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Sexual Misconduct Allegations in The CAF

daftandbarmy

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We can also blame a great host of senior officers and GOFO who preferred pursuing the functions of bureaucrats - the ones who wanted to do capital project management, major procurements, or policy as opposed to managing the force, controlling operations, or stewarding the profession. There is a similar host of bureaucrats who wrongly decided their area of responsibility was in the CAF fields that our officers were ignoring. There is also the current MND for whom the position has been more an imagined continuation of his reserve identity than any actual effort to keep the CAF accountable.

As far as I could tell, his 'Reserve identity' was about as self-servingly political as his other political career :)
 

FJAG

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I feel you are very emotionally invested in Hellyer being responsible for integration, but the evidence does not support that.
Actually it does but you have to properly define what "Integration" is.

"Integration" took place under Hellyer with a 1964 amendment to the National Defence Act. This amendment got rid of the three "service chief" in favour of one Chief of Defence Staff. At the same time the three service headquarters were "integrated" into one headquarters CFHQ. Subordinate to CFHQ there now were six commands: Maritime, Mobile, Air Defence, Air Transport, Materiel and Training.

Prior to that, and through it, NDHQ existed and continued to exist as a separate entity.

In 1966, "unification" took place as the result of The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act (still under Hellyer). This legislation was responsible for getting rid of the three services themselves and abolishing the titles Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force and Canadian Army and replacing then with ones service, the Canadian Armed Forces. This was accompanied by the adoption of a single uniform and rank structure and a reorganization of commands and people and base structures etc etc.

Again, NDHQ stood separate as an entity.

The subsequent merging of NDHQ and CFHQ in 1972 was "an integration" of sorts but not "THE INTEGRATION" which had happened 8 years earlier under Hellyer.

🍻
 
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KevinB

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If we are looking for blame, it starts with Donald MacDonald and his civilianizing integration of NDHQ. But the list goes longer than him. Who was the recruiting team that made the magazine add that depicted an officer with a briefcase and presented the officer corps as just like any industry executive class? They fed the problem.

We can also blame a great host of senior officers and GOFO who preferred pursuing the functions of bureaucrats - the ones who wanted to do capital project management, major procurements, or policy as opposed to managing the force, controlling operations, or stewarding the profession. There is a similar host of bureaucrats who wrongly decided their area of responsibility was in the CAF fields that our officers were ignoring. There is also the current MND for whom the position has been more an imagined continuation of his reserve identity than any actual effort to keep the CAF accountable.
I believe that occurred under PET's watch with the Civil Service - and tying salaries to equivalent positions etc.
Effectively bureaucratizing the CAF.

While I love to demonize PET, and I won't mis an opportunity to throw him under the bus, you cannot overlook the fact that in 50 years no one GOFO or MDN has managed to solve it.
That is a fail, and a major one.



And, as you note, the problem is decades in the making. Where originally people strayed from their lanes, everyone around today has been exposed to it through our whole careers to the point that many believe this is what right looks like.

We now have a culture where orders are for corporals not colonels, and too many are ready to ignore orders when they think they know better than the guy in charge. We are not going t fix that so long as suits and uniforms are interchangeable in all the various ADMs.
The crux of the matter is exactly the above -- civilian staff are there to administrate - not command, and to provide continuity as the "green suiters" rotate in and out.
I also believe that the Military (not just the CF, as I see it down here too) does a piss poor job of delineating lines of responsibilities in projects and even commands between soldiers and civilians.
… and since we are in the process of calling out relevant points of failure, let’s not forget whatever team has been responsible for (though still has not yet) done the work to implement transition from summary trials to hearings.

This. This is the right answer.

We don't expect anything from politicians or civilian employees - but we do have a right to expect things from Commissioned Officers, an oath is taken - and expectations and promises exchanged.
 

Blackadder1916

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"Through his application for judicial review, Fortin was asking the Federal Court to order the government to reinstate him to his former job at PHAC or for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to assign him a post of equivalent military grade."

Well. there is that recently created position reviewing recommendations about something or other under the VCDS that became vacant even before another MGen settled his backside into the chair.


Judge throws out Maj.-Gen. Dany Fortin’s bid to reverse firing as head of COVID-19 vaccine rollout​

Federal Court Justice Ann Marie McDonald wrote in a 20-page decision that Fortin must go through the military grievance process first

OTTAWA – A judge has thrown out Maj.-Gen. Dany Fortin’s attempt to have the Federal Court reverse his firing as head of Canada’s COVID-19 vaccine rollout, saying he needs to go through the military grievance process first.

“MGen Fortin has not demonstrated that the decision to remove him from his PHAC position cannot be redressed through the CAF grievance process. Therefore, he must avail himself of the grievance process before proceeding on judicial review,” Justice Ann Marie McDonald wrote in a 20-page decision released Tuesday.

In the spring, Fortin asked the federal court to judicially review the government’s decision to remove him from his secondment as vice president logistics and operations at the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) in May.

Maj.-Gen. Fortin was removed from his post back in May, months after he was informed that he was under investigation by military policy for alleged sexual misconduct.

Through his application for judicial review, Fortin was asking the Federal Court to order the government to reinstate him to his former job at PHAC or for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to assign him a post of equivalent military grade.

But lawyers for the attorney general replied by asking the federal court to throw out the application, arguing that his lawsuit was premature because he had not filed a military grievance first.

In her decision, Justice McDonald agreed with government lawyer Elizabeth Richards.

“In my view, the high-profile nature of MGen Fortin’s position and the allegations of political interference are not exceptional circumstances that allow him to bypass the internal grievance process,” reads the decision.

“Similarly, the reinstatement request made by MGen Fortin is more properly considered by the CAF and not by the Courts. MGen Fortin is and has always been a member of the CAF and the essential nature of the issues he raises are clearly service-related matters that should be addressed internally.”
 

Happy Guy

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I believe that occurred under PET's watch with the Civil Service - and tying salaries to equivalent positions etc.
Effectively bureaucratizing the CAF.
The movement to tie in the military pay to the civil service commenced in the 1960s. Back then the military trades were dissatisfied with their pay in comparison with their civil service and private sector counterparts. The dissatisfied highly trained military technicians were leaving and joining the civil service or the commercial sector - sounds familiar? The military initiated a study into this with the aim of improving the military pay with the hopes of reaching near parity with the civil service. One of the recommendations of the study was to link military pay with the civilian service and one of the other recommendations was the creation of specialist pay which ended having the following pay categories for all NCMs :
Standard. 80% of the population.
Spec 1. 15% of the population
Spec 2. 5% of the population.
The % were dictated by Treasury Board and remains in effect today.

I won't go into the assessment of the trades as this is will take some time and the information is considered sensitive. I will add that all NCM trades are assessed on a regular basis and the board consists of a representative (CWO/CPO1 or MWO/CPO2) from each of the environments, the Board Chairman and an independent observer (civilian). Having participated in these assessments I will tell you that everyone tries to be fair. It is up to the individual trades to present their case to the board to justify spec pay.
 

Good2Golf

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"Through his application for judicial review, Fortin was asking the Federal Court to order the government to reinstate him to his former job at PHAC or for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to assign him a post of equivalent military grade."

Well. there is that recently created position reviewing recommendations about something or other under the VCDS that became vacant even before another MGen settled his backside into the chair.


I guess we’ll see November 5 whether the Fed Govt, through its QC Courts proxy, will double-down on Fortin, or we’ll see charges dropped due to “a more recent assessment as to the likelihood of prosecution, indicating that said likelihood of prosecution is not as strong as it was before the Federal election previously.”

So, Fortin will grieve to the Initial Authority (the guy who removed him) and if told to keep pounding sand, then to the Final Authority…as yet untested beyond CDS, but one would assume the MND, because if the FA remained the CDS, could one expect fair consideration by the FA if they were the same as the IA to find against Fortin’s grievance.
 

ballz

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No one should be suprised by this.

He must be.... what an insanely expensive way to get a grievance submitted.

Either he ignored his lawyer's advice, or he should sue his lawyer for negligence for taking him down this path. And in saying that, "I'm too special to follow the normal procedure" is a pretty bad look to boot.
 

daftandbarmy

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He must be.... what an insanely expensive way to get a grievance submitted.

Either he ignored his lawyer's advice, or he should sue his lawyer for negligence for taking him down this path. And in saying that, "I'm too special to follow the normal procedure" is a pretty bad look to boot.

“What you do speaks so loudly I cannot hear what you are saying."

- Ralph Waldo Emerson
 

OldSolduer

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If we have cleans lines of responsibility, there is no ducking when it comes time enforce discipline, or to being found culpable if an officer fails to enforce discipline and generally take care of the welfare of subordinates- see QR&O Vol 1 chapter 4.02.
What you say is correct. There is way too much "commanding by committee" with no one taking responsibility for poor decisions.

Victory has many parents but defeat is an orphan - or words to that effect.
 

Edward Campbell

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Actually it does but you have to properly define what "Integration" is.

"Integration" took place under Hellyer with a 1964 amendment to the National Defence Act. This amendment got rid of the three "service chief" in favour of one Chief of Defence Staff. At the same time the three service headquarters were "integrated" into one headquarters CFHQ. Subordinate to CFHQ there now were six commands: Maritime, Mobile, Air Defence, Air Transport, Materiel and Training.

Prior to that, and through it, NDHQ existed and continued to exist as a separate entity.

In 1966, "unification" took place as the result of The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act (still under Hellyer). This legislation was responsible for getting rid of the three services themselves and abolishing the titles Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force and Canadian Army and replacing then with ones service, the Canadian Armed Forces. This was accompanied by the adoption of a single uniform and rank structure and a reorganization of commands and people and base structures etc etc.

Again, NDHQ stood separate as an entity.

The subsequent merging of NDHQ and CFHQ in 1972 was "an integration" of sorts but not "THE INTEGRATION" which had happened 8 years earlier under Hellyer.

🍻
I'm going to disagree. There are and were, in the 1960s, precise (and agreed) definitions of "unification" and "integration." Many countries, led by the USA but including the UK had already unified their armed forces: they had a single Chief of the Defence Staff (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), they had unified joint staffs; some had unified commands like the US' EuropeanCommand, Atlantic Command and Pacific Command within which there were single service components like US Army Europe (USAREUR) and US Air Force Europe (ASAFE). Canada went one (quite large) step in that direction with commands like Maritime Command within which there were two fleets and a Maritime Air Group with units in support of each fleet. Mobile Command had army brigades (in Canada and in Germany) and a mix of tactical (fixed wing) fighter and transport squadrons and rotary wing squadrons, too.

The big problem with a unified force for Canada was that Canada lacked navy admirals and army generals with enough vision to understand that their air assets were as important as their ships and tanks and bayonets. Canada had equally weak air force generals but they saw an opportunity and, in 1975, they executed a nonsensical military travesty of the highest order: Air Command.

I was told, by which I am 99% certain is an unimpeachable source that when Mr Hellyer and his CoS, Group Captain Bill Lee, an RCAF Public Relations specialist, went to Washington in the mid 1960s the Americas said" "Unify the bejeezus out of your navy, army and air force but be very, Very, VERY carful about integration 'cause we've tried it, with a few organizations like the Defence Communications Agency and an integrated Transport Command, and it ~ putting people from quite different backgrounds into the same units ~ is more trouble than it's worth."

But we did try it; integration ~ one single, service, the "jolly green jumper" and all that ~ was the sizzle that Mr Hellyer and GC Lee were selling to the public; unification was the steak which Mike Pearson, the bureaucrats and the admirals and generals all wanted because, US and UK experience suggested, unified forces could do more with less. We threw out the baby in 1975, the bathwater didn't follow until the 2000s.
 

FJAG

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I'm going to disagree. There are and were, in the 1960s, precise (and agreed) definitions of "unification" and "integration." Many countries, led by the USA but including the UK had already unified their armed forces: they had a single Chief of the Defence Staff (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), they had unified joint staffs; some had unified commands like the US' EuropeanCommand, Atlantic Command and Pacific Command within which there were single service components like US Army Europe (USAREUR) and US Air Force Europe (ASAFE). Canada went one (quite large) step in that direction with commands like Maritime Command within which there were two fleets and a Maritime Air Group with units in support of each fleet. Mobile Command had army brigades (in Canada and in Germany) and a mix of tactical (fixed wing) fighter and transport squadrons and rotary wing squadrons, too.
I'm going to disagree with you in turn.

The terminology that needs to be looked at is the one in context to the Canadian experience.

The US for example is a completely different one. The key element is that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not command anything and his role is not to lead either an integrated or a unified command. The Chairman is simply the principle military advisor to the president and is, by law, prohibited from exercising operational command over any part of the armed forces although he assists the President and Secretary of Defence in the exercise of their powers. On the other hand, the CDS is charged under the NDA with "control and administration of the Canadian Forces" and commands in the true sense of the word.

Commanders of US Unified Combatant Commands, on the other hand, have a unified headquarters but have no troops assigned to them. They have command and control only over those forces from the separate services assigned to the Component Commands affiliated with the specific UCC. For example ARCENT, NAVCENT, AFCENT etc with CENTCOM. The services remain separate and independent under the US military and departmental structure. The nearest equivalent we would have to a UCC would be CJOC but without the component command element.

Even the US Marines are not a comparison as they have air and land elements but not naval. The Marines are their own service but belong to the Department of the Navy.

In short unification and integration are flexible terms and need to be looked at in context.

In Canada's case Hellyer's plan worked on a continuum from his 1964 White Paper with two key stages. 1) The creation of a CDS and integration of the three services command structures in 1964; and 2) unification of the three services into one service in 1968.

Here's a short excerpt from a CFC staff paper.
The White Paper on Defence published in March 1964 set the final stage for unification of the Canadian Army, RCN and RCAF into the Canadian Armed Forces. The time involved significant US and Soviet tension, an increased demand for domestic social programmes, increased cost of a military which was in need of modern equipment, and an entrenched alliance system whose focus and potential action was across the Atlantic.66 The document stands out as important with respect to civil-military relations in Canada. It was to reaffirm all the existing roles in NORAD and NATO, but sought ways to make a more identifiable and economical contribution by the armed forces.67 Canada, with its proximity to the US, a country which would act unilaterally to defend itself with or without Canada’s participation, enjoyed the fringe benefit of being largely defended itself due to the unique geography of the continent. Canada was also a founding member of NATO and thus enjoyed a collective defence arrangement, allowing its own individual contribution to wane as allies were obliged to respond. This afforded Ottawa the luxury of pursuing idealistic notions such diplomacy and peacekeeping while seeking a more economical approach to defence. Hellyer felt the time was right for starting his changes to the functioning structure of the military.
Shortly after the White Paper was published, Bill C-90 became law creating a. “single Chief of Defence Staff and a functional structure for National Defence Headquarters.”68 This development effectively became known as integration and was a continuation of Claxton’s vision of integration within the department. After little debate, the minister announced his solution for the actual command structure of the military. Hellyer’s unification agenda was a break from what had come before, as he was effectively changing the inner-working of the armed forces. These changes would lead towards the creation of a truly unified force in theory, if not in practice.69 Once Bill C-243 passed in Parliament, unification came into effect on February 1, 1968.

And this from that font of all knowledge, Wikipedia
On 4 November 1966, Bill C-243, The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, was introduced to amend the National Defence Act. The aim of the bill was to reorganize the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force, previously separate and independent services, under one umbrella. Following the debate in the House of Commons and further examination by the Defence Committee, the Bill was given a third and final reading in April 1967, clearing the way for unification. The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act came into effect on 1 February 1968, creating one organization responsible for the defence of Canada, the Canadian Forces, and amending the National Defence Act.

And then there is Hellyer's 1964 White Paper itself which clear that initial integration and total unification is a two step process:
Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada.

The biggest problem with the entire process was Hellyer not having laid enough ground work to get consensus by the service chiefs and their staffs. Transformation of the military has been ongoing since day one and WW2 taught many lessons. The new Cold War was a financial shock for everyone in government who had expected a long peace dividend after 1945 and then had been disappointed with Korea and the Missile Crisis and the Berlin Wall etc etc. Basically the services were feeling their oats after the austerity that was imposed in the initial post war period when the total authorized strength of the full time military was 53,000. By 1963 that had grown to 120,871 and cost ballooned exponentially. Something needed doing and it was quite clear that there was much disagreement and hostility. Whether senior military leadership at the time was myopic or clairvoyant is a matter of much debate.

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The Bread Guy

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Latest variation on this theme ....
Canada’s top military commander wants his job back, saying he retains the moral authority to once again lead the Canadian forces after an investigation into a sexual-misconduct allegation cleared him of any charges.

The federal government, however, has placed him on administrative leave pending its own review after a probe by military police was concluded.

“I’ve been exonerated,” Admiral Art McDonald said in his first interview since he stepped aside from his position early this year when the investigation began.

“It is now time for the institution to step up, accept the results of the investigation, return me to my duties – or at least start a dialogue around an alternative approach,” he said ...
Archived link here if link posted above doesn't work.
 

Happy Guy

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I worked directly for LGen Cadieux while on an ops tour. From what I've seen working with him he is a morally straight up outstanding example of what an Officer and human being should be. I sincerely hope that this allegation is proven to be untrue and that he is allowed to command the Canadian Army. If we lose him, like the CAF lost Adm McDonald (the investigation exonerated him), then the CAF will be losing one of the most gifted leaders we have in recent times.

I'm surprised that the PM himself did not honourably step aside when allegations of sexual harassment were made public ('I am confident that I did not act inappropriately,' Trudeau says of groping allegation). Based on the actions on our military leaders, the PM should step aside now and his replacement be named shortly.

Yeah - I'm pissed!

Mod edit - link removed.
 
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