Theater & Continental Balistic Missile Defence . . . and Canada

[Ostrozac]

On the plus side, once that North Korean ordnance hits Canada, we can invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and then we can get most of the gang back together from the 1950-53 war. So we'll have to take the hit, but we should have help on the counter attack.

 

[daftandbarmy]

On the plus side, once that North Korean ordnance hits Canada, we can invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and then we can get most of the gang back together from the 1950-53 war. So we'll have to take the hit, but we should have help on the counter attack.

Except that the current Pink Fluffy Unicorn Government will probably just drop parkas on the evil doers, the poor things

 

[Colin Parkinson]

the one thing protecting Vancouver is the large number of rich Mainland Chinese here, Beijing would not be pleased.

 

[daftandbarmy]

the one thing protecting Vancouver is the large number of rich Mainland Chinese here, Beijing would not be pleased.

That, and the wildly inaccurate North Korean missiles....

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

That, and the wildly inaccurate North Korean missiles....

They only have to get lucky once.....

 

[Colin Parkinson]

That, and the wildly inaccurate North Korean missiles....

Unless they target Bemberton and miss.....

 

[Old Sweat]

Unless they target Bemberton and miss.....

and have compensated for inaccuracy by fitting a honking big warhead on the missile. Also weapons effects, and more so with nukes, observe no geographical and political boundaries. As someone who grew up in the age of atmospheric nuclear testing, believe me that people were concerned about fallout.

 

[GAP]

The Stronium 90 scare was real

 

[Old Sweat]

The Stronium 90 scare was real

Indeed it was, and it seemed to accumulate in dairy products, or so I recall. Gap, what do you remember?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

All right, Colin, you got me confused: When you say Bemberton, do you mean Pemberton, B.C. or Bremerton, WA?

 

[MarkOttawa]

One thing that would likely prompt NORTHCOM to try to shoot down a missile tracking to Canada is fear of fall-out from warhead in US, depending on plot (NORAD?) for impact.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Ostrozac]

One thing that would likely prompt NORTHCOM to try to shoot down a missile tracking to Canada is fear of fall-out from warhead in US, depending on plot (NORAD?) for impact.

Mark
Ottawa

Ballistic missile defence of the US is actually a STRATCOM function, not a NORAD/NORTHCOM function. This makes sense as it means that missiles that cross geographic command boundaries (like a North Korean missile bound for North America) are handled by a single headquarters, and probably keeps shoot/no-shoot decisions out of Colorado Springs, with it's sizable Canadian presence that has, in effect, requested not to be involved in ballistic missile defence except as a target.

An armed attack on Canada still violates the North Atlantic Treaty, so in the sense that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all, a US response would still be expected in the event of a strike on Canada, but a quick reading of Article 5 suggests that it wouldn't be triggered until after an attack actually occurs.

 

[GR66]

I'm wondering how accurately can they determine the EXACT target point for the warhead before they need to make the decision to intercept or not?  It looks like it's only around 150km or so from Ottawa to Fort Drum or 200km from Vancouver to Seatle/Bremerton.  Would they risk it?

Also, there is likely a difference between the stated policy of the US vs. what they would actually do if they saw a potentially nuclear armed missile headed for a North American target.  While they wouldn't be obliged in any way to defend Canada it would likely have political ramifications with all of their allies if they were seen to be able to prevent a humanitarian disaster and chose not to do anything about it. 

All the more reason then for Canada to do the right thing and help pay for that protection instead of taking a free ride.

 

[Halifax Tar]

All the more reason then for Canada to do the right thing and help pay for that protection instead of taking a free ride.

Don't say that in public.  Gerald Butts is listening and you will be scooped up and sent to a Laurentian re-education camp...

 

[Colin Parkinson]

All right, Colin, you got me confused: When you say Bemberton, do you mean Pemberton, B.C. or Bremerton, WA?

I wish they would hit Pemberton  >  I meant Bremerton, WA Naval Station

 

[daftandbarmy]

I wish they would hit Pemberton  >  I meant Bremerton, WA Naval Station

But what about the potatoes?

 

[MarkOttawa]

CGAI piece on Canada and missile defence, with good historical detail.  How about BMD capability for RCN Canadian Surface Combatants?  Conclusion on the article:

The Train Long Departed: Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence
...
While Canada has been blessed by the security afforded by its proximity to and friendship with the United States, ballistic missile proliferation has aptly reminded us that mere assumptions associated with geography, association and good will are simply insufficient. Longstanding limitations as a middle power, chronic military deficiencies and inescapable dependency upon its principal ally leave Ottawa with few choices in dealing with the significant and growing threat that ballistic missiles pose. With continental defence arrangements having long constituted a critical factor in achieving our security objectives, it only makes sense to invest further in suitable collaborative courses with the United States. In this respect, values and principles need to be put in their proper perspective and greater pragmatism applied in securing vital interests. The Canadian government can no longer afford to merely wait and hope for the best; rather, it needs to earnestly prepare for the worst.

Thirteen years following Canada’s decision to abstain from participation, the ballistic missile defence “train” has long departed the station. While the United States would almost certainly welcome involvement at this late stage, associated requirements will have changed with the maturation of ballistic missile defence architectures, technologies and operational dynamic. Accordingly, the price of admission will also have changed. Given this, the Canadian government needs to recover lost ground by not only signalling its desire to join, but also determining how to render itself a useful participant within a much-expanded international partnership. While there will invariably remain those who will decry it, participation would remain consistent with a precept long-embodied in NORAD; that is, the indivisibility of North American aerospace defence. It is, therefore, only reasonable to accept partnership in ballistic missile defence as a necessary graduation in securing Canada’s vital defence and security requirements.

About the Author

David Higgins served in the Canadian Forces Reserve before enrolling in the Regular Force in 1980. An Air Combat Systems Officer, he served as a tactical and long-range navigator and mission specialist on various Canadian Forces and allied nation aircraft. He was also employed in a variety of aircrew training capacities, including Tanker-Transport-Bomber Instructor and Chief of Standardization and Evaluation (United States Air Force Air Education and Training Command) and Advanced Flight Commander (Canadian Forces Aerospace and Navigation School).

His senior appointments have included Commander 9 Wing/CFB Gander; Director of Continental and Western Hemisphere Policy, National Defence Headquarters; Vice Director of Plans, North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and Commander 8 Wing/Canadian Forces Base Trenton. He also served as Policy Advisor to the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Policy Member of the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, a Command Director of the NORAD-United States Space Command Operations Centre and Air Mobility Advisor to the Commander 1 Canadian Air Division. His final military appointment was as Director Arms Control Verification in the Strategic Joint Staff, responsible for the planning, coordination and implementation of Canada’s proliferation security and confidence- and security-building programme, as prescribed by the treaties, agreements and arrangements established within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations, including the Conference on Disarmament.

David is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course and National Security Studies Course. He holds a Doctorate in War Studies from King’s College London, Masters degrees in Defence Studies (Royal Military College of Canada) and Diplomacy (Norwich University) and a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Toronto.
https://www.cgai.ca/the_train_long_departed_canada_and_ballistic_missile_defence

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

From end of Preface (whole doc at link)--what's poor Justin to do, even though reference to allies is to their overall capabilities, not missile defence specifically?

Pentagon 2019 Missile Defense Review
...
The logic of the 2018 NDS [National Defense Strategy] is simple; a more lethal and agile Joint Force, coupled with a more robust system of allied and partner capabilities that are designed to be interoperable with ours [emphasis added], will preserve an international order that is most conducive to peace and prosperity. The defense strategy stresses the readiness of today’s armed forces and prioritized development of future capabilities.
https://news.usni.org/2019/01/17/pentagon-2019-missile-defense-review

Some references to NORAD, Canada:

P. 71 PDF:

NORAD and the U.S. Air Force are upgrading aircraft that monitor the U.S. airspace with new sensors capable of tracking and targeting challenging offensive air threats like advanced cruise missiles.

And what is RCAF doing with CF-18s and our airspace?

P. 102 PDF: US:

will continue to work with Canada to modernize NORAD’s ability to detect, track, warn, and defend against air-breathing threats, including advanced cruise missiles [air-launched, sea-launched]. United States and Canada are conducting a joint examination of options to renew or replace the North Warning System, a bilateral integrated network, and adapt this capability to new threats.

How much are we willing/able to spend?

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

More on NORAD and cruise missile defence (capabilities of CF-18, then new RCAF fighter?):

Missile Defense Review Calls for Protecting US From Cruise Missiles
...
The North American Aerospace Air Defense Command, NORAD, is “pursuing a three-phased plan to improve the defense against cruise missiles for the United States and Canada.” It talks about how the military is upgrading warplanes with new sensors that can track cruise missiles.

“Adapting existing capabilities to perform new missions for homeland and regional missile defense will also be necessary,” the report states.

Radar and sensors on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter “can track and destroy adversary cruise missiles today,” the report states. In the future, the warplane “can be equipped with a new or modified interceptor capable of shooting down adversary ballistic missiles in their boost phase [emphasis added].

Karako said the cruise missile defense work by NORAD had already been under way.

“There’s a lot more than can be done,” he said.

Specifically, the report talks about plans to “bolster homeland defenses against cruise missile threats” to Washington, DC, which could be expanded to encompass the rest of North America. While it doesn’t go into details, the military officials have been sounding the alarm on threats to U.S. cities from cruise missiles.

“NORAD is expanding surveillance capabilities around the [Washington, DC, region],” the report states. It plans to “incorporate emerging technology and explore new options to expand surveillance and tracking of cruise missiles for the rest of North America.”

In a July interview, Raytheon CEO Thomas Kennedy touted the company’s NASAMS interceptors, which defend against low-flying objects, like cruise missiles and drones.

“We’re expanding that system because of the evolving threat,” Kennedy said. “We’re introducing something called AMRAAM-ER, it’s an extended-range AMRAAM that will significantly enhance the capabilities of our NASAMS systems.”

NASAMS interceptors are positioned around Washington, D.C., to defend against aircraft. Oman has purchased the interceptors as well.

In 2015, there was talk of using aerostats with radars to detect cruise missiles. The project gained widespread notoriety when a test blimp in Maryland broke free from a tether to the ground and floated north before deflating in Pennsylvania.

Now the Pentagon is focusing on using a new constellation of satellites to detect [really fast] missiles.

“Space-basing for sensors provides significant advantages,” the report states. “Such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and potentially targeting of advanced threats, including [hypersonic glide vehicles] and hypersonic cruise missiles.”
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2019/01/missile-defense-review-calls-protecting-us-cruise-missiles/154266/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

What about RCN CSCs?

Missile Defense Review Directs Numerous Studies
...
Another six-month study will be conducted by the U.S. Navy and MDA to develop a plan for converting all Aegis destroyers to be fully missile defense capable, including against ballistic missiles, within 10 years. Separately, the Pentagon will study repurposing the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Center in Hawaii to strengthen defense against North Korean missile capabilities. MDA and the Navy will evaluate the viability of this option and develop an emergency activation plan within 30 days of the defense secretary green lighting the decision, the report says...
http://aviationweek.com/defense/missile-defense-review-directs-numerous-studies

Mark
Ottawa