• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Leadership

Edward Campbell

Army.ca Myth
Subscriber
Donor
Mentor
Reaction score
5,973
Points
1,260
pbi said:
I had heard about this picture earlier. If she puts it on Facebook, she must be willing to see it circulated more widely, or at the very least acknowledge the high risk of same. I would be interested to see if any media outlets are willing to publish it.

But, so what? What does this change?

Does this rather thoughtless self-promotion mean that nothing Ms Lalonde said is at all true? Is the message wrong because we don't like the messenger?

Does it mean there is no problem in the CAF with narrow-minded, immature people with an overwhelming sense of self-entitlement acting out when they feel like it?

Does it mean that there aren't any questions about where the adult leadership in RMC was when this mess happened?

Probably not. In the big picture, this entire embarrassing shambles at RMC, and the Strat/Pol firestorm surrounding the earlier inquiry report, are just distractions from a much bigger question: does the military treat people right, or not?

If not, why not? And whose ass is going to get kicked over it?

Because to a grubby old retired guy like me, it is exactly just that simple. If you want to change behaviour in a group, you have to work very hard, all the time, until it's changed. Then you keep working hard to make sure it stays that way. You can't just sit in the office and issue e-mails and memos and vapid videos or wall posters, or send out silly (if well-meaning) briefing teams to bother people.

It isn't easy to force change, and you will not be well-liked. You are going to hear people (at all rank levels...) say: "Hey. c'mon-he's a really good soldier. Can't we just overlook this?". At the other end, you will also have to deal with the oxygen-stealing disgruntled whiner who sees yet another chance to use the system against their bosses. Good luck sorting that out. (Been there, on both of the above).

Either the CAF will be a place where all who make the grade can serve honourably and in good spirit, regardless of who else they happen to be, or it won't be. Take your pick.


We are, it seems to me, in several threads, here in Army.ca, skirting around a fundamental problem: Leadership ... or, perhaps, lack of same.

Does anyone else remember a book by Robert Raurk called "Something of Value?" At the start of the book, Ruark quotes an old African prover:

              If a man does away with his traditional way of living and
              throws away his good customs, he had better first make
              certain that he has something of value to replace them.
                                                                  - Basuto proverb


I think we, Canadian society at large but the CF, in particular, threw away some "traditional values" and we did not make certain that we had "something of value to replace the."

In Canadian society we began the throwing away process in around 1960; in political terms that was the Kingston Conference and the decades (1960s and 70s) of missteps that flowed from it.

In the CF we had our own major disruption: 1964-68, the process of integrating and unifying the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF into the CAF. Not everything about integration was wrong, but a lot was; much of unification was good, but we have, since about 1975 (creation of Air Command), actually regressed, tossed out some good ideas and replaced them with less operationally effective single service 'stovepipes.'

But the big thing we tossed aside in 1966 when, mainly in an effort to solve some long standing and serious compensation (pay) problems, Minister Hellyer and the CDS (Air Chief Marshal Miller) decided upon a new rank structure which, effectively, destroyed the junior leadership levels of, especially, the army.

It may be true that the sergeants are the "heart and soul" of the army, but it is junior leaders, corporals and subalterns who actually lead, from the front, in battle. I had, and still have no problem with Mr Hellyer's plan to raise my pay ~ I needed a pay raise and i was damned glad to have it. But I, in 1966, and almost everyone else in the army did have, and still have, a problem with what was done to the ranks of corporal and captain. Creating MCpols and inflating ranks - making section and tank commander a sergeant's position - did not solve the problem. If the sergeants are the army "backbone" then the junior leaders are its very foundation; in my opinion everything rests on them and the business of selecting, training and developing them is the most important thing the army does. Selecting the CDS begins, I would suggest, at recruiting officer cadets and the CFCWO et al didn't spring, fully formed, from "dragons' teeth," they were selected and trained as leaders along the way. But what about all those people who needed (and deserved) a pay raise? Good question ...

There was a model open to Mr Hellyer and ACM Miller, one which I suspect would have been just as well received as the one they chose: the US rank model, circa 1965, which (until 1968) included several grades of specialist ...

ImageHandler.ashx


... now that has all changed and, today, there is only one grade of specialist, equivalent to a corporal.

But, one of our other sister services, the Royal Air Force, still used graded (specialist) Technician ranks ...

4872D96E_DB10_222A_D5BAC6421DAA7833.jpg


I'm not interested in the "buttons and bows," just in the principle which is that rank and trade can and should be divided ... not totally separated: we shouldn't waste a Group 4 trade course on a soldier whop cannot even manage a small team, but junior leaders, especially, should be identified, trained, and streamed as leaders, albeit being required to be journeyman tradesmen, too. It ought to be possible to reward (pay) both technical/trade skill and leadership ability/responsibility.

As I understand most trade progression, today, it is:

    Basic tradesman: (Trade Group 1 badge) TQ3 (pte)
    Journeyman tradesman: (Trade Group 2 badge) TQ4 (pte)
    Skilled tradesman: (Trade Group 3 badge) TQ5 (cpl)
    Expert tradesman: (trade Group 4 badge) TQ6 (sgt)

I believe that rank, as opposed to specialist/technician qualification, should also have levels. I see a need for something like this:

    Soldier:            (worker): (private) and, after training, TQ3;
          Those who can pass the TQ4 and TQ5 courses but cannot pass junior leader training will be specialists or technicians in the 4th or 5th grade
    Junior leader 1 (leader of a very few): (corporal) - requires a rigorous junior leader course and must be TQ4;
    Junior leader 2 (leader of a large team or a complex small team, say a tank): (master corporal) - requires seasoning and selection after junior NCO training and must be TQ5;
          Those junior leaders who can pass the TQ5 and TQ6 courses but cannot pass the senior leader training will be specialists or technicians in the 5th and 6th grades
    Senior leader 1 (e.g. armoured troop or infantry platoon 2IC): (sergeant) - requires a senior leader course, more selective, also a rigorous course and must be TQ5;
    Senior leader 2 (e.g. CQMS or engineer troop 2IC): (sergeant 1st class) - requires additional management training and must be TQ6;
          Those senior leaders who can pass the TQ7 training but cannot pass the senior management training will be specdialists/technicians in the 7th grade
    Senior leader 3 (e.g. SSM/BSM/CSM and senior technical leader/manager): (master sergeant) - requires additional trade and management training and must be TQ6 or even 7, in some specialties; and
    Senior leader 4 (e.g. RSM and selected senior staff WOs): (warrant officer) - requires selection and some additional management training and must be TQ6 or 7.

The key things are: the first junior leader ranks - team and infantry section and tank commanders - are junior non commissioned officers. They live and work with the men and women they command and lead. They have been selected for leadership training because their leaders see some potential in them. The leadership training which they undergo is, and is seen to be, tough, hard, and so on ... there is a respectable failure rate on the junior leader course to prove it. (And it's no disgrace for a good soldier to fail junior leader training ... once.)

We are, I think, already fairly careful in selecting and training junior officers. They need a system of formal examination to qualify for the training that will take them to and beyond the rank of captain. We ought not to assume that every cadet who is enrolled in ROTP is, automatically, a future CDS. Sorry, folks, the recruiting and selection crystal ball is not that good.

The key aspect of training for junior leaders ~ both junior NCOs and junior officers ~ is: integrity, responsibility, teamwork, responsibility, honesty, responsibility, leadership/personnel management, responsibility, ethics, responsibilioty, fitness and responsibility. Leaders are a whole lot of things but, mostly, they are, personally, responsible for everything that their team is and does. It is willingly accepting, and seeking responsibility that separates the leader from the led. And, you can teach or, at least, refine integrity, teamwork, personnel management, ethics, fitness and responsibility. It's hard to learn to be honest and self sacrificing and strong ... but anything worth having requires hard work.

We need to stop worrying about the CDS and the commander of the army and the CFCWO and so on ... we need to worry about the leaders who matter most: corporals and lieutenants. If we can select and train them well then everything else, cox'ns and RSMs, ship's captains, regimental and brigade commanders, even the CDS, will follow because their development and selection will rest on a firm foundation of good excellent superb junior leadership training and development.

We need "something of value" as the very base of our system ... I think we're missing it, now, but I also think we can fill the void.

 
A good summary, Edward.

We seem to have lots of professional leadership education for our NCOs (PLQ,ILQ,ALQ), but not for our officers. We provide our most junior officers with some of the nuts and bolts of the PLQ during their BMOQ, but that's where it seems to end. They can then become quite senior Majors without any further training in Leadership.

As much as we in the military like to think that leadership is completely different from management, I'm not convinced that it is. In classical management, it is one of the core functions - Planning, Organizing, Leading and Controlling. It is not viewed as a separate function. I would agree with that perspective, but temper my opinion by stating that each of these management functions has their own, separate qualities that need to be learned.

Officers may be managers in the traditional sense of organizational structure, but they're also leaders. If we don't provide them with specific leadership training in a similar vein as we do NCOs how do we expect them to become good leaders? Why are we then surprised when we encounter leadership failures in the officer corps?

Leadership is part of management, and managers need specific training in leadership. You can manage personnel, but first you must be able to lead them.
 
Mike, I believe that effective leaders are, inherently, good managers, and good managers are, of necessity, leaders, too.

There are all sorts of models ...

   
graph_leadership_model-300x286.gif

    Source: http://www.hr.ubc.ca/managing-at-ubc/overview/program-framework/

          ... but I like Warren Bennis axiom: Leaders are people who do the right thing; managers are people who do things right ...
          Source: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/w/warren_bennis.html#RRSsDLq4eJuauSXE.99

              ... and I am convinced that military officers and NCOs must be both. The degree to which one might have to lead or manage more (or less) is situational. When I was a very junior NCO and junior officer it was, mostly,
              about leading ... from the front. When I was a regimental commander I had to lead and manage. When I was a director in NDHQ I was, by definition, a manager, but I had to lead a team, too ... to direct, guide, mentor,
              support, and set a good example ... and all those things that leaders, at all levels, corporals or colonels, must do.
 
Corporal - the body
Captain - the head
Lieutenant - the Captain's place holder
Sergeant - the Captain's servant.

Everything else is derivative.

I can remember, as a relatively newly created MITCP 2Lt, feeling quite unworthy the first time I received a salute from a British Army Corporal at Wainwright (he was with the Duke's as I recall).  His bearing and demeanor were nothing like any Corporal in Canadian service at the time.
 
The Peter Farey model is actually a knock-off version of Ned Hermmann's research and typology.

The Task leadership quadrant would be type A, going to type D by going counter clockwise.

Your strong leader in that typology, the CEO's, are the type A dominant with type D secondary, while your best "managers" are the type B dominant with type C secondary. Everyone has seen good examples of the best CEO being nobody without a good secretary to keep them organized.

I think it is the same for the military. Your best leaders are those who have a vision, the capacity to quickly analyze and conclude and formulate the general plan (type A) and then inspire others to endorse the plan and motivate them to execute it (type D). But they can only do it with a good staff that is in the now and then to organize (type C) and then arrange for it to be done with consideration for those who have to do the work (type C).

In my experience, while everyone has some aspects of this classification in their character, very few people are equally good at the leadership (A-D) and managerial (B-C) side at the same time. Shorly put: you have your field officers and your staff officers, but few with the character to excel at both.

I do agree with you that we (the CF) must go back to giving more respect to leadership vs management/trade knowledge in the promotion system.

It was not just the army who suffered the changes of 1966 "rank upgrade" for purposes of pay compensation in that respect. In the Navy, the loss of prestige of the "Leading seaman" (see the word used here: "Leading") was felt through the ranks. Similarly, the unexpected promotions to leading seaman made the Navy lose the old "AB three badges" the able seamen who was thoroughly professional in his trade without being a leader, and the old "Petty Officer No Trade" who was your superior leader without achieving quite all the trade qualifications expected at that rank. 
 
Some interesting reading here - but I must ask, can we afford to retain soldiers that cannot pass a junior leadership course?

We only have a RegF of ~68k (and I feel even that number will be hard to maintain budget wise) how do we balance the numbers of leaders/specialists? We have many smaller trades where pers are attached/employed in small dets within the larger force. By nature of their employment, they should already be specialists. As we continue to prepare for full spectrum/dispersed operations, I think we should be emphasizing the role of the "Strategic Corporal".

I think the successful completion of a junior leadership course should be a prerequisite to a full term military career. I'm not opposed to short service (3-6 years perhaps) for those that cannot/do not wish to complete further training. For long service, I think we should be more selective.

Let's focus on building personnel who are equal parts military leader, manager, and Subject Matter Expert.

I can dream, right?


 
ModlrMike said:
We seem to have lots of professional leadership education for our NCOs (PLQ,ILQ,ALQ), but not for our officers. We provide our most junior officers with some of the nuts and bolts of the PLQ during their BMOQ, but that's where it seems to end. They can then become quite senior Majors without any further training in Leadership.

I know things have likely changed considerably in the many years since I've taken off the uniform, but the continuum of on-going leadership/management education for officers was probably as stratified even if the course titles didn't so suggest.  While it may seem that formal leadership training ended at BMOQ (BOTC in my day), there was always an element of either leadership/management theory or application in most officer MOC courses - after all that was the primary function of most officers, to lead.  As an officer progressed his on-going leadership and management training and education was likely more "generalist", as in Staff School (was more than a memo writing course but is now gone) at the Capt level, CLFCSC (as a component of battlefield comd and staff training), Staff College for Majors, Cbt Team Comd course (for arms) and corps specific advanced courses for services, as well as the various odds and sods of OPDP, FOE, Management Development (another school gone) and some job specific things like project management.  Though I didn't sit around the mess have philosophical discussions about leadership theory and practice with fellow officers (and we didn't have the luxury of internet and army.ca), the good officers I knew seriously thought about it and were always ready to provide advice.  I know that as a more senior captain (and later as a major), leadership development of the junior officers under me (as well as the NCMs) was a consideration.
 
Oldgateboatdriver said:
The Peter Farey model is actually a knock-off version of Ned Hermmann's research and typology.

The Task leadership quadrant would be type A, going to type D by going counter clockwise.

Your strong leader in that typology, the CEO's, are the type A dominant with type D secondary, while your best "managers" are the type B dominant with type C secondary. Everyone has seen good examples of the best CEO being nobody without a good secretary to keep them organized.

I think it is the same for the military. Your best leaders are those who have a vision, the capacity to quickly analyze and conclude and formulate the general plan (type A) and then inspire others to endorse the plan and motivate them to execute it (type D). But they can only do it with a good staff that is in the now and then to organize (type C) and then arrange for it to be done with consideration for those who have to do the work (type C).

In my experience, while everyone has some aspects of this classification in their character, very few people are equally good at the leadership (A-D) and managerial (B-C) side at the same time. Shorly put: you have your field officers and your staff officers, but few with the character to excel at both.

I do agree with you that we (the CF) must go back to giving more respect to leadership vs management/trade knowledge in the promotion system.

It was not just the army who suffered the changes of 1966 "rank upgrade" for purposes of pay compensation in that respect. In the Navy, the loss of prestige of the "Leading seaman" (see the word used here: "Leading") was felt through the ranks. Similarly, the unexpected promotions to leading seaman made the Navy lose the old "AB three badges" the able seamen who was thoroughly professional in his trade without being a leader, and the old "Petty Officer No Trade" who was your superior leader without achieving quite all the trade qualifications expected at that rank.


Thanks for both those observations, OGBD: management theory is not my strong suit; and while I had heard anecdotal evidence of the impact of the Hellyer corporal and instant captain on the other two services my first hand knowledge, from the 1960s and 70s, is confined to the army.

You point about some people being more leader and others more manager is, of course, familiar ~ I think we've all seen it over and over, but I have known a few who were both, at once. I'll name one name, because he's a public figure: Jim Leech, now Chancellor of Queens University was/is an exceptional leader, in the army and in business, and, simultaneously, a fine manager. It can be done; it's not the norm, but it happens and it has, more than once, happened in the military, too.
 
Just one more point, to clarify where I stand: the greatest need for junior leadership selection, training and development is at the private/corporal level. Officers are easier and the consequences of failures are, in my personal opinion, less. We must get the junior NCO right ... everything else is secondary.
 
Spectrum said:
Some interesting reading here - but I must ask, can we afford to retain soldiers that cannot pass a junior leadership course?

We only have a RegF of ~68k (and I feel even that number will be hard to maintain budget wise) how do we balance the numbers of leaders/specialists? We have many smaller trades where pers are attached/employed in small dets within the larger force. By nature of their employment, they should already be specialists. As we continue to prepare for full spectrum/dispersed operations, I think we should be emphasizing the role of the "Strategic Corporal".

I think the successful completion of a junior leadership course should be a prerequisite to a full term military career. I'm not opposed to short service (3-6 years perhaps) for those that cannot/do not wish to complete further training. For long service, I think we should be more selective.

Let's focus on building personnel who are equal parts military leader, manager, and Subject Matter Expert.

I can dream, right?

Spectrum -

I am going to suggest that someone who has reached their ceiling in the Reg Force could be offered a role in the Reserve Force where their skills could be kept available to the service and they could find a gentle off-ramp into civilian life.

That way the Reg Force would have access to a pool of trained members that could come in at junior levels and fill up the ranks when necessary.

 
Kirkhill said:
Spectrum -

I am going to suggest that someone who has reached their ceiling in the Reg Force could be offered a role in the Reserve Force where their skills could be kept available to the service and they could find a gentle off-ramp into civilian life.

That way the Reg Force would have access to a pool of trained members that could come in at junior levels and fill up the ranks when necessary.

In many cases, I agree and feel that PRes units can benefit from the experience of ex Reg-F members. I think a real effort should be made to attract quality personnel to the PRes once they move on from full time service.

With that said, regardless of Reg or Res, our soldiers deserve quality junior leaders. We need to set the bar higher, and make sure we select and retain the right people. I'd prefer fewer, better soldiers and this mentality should carry forward up the ranks.

I think we should be putting suitable folks through PLQ sooner rather than later, even if there is no promotion to MCpl right away. It sure beats minting A/L MCpl's who have had zero leadership training, and no time to grow into the role.
 
Spectrum said:
In many cases, I agree and feel that PRes units can from the experience of ex Reg-F members. I think a real effort should be made to attract quality personnel to the PRes once they move on from full time service.

With that said, regardless of Reg or Res, our soldiers deserve quality junior leaders. We need to set the bar higher, and make sure we select and retain the right people. I'd prefer fewer, better soldiers and this mentality should carry forward up the ranks.

I think we should be putting suitable folks through PLQ sooner rather than later, even if there is no promotion to MCpl right away. It sure beats minting A/L MCpl's who have had zero leadership training, and no time to grow into the role.

When I was the Ops/Trg NCO at my unit we were doing something close to this. Not many reserve regiments were particularly attentive to the PLQs running year round at the various schools, so we had a lot of success getting members onto courses mostly comprising reg force pers. We sent some Cpls who were pretty young in service, but they've generally done pretty well, and it helped us avoid a MCpl deficit that was looming when the PRes infantry career courses were adjusted. I'm all for throwing Cpls who aren't mouth breathers onto the course and seeing how they do- some will unexpectedly shine, and others will learn a lot from a rough experience.
 
Spectrum said:
In many cases, I agree and feel that PRes units can benefit from the experience of ex Reg-F members. I think a real effort should be made to attract quality personnel to the PRes once they move on from full time service.

With that said, regardless of Reg or Res, our soldiers deserve quality junior leaders. We need to set the bar higher, and make sure we select and retain the right people. I'd prefer fewer, better soldiers and this mentality should carry forward up the ranks.

I think we should be putting suitable folks through PLQ sooner rather than later, even if there is no promotion to MCpl right away. It sure beats minting A/L MCpl's who have had zero leadership training, and no time to grow into the role.

I'm not suggesting that the PRes has to make do with the Regs "cast-offs".  The PRes needs leaders that are every bit as good as those in the Regs - in some cases, because issuing a command is often less of an option in the Reserves, leadership may be more critical.

What I am suggesting is that when a Reg times out he should be kept available if at all possible by putting him into the Reserve system.
 
I heard much talk about "One Navy" in Halifax last week ... mostly idle chatter, in my opinion, and it will remain that until I see some real commitment from both regular and reserve leaders.

If, and it's a BIG IF, we really want "one force" then the regular component leaders have to start posting the best people into reserve units. It should be an honour to serve in a reserve unit, not a career ending move; a posting to a reserve unit should certify that you're on the way us.

If the reserves want to be part of "one force," then they have to clean house: get rid of the deadwood, welcome unit amalgamations, look for now, innovative ways to train ... and accept expert help and guidance.

Reserve units should have full time COs or DCOs and full times adjutants, chief clerks and RQMS, etc, and equivalent in the RCN, plus a full complement of more junior full time officers and NCOs ~ senior and junior. (Full time might, often will mean regular force, but it can mean good, solid experienced reservists who can provide full time service.)

But, in my opinion, the lead must come from the regular force admirals and general ... until I see some I will continue to think that they are just blowing smoke up the arses of their reserve force comrades in arms.
 
If there is already a Leadership thread or this is in the wrong place I urge the moderators to fix the error as they are so inclined.

Leadership comes up regularly in our discussions but I can't find a thread devoted to the discussion of Leadership.

I came across this article - It talks about the value of experienced leaders, especially senior NCOs, in managing attrition.

https://americanmilitarynews.com/2018/10/army-should-change-how-it-picks-enlisted-leaders-to-lower-attrition-study-says/?utm_source=amn&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=alt

Boiled down it seems that young soldiers respect time-in more than rank.  Young sergeants have higher attrition rates than older sergeants and also combat veterans.  At the other end of the spectrum older NCOs can outlive their best before dates.

The optimum NCO is someone with about 25 years of service and 25 months of active deployments on the two-way range.
 
And we put more weight on second-language profiles than actual experience and leadership attributes.
 
dynaglide said:
And we put more weight on second-language profiles than actual experience and leadership attributes.

There comes a time when you ability to express yourself in both official languages has an influence on how effective a leader you are. 
 
SupersonicMax said:
There comes a time when you ability to express yourself in both official languages has an influence on how effective a leader you are.

Could you go into a little more detail what you mean?
 
SupersonicMax said:
There comes a time when you ability to express yourself in both official languages has an influence on how effective a leader you are.

Sorry Max, but that is a built in CAF and GoC/provincial gov't constraint. Ability/accessibility to learn a second language does not directly indicate  natural or learned leadership. 
 
Back
Top