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In the early hours of the morning of November 20, 1953, elements of the 6th BPC (Battalion Parachutiste Colonial) and the II/1 RCP (2nd Battalion 1st Regiment of Parachute Light Infantry) of the French Army began to drop from a fleet of C-47 transport aircraft into a long remote narrow valley in north western Vietnam near the Chinese and Laotian borders. As soon as the paratroopers hit the ground, and in some cases even before, they came under intense fire from elements of the 148th Independent Regiment, the 675th Artillery Regiment, and other assorted units of the Viet Nam’s Peoples Army, commonly known as the Viet Minh.
Throughout the day short and sharp skirmishes took place around the abandoned air strip that was the prominent feature of the valley. Wave after wave of transport aircraft dropped in further paratroopers and tactical fighter bombers hit identified “enemy positions.” By nightfall the Viet Minh forces had withdrawn to the surrounding hills and jungles. The French and colonial paratroopers began to dig in and prepare for the next day and the next phase of their operations. The battle of Dien Bien Phu had begun.
It would end 209 days later on May 8th 1954 when victorious Viet Minh troops assaulted and captured the last of the French defences and tore down the tri colour flying above it. Soon after the surviving 6,500 of the 13,500 French and colonial troops who had defended Dien Bien Phu were marched into an inglorious and brutal captivity. Many more would never return from it.
In 1759 on a wind swept plain in North America a single blast of musketry began the demise of the French Empire. On a shell marked bunker in South East Asia the penultimate nail in the coffin of that empire’s demise was driven in. **** In A Very Small Place The Siege of Dien Bien Phu written by Bernard Fall in 1966 a mere twelve years after the siege ended was the first comprehensive account of the battle. Today almost forty years later it remains one of the most, if not the most, detailed and accurate book written on Dien Bien Phu.
What makes Fall’s book so good is the amount of research that he put into it. He had access to literally mountains of French military and political documents and reports many recently declassified. While these would not provide the whole story, in fact many official documents remained classified in 1966 and perhaps even to this date, they did provide a starting point. At the very least they told Fall what questions to ask, and of whom.
Fall complimented this with extensive interviews of the combatants. From former private soldiers located by classified ads in newspapers to general officers he interviewed hundreds of French, Arab, African, and Vietnamese veterans of the illustrious regiments of the French Colonial Army.
More than one military career was damaged or destroyed by the outcome of Dien Bien Phu, and there no shortage of sniping and blame games of and by various officers at one another in the press, and through various published memoirs. These too helped present the complete picture of what happened.
Finally he was given almost unprecedented access to the North Vietnamese records of the battles. These were perhaps the most complete selection of source information for the battle in existence. In addition to their own collection of documents and interviews with Viet Minh veterans they contained one other aspect.
Literal reams of captured French documentation were found in the bunkers. In addition the Viet Minh conducted interviews and debriefs on the prisoners they took and transcripts of these existed. All of this was made available by the government in Hanoi to Fall. Ho Chi Minh and General Giap of course had no reason to withhold information from Fall. After all they won.
Despite this mountain of documentation it is not a hard read. Fall has a good literary style about him. One soon becomes absorbed in the work as it moves from planning rooms in Paris and Hanoi to mud filled slit trenches in the Vietnamese Highlands.
The French Plan was to establish a Base Aero Terreste, basically a fortified airfield in the heart of Viet Minh controlled territory. Their reasons for this were both political and military.
One it would serve as a staging area to conduct guerilla or counter guerilla operations against Viet Minh forces in the region. Columns operating from Dien Bien Phu could strike at Viet Minh supply and communications lines until then safe from the French due to their distance from Hanoi.
Secondly it was hoped, rightly so as it turned out, that such a concentration of troops would force the Viet Minh to face them in a single decisive conventional battle as opposed to the hit and run guerilla campaign that had been conducted until then. The French high command believed that their superiority in artillery, and air power would allow them to win such a battle and at one stroke.
There were political considerations too, which helped to determine why this particular valley was chosen. The French needed to retain and/or reestablish a presence in the region to ensure cooperation of the various local tribes and quasi independent federations. Dien Bien Phu was also close to the border with Laos and a major French military presence their it was hoped would deter any communist incursions into that nation, recently granted nominal independence from, and still retaining close ties with, France.
It was for this political reason that Dien Bien Phu was chosen although it was far from the ideal military choice. As is often the case when military and political concerns are at odds with one another, the political ones will win out often with tragic results.
The concept of establishing a static fortified position deep within enemy controlled territory and then supplying it completely from the air is not as tactically insane as it first sounds. The French had already done it on a more limited scale with success earlier in the war. In fact it was now becoming an accepted and approved part of their doctrine. Although any French General would be loathe to admit it the British had developed the technique a decade earlier in the Second World War with the Chindits in Burma.
The plan while in theory sound was doomed to failure. In fact Fall suggests that the battle was lost even before the first paratroopers began to exit the aircraft on the first day. It was lost in the planning rooms at HQ in Hanoi months earlier.
Dien Bien Phu was isolated and could realistically only be supported, supplied and reinforced by air. Unfortunately unlike early versions of the Base Aero Terreste the distance from the airfields of Hanoi was at the very limits of range for the resupply and tactical aircraft. That and the weather conditions in the region would limit the availability and effectiveness of air power.
The plan to use the small air strip itself as a base for short range tactical ground support aircraft failed to consider one fact. The Viet Minh would object to that. More importantly they would have the means to do something about it.
The French Artillery Commander at Dien Bien Phu Colonel Piroth bragged that the Viet Minh neither possessed the heavy artillery or had the means to get it into the area to interdict the air strip and bring the French positions under effective fire. On March 13, 1954 when the actual battle for the valley commenced with a savage artillery barrage from concealed Viet Minh artillery it became evident he was wrong. He later killed himself.
The Viet Minh had a supply of American made 105mm howitzers, the same type as the French forces, and ample supplies of ammunition. These had bee captured by the Chinese Communists during the Korean War and turned over to the Viet Minh. General Giap using thousands of labourers had them manhandled through miles of “impenetrable” jungle and mountains until he was able to ring Dien Bien Phu completely.
After that it was a mere matter of time. The fact that the besieged garrison lasted as long as it did was a testament to the quality of the defenders. In all Giap would amass almost 100,000 soldiers half of them combat troops, the rest porters and support troops to swamp the garrison.
The 13,500 defenders though were the cream of the French Army, the hard veteran “paras” the stubborn Vietnamese, Tao,, Algerian and African troops and the infamous regiments of the Foreign Legion. On that point Fall also dispels the myth that Dien Bien Phu was defended solely by the Legion Etrange. They in fact made up only part of the garrison.
Fall provides pages of evidence, testament in fact to the tenaciousness and bravery of these soldiers. He also shows that their enemies the Viet Minh, were as equally tenacious and brave. The difference was in the leadership. General Giap was brilliant as were many of his subordinate commanders.
In regards to the French leadership that was a completely different matter. Fall does not go as far as to suggest that they were incompetent, although more than some deserve that title. Arrogant and over confident would be a more suitable description. There was no doubt that they were brave officers too and many proved that. That wasn’t enough though.
It was the arrogance and the underestimation of their opponents in fact the almost blind refusal to except them as military equals deserving of respect that was their shortcoming. It would be enough to ensure the inevitable defeat.
After Dien Bien Phu, the war for the French which until then had not been prosecuted effectively was all but lost. It was again merely a matter of time before they withdrew from South East Asia and the stage would be set for the next act.
**** In A Very Small Place was published in 1966 just as another super power was intensifying it’s own efforts in the same place where the French. Had failed a decade earlier. One wonders what would have happened had several hundred copies been provided to the White House, The Capital Building and most importantly the Pentagon and been made required reading. Perhaps the United States own efforts in that part of the world would have ended differently? As they say those who refuse to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
Dien Bien Phu was not the longest siege in the history of warfare. The campaign lasted only 209 days and the actual siege a mere 59 days. This pales in comparison to such modern military sieges as Leningrad, Tobruk and Baatan as Fall points out. The numbers of combatants was also small. It was also not the worst defeat ever suffered by an army, although perhaps it had the most military and political consequences.
It however has become a name synonymous with absolute defeat. More than that it has become a “glorious defeat” a strange circumstance that seems to exist only in French military history where there is some perverse form of honour and glory in the sheer scope and manner in which one was bested. It does not matter it seems who wins or lose as long as a certain style is maintained in the face of adversity, or even certain demise. Dien Bien Phu now ranks alongside Quebec, Waterloo, and Camerone as an example of this gaullic phenomenon.
Throughout the day short and sharp skirmishes took place around the abandoned air strip that was the prominent feature of the valley. Wave after wave of transport aircraft dropped in further paratroopers and tactical fighter bombers hit identified “enemy positions.” By nightfall the Viet Minh forces had withdrawn to the surrounding hills and jungles. The French and colonial paratroopers began to dig in and prepare for the next day and the next phase of their operations. The battle of Dien Bien Phu had begun.
It would end 209 days later on May 8th 1954 when victorious Viet Minh troops assaulted and captured the last of the French defences and tore down the tri colour flying above it. Soon after the surviving 6,500 of the 13,500 French and colonial troops who had defended Dien Bien Phu were marched into an inglorious and brutal captivity. Many more would never return from it.
In 1759 on a wind swept plain in North America a single blast of musketry began the demise of the French Empire. On a shell marked bunker in South East Asia the penultimate nail in the coffin of that empire’s demise was driven in. **** In A Very Small Place The Siege of Dien Bien Phu written by Bernard Fall in 1966 a mere twelve years after the siege ended was the first comprehensive account of the battle. Today almost forty years later it remains one of the most, if not the most, detailed and accurate book written on Dien Bien Phu.
What makes Fall’s book so good is the amount of research that he put into it. He had access to literally mountains of French military and political documents and reports many recently declassified. While these would not provide the whole story, in fact many official documents remained classified in 1966 and perhaps even to this date, they did provide a starting point. At the very least they told Fall what questions to ask, and of whom.
Fall complimented this with extensive interviews of the combatants. From former private soldiers located by classified ads in newspapers to general officers he interviewed hundreds of French, Arab, African, and Vietnamese veterans of the illustrious regiments of the French Colonial Army.
More than one military career was damaged or destroyed by the outcome of Dien Bien Phu, and there no shortage of sniping and blame games of and by various officers at one another in the press, and through various published memoirs. These too helped present the complete picture of what happened.
Finally he was given almost unprecedented access to the North Vietnamese records of the battles. These were perhaps the most complete selection of source information for the battle in existence. In addition to their own collection of documents and interviews with Viet Minh veterans they contained one other aspect.
Literal reams of captured French documentation were found in the bunkers. In addition the Viet Minh conducted interviews and debriefs on the prisoners they took and transcripts of these existed. All of this was made available by the government in Hanoi to Fall. Ho Chi Minh and General Giap of course had no reason to withhold information from Fall. After all they won.
Despite this mountain of documentation it is not a hard read. Fall has a good literary style about him. One soon becomes absorbed in the work as it moves from planning rooms in Paris and Hanoi to mud filled slit trenches in the Vietnamese Highlands.
The French Plan was to establish a Base Aero Terreste, basically a fortified airfield in the heart of Viet Minh controlled territory. Their reasons for this were both political and military.
One it would serve as a staging area to conduct guerilla or counter guerilla operations against Viet Minh forces in the region. Columns operating from Dien Bien Phu could strike at Viet Minh supply and communications lines until then safe from the French due to their distance from Hanoi.
Secondly it was hoped, rightly so as it turned out, that such a concentration of troops would force the Viet Minh to face them in a single decisive conventional battle as opposed to the hit and run guerilla campaign that had been conducted until then. The French high command believed that their superiority in artillery, and air power would allow them to win such a battle and at one stroke.
There were political considerations too, which helped to determine why this particular valley was chosen. The French needed to retain and/or reestablish a presence in the region to ensure cooperation of the various local tribes and quasi independent federations. Dien Bien Phu was also close to the border with Laos and a major French military presence their it was hoped would deter any communist incursions into that nation, recently granted nominal independence from, and still retaining close ties with, France.
It was for this political reason that Dien Bien Phu was chosen although it was far from the ideal military choice. As is often the case when military and political concerns are at odds with one another, the political ones will win out often with tragic results.
The concept of establishing a static fortified position deep within enemy controlled territory and then supplying it completely from the air is not as tactically insane as it first sounds. The French had already done it on a more limited scale with success earlier in the war. In fact it was now becoming an accepted and approved part of their doctrine. Although any French General would be loathe to admit it the British had developed the technique a decade earlier in the Second World War with the Chindits in Burma.
The plan while in theory sound was doomed to failure. In fact Fall suggests that the battle was lost even before the first paratroopers began to exit the aircraft on the first day. It was lost in the planning rooms at HQ in Hanoi months earlier.
Dien Bien Phu was isolated and could realistically only be supported, supplied and reinforced by air. Unfortunately unlike early versions of the Base Aero Terreste the distance from the airfields of Hanoi was at the very limits of range for the resupply and tactical aircraft. That and the weather conditions in the region would limit the availability and effectiveness of air power.
The plan to use the small air strip itself as a base for short range tactical ground support aircraft failed to consider one fact. The Viet Minh would object to that. More importantly they would have the means to do something about it.
The French Artillery Commander at Dien Bien Phu Colonel Piroth bragged that the Viet Minh neither possessed the heavy artillery or had the means to get it into the area to interdict the air strip and bring the French positions under effective fire. On March 13, 1954 when the actual battle for the valley commenced with a savage artillery barrage from concealed Viet Minh artillery it became evident he was wrong. He later killed himself.
The Viet Minh had a supply of American made 105mm howitzers, the same type as the French forces, and ample supplies of ammunition. These had bee captured by the Chinese Communists during the Korean War and turned over to the Viet Minh. General Giap using thousands of labourers had them manhandled through miles of “impenetrable” jungle and mountains until he was able to ring Dien Bien Phu completely.
After that it was a mere matter of time. The fact that the besieged garrison lasted as long as it did was a testament to the quality of the defenders. In all Giap would amass almost 100,000 soldiers half of them combat troops, the rest porters and support troops to swamp the garrison.
The 13,500 defenders though were the cream of the French Army, the hard veteran “paras” the stubborn Vietnamese, Tao,, Algerian and African troops and the infamous regiments of the Foreign Legion. On that point Fall also dispels the myth that Dien Bien Phu was defended solely by the Legion Etrange. They in fact made up only part of the garrison.
Fall provides pages of evidence, testament in fact to the tenaciousness and bravery of these soldiers. He also shows that their enemies the Viet Minh, were as equally tenacious and brave. The difference was in the leadership. General Giap was brilliant as were many of his subordinate commanders.
In regards to the French leadership that was a completely different matter. Fall does not go as far as to suggest that they were incompetent, although more than some deserve that title. Arrogant and over confident would be a more suitable description. There was no doubt that they were brave officers too and many proved that. That wasn’t enough though.
It was the arrogance and the underestimation of their opponents in fact the almost blind refusal to except them as military equals deserving of respect that was their shortcoming. It would be enough to ensure the inevitable defeat.
After Dien Bien Phu, the war for the French which until then had not been prosecuted effectively was all but lost. It was again merely a matter of time before they withdrew from South East Asia and the stage would be set for the next act.
**** In A Very Small Place was published in 1966 just as another super power was intensifying it’s own efforts in the same place where the French. Had failed a decade earlier. One wonders what would have happened had several hundred copies been provided to the White House, The Capital Building and most importantly the Pentagon and been made required reading. Perhaps the United States own efforts in that part of the world would have ended differently? As they say those who refuse to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
Dien Bien Phu was not the longest siege in the history of warfare. The campaign lasted only 209 days and the actual siege a mere 59 days. This pales in comparison to such modern military sieges as Leningrad, Tobruk and Baatan as Fall points out. The numbers of combatants was also small. It was also not the worst defeat ever suffered by an army, although perhaps it had the most military and political consequences.
It however has become a name synonymous with absolute defeat. More than that it has become a “glorious defeat” a strange circumstance that seems to exist only in French military history where there is some perverse form of honour and glory in the sheer scope and manner in which one was bested. It does not matter it seems who wins or lose as long as a certain style is maintained in the face of adversity, or even certain demise. Dien Bien Phu now ranks alongside Quebec, Waterloo, and Camerone as an example of this gaullic phenomenon.
