Antonov’s AN-70 has had a long and difficult development history from its first studies and concepts in 1979, including the dissolution of its sponsoring state in 1991, the crash of the initial prototype aircraft in a 1995 collision with its chase plane, and the selection of the EADS A400M development project as the basis of Europe’s Future Large Aircraft. The project has been kept alive on a shoestring budget by the participating companies, who have consistently believed that they had a winner on their hands if they could just make it into production. The A400M’s struggles and cost escalation, and the C-130J’s 20-ton limitations, have validated that assessment – but assessments don’t meet payroll, or pay for equipment.
The European FLA/A400M program has been criticized of late for its rejection of the AN-70, but there are always considerations beyond the base financials. Development of domestic aerospace industries and technologies, albeit at greater expense, is always a factor. Then there’s the longer-term market forcecasts that saw the American C-17 program reaching its end, leaving a decade or 2 of dominance for a transport that could bridge the gap between strategic and tactical transport options. Who would produce it? Financing the development and refinement of a critical power projection tool that would be likely to see service with Russia is a project not to be undertaken lightly, especially if it means that Ukranian and/or Russian firms would also be able to compete for future production business in a key aerospace segment.
The FLA loss was indeed a bitter blow to an AN-70 program that had already seen many setbacks. For many years, it even looked like it might turn out to be fatal, consigning the AN-70 to “what if” status on par with Canada’s fabled CF-105 Avro Arrow fighter. Recent developments, 30 years after the project first began, look set to change that status…
The AN-70 aims to offer A400M class operational performance or better, for about 40% less per aircraft. Total cargo weight is touted as 35-47 tonnes, and depending on the load carried, range is touted as 3,000 – 5,100 km at cruising speed of 700 – 750 km/h. If flown empty in ferry configuration, that range extends to 8,000 km. Redundant fly-by-wire controls and “glass cockpit” avionics, pioneered on the AN-124-100 Ruslan, have been added to the AN-70 as well. Its 14,000 shp Progress/Motor Sich D-27 turboprop engines use Aerosila’s CV-27 8+6 blade configuration of contra-rotating, reversible-pitch propellers, allowing STOL capabilities from unpaved runways only 600-800m long at a reduced 20t cargo weight. At full load, the aircraft can use 1550-1800 meter runways.
A spacious 15,000 sq. foot/ 425 sq. meter cargo area can be used to deliver up to 300 soldiers at absolute maximum capacity, or evacuate up to 200 or so casualties requiring minimal support. More likely scenarios would involve about 130-170 fully-equipped troops. Onboard loading equipment consists of 4 overhead rail electric motor hoists with a total cargo lifting capacity of 12 tonnes, and 2 onboard electric winches with 1.5 tonne traction. An easily removable upper deck and/or roller conveyers, can be added as options to simplify container handling.
By comparison, the A400M will have a maximum capacity of 37 tonnes if it lives up to its full specifications, something that has become less probable due to airframe weight gains. The A400M’s range is also imperiled, though specifications give it about 3,300 km range at full payload. This would give the AN-70 an advantage of over 1,500 km at a similar load. Compared to the AN-70, the A400M is about 4.6 meters longer (45.1m vs. 40.55m), with a wingspan that’s 1.6 meters shorter (42.4m vs. 44.06m). Active cargo space is less tall (3.85m vs. 4.1m) and 0.9m shorter than the AN-70 (17.71m vs. 18.6m), though overall internal space is slightly longer (23.11m vs. 22.4m) due to a ramp that’s 1.6m longer.
Both aircraft significantly outclass the smaller C-130J Hercules, which is limited to a load of 21 tonnes. That’s an issue in an era where survivable armored vehicles tend to be at least 25 tonnes, and are often 30-35 tonnes. On the other hand, the C-130J’s flyaway price tag of $65-80 million/ EUR 56 million is less than either the A400M (EUR 120-140 million est.) or the intended cost of the AN-70 (at 40% less than the A400M, EUR 72-86 million).
While all 3 aircraft are considered to be medium tactical transports, new programs for 20t class transports (Embraer KC-390, Irkut/HAL MRTA) and the closure of the USA’s C-17 line will leave the A400M turboprop and turbofan-powered IL-76MF segmented in a different “medium-heavy” class of strategic transports. If the program continues, the AN-70 turboprop would join them, offering capacity that rivals the IL-76MF and turboprop economics for operating costs. If Russia manages to repair its growing image as an unreliable supplier of poor-quality equipment, the AN-70s performance and cost could make it an attractive option for a number of customers around the world.
Past projections have involved around 60 aircraft for the Ukraine, and 160 or so aircraft for Russia. So far, only 5 aircraft have been ordered by the Ukraine, and it remains to be seen whether actual contracts come close to those projections.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Antonovs-Odyssey-AN-70-Program-Taking-Flight-05741/
