Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]

[McG]

A similar bit from the Globe and Mail suggests that it is that Russian nationalism that may be the biggest hazard for what comes next.

Putin, not oil prices, the author of Russia's miseries
The Globe and Mail
18 Dec 2014

Russia has been a country on the brink for a long time, held together by the force of Vladimir Putin’s personality. But even an 80-per-cent domestic approval rating cannot help Mr. Putin when so many economic forces are lining up against him. A deep dive in oil prices in recent weeks is simply the final nudge pushing Russia to the edge of the cliff.

The ruble’s value against the U.S. dollar has been cut in half this year; after the country’s central bank this week attempted to stem the tide by hiking interest rates to 17 per cent from 10.5 per cent, the markets responded by shaving 20 per cent off the value of the currency in a matter of hours. The ruble’s fall is linked to a 50-per-cent decline in oil prices since last summer. But oil prices alone have not caused Russia’s decline.

If Mr. Putin were the introspective type, he would have to accept blame for much of this situation. Russia has been shovelling money into its incursions in Ukraine and in retaliation is beset by an array of global trading sanctions. Foreign companies have become increasingly leery of the corrupt regime he oversees and have withdrawn in droves. Domestic investors are even wiser.

But Mr. Putin is defiant and defensive, and the worry now is what he may do next to try to distract from his problems. The worst case scenario is that he plays the nationalist card to provoke more military conflicts in neighbouring countries, a strategy he has employed in Ukraine with great domestic success.

There are those who think that sanctions should be eased, to help protect Russia from a full-out economic collapse. But unless Mr. Putin agrees to withdraw from Ukraine, any reversal on sanctions will be read as acceptance of his actions. That would reward aggression, and further empower him against what little domestic opposition still exists. It would give him a huge win.

No one wants Russia to sink further into economic turmoil. But Mr. Putin is the main author of his country’s misfortunes. His policies have damaged Russia’s global relationships and left few tools in place for western countries or corporations to help clean up its growing mess.

 

[a_majoor]

And WRM suggests that Putin may well become more dangerous as his options become more limited:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/12/16/ruble-crisis-puts-putins-back-against-the-wall/

Ruble Crisis Puts Putin’s Back Against the Wall
WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
Putin’s path of least resistance is the path of greatest danger for Russia.

It’s panic time in Moscow, as the deadly double whammy of collapsing oil prices and Western sanctions is knocking the Russian economy into recession. Nothing the government can do has been able to stem the accelerating selloff in Russian assets, and the meltdown has gone so far that average people increasingly understand that their economic futures are at risk. And for good reason, as Reuters explains:

The rouble plunged more than 11 percent against the dollar on Tuesday in its steepest intraday fall since the Russian financial crisis in 1998 as confidence in the central bank evaporated after an ineffectual rate hike…

It has now fallen close to 20 percent this week, taking its losses this year against the dollar to over 50 percent and raising memories of the crisis in 1998 when the currency collapsed within a matter of days, forcing Russia to default on its debt… [A]nalysts say the country is on the brink of a full-blown currency crisis.

The Putin government has come to a fork in the road—and both of its choices look unpleasant. It can accept that the oil price collapse is forcing it to change paths in foreign policy and give up (at least for now) on its dreams of geopolitical revenge for the defeat in the Cold War—or it can double down on the fight against the West and the world system.

The first course is obviously the smartest from the standpoint of Russian national interest, but the second may make more sense in terms of the personal fortunes of one Vladimir Putin—and unless something changes in Russia, Putin is firmly in charge.

Putin has to be thinking in terms of using the crisis to enforce even tighter government control over Russia’s economy: cracking down on currency trading, increasing control over banks, possibly repudiating private as well as public debts to Western creditors. To make this work, he’d have to resort to claims that the West is in an all-out war to destroy Russia, and that national mobilization (under, of course, his inspired leadership) is the only way to save the country.

The long term prospects for such a course of doubling down on an aggressive foreign policy are not good; the Soviet Union was a lot stronger than Russia is today, and the USSR went down in poverty and defeat. And many of the Russian oligarchs and elites who have made huge fortunes under Putin would face massive financial losses if this plan goes forward. (They’ve already sustained heavy blows as Russia’s stock market implodes.) So to continue down this road, Putin will need to tighten his control over his supporters; the logic of Putin’s policy abroad is a more radical dictatorship at home. To justify the crackdown, Putin will need to convince Russians that the country faces a truly diabolical threat from beyond its borders, so we could well see him simultaneously embracing more confrontational policies abroad and a more totalitarian style of leadership at home.

Putin, who embodies a mix of geopolitical recklessness and shrewd calculation, will do his best to avoid being trapped into the harshest and most radical course. He will be looking for a strategy that avoids the worst economic consequences without giving up on his ambitions in Ukraine. One choice would be to do something dangerous and expensive from the standpoint of Russia’s longterm national interests, and double down on his relationship with China.

Putin has tried this route before, announcing large, long term gas deals with China as a way of underlining his independence from European energy customers. But those deals are long term and may never reach fruition. If he needs ready cash—and the increasing pressure on his shrinking foreign exchange reserves suggests that he soon may—he’ll have to find some compelling deals that the Chinese are willing to pay for up front. Fire sales of Russian assets to Chinese buyers could generate enough cash to ride out the storm in the financial markets, and China’s hunger for raw materials remains huge. Long term contracts to exploit mineral resources, sweetened perhaps with agreements not to contest Chinese influence in central Asia and so forth, could provide—at an extremely high cost to Russia’s own long term national interests—a way for Putin to ease the pressure he’s under now.

At the moment, China wants no part of Russia’s quarrel with the West. But, it also doesn’t want the U.S. to crush Russia once again. If there were a way for China to make extremely advantageous energy and mineral deals while also propping up a power that, like China, wants to see a reduced U.S. role in the world, Beijing just might lend Putin a helping hand.

It won’t come cheap, though: Beijing can see what a weak hand Putin has, and it will expect to be compensated—at Russia’s expense—for any help it offers the struggling strong man.

Another route Putin may opt for is to take measures to bring Russian oligarchical capital, which has been in full-on flight mode, back to Russia. One of the least-discussed parts of Putin’s recent annual state-of-the-country speech was his announcement of an amnesty that will allow the oligarchs to bring their money home without punishment.

There is one other alternative that the Dark Genius of the Kremlin may be turning over in his mind: Is there some way Russian foreign policy could create a Middle East crisis that would drive oil prices back up into the stratosphere? The most obvious way would be to bring about some kind of situation involving the Iranian nuclear talks—perhaps by offering quiet support to Iranian hardliners, increasing the chances that the talks fail. Any kind of serious war scare in the Persian Gulf would be good for Russia’s financial situation; Russian foreign policy experts are presumably thinking through their options.

One hopes for the sake of the long-suffering people of Russia that Putin somehow finds it in himself to turn away from the very dark path that now lies before him. But it won’t be an easy thing to do. He’s gone out on such a limb in Ukraine, introduced such a poisonously chauvinistic public mood in Russia, and alienated so many potential partners and interlocutors in the West that it will be extremely difficult for him to defuse the crisis while remaining in power.

The path of least resistance for Putin is the path of greatest danger for Russia; we shall see what choices he now makes—and we shall see if he has so thoroughly mastered Russia’s oligarchs and institutions that no effective opposition to him is possible even if he pushes the country further down the road to isolation and ruin.

 

[CougarKing]

A trade/customs union?

Associated Press

Leaders of Russia and 4 other ex-Soviet nations finalize creation of new ambitious alliance

MOSCOW - The leaders of Russia and four other ex-Soviet nations have completed the creation of a new ambitious alliance intended to bolster their economic integration.

The Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, comes to existence on Jan. 1. In addition to free trade, it's to co-ordinate the members' financial systems and regulate their industrial and agricultural policies along with labour markets and transportation networks.

(...SNIPPED)

 

[a_majoor]

Because Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan provide so much value added to Russia.

The ideal outcome for Russia is the Russians get to plunder the natural resources and exploit the labour resources of these nations for Russia's profit. the ideal outcome for us is they become even greater drags on the Russian economy, since as impoverished and underdeveloped nations they would demand Russian financial resources to participate in any projects and modernize their economies.

 

[vonGarvin]

Well, it's only fair.  The EU has such stalwart economic powers as Greece, and has taken on the burden of Ukraine, so I guess it balances things out

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Well, it's only fair.  The EU has such stalwart economic powers as Greece, and has taken on the burden of Ukraine, so I guess it balances things out

 

[McG]

Not sure if it is doctrine (as the article suggests) or policy, but regardless it would seem the Russia is expressly, publicly declaring a first-strike nuclear defence policy and is naming NATO as the key enemy.  Is the return to Cold War now complete?

Putin signs new military doctrine naming NATO as Russia’s top military threat
by Associated Press
National Post
26 Dec 2014

MOSCOW — President Vladimir Putin has signed a new military doctrine that describes NATO’s military buildup near the Russian borders as the top military threat amid Russia-West tensions over Ukraine.

The document released by the Kremlin on Friday maintains the provisions of the previous, 2010 edition of the military doctrine regarding the use of nuclear weapons. It says Russia could use nuclear weapons in retaliation to the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies, and also in case of aggression involving conventional weapons that “threatens the very existence” of the Russian state.

For the first time, the new doctrine says that Russia could use precision weapons “as part of strategic deterrent measures.” The document doesn’t spell out conditions for their use.

...

 

[vonGarvin]

Can't say that I blame them for this, and it's our (the West's) fault: we started it first when we started converting former WP nations and Soviet Republics to NATO.  Then the coup d'état in Kyiv (with or without our help is irrelevant: the fact is that "we" benefited from it and are now providing material support to Kyiv).

Best to keep a hands-off approach to anything the other side of the Bug river.

 

[dimsum]

Not sure if it is doctrine (as the article suggests) or policy, but regardless it would seem the Russia is expressly, publicly declaring a first-strike nuclear defence policy and is naming NATO as the key enemy.  Is the return to Cold War now complete?

CF bases in France and Germany back on the table?    :blotto:

 

[Edward Campbell]

Forcing the Russians to (stupidly) waste (spend) more and More and MORE on their national defence while, simultaneously, undercutting their economy, by all means, fair and foul, is the best tactic. We don't need to spend a lot more on defence ... just keep pressuring them.

The Chinese will, eventually, step in and "rescue" them, I think, but I doubt the Russians will like the rescue package very much, at all. (As someone pointed out earlier, the Chinese don't want the Russians to fall. Weaken and wither? Yes. Fall? No. The Chinese want to pick up the pieces of an only partially collapsed Russia - mainly the natural resources, especially water, oil and gas, in Central and Eastern Siberia.)

 

[a_majoor]

Can't say that I blame them for this, and it's our (the West's) fault: we started it first when we started converting former WP nations and Soviet Republics to NATO.  Then the coup d'état in Kyiv (with or without our help is irrelevant: the fact is that "we" benefited from it and are now providing material support to Kyiv).

Best to keep a hands-off approach to anything the other side of the Bug river.

Although *we* certainly benefit, it is also quite clear that the vast majority of Eastern European nations actively wanted to join the EU and become part of NATO in order to achieve a permanent severing of their "ties" to Russia. Other than allowing the formation of an Eastern European Union centred on Poland (which in the end is actually happening now), I'm curious as to what other COA there was? They clearly had no desire or intention of remaining under the Russian influence or inside any sort of Russian zone of influence, regardless of what Russia or the EU wanted...

 

[vonGarvin]

Simple COA: Partnership for Peace.

 

[a_majoor]

I remember that many of the nations involved looked at the Partnership for Peace as the essential first stepping stone for entry into the EU Zone and becoming integrated with the West (joining the EU, NATO etc.). If you are suggesting that the PfP should have been used as a sort of corral for Eastern European nations, my question would be was that a realistic proposition, given that it was the express desire for all these nations and peoples to exit the Russian "zone" as rapidly as possible?

Even if it it was somehow possible to corral the Eastern European nations into a PfP zone sandwiched between the EU and Russia, would that have been a better solution? I could certainly picture a grouping of nations centred on Poland which looked with suspicion and dread to the East, while being resentful of being excluded from the prosperous and peaceful West, hardly an improvement in my view.

I'm not disputing that the process that was followed in the real world could have been done differently, I'm saying that there were very strong forces at work to bring the Eastern European nations into the West, and not all these forces were coming from Bonn or Brussels.

 

[CougarKing]

Putin's grip on power weakening?

Reuters

After 15 years in power, Putin risks running out of luck

By Timothy Heritage

MOSCOW (Reuters) - When Vladimir Putin was handed power unexpectedly by an ailing Boris Yeltsin on the last day of the last century, his first move was to go on television to guarantee Russia the freedoms needed for a "civilized society".

Fifteen years later, his critics accuse the former KGB spy of sacrificing emerging political and economic freedoms to the idea of Soviet-style glory, bringing the country close to economic collapse and international isolation over Ukraine.

Opinion pollsters say his ratings are at near record highs and a groundswell of protest is unlikely in the near future.

(...SNIPPED)

Reuters

Putin foe found guilty of fraud; anti-government protest erupts in Moscow
The Canadian Press

By Nataliya Vasilyeva, The Associated Press

MOSCOW - President Vladimir Putin's chief political foe was convicted along with his brother on Tuesday in a fraud case widely seen as a vendetta by the Kremlin, triggering one of Russia's boldest anti-government demonstrations in years.

Police allowed a few thousand protesters to gather just outside Red Square for about two hours — a show of relative restraint for Russian authorities, who have little tolerance for dissent — before moving in to break up the unsanctioned rally by pushing the demonstrators toward subway entrances

(...SNIPPED)

 

[Kirkhill]

The Counter-Offensive Begins....

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11321207/Russias-Red-Army-Choir-cover-Pharrell-Williams-Happy.html

 

[The Bread Guy]

The Counter-Offensive Begins....

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11321207/Russias-Red-Army-Choir-cover-Pharrell-Williams-Happy.html

"Because I'm happy to be here, instead of doing traffic control in Novorossia right now ...."  >

 

[a_majoor]

Russia's military seems determined to go all out in developing combat robots. While the US has developed various sorts of combat robots, concerns about their effectiveness and ethical issues about control over autonomous killing machines have prevented them from being used to date. Russia already fields some of these devices, and things like the next generation Russian T-14 tank are claimed to have robotic turrets. The reasoning seems a bit fuzzy from these articles; are the Russians thinking ahead to the demographic crash when they will need to man the borders and the factory floors with half their current population, or are they looking at the here and now and massively upgrading the firepower available to their troops?

There is perhaps something to be learned for us in the CF: we have the need for lots of systems and enablers, but simply do not have the manpower (to field mortar platoons or fire support platoons in the Infantry, for example). A robot carrying an HMG/grenade launcher/automatic cannon or an automatic mortar similar in conception to the "Dragonfire" or the 2B9 Vasilek could move with the infantry (both mounted and dismounted) to provide heavy firepower for a fraction of the manpower needed to field a platoon that can provide the same amount of firepower and support. Robotic trucks to flesh out the logistics systems, and robotic engineering machines to carry out the most dangerous tasks are also real, near term possibilities that a rich, Western military could field.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/robots/russia-wants-autonomous-fighting-robots-and-lots-of-them-16787165

Russia Wants Autonomous Fighting Robots, and Lots of Them
Putin's military is busy building autonomous tanks with mounted machine guns and unmanned, amphibious Jeep-size vehicles.
By David Hambling
May 12, 2014 5:00 PM

A new video shows a Russian military robot doing something no American machine in service can match: firing a machine gun. It's hardly a technological triumph—the U.S. has been testing armed robots for decades. But while political and ethical caution has prevented the West from advancing with the concept, Russia seems determined to field a wide variety of combat robots.

The Russians call such robots MRKs, from the Russian for Mobile Robotic Complex. The latest is the MRK-002-BG-57, nicknamed Wolf-2. It's basically a tank the size of a small car with a 12.7-mm heavy machine gun. In the tank's automated mode, the operator can remotely select up to 10 targets, which the robot then bombards. Wolf-2 can act on its own to some degree (the makers are vague about what degree), but the decision to use lethal force is ultimately under human control.

Ramp-Up

Although the U.S. military fielded thousands of robots in Iraq and Afghanistan, these were used for bomb disposal and reconnaissance only. In 2007 the widely publicized deployment of three Talon/SWORDS robots fitted with machine guns ended in fiasco. The robots were confined to their base and never sent out on patrol because of fears of what might happen if anything went wrong. Work continues with MAARS, the successor to Talon/SWORDS, but there is no sign yet of anything being fielded. And when the budget gets tight, unmanned systems tend to feel the squeeze first.

While research stalls in the United States, Russia's leaders are determined to make their country a robot superpower. In January 2013, defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced plans to expand the army's use of robots. A few months later, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced a new production facility for military robots and a research center for military robotics. Rogozin says that someday soon, one Russian soldier will do the work that takes five or 10 soldiers today, which would be impossible without advanced robots.

Not surprisingly, then, Wolf-2 is far from Russia's only entry in armed robotics. In December, Shoigu visited Rzhevsky Proving Ground to watch a Jeep-size amphibious vehicle called Argo swim across a lake and fire at targets. In June Rogozin was treated to a display by the tank-like Nerehta with twin machine guns; the developers claim the stabilization is better than on Western models. (Rogozin advised adding some anti-tank missiles. This would give it effective firepower against other vehicles as well as against foot soldiers.

There are smaller machines for urban operations, like the Strelok or "Sharpshooter," a 5-foot by 2-foot robot armed with a Kalashnikov, that can slam through doors and climb stairs. Then there is the Metalliste, a short-range, grenade-lobbing device, a 110-pound six-wheeler that can mount a silenced submachine gun as well. It is supposed to reduce casualties to Interior Ministry police by keeping them out of harm's way.

Catch-Up

These unmanned systems represent a monumental undertaking, especially for a Russian military known not for high-tech systems but for rugged, reliable weapons that can be churned out in great numbers (think the T-34 tank, AK-47 Kalashnikov, and RPG-7 grenade launcher). Frank Tobe, editor of The Robot Report, says that the Russians have a lot of catching up to do when it comes to sophisticated fighting robots.

"My sources in Israel and the U.S. say that Russia is generations behind and not a serious participant in the growing science of unmanned vehicles," Tobe told Popular Mechanics.

But Mark Gubrud, an expert on emerging technology and a member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, believes the situation has the makings of an arms race.

"Russia will need years to catch up in robotics but is fully capable of doing so," Gubrud says. "This highlights the folly of pursuing a robot arms race. As the U.S. and U.K. are clear leaders in the race, they should equally well take the lead in calling it off." Would Russia really agree to call off the arms race? "I do believe they may support the initiative if others do, especially the U.S, U.K. and allies," Gubrud says.

We're still waiting to see whether Russia has the funding to back up its armed robot rhetoric. It is clear, however, that the push to develop Russia's own Terminators has support from the very top.

"These are serious combat systems, both attack and reconnaissance versions," President Vladimir Putin said last year, describing new Russian development in unmanned vehicles. "It is absolutely clear that they have good prospects."

 

[The Bread Guy]

Meanwhile, another retired Russian general has killed himself apparently because he couldn't get adequate cancer treatment:

Lieutenant general Anatoly Kudryavtsev, a 77-year-old former serviceman in the Russian air force committed suicide in Moscow on Tuesday according to Russian police, becoming the fourth case of a former high-ranking Russian military officer taking his own life in less than a year.

Police in the Russian capital said that they had found Kudryavtsev’s body in his flat in southwestern Moscow. It’s reported that he had hung himself and left a suicide note explaining that he had suffered "excruciating pain" as a result of his stomach cancer and that he did not “blame anyone” for his death.

According to official records Kudryavtsev served in the air force until 1993.

(....)

In June, 68-year-old retired Russian secret service agent general Viktor Gudkov was found dead by police in his flat in southern Moscow. He appeared to have shot himself in the throat with a gun awarded to him for his military service in Chechnya.

Gudkov was reported to have suffered a “serious illness”, which was said to have caused him to fall into a depression, though his health problems had not been specifically diagnosed before his death.

Several months prior, also in Moscow, the highly decorated major general Boris Saplin, who retired in 1989, committed suicide by shooting himself in the head with a prize gun which had been given to him after his service in the Soviet-Afghan war.

According to police, he too was suffering from cancer, leaving a short suicide note in which he complainined of an “immense headache”.

Earlier in the year in February, retired rear admiral of the Russian navy Vyacheslav Apanasenko also shot himself in the head in his Moscow apartment after also suffering from stomach cancer.

Apanasenko was found by police and rushed to hospital, where he remained in critical condition for 10 days until he passed away. His suicide note alleged his wife had tried to procure the necessary drugs to treat his condition but had been unsuccessful. He wrote: “I do not blame anyone for this except the government and our health care.” ....

 

[a_majoor]

The ramifications of Russias actions in the Caucus have not been subject to much analysis to date. This article from The American Interest is a good starting point:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/01/06/the-caucasus-after-ukraine/

The Caucasus After Ukraine
Sergey Markedonov & Maxim A. Suchkov

A look around the Caucasus shows that the various constituent countries have drawn vastly different lessons from the crisis in Ukraine.

The crisis in Ukraine seized the world’s attention for the better part of 2014, and it may be just the beginning of a broader trend in confrontation and competition between Russia and the West across Russia’s periphery.
Within the territory of Ukraine itself, the conflict has some risk of spreading. Ukraine has a 405 km-long border in its southeast with an internationally unrecognized pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria, which is locked in a “frozen conflict” with the government of Moldova. Before the current crisis in Ukraine blew up, Kyiv had acted as one of the guarantors of the peacekeeping process there (along with Russia, and with the OSCE as mediator). The new Ukrainian authorities have, however, changed tack on the region, constructing defensive fieldworks across the border and disallowing Transnistrians who hold Russian passports from crossing it. While the current economic malaise consuming Moscow’s elites makes it unlikely that the Kremlin will push events on behalf of the Transnistrians, Western policymakers focusing solely on events in the eastern half of Ukraine are ignoring a potentially dangerous situation.

But the real effects of the Ukraine crisis will be felt most profoundly in the South Caucasus, the least predictable hotbed of discontent in Eurasia, where the events in Ukraine are being watched attentively. Six of the nine armed conflicts in the space of the former Soviet republics are festering in the South Caucasus, and it is here that several destabilizing precedents—like the recognition of former autonomous areas (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia) as independent states—were first attempted by Moscow. It is also the only part of the former USSR where neighboring states have no diplomatic relations with each other (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia). Finally, it is a region of particular focus for Russian security services, which are preoccupied with the looming threat of cross-border Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, always apparently on the verge of spinning out of control.
The precedents and examples created by Ukraine’s Maidan protests, its civil war in the Donbass, and the case of Crimea are reverberating across the region. And although Ukraine itself has not historically been the biggest player on the South Caucasian chessboard, its role in regional affairs should not be underestimated.

Kyiv’s Strategic Ally

Georgia was among the first of the former Soviet republics to sign the treaty “On Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Help” with Ukraine, in April 1993. Ever since, Tbilisi has been Ukraine’s most loyal ally in the region. The dynamics and the content of the relationship have certainly changed over time, but what has been preserved and re-emphasized is a focus on strategic cooperation. Georgian elites viewed Ukraine as a new potential “elder brother”, and an alternative power center for Moscow’s policies in the post-Soviet space. The idea reached its zenith in the GUAM project in 2001, a trade and security pact uniting Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in a bid to counter Moscow’s predominant influence in the region. At one point, there was even a serious debate about the possible deployment of Ukrainian peacekeepers in the zone of Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.1

Today, Georgian elites regard the situation in Ukraine as a microcosm of the bigger geopolitical standoff between Russia and the West, rather than as a sui generis crisis that arose out of various domestic political developments. As a result, Georgia’s leaders are on tenterhooks, worrying if Tbilisi is next on Moscow’s list of states that need to be brought to heel. Make no mistake: the Ukraine crisis is currently a prime driver of Georgia’s ambitions for integrating into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

And these fears seem justified by the recent developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the Ukrainian conflict was cited by the breakaway factions as justification for further moves for outright secession. During the parliamentary elections in South Ossetia, the victorious “United Ossetia” party trumpeted reunification with North Ossetia in Russia. Similarly, the newly elected President of Abkhazia, Raul Khadzhimba, favors deeper politico-military relations with Russia and a freezing of all contact along the breakaway region’s frontier with Georgia. Moscow subsequently began preparing a new bilateral treaty, with emphasis on deeper trade integration and further liberalization of the border. It was finally signed last November.

Nevertheless, it’s important to note that the treaty was not some sort of unilateral triumph for the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions, as it was often portrayed in Western media. Though the Abkhaz elite was interested in having deeper relations with Moscow, it nevertheless managed to reject some key points in the treaty, such as a clause allowing Russians the right to acquire Abkhaz citizenship and to claim land and property there.

Though the worry that Moscow will incorporate the breakaway regions into its territory is certainly not farfetched, it is based on the assumption that it is now the Kremlin’s strategy to multiply “Crimean precedents” all across the post-Soviet space. The reality, however, is that Moscow has shown little appetite to extend the precedent to the Caucasus. Right after the five-day war with Georgia in 2008, for example, the Kremlin extended its Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership with Ukraine, originally signed on May, 31, 1997, for another ten years. This was at a time when Saakashvili’s close ally, Victor Yuschenko, ran the country. And more importantly, while it has expressed interest in a closer relationship with Georgia’s two breakaway entities, Moscow has repeatedly declined to discuss the regions’ change in status and any “incorporation” of new territories into the Russian Federation.
The truth of the matter is that Russia has little additional leverage to gain from outright annexation, and in fact would be only multiplying its liabilities, both economic and in the security realm, should these wayward territories be joined to it. And therein lies a potentially serious trap for Moscow. If the Russian-backed regions present the Kremlin with a direct plea for annexation, it will face an unpleasant choice: either disappoint its clients or further antagonize the West, cementing its reputation as a pariah state for more than a generation to come.

Nevertheless, none of this means that Russia will foreswear annexation eventually. Many Georgian leaders, in both the United National Movement party and the Georgian Dream, hope that Russia’s support for the separatist forces in Ukraine is ineluctably forcing the West to confront Russia both directly, through sanctions, and indirectly, by putting in place some kind of security framework in other post-Soviet states. Though there is precious little evidence that the West is tilting in this direction—both the Obama administration and the EU seem focused on keeping their disagreement with Moscow focused on what is going on in Ukraine alone—Georgian leaders’ most fervent wishes could well turn out to be the stuff of nightmares for them. For as history has repeatedly shown since the fall of the Soviet Union, pushing Russia out of areas where it perceives it has real national interests only increases its resolve. And this has little to do with Russia’s political or military swagger, or with dreams of recreating some kind of expansive empire on the ashes of the Soviet Union. It is, rather, the product of a genuine and broad resentment across Russian society for any and all foreign encroachments on its sovereignty. President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry can speak all they want of outmoded 19th-century ideas about spheres of influence, but if anyone in Washington or Brussels is at all perplexed by the resiliency of Vladimir Putin’s popularity, he need not look further than this very real psychological fact.

Ukraine Crisis as Accelerator of Eurasian Integration

The Ukrainian Maidan pushed Georgia’s neighbor Armenia in the opposite direction. While Yerevan had never been particularly close to Kyiv2, it was far from an open-and-shut case that the country would choose to join Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (as it did by signing a treaty on October of 2014 that gives it full membership in January 2015). There is no common border between Armenia and Russia, and tariffs and custom duties are already lower in Armenia than in the current members of the Eurasian Economic Union. Furthermore, the common border between Armenia and a Western-inclined Georgia, which is still angling for further Euro-Atlantic integration, could potentially also create problems.

Ideally, the Armenian leadership would have liked to stick to a balancing, “complimentary approach”, having both Russia and the West woo it, playing one off against the other just as Ukraine had managed to do to varying degrees after the Orange Revolution. After Maidan, however, it saw the Eurasian Union as the better deal: an opportunity to re-configure bilateral relations with Russia and to get some additional sweeteners from Moscow. The Association Treaty with the EU, the leadership judged, would just as surely scupper Yerevan’s “complimentary approach” without giving it any of the tangible benefits that Moscow was offering.
The government decision to do so, however, triggered a great deal of skepticism among some sectors of Armenia’s elites, and strengthened support for opposition parties. While the treaty may well be a done deal, the political ramifications may not yet be fully felt.

The other precedent Ukraine set for Armenia parallels what we have seen in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and has to do with the resurgence of nationalism in the region. There is growing sentiment across the political spectrum that the “re-incorporation of Crimea into Russia” justifies Yerevan’s striving to win back “Armenia’s historical lands” in Nagorno-Karabakh. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the summer of 2014 saw the largest number of reported cases of ceasefire violations in the region since overt hostilities ended in 1994. Over the last week of July and first week of August, there were more than 1,500 breaches of the ceasefire on both sides, resulting in at least 24 dead. In one of the most serious incidents, an Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army plane was shot down by the Azeri military this November. This is all truly regrettable, as Nagorno-Karabakh has probably been the only conflict in the post-Soviet space where, despite differences in interests and positions, Russia and the West (the United States and France) cooperated within the OSCE Minsk group with relative success over two decades.

And the international community is being far from helpful. As the crisis in Ukraine grew more heated with each passing week, each member of the OSCE Minsk group tasked at policing the conflict—the United States, Russia and France—insisted more vehemently on pursuing its own policy without coordinating with the others. This led to a particularly silly series of repetitive meetings between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, first mediated by President Putin in August, then by Secretary John Kerry in October, and then by French President François Hollande in November.

Azerbaijan: Between the Energy and Revolution

Azerbaijani interpretations of the developments in Ukraine, however, are based on different premises than those of its neighbors. For one, Azerbaijan has been Ukraine’s principal partner since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992. Unlike Georgia, the strategic focus between the countries has been the creation of an alternative energy supply route to minimize Russian influence. Just before the protests sparked on the Maidan, then-President Victor Yanukovich declared Ukraine to be a reliable transit-state for Azerbaijan’s energy exports, and called on Baku to consolidate this key segment of their nexus and to pool their efforts in supplying hydrocarbons to Europe. Yanukovich, of course, is there no more, but despite the outspoken criticism of his policies on the part of the current Ukrainian leadership, there’s every reason to presume that this specific area of Azeri-Ukrainian relationship will remain in place.

The strongly authoritarian government in Baku remains extremely wary of any signs of agitation for regime change on its territory and in its periphery. A little-known fact is that the Maidan first appeared as a symbol of civic and political activity in Azerbaijan during an 18-day rally in late November and early December of 1988. From that time, numerous small-scale Maidans have recurred across Azerbaijan, usually during election campaigns—for example in 2003 and 2005. This explains the circumspect way the Azerbaijani authorities have approached the Ukrainian revolution. Since the country’s territorial integrity with the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is brought in question by the precedents in Ukraine, the ruling elite in Baku have sensibly adopted a wait-and-see approach, until a real power center in Ukraine emerges that they can do business with.

One thing is for certain: the longer the conflict in Ukraine continues, the more ripple effects it is likely have across the Caucasus and the rest of Eurasia—ripples which can easily grow into sizable waves, given how divisive the conflict is proving across the post-Soviet space. The Ukrainian experience certainly will not be exactly repeated in any of the countries, but it has stirred passions across the political spectrum in all the important countries in the Caucasus, a region that neither Russia nor the West is likely to let go easily.

How one sees the Ukrainian revolution all depends on one’s “sitting point” (a favorite phrase of Ukraine’s second President, Leonid Kuchma). But by stubbornly clinging to the inviolability of its “sitting points” and by failing to work out a modus operandi, Ukraine could easily become a sticking point that leads to yet another era of deep mistrust, confrontation, and uncertainty between the West and Russia, with neither side a winner.

Dr Sergey Markedonov is Associate Professor at Russian State University for the Humanities. In 2010-2013 he was a Visiting Fellow at the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program (Washington, DC). He is the author of numerous works on the Caucasus and Black Sea security and ethno-political issues. Dr. Maxim A. Suchkov, formerly Fulbright Visiting Fellow at Georgetown University, is currently a Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies (Pyatigorsk, Russia), a contributor to Al-Monitor and to the Carnegie Moscow Center's Eurasia Outlook.

 

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More on Russian modernization plans for the future. It is interesting that they are focusing on area weapons (flame and thermobaric) rather than increasing the scale and scope of PGMs like Western nations (Think of things like the XM-25 or mini Spike Anti Personnel Guided Missile as examples of man portable Infantry PGM's.). The big question is can the Russian economy support this level of effort?

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/01/russia-will-deploy-innovative-special.html

Russia will deploy innovative special ammunition for better penetration of fortification and armor

Russia’s intendsto modernise much of its military in the coming years. Russia will spend about $600 billion from now to 2020 upgrading tanks, planes, missiles and ships.

The commander of Russia’s Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense (RBhBD) troops, Maj. Gen. Eduard Cherkasov, announced a focus on so-called ‘flame weapons’ – incendiary, thermobaric and fuel-air explosive (FAE) weapons – describing a program of modernisation and development.

Russia is creating special ammunition that will hit highly secure defense constructions. Shortly, infantry flame units will receive new weaponry with higher fire precision and the penetration before exploding effect, ability to destroy fortified emplacements, armoured equipment, and personnel in trenches.”

“Flame weapons are very efficient in close combat and have not only physically destructive but also psychological effect on an enemy.”

Some examples of existing flame based weapons and special ammunition

The RPO-A is a shoulder-fired recoilless weapon in a 93 mm calibre, with an effective range of approximately 200 meters. It enteredservice in Soviet times and remains in production today, however it has been supplemented in Russian service by the MRO-A. The MRO-A is a 72.5 mm rocket launcher with a total weight of 4.7 kg, and an effective range of around 90 meters.

The 9M22S incendiary rocket ws used in eastern Ukraine. The 122 mm 9M22S rocket carries the 9N510 warhead, containing 180 incendiary elements which are composed of ML-5 magnesium alloy and filled with a pyrotechnic composition similar to thermite. Each element has a burning time of at least 2 minutes. The 122 mm rocket is launched from the 9K51 Grad MLRS and similar systems, with the 9K51 being capable of firing up to 40 rockets in around 20 seconds.

The 9M51 fuel-air explosive rocket has also been employed in eastern Ukraine. This 220 mm rocket is launched from the 9K57 Uragan MLRS and delivers the 30.2 kilogram 9N515 FAE warhead. This rocket is designed to engage infantry and light vehicles, and is particularly effective against targets in confined spaces