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On December 8, 1941, while the smoke from burning fuel and ships still hung over Pearl Harbour, Japanese Forces began landing and securing the first US territory to be occupied during the Second World War Guam. Forces from the nearby Japanese territory of Saipan quickly landed and overran the small US territory of Guam in the Marianas islands in the Western Pacific after a brief but futile defense by the small garrison of Sailors and Marines.
Two and a half years later in June 1944 US forces returned to Guam and nearby islands of Saipan and Tinian with a vengeance. Hell is Upon Us: D-Day in the Pacific by Victor Brooks is a brief overview of this pivotal campaign in the Pacific war.
Brooks begins with a couple of brief preambles to set the stage for the Marianas Campaign. There is a brief account of the initial invasion of Guam and the overall Japanese success in the first half of 1942.
He follows this with a section on the Casablanca Conference where Churchill and Roosevelt decided on the overall Allied “Germany first” strategy. With only a holding action to be initially devoted to dealing with Japan, and limited resources devoted to the Pacific and Asian theatres.
This is followed by a brief explanation of the two converging fronts that developed in the Pacific. One in the South West under General MacArthur moving north from Australia through the Solomon’s, the second island hopping westward across the Central Pacific under the overall command of Admiral Nimitz. Brooks points out how successful this strategy was as the Japanese high command were never able to decide where the next major attack was coming form and therefore were unable to mass enough forces to effectively deal with any incursions, being forced to try and defend all their territory.
Initially it was decided to bypass the Marianas, and attack island groups closer to Japan. The decision to invade Guam, Saipan and Tinian as Brook’s notes was based on their availability as airbases.
Initial plans to launch a strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands to destroy their industrial base in a manner similar to that being conducted against Germany had to be abandoned. The range of the US heavy bombers the B-17s and B-24s was too limited. The development to the long range B-29 later in the war however meant that the Japanese home islands could be reached from airbases in the Marianas; hence plans were developed to secure the islands and build massive air strips on them.
Brooks covers the initial planning of the campaign and then divides it into four distinct parts, the invasions of each of the three islands in turn and the naval battle that preceded them and made the invasion possible, the Battle of the Philippine Seas
In June 1994 the Imperial Japanese finalized plan to engage the US navy in a massive decisive battle that hopefully would destroy or severely damage the American fleet, and delay US operations for sometime. Aware that the Americans were advancing on the Marianas Island they positioned most of their remaining aircraft carriers and support ships in the region. To make up numerical losses in carrier born aircraft, hundreds of planes were positioned on airfields in the Marianas and other nearby by islands.
It was hoped that a massive a massive surprise blow would cripple the advancing American fleet and force the Americans to withdraw their impending invasion force. What followed was the largest to date naval battle in the Pacific.
While the Japanese forces were numerically close to the Americans, nine heavy and light aircraft carriers and 750 carrier and land based aircraft versus fifteen heavy and light carriers and 950 planes. Quality of the forces engaged though was a major factor. The Japanese may have replaced the losses in aircraft and ships after the disaster at Midway; however the veteran pilots who had caused so much damage at Pearl Harbour and in the Coral Sea and Indian Ocean could never be replaced.
In contrast the Americans had learned hard lessons from their earlier defeats and the pilots they fielded were confident in their skills and new equipment and thirsting for revenge.
The Battle of the Philippine Seas was one of the most one sided actions of the war. The Japanese attacks were uncoordinated and minimal damage was done to the US fleet. In contrast the Americans coordinated their air and submarine attacks to great effect. Three Japanese carriers were sunk and over 600 planes destroyed in contrast to minimal damage to US forces and only slightly more than 100 planes, most of whose crews were rescued. To the Americans the battle would be referred to as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.
The Japanese fleet would never be a major factor in the war again and the way to the islands was clear.
Despite having overwhelming air and sea superiority the invasions of all three islands were no cake walk as Brook’s is quick to point out. The Japanese had occupied both Tinian and Siapan since the end of the First Word War and considered them Japanese soil. Over three decades of hard labour had turned Saipan into a veritable island fortress. In addition all three islands had been recently reinforced with fresh troops and equipment, although not as much as the Japanese commander wished for.
The American initially hoped to secure Saipan in a few days then recapture Guam to the south. They were almost naively optimistic. It took 4 weeks, from June 15 to July 9, 1944. The subsequent Invasion of Guam was postponed from June 18th to July 21st. Guam would also take time to capture, hostilities ending there on August 10, 1944. Surprisingly Tinian the third and final island only took a little over a week to secure. Fighting there lasted from July 24 to August 1, 1944.
As Brooks points out the major problem was the relative size of both islands. Most of the US Marines and later Army formations experience with Japanese defenders was on smaller islands such as Tarawa. Yes the Japanese fought fanatically; however the small size of the island often measured in mere hundreds of yards across, meant that the savage fighting ended soon. On Saipan and late Guam there was plenty of room for the Japanese forces to fall back, and then counter attack repeatedly.
There were other factors involved. Guam saw the first major street fighting in the Pacific Campaign as the Japanese literally fought for Garapan the largest city block for block. Both Guam and to a lesser extend Saipan also saw the first large scale use of tanks by the Japanese and while limited in both quality and numbers compared to European battlefields they were still something relatively new to the America forces in this theatre.
Saipan also had a large population of Japanese Civilians. As the Japanese forces slowly retreated to the north end of the island, many of these non combatants indoctrinated by years of propaganda chose mass suicide rather than surrender.
Brooks provides a good overall account of all three campaigns, the forces involved and similarities and differences noted. He also spends some time on the infamous Smith versus Smith controversy which would have wide repercussions all the way back to Washington.
On Saipan the overall commander of the land forces USMC Lt. General Holland Smith relieved Major General Ralph Smith the Commanding Officer of the US Army’s 27th Infantry Division of his command on the battlefield for what he (Lt. General Holland Smith) believed was the poor performance of the Army Division compared to the two Marine Divisions also fighting on the island.
The action showed the different approach to combat inherent in the two services and would later cause severe dissention between the services including a reluctance to have Army troops placed under Marine command in future operations.
Throughout the book Brooks makes comparisons to the Normandy campaign being conducted half way across the world at approximately the same time. While as Brooks points out none of the individual invasions of the islands were as large in scope as Overlord was, all three combined dwarfed it. In addition the invasion of Saipan and Guam were launched from Hawaii thousands of miles away, not across the English Channel, the invasion of Tinian was conducted by forces from Saipan after resistance ended there.
The loss of the Marianas Islands for the Japanese would have far reaching consequences. First the battles cost them a substantial loss of their naval and aviation assets and a not inconsequential number of ground troops. Secondly it gave the advancing US military a new forward supply base much closer to the Japanese home islands from which to plan and prepare new advances from.
Finally the Americans were able to quickly convert the airfields on the islands to handle the almost endless supply of long range B-29 Super Fortresses now coming off the assembly lines in the United States. For the next year these fleets of aircraft would begin a remorseless bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands and their major urban centres. Enola Gay the B-29 that delivered the first Atomic Bomb dropped on Hiroshima left on the at mission form an airfield on Tinian.
On hearing of the loss of the Marianas and the relentless drive of the US forces a senior Japanese Military officer was quoted as saying “Hell is upon us” an apt phrase that Brooks would take as the title of his work.
Brooks style of writing is fairly clear and concise and the book is not too “dry” and overloaded with factual information. Individual accounts and exploits of common soldiers are interspaced with the overall campaign picture. That said there is one annoying feature that cannot be overlooked.
Brooks has written several works dealing with the American Civil War previously and it is obvious this is both his passion and main area of expertise. This unfortunately is very evident throughout Hell is Upon Us.
He continually compares actions, both the naval and land aspects, of the campaign with Civil War battles, and while sometimes this works, other times it is stretching it at best.
For those not familiar with the Civil War it does not help to equate a specific action by US or Japanese forces or commanders to one conducted by Grant, Jackson or Lee almost a century earlier.
In addition Brooks has the annoying habit of providing biographical details about personalities especially American in the book in context to the Civil War. Rather that tell us the exact date when an American General or Admiral was born, or graduated from West Point or Annapolis he gives it to the reader in a round about way related to a 19th century date or land mark in the manner of “General ------- was born of the ---- anniversary of the battle of ------“rather than simply the date. This forces the reader to almost resort to having a copy of a history of the Civil War, perhaps one written by Brooks himself, nearby to cross reference with while reading this book.
Hell is Upon Us is a reasonable and, the above noted comments aside, an easy to read account of the Marians campaign and should serve either as a fair source for those interested in brief accounts of the Second World War in general and/or the Pacific War in particular. It could also serve as a primer for those with a specific interest in the Marianas campaign. However it is not the most definitive account available.
Even casual readers are better off with the late William Manchester’s memoirs of the Pacific Campaign Goodbye Darkness. Manchester provides as much attention to the Marianas as does Brooks and as a bonus also covers most of the other Pacific battles and campaigns as well.
I received Hell is Upon Us as part of my Military book Club list. I hadn’t ordered it and it came in error however I decided to keep it. Having read it once, it now sits on my bookshelf and will probably remain there gathering dust. My copy of Manchester’s book on the other hand has been read and reread dozens of times over the years.
Two and a half years later in June 1944 US forces returned to Guam and nearby islands of Saipan and Tinian with a vengeance. Hell is Upon Us: D-Day in the Pacific by Victor Brooks is a brief overview of this pivotal campaign in the Pacific war.
Brooks begins with a couple of brief preambles to set the stage for the Marianas Campaign. There is a brief account of the initial invasion of Guam and the overall Japanese success in the first half of 1942.
He follows this with a section on the Casablanca Conference where Churchill and Roosevelt decided on the overall Allied “Germany first” strategy. With only a holding action to be initially devoted to dealing with Japan, and limited resources devoted to the Pacific and Asian theatres.
This is followed by a brief explanation of the two converging fronts that developed in the Pacific. One in the South West under General MacArthur moving north from Australia through the Solomon’s, the second island hopping westward across the Central Pacific under the overall command of Admiral Nimitz. Brooks points out how successful this strategy was as the Japanese high command were never able to decide where the next major attack was coming form and therefore were unable to mass enough forces to effectively deal with any incursions, being forced to try and defend all their territory.
Initially it was decided to bypass the Marianas, and attack island groups closer to Japan. The decision to invade Guam, Saipan and Tinian as Brook’s notes was based on their availability as airbases.
Initial plans to launch a strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands to destroy their industrial base in a manner similar to that being conducted against Germany had to be abandoned. The range of the US heavy bombers the B-17s and B-24s was too limited. The development to the long range B-29 later in the war however meant that the Japanese home islands could be reached from airbases in the Marianas; hence plans were developed to secure the islands and build massive air strips on them.
Brooks covers the initial planning of the campaign and then divides it into four distinct parts, the invasions of each of the three islands in turn and the naval battle that preceded them and made the invasion possible, the Battle of the Philippine Seas
In June 1994 the Imperial Japanese finalized plan to engage the US navy in a massive decisive battle that hopefully would destroy or severely damage the American fleet, and delay US operations for sometime. Aware that the Americans were advancing on the Marianas Island they positioned most of their remaining aircraft carriers and support ships in the region. To make up numerical losses in carrier born aircraft, hundreds of planes were positioned on airfields in the Marianas and other nearby by islands.
It was hoped that a massive a massive surprise blow would cripple the advancing American fleet and force the Americans to withdraw their impending invasion force. What followed was the largest to date naval battle in the Pacific.
While the Japanese forces were numerically close to the Americans, nine heavy and light aircraft carriers and 750 carrier and land based aircraft versus fifteen heavy and light carriers and 950 planes. Quality of the forces engaged though was a major factor. The Japanese may have replaced the losses in aircraft and ships after the disaster at Midway; however the veteran pilots who had caused so much damage at Pearl Harbour and in the Coral Sea and Indian Ocean could never be replaced.
In contrast the Americans had learned hard lessons from their earlier defeats and the pilots they fielded were confident in their skills and new equipment and thirsting for revenge.
The Battle of the Philippine Seas was one of the most one sided actions of the war. The Japanese attacks were uncoordinated and minimal damage was done to the US fleet. In contrast the Americans coordinated their air and submarine attacks to great effect. Three Japanese carriers were sunk and over 600 planes destroyed in contrast to minimal damage to US forces and only slightly more than 100 planes, most of whose crews were rescued. To the Americans the battle would be referred to as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.
The Japanese fleet would never be a major factor in the war again and the way to the islands was clear.
Despite having overwhelming air and sea superiority the invasions of all three islands were no cake walk as Brook’s is quick to point out. The Japanese had occupied both Tinian and Siapan since the end of the First Word War and considered them Japanese soil. Over three decades of hard labour had turned Saipan into a veritable island fortress. In addition all three islands had been recently reinforced with fresh troops and equipment, although not as much as the Japanese commander wished for.
The American initially hoped to secure Saipan in a few days then recapture Guam to the south. They were almost naively optimistic. It took 4 weeks, from June 15 to July 9, 1944. The subsequent Invasion of Guam was postponed from June 18th to July 21st. Guam would also take time to capture, hostilities ending there on August 10, 1944. Surprisingly Tinian the third and final island only took a little over a week to secure. Fighting there lasted from July 24 to August 1, 1944.
As Brooks points out the major problem was the relative size of both islands. Most of the US Marines and later Army formations experience with Japanese defenders was on smaller islands such as Tarawa. Yes the Japanese fought fanatically; however the small size of the island often measured in mere hundreds of yards across, meant that the savage fighting ended soon. On Saipan and late Guam there was plenty of room for the Japanese forces to fall back, and then counter attack repeatedly.
There were other factors involved. Guam saw the first major street fighting in the Pacific Campaign as the Japanese literally fought for Garapan the largest city block for block. Both Guam and to a lesser extend Saipan also saw the first large scale use of tanks by the Japanese and while limited in both quality and numbers compared to European battlefields they were still something relatively new to the America forces in this theatre.
Saipan also had a large population of Japanese Civilians. As the Japanese forces slowly retreated to the north end of the island, many of these non combatants indoctrinated by years of propaganda chose mass suicide rather than surrender.
Brooks provides a good overall account of all three campaigns, the forces involved and similarities and differences noted. He also spends some time on the infamous Smith versus Smith controversy which would have wide repercussions all the way back to Washington.
On Saipan the overall commander of the land forces USMC Lt. General Holland Smith relieved Major General Ralph Smith the Commanding Officer of the US Army’s 27th Infantry Division of his command on the battlefield for what he (Lt. General Holland Smith) believed was the poor performance of the Army Division compared to the two Marine Divisions also fighting on the island.
The action showed the different approach to combat inherent in the two services and would later cause severe dissention between the services including a reluctance to have Army troops placed under Marine command in future operations.
Throughout the book Brooks makes comparisons to the Normandy campaign being conducted half way across the world at approximately the same time. While as Brooks points out none of the individual invasions of the islands were as large in scope as Overlord was, all three combined dwarfed it. In addition the invasion of Saipan and Guam were launched from Hawaii thousands of miles away, not across the English Channel, the invasion of Tinian was conducted by forces from Saipan after resistance ended there.
The loss of the Marianas Islands for the Japanese would have far reaching consequences. First the battles cost them a substantial loss of their naval and aviation assets and a not inconsequential number of ground troops. Secondly it gave the advancing US military a new forward supply base much closer to the Japanese home islands from which to plan and prepare new advances from.
Finally the Americans were able to quickly convert the airfields on the islands to handle the almost endless supply of long range B-29 Super Fortresses now coming off the assembly lines in the United States. For the next year these fleets of aircraft would begin a remorseless bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands and their major urban centres. Enola Gay the B-29 that delivered the first Atomic Bomb dropped on Hiroshima left on the at mission form an airfield on Tinian.
On hearing of the loss of the Marianas and the relentless drive of the US forces a senior Japanese Military officer was quoted as saying “Hell is upon us” an apt phrase that Brooks would take as the title of his work.
Brooks style of writing is fairly clear and concise and the book is not too “dry” and overloaded with factual information. Individual accounts and exploits of common soldiers are interspaced with the overall campaign picture. That said there is one annoying feature that cannot be overlooked.
Brooks has written several works dealing with the American Civil War previously and it is obvious this is both his passion and main area of expertise. This unfortunately is very evident throughout Hell is Upon Us.
He continually compares actions, both the naval and land aspects, of the campaign with Civil War battles, and while sometimes this works, other times it is stretching it at best.
For those not familiar with the Civil War it does not help to equate a specific action by US or Japanese forces or commanders to one conducted by Grant, Jackson or Lee almost a century earlier.
In addition Brooks has the annoying habit of providing biographical details about personalities especially American in the book in context to the Civil War. Rather that tell us the exact date when an American General or Admiral was born, or graduated from West Point or Annapolis he gives it to the reader in a round about way related to a 19th century date or land mark in the manner of “General ------- was born of the ---- anniversary of the battle of ------“rather than simply the date. This forces the reader to almost resort to having a copy of a history of the Civil War, perhaps one written by Brooks himself, nearby to cross reference with while reading this book.
Hell is Upon Us is a reasonable and, the above noted comments aside, an easy to read account of the Marians campaign and should serve either as a fair source for those interested in brief accounts of the Second World War in general and/or the Pacific War in particular. It could also serve as a primer for those with a specific interest in the Marianas campaign. However it is not the most definitive account available.
Even casual readers are better off with the late William Manchester’s memoirs of the Pacific Campaign Goodbye Darkness. Manchester provides as much attention to the Marianas as does Brooks and as a bonus also covers most of the other Pacific battles and campaigns as well.
I received Hell is Upon Us as part of my Military book Club list. I hadn’t ordered it and it came in error however I decided to keep it. Having read it once, it now sits on my bookshelf and will probably remain there gathering dust. My copy of Manchester’s book on the other hand has been read and reread dozens of times over the years.
