Secret War Files: the Mace (Falaise 44)

[Petard]

The history channel has a fascinating series on the reexamination of secret logs and files, in particular ultra, to put forth some interesting arguments on why certain critical battles during the latter part of the Normandy campaign turned the way they did.

For operation Totalize its suggested it was because of a missed address group on a vital piece of intelligence, that caused an unnecessary delay of the Canadian advance. The show then gives a good explanation of the consequences of that failure.

In the case of the Polish Bde's occupation of key terrain, the Mace, they outline two possibilities why it went wrong: poor navigation because of a French guides misunderstanding of the village the Poles wanted to go to, or a hot head of a Battle Group Commander striking at what he thought was a target of opportunity

Finally, during the battle for the Mace itself, high ground overlooking the notorious Falaise gap, the program looks at some of the tragic missed opportunities. Once again caused by the fog of war and simple misunderstandings in the heat of the amount, but also, it is implied, by a mistrust of their own intelligence staff.

A very well done show, I thought. I'm not a fan of recreation of certain historical events, but this one has a good blend of that, archival photographs and newsreel footage, and modern day battlefield tours. I think the show also makes far better use of 3D computer maps and graphics than other similar programs like Tank Battles. All of which helps the viewer follow the point being made in what, at imes, is a very complex story..

Best of all, are the interviews of veterans themselves that fought there. Still incredibly humble, yet their testimony puts a very real human face to the event. Thank god we still have them to share their stories first hand.
Check it out on the link, you'll have to navigate through the site a bit to find it, but well worth it.
http://www.history.ca/video/default.aspx

 

[daftandbarmy]

I visited the Mace and surrounding area on a 'bottlefield tour' a few years ago. Very nice visitor's centre dedicated to the memory of the Poles who fought there. However, the local museum is pretty awful, so I would strongly suggest that anyone going there do a bunch of home work first, and bring your own maps, books etc.

 

[Old Sweat]

The missed address was on an Ultra reporting that 1 SS Panzer Division was being deployed to the west to take part in the Mortain offensive. It also was claimed that 12 SS Panzer Division was fighting against the British. The theory was that had Crerar, Simonds et al been included on the Ultra distribution, they would not have waited for the day bombing scheduled for early afternoon on 8 August. The host of the program made a good point except that:

a. by noon on 7 August, 1 SS Panzer Division had been identified fighting against the Americans and elements of 12 SS Panzer Division were known to be engaged against Second British Army.

b. the First Canadian Army intelligence appreciation issued at about 1330 hours on 7 August reported the above information, along with the warning that the location of the rest of 12 SS Panzer Division was unknown, as was the location of 101 SS Heavy Tank Battalion.

In my opinion, Simonds would have been unlikely to have changed his plan again. He already had changed it a couple of days before when 1 SS Panzer Division was taken out of the line and replaced with 89 Infantry Division. He also had advanced the start of the operation by 24 hours on Montgomery's request, a decision he might later have cause to regret. Guy Simonds was not the type to change his plan again, esecially as, to his mind, the bombing provided him with the extra insurance. The thinning out of the German lines was well known by both Crerar and Simonds, and on the afternoon of 7 August they were discussing exploiting past Falaise and advancing on to Trun.

 

[Journeyman]

In my opinion, Simonds would have been unlikely to have changed his plan again.

I agree whole-heartedly, for the reasons you gave, with emphasis on Simonds' personality and the risks inherent each time a plan is changed.

The program demonstrates a recurring theme in historical investigation -- the armchair quarterback who finds a document leading to an "ah ha!" moment, which often precludes consideration of many other factors extant.

 

[Old Sweat]

The program demonstrates a recurring theme in historical investigation -- the armchair quarterback who finds a document leading to an "ah ha!" moment, which often precludes consideration of many other factors extant.

For whatever it is worth, I had seen the message in question midway through my research. At first I thought it was a vital clue, but for a number of reasons, including the ones stated above, eventually decided to not make a big deal of it. The omission of First Canadian army on the distribution is mentioned in an endnote, which is about right.

Having said that, Mister?/Doctor? O'Keefe deserves credit for exploring the source.

 

[Journeyman]

Having said that, Mister?/Doctor? O'Keefe deserves credit for exploring the source.

Certainly.

I don't know him; from Canadian Army Journal, however,

Professor David O’Keefe is a military historian, teacher, documentary filmmaker and former officer with the Black Watch (RHR) of Canada. After studying at McGill, Concordia, University of Ottawa and Cambridge, David taught history at various locations over the last 15 years including the University of Ottawa, John Abbott College as well as the Lester B. Pearson and English Montreal School Boards.

From the footnotes in the article linked, he seems to have done his homework -- it's then a case of interpretation.

 

[qualicumwind]

The Battle of the Mace show is probably right in suggesting that the Falaise Gap could have been closed earlier if the Canadians and Poles had moved south more quickly.  The other side of the equation, though, is that the Americans and Free French forces to the south appear to have been more interested in liberating Paris than in closing the Gap and capturing the remnants of the German 7th Army.  The price for that decision was paid later in the Bulge.

My father was in the middle of the Falaise Gap from August 19 to 21.  Here is a link to an article he wrote about it.  It's the only first hand account of any length from the Canadians' perspective that exists.

http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/cmh/back%20issues/CMH/volume%209/Issue%203/Bridge%20-%20In%20the%20Eye%20of%20the%20Storm%20-%20A%20Recollection%20of%20Three%20Days%20in%20the%20Falaise%20Gap,%2019-21%20August%201944.pdf

 

[mike63]

The Battle of the Mace show is probably right in suggesting that the Falaise Gap could have been closed earlier if the Canadians and Poles had moved south more quickly.  The other side of the equation, though, is that the Americans and Free French forces to the south appear to have been more interested in liberating Paris than in closing the Gap and capturing the remnants of the German 7th Army.  The price for that decision was paid later in the Bulge.

My father was in the middle of the Falaise Gap from August 19 to 21.  Here is a link to an article he wrote about it.  It's the only first hand account of any length from the Canadians' perspective that exists.

http://www.wlu.ca/lcmsds/cmh/back%20issues/CMH/volume%209/Issue%203/Bridge%20-%20In%20the%20Eye%20of%20the%20Storm%20-%20A%20Recollection%20of%20Three%20Days%20in%20the%20Falaise%20Gap,%2019-21%20August%201944.pdf

Thanks very much for showing/sharing that link.  I read that article twice because it was so good and had never knew about that part of the war.  You can not beat first hand experience and we are slowly loosing our link to that history.