclear units in Europe faced a similar nuclear surety failure rate. U.S. Air Forces in Europe tested 12 units in 1993, and only seven passed, according to a partially declassified Air Force report, “History of United States Air Forces in Europe, Calendar Year 1993.”
But the inspection issue goes beyond pass-fail rates.
High marks?
Last year, Minot’s 5th Bomb Wing passed its NSI and received “outstanding” ratings in certain subareas of the test, such as the Personnel Reliability Program.
“Our report found that the problem with the inspections is the scope is just too limited,” Welch told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb. 12. “Over time, the scope has been more and more limited, to the point where they really don’t demonstrate operational readiness.”
The Air Force also is taking its most comprehensive look yet at the breadth and depth of the nuclear surety inspection process, said Maj. Gen. Polly Peyer, who directed the Air Force’s blue ribbon review into the incident, which produced an internal report Feb. 12.
Lt. Gen. Daniel Darnell, deputy chief of staff for air, space and information operations, told senators that now nuclear units might receive less warning before an NSI takes place.
“We think that there may be some value to a limited-notice inspection for units,” he said.
An executive summary of the blue ribbon review report, obtained by Air Force Times, said Peyer’s team of 30 airmen visited 29 locations and interviewed 822 people. The report criticized the inspection process, the waning focus on the nuclear mission, the lack of experience in the ranks and the aging equipment used to maintain the nuclear stockpile.
“We did see a diminished focus on the nuclear mission,” Peyer said in an interview. “You can kind of trace it back to 1991 and the end of the Cold War.”
The Air Force referenced the blue ribbon review’s 36 recommendations as justification for adding 11 items, totaling $99.5 million, to the unfunded requirements list it sent to Congress. These requests, designed to shore up nuclear security, include nuclear test equipment, intercontinental ballistic missile transporters, UH-1N helicopters to monitor missile fields and nuclear munitions storage trailers.
Service officials said they could not fit the requests into the regular fiscal 2009 budget because it was due before the report from the blue ribbon panel.
Aging infrastructure is a problem, Peyer told senators at the Feb. 12 hearing. “For example, nuclear weapons test equipment is 25 to 30 years old, and so [we’re] definitely [looking] at recapitalizing that,” Peyer said.
Sen. John Thune, R-S.D., said he didn’t understand how updating nuclear weapons security could be put on the back burner over the years.
“How do you think we got to where we didn’t allocate enough to ensure nuclear weapons surety and safety, even in an environment where we’ve got constrained resources?” he asked.
Fair warning
But the problem is not new. A decade ago, security systems used to monitor nuclear weapons storage areas at bases such as Minot, Barksdale and Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., had exceeded their “useful life cycle” by 12 years and were in danger of failing, according to a partially declassified report, “History of Air Combat Command: 1 January — 31 December 1998.”
The Air Force installed the Advanced Entry Control System that year at all three bases, narrowly avoiding a dangerous sensor failure, ACC Security Forces officials said in the report.
Peyer said the service also is looking into procuring new technology to monitor its nuclear stockpile.
For example, portal monitors that can detect sources of radiation entering or leaving a weapons storage area are being considered. Such an advance could have prevented the mistake at Minot by warning airmen that radiological munitions were exiting the storage structure.
Peyer, a senior logistics officer, said she has seen technological advances used in the logistics field and would like to see them transferred to tracking nuclear weapons, especially an information system that could “tie together scheduling functions.”
Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, ACC’s director of air and space operations, told senators three major scheduling mistakes by the 5th Bomb Wing led to the mix-up at Minot.
But, Peyer warned that technological upgrades can’t make up for airmen’s lack of expertise in handling nuclear munitions. Along with the loss of focus on the nuclear mission has come a waning experience level within the ranks.
“The decline is characterized by embedding nuclear mission forces in non-nuclear organizations, markedly reducing levels of leadership whose focus is the nuclear enterprise, and a general devaluation of the nuclear mission and those who perform the mission,” according to the report by the Defense Science Board task force led by Welch.
Interviews with B-52 crews showed they typically spend only 5 percent to 20 percent of their time on the nuclear mission. Air Force leaders understand that the conventional mission is still the primary role of most bomber units, but they stressed that airmen need to spend more time training.
“We need to look at our exercise and inspection programs,” Peyer said. “What you can’t get from practical experience you have to supplement through your training and your exercise program. We can’t go back to where we were in 1991. We don’t live in the same world.”
By acting on the 132 recommendations of the various reviewing agencies, Air Force leaders hope to rebuild the nation’s faith in its ability to secure nuclear weapons, but Thune and Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., voiced the concern many people still have: How could the Air Force have ignored the warnings and let the program erode to this point?
“The sloppiness and the lack of discipline and the lack of respect for the process didn’t just happen overnight,” Nelson said.
The spotlight on the Air Force’s nuclear program will eventually dim, Thune warned.
“While I have every confidence in the system while this subject is very much at the forefront of our minds, my concern would be that as we get farther away from the time of this incident that we’ll have the same loss of focus and perhaps erosion of procedures,” he said.
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And for years we've criticized the former Soviet republics for their lack of security and foresight in safing their inventory of WMDs......
Hove everyone has had a good sleep last night - those for some time to come may be the source of your worst nightmare(s)
Hove everyone has had a good sleep last night - those for some time to come may be the source of your worst nightmare(s)
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tomahawk6 said:
are you sure about that, I know a solider who was serverly punished for leaving his rifle in the bush after an exercise, I believe they found it three days later and he got discharged. one more thing, can a rifle take out a major US city in a second? It might have been strapped to a B-52 but could have ended in a "broken arrow". The U.S. have lost at least half a dozen nuclear devices because they shouldn't be there, wasting the fuel of the plane until it potentially crashes...
can't believe this stuff keeps on happening, wasn't it a couple months ago that they shipped weapon control electronics to Taiwan by mistake?
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Oh this is obviously a cover up. Its clear that John Travolta took them. ;D
- Reaction score
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More bad news at Minot AFB. It seems that even with a new commander the wing still isnt following procedure.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/05/airforce_minot_failure_053008w/
Minot’s 5th Bomb Wing flunks nuclear inspection
By Michael Hoffman - Staff writer
Posted : Saturday May 31, 2008 7:38:55 EDT
The 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., has failed its much-anticipated defense nuclear surety inspection, according to a Defense Threat Reduction Agency report.
DRTA inspectors gave the wing an “unsatisfactory” grade Sunday after uncovering many crucial mistakes during the weeklong inspection, which began May 17. They attributed the errors primarily to lack of supervision and leadership among security forces.
Inspectors from Air Combat Command also participated, but the Air Force refused to provide specifics on their findings.
Security broke down on multiple levels during simulated attacks across the base, including against nuclear weapons storage areas, according to the DTRA report, a copy of which was obtained by Air Force Times.
Inspectors watched as a security forces airman played video games on his cell phone while standing guard at a “restricted area perimeter,” the DTRA report said. Meanwhile, another airman nearby was “unaware of her duties and responsibilities” during the exercise.
The lapses are baffling, given the high-level focus on Minot since last August, when 5th Bomb Wing airmen mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles onto a B-52 Stratofortress and flew them to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., where the plane sat on the flight line, unattended, for hours. That incident not only embarrassed the Air Force, but raised concerns worldwide about the deterioration in U.S. nuclear safety standards.
Col. Joel Westa took command of the 5th Bomb Wing following that fiasco. After it failed an initial nuclear surety inspection, or dry run, in December, Westa acknowledged this inspection was going to be the “most scrutinized inspection in the history of time.”
Even so, airmen were unprepared.
“Overall their assessment painted a picture of some things we need to work on in the areas of training and discipline,” Westa said in a statement.
His airmen are working diligently to correct deficiencies, he said.
Inspectors from Air Combat Command will now return to Minot in August to determine if the necessary improvements have been made. Eventually, the wing will have to pass a full defense nuclear surety inspection.
Although the wing failed, it will keep its certification to handle nuclear weapons and will carry on with training right up to the day ACC inspectors revisit the base, said Maj. Thomas Crosson, a command spokesman. The base lost its certification immediately after the incident last August and didn’t have it restored until March 31, after it passed a second dry run.
The wing will participate in both a Red Flag exercise this summer and a nuclear readiness operation exercise as it prepares for the inspectors’ next visit, Crosson said.
DTRA inspectors gave the wing passing grades in nine of 10 areas they examined, including safety and technical operations, but failed it for its nuclear security.
“The most serious failure is the one regarding security, which is exactly what the Minot incident was all about,” said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists.
Litany of failure
The DRTA report highlighted an incredible number of gaffes:
* An internal security response team didn’t respond to its “pre-designated defensive fighting position” during an attack on the weapon storage area, leaving an entire side of the maintenance facility vulnerable to enemy fire.
* Security forces didn’t clear a building upon entering it, which allowed inspectors to “kill” three of those four airmen.
* Security forces failed to use the correct entry codes, issued that week, to allow certain personnel into restricted areas.
* Security forces airmen failed to properly check an emergency vehicle for unauthorized personnel when it arrived at a weapons storage area, or search it correctly once it left.
* While wing airmen simulated loading an aircraft with nuclear weapons, security forces airmen failed to investigate vulnerabilities on the route from the storage area to the flight line, and didn’t arm three SF airmen posted at traffic control points along that route.
* While on the aircraft, one flight of security forces airmen didn’t understand key nuclear surety terminology, including the “two-person concept” — the security mechanism that requires two people to arm a nuclear weapon in case the codes fall into the hands of an airman gone bad.
“Security forces’ level of knowledge, understanding of assigned duties, and response to unusual situations reflected a lack of adequate supervision,” wrote the DTRA team chief.
Security forces leaders rarely visited their airmen on post, and routine exercises “were neither robust nor taken to their logical conclusion,” according to the report.
After reviewing base records, inspectors found “leaders were unengaged [in] the proper supervision of SF airmen.”
“If the leadership is still unengaged after all that has happened with the warheads, the missing ballistic missile fuses and problems with the first inspection, then they’re not fit to have this mission,” Kristensen said. “It’s really frightening.”
Security forces errors made up the majority of the 14-page DTRA inspection report, but inspectors found fault with other parts of operations, including late status reports and major errors in the wing’s personnel reliability program, which dictates who can handle nukes.
While reviewing records, inspectors found one individual cleared to handle nukes had been “diagnosed for alcohol abuse” but was allowed to keep his certification, according to the report.
More fallout?
Immediately after the loss of control over the six nuclear warheads last August, the former 5th Bomb Wing commander was fired, along with three other high-ranking officers. Sixty-nine airmen temporarily lost their certification to handle nukes.
Crosson said there are no plans to fire any “key personnel” now. He did not rule out punitive actions for other airmen, however.
This latest setback comes shortly after Air Force officials announced plans to form a new B-52 squadron at Minot, which will allow one bomber squadron to focus solely on the nuclear mission. The move is largely in response to the findings of a blue ribbon panel, which told Congress the bomber force had lost sight of the nuclear mission due to the heavy demands of supporting troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“Several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable,” according to a report written by a Defense Science Board task force headed by retired Air Force Gen. Larry Welch, a former chief of staff.
Considering the level of resources dedicated to ensuring the 5th Bomb Wing could meet standards — including the arrival of new senior noncommissioned officers from other bases — Kristensen said he worries about nuclear security not only at Minot but across the service.
“It makes you wonder what’s going on elsewhere, like the nuclear weapons stationed at bases overseas, and at Barksdale Air Force Base and Whiteman Air Force Base,” he said.
ACC officials said the command will continue to support the 5th Bomb Wing’s leadership and provide the manning to fix security problems.
“We take our responsibilities to protect and safeguard weapons with the utmost seriousness, and understand there is zero tolerance for errors,” according to an ACC statement.
Airmen with the 5th Bomb Wing can expect more long hours ahead as the wing scrambles to fix its security holes before ACC inspectors return.
“They really need to drill their people to make sure this can’t happen,” Kristensen said.
It’s not the first time airmen at Minot have heard such warnings.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/05/airforce_minot_failure_053008w/
Minot’s 5th Bomb Wing flunks nuclear inspection
By Michael Hoffman - Staff writer
Posted : Saturday May 31, 2008 7:38:55 EDT
The 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., has failed its much-anticipated defense nuclear surety inspection, according to a Defense Threat Reduction Agency report.
DRTA inspectors gave the wing an “unsatisfactory” grade Sunday after uncovering many crucial mistakes during the weeklong inspection, which began May 17. They attributed the errors primarily to lack of supervision and leadership among security forces.
Inspectors from Air Combat Command also participated, but the Air Force refused to provide specifics on their findings.
Security broke down on multiple levels during simulated attacks across the base, including against nuclear weapons storage areas, according to the DTRA report, a copy of which was obtained by Air Force Times.
Inspectors watched as a security forces airman played video games on his cell phone while standing guard at a “restricted area perimeter,” the DTRA report said. Meanwhile, another airman nearby was “unaware of her duties and responsibilities” during the exercise.
The lapses are baffling, given the high-level focus on Minot since last August, when 5th Bomb Wing airmen mistakenly loaded six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles onto a B-52 Stratofortress and flew them to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., where the plane sat on the flight line, unattended, for hours. That incident not only embarrassed the Air Force, but raised concerns worldwide about the deterioration in U.S. nuclear safety standards.
Col. Joel Westa took command of the 5th Bomb Wing following that fiasco. After it failed an initial nuclear surety inspection, or dry run, in December, Westa acknowledged this inspection was going to be the “most scrutinized inspection in the history of time.”
Even so, airmen were unprepared.
“Overall their assessment painted a picture of some things we need to work on in the areas of training and discipline,” Westa said in a statement.
His airmen are working diligently to correct deficiencies, he said.
Inspectors from Air Combat Command will now return to Minot in August to determine if the necessary improvements have been made. Eventually, the wing will have to pass a full defense nuclear surety inspection.
Although the wing failed, it will keep its certification to handle nuclear weapons and will carry on with training right up to the day ACC inspectors revisit the base, said Maj. Thomas Crosson, a command spokesman. The base lost its certification immediately after the incident last August and didn’t have it restored until March 31, after it passed a second dry run.
The wing will participate in both a Red Flag exercise this summer and a nuclear readiness operation exercise as it prepares for the inspectors’ next visit, Crosson said.
DTRA inspectors gave the wing passing grades in nine of 10 areas they examined, including safety and technical operations, but failed it for its nuclear security.
“The most serious failure is the one regarding security, which is exactly what the Minot incident was all about,” said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists.
Litany of failure
The DRTA report highlighted an incredible number of gaffes:
* An internal security response team didn’t respond to its “pre-designated defensive fighting position” during an attack on the weapon storage area, leaving an entire side of the maintenance facility vulnerable to enemy fire.
* Security forces didn’t clear a building upon entering it, which allowed inspectors to “kill” three of those four airmen.
* Security forces failed to use the correct entry codes, issued that week, to allow certain personnel into restricted areas.
* Security forces airmen failed to properly check an emergency vehicle for unauthorized personnel when it arrived at a weapons storage area, or search it correctly once it left.
* While wing airmen simulated loading an aircraft with nuclear weapons, security forces airmen failed to investigate vulnerabilities on the route from the storage area to the flight line, and didn’t arm three SF airmen posted at traffic control points along that route.
* While on the aircraft, one flight of security forces airmen didn’t understand key nuclear surety terminology, including the “two-person concept” — the security mechanism that requires two people to arm a nuclear weapon in case the codes fall into the hands of an airman gone bad.
“Security forces’ level of knowledge, understanding of assigned duties, and response to unusual situations reflected a lack of adequate supervision,” wrote the DTRA team chief.
Security forces leaders rarely visited their airmen on post, and routine exercises “were neither robust nor taken to their logical conclusion,” according to the report.
After reviewing base records, inspectors found “leaders were unengaged [in] the proper supervision of SF airmen.”
“If the leadership is still unengaged after all that has happened with the warheads, the missing ballistic missile fuses and problems with the first inspection, then they’re not fit to have this mission,” Kristensen said. “It’s really frightening.”
Security forces errors made up the majority of the 14-page DTRA inspection report, but inspectors found fault with other parts of operations, including late status reports and major errors in the wing’s personnel reliability program, which dictates who can handle nukes.
While reviewing records, inspectors found one individual cleared to handle nukes had been “diagnosed for alcohol abuse” but was allowed to keep his certification, according to the report.
More fallout?
Immediately after the loss of control over the six nuclear warheads last August, the former 5th Bomb Wing commander was fired, along with three other high-ranking officers. Sixty-nine airmen temporarily lost their certification to handle nukes.
Crosson said there are no plans to fire any “key personnel” now. He did not rule out punitive actions for other airmen, however.
This latest setback comes shortly after Air Force officials announced plans to form a new B-52 squadron at Minot, which will allow one bomber squadron to focus solely on the nuclear mission. The move is largely in response to the findings of a blue ribbon panel, which told Congress the bomber force had lost sight of the nuclear mission due to the heavy demands of supporting troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“Several of the senior [Defense Department] people interviewed believe that the decline in focus has been more pronounced than realized and too extreme to be acceptable,” according to a report written by a Defense Science Board task force headed by retired Air Force Gen. Larry Welch, a former chief of staff.
Considering the level of resources dedicated to ensuring the 5th Bomb Wing could meet standards — including the arrival of new senior noncommissioned officers from other bases — Kristensen said he worries about nuclear security not only at Minot but across the service.
“It makes you wonder what’s going on elsewhere, like the nuclear weapons stationed at bases overseas, and at Barksdale Air Force Base and Whiteman Air Force Base,” he said.
ACC officials said the command will continue to support the 5th Bomb Wing’s leadership and provide the manning to fix security problems.
“We take our responsibilities to protect and safeguard weapons with the utmost seriousness, and understand there is zero tolerance for errors,” according to an ACC statement.
Airmen with the 5th Bomb Wing can expect more long hours ahead as the wing scrambles to fix its security holes before ACC inspectors return.
“They really need to drill their people to make sure this can’t happen,” Kristensen said.
It’s not the first time airmen at Minot have heard such warnings.
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