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Ukraine - Superthread

I can't wait for the Russian explanation of this one....
Easy, someone was trying to check on their summer beach villa in Varna and the drone ran out of gas on the return trip.

 
I think 200k + KIA is a more realistic number for Ukraine, not including civilians.

However while both sides actively attempt to put out a public face that is much different from reality in terms of losses, both sides also have very different ‘legitimate’ reasons for bad data, on top of that.

1) UKR losses are vastly underestimated in the early stages of the war.
a) In occupied territories it is very hard to get an accurate count of the casualties.
b) Initial mobilization was at the point of everyone grab a gun etc.

2) Russia excludes various types of soldiers from their casualties
a) “LPR” and “DPR” personnel (presss gang mobilized or not) are not considered as part of the RuAF
b) PMC fighters until the ‘recent’ nationalization where not considered.
c) Convicts for the Storm Z Penal Battalions where not considered part of the RuAF.
d) Forces from other security elements (Rosy etc) are not part of the RuAF, and suffered significant losses early on. The Pre-Invasion Rosgvardiya strength was 380k. It dipped to 340k shortly after the invasion as they took significant losses not being equipped at the time for front line combat duties.

So @kirkhills numbers while likely accurate for the RuAF casualties also hides another few hundred K KIA losses to the Russian side.


I don’t think we will get a true cost of this war until the end, but I believe that it will exceed the Korean War which had ~3million dead on all sides (Military and Civilian).
Not sure I was clear. I meant Ukraine has only claimed about 270k Russians killed, 100k less than those compensation figures suggest. If you had told me they were overreporting by that same amount I would have thought it was totally plausible.

I'm not sure Ukraine gets much out of low balling those numbers. Maybe the Russians are misreporting pows or other mia as kia, especially if someone can steal the payments. But it also suggests a lot of Russian troops are expiring where Ukrainians can't tally them, meaning accidents, exposure, darwin awards, and shockingly bad medical care and overall health standards. Isn't 1.5 wounded per killed ratio somewhat low? And as you said a lot of other casualties in other services may not even be included yet.

I don't know how Ukraine is faring but absent any large encirclements I'm assuming their losses start at at least half the Russian numbers. Brutal, but they're fighting for national survival, which is a motivation Russia doesn't really have, propaganda notwithstanding.
 
It's like Jeremy Clarkson's V8 powered rocking chair.
jeremy-clarkson-v8.gif
 

Opening gambits in the South on Feb 24, 2022

20,000 to 1,500.

“The South Grouping of Forces was founded on a rotational basis. That is, some people arrived, then they were replaced by other people. If we take the total number of combat units, there were about 1,500 people at the time of the invasion,” Sokolov said.

In particular, he said that the 59th Brigade had approximately 1,300 personnel, as the brigade had left the JFO zone the day before in December 2021 and was restoring its combat capability. The restoration process had not yet been completed when they were appointed to the group. The soldiers were moved to the Oleshky Sands training area. The brigade’s staffing was up to about 60%.

 
M777 Gunners

Good video

Much better gun drill and gun platform in general then many others we've seen videos of. Gun is operating with standard sights and not digital gun management.

I find it interesting that these guns seem to not be as mobile as one would expect if there was good counter battery from the Russian side. The age old question of which makes guns more vulnerable - staying put or being spotted moving. I'm hoping to see some good data at some point in the future. While they seem to be staying put, I don't see the gun itself dug in.

Five days converting a trained gunner to the M777 is quite doable. We basically did that in 2005 for TF Orion in mid winter in Shilo. They'd just been flat-bedded in from Yuma Proving grounds after proof firing and immediately after were on an Antonov from Winnipeg to Afghanistan. We can do stuff when we have to.

🍻
 
Good video

Much better gun drill and gun platform in general then many others we've seen videos of. Gun is operating with standard sights and not digital gun management.

I find it interesting that these guns seem to not be as mobile as one would expect if there was good counter battery from the Russian side. The age old question of which makes guns more vulnerable - staying put or being spotted moving. I'm hoping to see some good data at some point in the future. While they seem to be staying put, I don't see the gun itself dug in.

Five days converting a trained gunner to the M777 is quite doable. We basically did that in 2005 for TF Orion in mid winter in Shilo. They'd just been flat-bedded in from Yuma Proving grounds after proof firing and immediately after were on an Antonov from Winnipeg to Afghanistan. We can do stuff when we have to.

🍻
Depending on location in theater at this point in time, there may be no credible Russian CB threat to them at all.
 
I've been watching/reviewing this map daily for a while now and what I've noticed for the last 4-6 days is that the amount of Ukrainian shelling of the area west of Melitopol to the coastline south of Kherson has dramatically increased and the amount of shelling east/north of Melitopol to Mariupol and north of it has fallen off significantly.

1) Is the shelling west of Melitopol because the Ukrainians are trying to suppress Russian reserves from moving to the east to counter the Ukrainian moves around Robotyne
2) Are the Ukrainians getting ready to attempt an assault in force of the left bank of Kherson area? Do you remember the notice to evocate to all families along the Kherson front that came out late last week?
3) Are there simply not enough targets for the Ukrainians to target east/north of Melitopol and west of Mariupol? Is Russian UAV/drone coverage so high in this area that the Ukrainians aren't willing to risk exposing their arty to counter-fire?
4) Also, note the amount of incoming Russian fire in the Kherson area vs the area north of Melitopol and Mariupol on the Ukrainian side

 
I've been watching/reviewing this map daily for a while now and what I've noticed for the last 4-6 days is that the amount of Ukrainian shelling of the area west of Melitopol to the coastline south of Kherson has dramatically increased and the amount of shelling east/north of Melitopol to Mariupol and north of it has fallen off significantly.

1) Is the shelling west of Melitopol because the Ukrainians are trying to suppress Russian reserves from moving to the east to counter the Ukrainian moves around Robotyne
2) Are the Ukrainians getting ready to attempt an assault in force of the left bank of Kherson area? Do you remember the notice to evocate to all families along the Kherson front that came out late last week?
3) Are there simply not enough targets for the Ukrainians to target east/north of Melitopol and west of Mariupol? Is Russian UAV/drone coverage so high in this area that the Ukrainians aren't willing to risk exposing their arty to counter-fire?
4) Also, note the amount of incoming Russian fire in the Kherson area vs the area north of Melitopol and Mariupol on the Ukrainian side

Hard to answer all of those from available OS releases.
1) the Russians have no real reserves at this point. All units are committed to actions at this point. There are enough OS reports of Russia moving units from one engagement area to another that it’s clear that the reserve pool is dry.

2) Ukrainians have 5-6 Bde in Kherson, plus 1k of Uk trained Marines who’ve spent 6 months training with the RM and Uk SOF - I would expect the AFU to conduct a lot of raids and harassment in that OA before any larger push. There has been a lot of talk of Tomcar type buggies, and other fast attack vehicles in that AO so a Kharkiv type offensive is at least theoretically possible. I think there needs to be more forces across the river before UKR commits to building bridges to bring heavy stuff across, and I don’t think they can use that effectively until the freeze anyway.

3) There are a lot of range band analysis on Twitter, as well as attrition rates, as well as RuAF admissions that I think it’s safe to say that the CB threat is very low and it’s a lack of targets combined with priority of targets elsewhere. The AFU has a large advantage in Arty there.

4) RuAF Arty efforts in Kherson seem to be heavily focused on civilian targets, to the detriment of military effects. This seems to be mirrored in several other locations as well.
 
Looks like VAC has expanded with new clients.

Russian Veterans Return From Ukraine And Find Themselves Ignored And Forgotten

 
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