Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[GR66]

Look at Corps level down here, not Div.
XVIII Airborne, and III Corps are probably the ones to tie into.

10th Mountain is in XVIII Airborne Corps

The problem with III Armored Corps is that all its component Divisions are in the South so more difficult to train with. Also, well it's an Armored Division and that's one area of equipment we're sorely lacking in. There's only two SBCTs in the whole Corps so not only would logistics not tie in well together but frankly we'd have difficulty keeping up with the rest of the Corps.

I Corps (with 7th ID and 11th Airborne) is both closer and composed with a mix of Stryker and Light Brigades which suit our current vehicle set.

 

[FJAG]

Given the above I'd argue that it would make sense to establish a close working relationship with the US forces we would be most likely to deploy with and also as much as possible align our future equipment acquisitions to match what those partners are using so as to take advantage of an integrated logistical pipeline.

I've always been a proponent of such alignment and think it is both desirable and critical.

I'll add two additional organization:

1) the 34th ID (ARNG) headquartered in Arden Hills, Minnesota. It encompasses and coordinates the training of the following including two ABCTs centred on Minnesota and Idaho, two IBCTs centred on Indiana and Wisconsin and an Aviation Brigade centred on Minnesota.

2) The 42nd ID (ARNG) headquartered in Troy, NY with IBCTs centred on New York State, New Jersey and Vermont and an aviation brigade in New York.

There's actually a lot of synergy that could be generated (and is already being generated informally) between CA ARes units and the ARNG. A lot more could be done on a wider basis if we reformed our own system first.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

There's actually a lot of synergy that could be generated (and is already being generated informally) between CA ARes units and the ARNG. A lot more could be done on a wider basis if we reformed our own system first.

Hey whoa.... the Pictou Fusiliers stormed the beaches of Normandy in 1944 and the section+ they parade twice a month takes great pride in that.

How dare you suggest trampling on that proud heritage in the pursuit of a more functional ORBAT

 

[GR66]

I've always been a proponent of such alignment and think it is both desirable and critical.

I'll add two additional organization:

1) the 34th ID (ARNG) headquartered in Arden Hills, Minnesota. It encompasses and coordinates the training of the following including two ABCTs centred on Minnesota and Idaho, two IBCTs centred on Indiana and Wisconsin and an Aviation Brigade centred on Minnesota.

2) The 42nd ID (ARNG) headquartered in Troy, NY with IBCTs centred on New York State, New Jersey and Vermont and an aviation brigade in New York.

There's actually a lot of synergy that could be generated (and is already being generated informally) between CA ARes units and the ARNG. A lot more could be done on a wider basis if we reformed our own system first.

100% agree. I actually looked at those before I posted because there would be good synergy. Especially with the ABCT in 34th ID.

I see some advantages in keeping the Reserve Brigade from each Division keeping the same association as their Reg Force counterpart so that they have a more unified sense of direction. However I also see the advantage of having Canadian Reserve units associated with US Reserve units as they may have many more practical lessons to share about managing part time soldiering than a Reg Force unit would.

 

[FJAG]

Hey whoa.... the Pictou Fusiliers stormed the beaches of Normandy in 1944 and the section+ they parade twice a month takes great pride in that.

How dare you suggest trampling on that proud heritage in the pursuit of a more functional ORBAT

I know that comes with a healthy dose of sarcasm but in reading "Relentless Struggle" and Reserves 2000's website and material one realizes the tremendous counterproductive gap that exists between the RegF view of the ARes and the politicized ex-leadership of the ARes. One needs to find a happy medium between the dismal reality of the ARes and its realizeable potential.

The trouble is that both sides have some good points but also some stupid ideas which neither will let go of.

I've been puzzling through this as I look at my napkin force from time-to-time. There frankly are no courses of action which will please both sides. In typical lawyer fashion one has to reach a settlement which leaves both sides equally dissatisfied.

I'm someone who doesn't want to throw out the baby with the bathwater by creating a whole new set of numbered battalions or newly named regional units. I believe in keeping alive traditions that are already established as much as possible. I've got a lot of flexibility here but think one could reach a balance with 30/70 / 70/30 units with the following:

1. reduce each of the three RegF infantry regiments to a single 70/30 PPCLI bn, a single 100/0 RCR bn and a single 100/0 R22eR bn;

2. designate 12 - 15 of the strongest ARes battalions across the country as either a 70/30 or a 30/70 battalion;

3. designate 4 additional ARes battalions across the country as depot battalions;

4. designate the GGFG as a public duties battalion;

5. each of items 2, 3 and 4 will be assigned a RegF CO and a large RegF Regt'l HQ staff;

6. all remaining RegF rifle companies not part of serial 1. will be assigned to serials 2 and 3 at the rate of one per 30/70 bn and two per 70/30 bn;

7. all RegF CS and CSS companies will be distributed across the infantry battalions in platoons of appropriate ratios;

8. all remaining ARes bns are reduced to coy strength and assigned to one or another of the 30/70 and 70/30 bns

Similar reallocation will occur for armed, arty, engineer and CSS battalions

I've been toying with a continued affiliation system so that, as an example, the RHLI becomes a 30/70 battalion with a rifle company plus a CS platoon and a CSS platoon from let's say 3 RCR (but moved into the Hamilton area on long tour postings - and probably rebadged as RHLI) as its fully equipped RegF "30" components; an ARes rifle company from the original RHLI in Hamilton; an ARes rifle company from the L&WRegt from St Catherines/Welland and maybe the A&SHighrs as the ARes portion of two CS platoons and two CSS platoons as the "70". Let the RHLI have an honourary colonel and each of the other three ARes "companies" have an honourary LCol and maybe even let them keep their dress uniforms and volunteer bands.

It's not the neatest solution but it preserves important regimental ties and affiliations and the regional connection with the communities while creating a viable battalion with a solid RegF core. It might make the whole program less unpalatable to both sides. I'm way open to other suggestions as to how to make something like this work.

 

[Kirkhill]

7th Infantry Division organization 2021



10th Mountain Div


Both Divs incorporate a National Guard Brigade.

 

[KevinB]

Both Divs incorporate a National Guard Brigade.

Only when Federalized.
The workings of our Regular Army and ARNG are not as easy to put on paper as it appears. The ARNG belongs to the state, not the Fed Gov, unless activated by the Fed Gov

Litany of domestic reasons.

However as Posse Comitatus doesn’t have a similar relative in Canada, you won’t need to worry about the legal hurdles and web of issues that come with the separation of the Regular Army from domestic usage.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Hey whoa.... the Pictou Fusiliers stormed the beaches of Normandy in 1944 and the section+ they parade twice a month takes great pride in that.

How dare you suggest trampling on that proud heritage in the pursuit of a more functional ORBAT

There are ARes Colonels and Generals who owe their meteoric rise to the hard work of 30 or so random all ranks in their home regiments ... with boot prints on their backs

 

[Kirkhill]

Only when Federalized.
The workings of our Regular Army and ARNG are not as easy to put on paper as it appears. The ARNG belongs to the state, not the Fed Gov, unless activated by the Fed Gov

Litany of domestic reasons.

However as Posse Comitatus doesn’t have a similar relative in Canada, you won’t need to worry about the legal hurdles and web of issues that come with the separation of the Regular Army from domestic usage.

Got that. On the other hand the Guard train with the same kit and to the same standards are expected to work with the Regulars when federalized. No?

As a mobilization model, is there a reason it wouldn't work for FJAG, GR66 and McG?

 

[FJAG]

Got that. On the other hand the Guard train with the same kit and to the same standards are expected to work with the Regulars when federalized. No?

As a mobilization model, is there a reason it wouldn't work for FJAG, GR66 and McG?

There is no reason why it wouldn't work from a Canadian legislative framework point of view.

The ARes's problem's arise out of the "attend when you feel like it" concept of reserve service. There are fixes for most everything through organizational and regulatory changes which are within the control of DND/CAF. Equipment for mobilization is a challenge; equipment for training is doable through reorganization. Employer/employee legislation needs a big fix but is not a deal breaker, it's a speed bump to retaining well trained middle tier leaders.

Yes. The ARNG could be a mobilization model. I think, however, in adopting it outright, with continuing senior ARes leadership, we might retain many of the current weaknesses. I think that a 30/70-based system would make supressing those weaknesses easier. One needs to make career soldiers responsible and accountable for their blended units within a framework that enables proper training activities suitable for ARes members.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There is no reason why it wouldn't work from a Canadian legislative framework point of view.

The ARes's problem's arise out of the "attend when you feel like it" concept of reserve service. There are fixes for most everything through organizational and regulatory changes which are within the control of DND/CAF. Equipment for mobilization is a challenge; equipment for training is doable through reorganization. Employer/employee legislation needs a big fix but is not a deal breaker, it's a speed bump to retaining well trained middle tier leaders.

Yes. The ARNG could be a mobilization model. I think, however, in adopting it outright, with continuing senior ARes leadership, we might retain many of the current weaknesses. I think that a 30/70-based system would make supressing those weaknesses easier. One needs to make career soldiers responsible and accountable for their blended units within a framework that enables proper training activities suitable for ARes members.

The ARes' main issue is not 'attend when you feel like it' as much as it is 'serve under really bad leaders, both Reserve and Reg F, because there's no one else available'.

You can pour millions into it, and fix all the legislation you want, but when the leadership competence ceiling for ARes is about Major/MWO (and that's a big stretch in many cases), and the Reg F continues to use the ARes as a dumping ground for misfits, you'll be throwing good money/effort after bad.

 

[Rifleman62]

The ARes' main issue is not 'attend when you feel like it' as much as it is 'serve under really bad leaders, both Reserve and Reg F, because there's no one else available'.

You can pour millions into it, and fix all the legislation you want, but when the leadership competence ceiling for ARes is about Major/MWO (and that's a big stretch in many cases), and the Reg F continues to use the ARes as a dumping ground for misfits, you'll be throwing good money/effort after bad.

You hit the nail on the head. Dumping ground.

There are ARes Colonels and Generals who owe their meteoric rise to the hard work of 30 or so random all ranks in their home regiments ... with boot prints on their back.

Personally served with them. Stopped counting at five.

 

[GR66]

The ARes' main issue is not 'attend when you feel like it' as much as it is 'serve under really bad leaders, both Reserve and Reg F, because there's no one else available'.

You can pour millions into it, and fix all the legislation you want, but when the leadership competence ceiling for ARes is about Major/MWO (and that's a big stretch in many cases), and the Reg F continues to use the ARes as a dumping ground for misfits, you'll be throwing good money/effort after bad.

Does that not lend itself to the idea that there should not be separate Reg Force units and Reserve Force units but rather just Army units with varying percentages of Full-time and Part-time members?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Does that not lend itself to the idea that there should not be separate Reg Force units and Reserve Force units but rather just Army units with varying percentages of Full-time and Part-time members?

I'm guessing it should be something like that.

Right now - IMHO - we have created the equivalent of a third world country in the Canadian Army, and people are wandering around congratulating themselves as if they've actually accomplished something meaningful, you know, kind of like the US military did with the ARVNs just before the Tet Offensive .

 

[FJAG]

I'm guessing it should be something like that.

Right now - IMHO - we have created the equivalent of a third world country in the Canadian Army, and people are wandering around congratulating themselves as if they've actually accomplished something meaningful, you know, kind of like the US military did with the ARVNs just before the Tet Offensive .

We have indeed.

At the best of times, the lack of proper training and experience in both the ARes's officer corps and senior NCO corps as you get above lieutenant and sergeant level generally ensures poor leadership in garrison and definitely in combat. One can always find the exception to the rule and discover an exceptional individual but in general the system leaves even them lacking the proper foundation to develop their excellence.

This is why the ARNG model is not the best either because even there you have a 'last man standing' factor which still leads to promotion to the most senior levels. Training may be more uniform as between the Active Army and the ARNG but experience can be lacking. The mass of rotations through Iraq and Afghanistan by the ARNG (and for that matter many ARes officers and NCOs have helped with experience.

My belief is that by blending the 30/70 70/30 units under RegF leadership the RegF can't simply dump its less capable officers and NCOs with the reserves. Leaders at all levels above, say, sergeant and Capt, will have had both RegF training and experience as RegF personnel and will be evaluated for their future careers by RegF personnel in competition with their peers as they lead and develop both their RegF and ARes subunits and personnel.

There is still some room for exceptional ARes officers and NCOs to rise to higher ranks but essentially they will be limited to the ones who have had the requisite training and experience along the way.

It's by no means a perfect solution but it is a viable one that has a chance of succeeding while any ones that retain pure ARes units will always result in there being second class status associated with them.

As an aside, while leadership is very important, the development of the personnel and units themselves depends entirely on the training given them. We need to first create a common training standard at the DP1 level to ensure that every soldier, RegF and ARes, comes to their unit with a common level of training. That's where I see depot battalions that provide a mandatory common training standard for all DP1 (and later voluntary DP2 trainees)

Thereafter, to ensure that the units can function as units there has to be an adequate minimum level of collective training at the sub unit level within a unit framework. That means that units need for to be relieved of responsibilities for individual training (by the depot battalions) to concentrate on collective training only. That also means that we establish a mandatory training regime/cycle for the ARes members and elements of each unit that allows meeting the minimum standard but in a rigorously consistent way that facilitates attendance by ARes members. I see that through ten months of a single 2.5 day weekend per month and a a single summer exercise of 16.5 days (Friday evening to Sunday evening) for a total of 41.5 mandatory days per year. All other events, additional training, ceremonial occasions social gatherings etc would be purely voluntary.

I'll add one other component. Service contracts need to be for fixed terms to allow the CA to recapture service for the investment made in DP1 training. We already use that concept for education provided with obligatory service contracts. That concept needs expanding so that when we spend time and money on training any soldier to a DP1 level in any trade or classification we get a certain number of years of service as either a RegF or ARes soldier out of them. We can't simply have a soldier walk away with six months notice or by stopping parading. An enrolling soldier must commit themselves to a reasonable fixed term contract before enlistment and be held to the terms of that contract or face consequences if he/she fails to follow through.

 

[Kirkhill]

The 7th, 10th and 11th Divisions may offer interesting comparisons for Reg/Res cooperation for the CAF, but looking at the ORBATs shown, something else stood out: the organization of the artillery.

In the 7th there is an artillery brigade but the battalions stay with their supported brigades - reinforcing the notion of the BCT as the primary combat element and capable of independent action.

In the 10th the artillery is brigaded at the divisional level with the exception of the ARNG BCT that brings its own artillery battalion along with it when it joins the division. Presumably that battalion then falls under the artillery brigade's command and control. Does the 10th feel that freeing the light brigade commanders from the artillery enhances their speed of response and flexibility perhaps?

The 11th is still sorting itself out.

The all-singing all-dancing BCT, on the other hand, seems to work well for the ARNG as a plug and play entity when transferred from State to Federal control.

And both the 7th and the 10th could be described as 70/30 Divisions.

7th Infantry Division organization 2021

View attachment 73913

10th Mountain Div


Both Divs incorporate a National Guard Brigade.

As to levels of competence - other armies have retained the traditional difference between the local Captain, his Lieutenants and Sergeants and the Government's officers - the Generals, Colonels, Lt Cols and Majors and the Warrant Officers - all those that wear the Crown in the Canadian system.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thereafter, to ensure that the units can function as units there has to be an adequate minimum level of collective training at the sub unit level within a unit framework. That means that units need for to be relieved of responsibilities for individual training (by the depot battalions) to concentrate on collective training only. That also means that we establish a mandatory training regime/cycle for the ARes members and elements of each unit that allows meeting the minimum standard but in a rigorously consistent way that facilitates attendance by ARes members. I see that through ten months of a single 2.5 day weekend per month and a a single summer exercise of 16.5 days (Friday evening to Sunday evening) for a total of 41.5 mandatory days per year. All other events, additional training, ceremonial occasions social gatherings etc would be purely voluntary.

For individual training could more emphasis be placed on self-learning through on-line study with one night a week being set aside for supervised TOETs and tutoring?

 

[foresterab]

Been following this for a while and please ignore any errors made through my ignorance. I'm a civilian, haven't served, but have an interest in ensuring that the Armed Forces of Canada are effective within the constraints imposed by the government.

I've also only focused on the infantry units because frankly I don't know enough about the service/support units and my understanding of the Armour units was initially wrong.

Infantry:

• Currently 11 primary units (9 infantry battalions) + JTF2 + Governor General Guards for ceremonial purposes
  • Shift to 11 different units:
  • Governor General’s Foot Guards – Ceremonial Unit only manned primarily by longer term (6-12 month contract positions) reserve forces
  • JTF2 – expand to 2 units. The folks that do lots of things only told over beers and outside of media. 100% Reg. force manning
  • 9 separate infantry battalions
• Only 1 cap badge per battalion. Intent is to eliminate the regimental godfather blessing and focus on role more.

• CFB Edmonton/CFB Wainwright
  • Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• Rocky Mountain Rangers (Former PPCLI)
  • manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• CFB Shilo
• Canadian Grenadier Guards (former PPCLI)
  • manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• CFB Petawawa
• Royal Canadian Regiment
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• CFB Gagetown
• The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada (former RCR unit)
  • manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• CFB Valcartier
• Royal 22nd Regiment
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• Fusiliers de St. Laurant (former 22nd regiment)
  • manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• Royal Rifles of Canada (former 22nd regiment)
  • manned up from supplemental order of battle but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

• Wikipedia lists 49 units in the reserves some of which have multiple battalions and does not address those with separate Companies.
  • At approximately 5 units/ regular force unit that means that to fill the missing company each reserve unit would be required to man 2 sections for deployment in the event of ROTO tour.
• Training to focus upon 3 major events per year
  • Fall training dominated by Reg force units
    • One exercise at a battalion command level, one at brigade.
    • Rotating exercise locations. Troops move to location and focus (i.e. Yellowknife, Shilo, Chilliwack…)
  • Late winter training dominated by Reg force units
    • One exercise at a battalion command level, one at brigade.
    • Rotating exercise locations. Troops move to location and focus (i.e. Yellowknife, Shilo, Chilliwack…)
  • Summer training session, not to exceed 2 weeks, for Reserve units.
    • Full company deployment x5 units + 1x unit from regular force
    • Should align with all new recruit battle school completed prior to event.
  • Published schedule 2 years in advance.

Army wide:

• Increased number of units to help break the cap badge mafia within Reg Force and promote a wider range of thinking. Tradition is important but there needs to be more than 3 ways of thinking.
• Training to be based upon a mix of battalion and brigade level exercises.
• Promotion must show competence in leadership at multiple exercises.
• Reserve unit performance directly tied performance of battalion commanders.
• Battalion and higher rank requires full time Reg Force roles.
• Reserve units
  • ALL UNITS, unless mobilized above, will be rebadged
  • Rebadging of units will occur based upon provincial name similar to the approach taken by the British Army where this is now the Royal Regiment of Scotland
  • Each company/troop of units, as associated with the historical unit, will be allowed to retain tartan/hackle/badge within the assembly of each unit.
  • Unit name also will require endorsement from province or territory.
• Mission Focus
  • Company based unit designed to develop and deploy at primarily section level (basic role) with annual company training (reg force battalion command, reserve force company command)
  • Performance of Reserve units directly tied to success of regular force units and performance. And vice versa…
  • Long term taskings (OP REASSURANCE) will be completed with minimum 1 year notice to associated units and reserve units mobilizing 2 sections minimum per unit for deployment. Formal activation of subunit or entire unit if appropriate.
  • Summer training will be known minimum 2 years in advance state of emergency declared and will be full unit deployment under command of 2 i/c Captain.
• Secondary focus:
  • All armouries will be updated to work as a local state of emergency center. Command and Control centers to allow for use by local civilian agencies to deal with a state of emergency.
  • Updates depending upon local hazard needs. Not the supply depot but an overlapping command center (if needed) and/or mobilization point.
  • Supply depots to be keep separate from armoury/unit tasking’s
  • Includes basic ICS training with specialized knowledge added depending on location (wildfire/flood/earthquake etc..)

• It is impossible to figure out exactly what the next major conflict will require but there are aspects to which Canada can train for and become known for:
  • Small unit leadership. From section to company command we are more and more relying upon effective small unit leaders and even when dealing with the mess of the Ukraine it is the difference in small unit leadership that is most obvious
  • Heavy emphasis upon night fighting. We were known the for trench raids of WW1 and it’s time to bring that back. Lets utilize a high level of training and ensure that we can punch when the opponent may be weak
  • Winter training. Winter isn’t going away so we should be not only training in these conditions but a leader within NATO in operating in the cold.
  • Less training on the static and more both mobility training (i.e. shoot and scoot) and urban training. Conflicts will be where the people are and we don’t train much in urban fighting settings.
  • No unit is completely manned. This is on purpose as it forces a discussion on a) how to man it up completely and b) forces a unit to rely upon communication with others. Note that it’s a flip/flop between battalion led exercises on who provides the manpower depending upon time of year
  • Increase emphasis upon plugging and playing units. Complete a brigade exercise at CFB Suffield with BATUS/Strathconas and the PPCLI. A winter training exercise in Norway with a unit from there. RCR’s go to meet with the Marine Corp in Florida….well maybe not that one…
• If Canada politically will not fund a full force then we must be as adaptable as possible to be useful, in a meaningful way, to those other resources.
• Promotion to general field rank requires:
  • Proven experience in small unit leadership.
  • Proven leadership through battalion leadership integrating multiple units into battle plan
  • May involve 3rd party feedback from allied nations
  • Planning and supporting a major field exercise
  • Note this can be either plans or logistics roles for supply folks.
  • Proven leadership through brigade/fleet exercise.
  • This will be judged in part through 3rd party observers from allied nations commenting on responses.

 

[KevinB]

Been following this for a while and please ignore any errors made through my ignorance. I'm a civilian, haven't served, but have an interest in ensuring that the Armed Forces of Canada are effective within the constraints imposed by the government.

I've also only focused on the infantry units because frankly I don't know enough about the service/support units and my understanding of the Armour units was initially wrong.

Infantry:

• Currently 11 primary units (9 infantry battalions) + JTF2 + Governor General Guards for ceremonial purposes
  • Shift to 11 different units:
  • Governor General’s Foot Guards – Ceremonial Unit only manned primarily by longer term (6-12 month contract positions) reserve forces
  • JTF2 – expand to 2 units. The folks that do lots of things only told over beers and outside of media. 100% Reg. force manning
  • 9 separate infantry battalions
• Only 1 cap badge per battalion. Intent is to eliminate the regimental godfather blessing and focus on role more.

• CFB Edmonton/CFB Wainwright
  • Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• Rocky Mountain Rangers (Former PPCLI)
  • manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• CFB Shilo
• Canadian Grenadier Guards (former PPCLI)
  • manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• CFB Petawawa
• Royal Canadian Regiment
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• CFB Gagetown
• The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada (former RCR unit)
  • manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• CFB Valcartier
• Royal 22nd Regiment
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• Fusiliers de St. Laurant (former 22nd regiment)
  • manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
• Royal Rifles of Canada (former 22nd regiment)
  • manned up from supplemental order of battle but chosen due to non-specific town/province
  • 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

• Wikipedia lists 49 units in the reserves some of which have multiple battalions and does not address those with separate Companies.
  • At approximately 5 units/ regular force unit that means that to fill the missing company each reserve unit would be required to man 2 sections for deployment in the event of ROTO tour.
• Training to focus upon 3 major events per year
  • Fall training dominated by Reg force units
    • One exercise at a battalion command level, one at brigade.
    • Rotating exercise locations. Troops move to location and focus (i.e. Yellowknife, Shilo, Chilliwack…)
  • Late winter training dominated by Reg force units
    • One exercise at a battalion command level, one at brigade.
    • Rotating exercise locations. Troops move to location and focus (i.e. Yellowknife, Shilo, Chilliwack…)
  • Summer training session, not to exceed 2 weeks, for Reserve units.
    • Full company deployment x5 units + 1x unit from regular force
    • Should align with all new recruit battle school completed prior to event.
  • Published schedule 2 years in advance.

Army wide:

• Increased number of units to help break the cap badge mafia within Reg Force and promote a wider range of thinking. Tradition is important but there needs to be more than 3 ways of thinking.
• Training to be based upon a mix of battalion and brigade level exercises.
• Promotion must show competence in leadership at multiple exercises.
• Reserve unit performance directly tied performance of battalion commanders.
• Battalion and higher rank requires full time Reg Force roles.
• Reserve units
  • ALL UNITS, unless mobilized above, will be rebadged
  • Rebadging of units will occur based upon provincial name similar to the approach taken by the British Army where this is now the Royal Regiment of Scotland
  • Each company/troop of units, as associated with the historical unit, will be allowed to retain tartan/hackle/badge within the assembly of each unit.
  • Unit name also will require endorsement from province or territory.
• Mission Focus
  • Company based unit designed to develop and deploy at primarily section level (basic role) with annual company training (reg force battalion command, reserve force company command)
  • Performance of Reserve units directly tied to success of regular force units and performance. And vice versa…
  • Long term taskings (OP REASSURANCE) will be completed with minimum 1 year notice to associated units and reserve units mobilizing 2 sections minimum per unit for deployment. Formal activation of subunit or entire unit if appropriate.
  • Summer training will be known minimum 2 years in advance state of emergency declared and will be full unit deployment under command of 2 i/c Captain.
• Secondary focus:
  • All armouries will be updated to work as a local state of emergency center. Command and Control centers to allow for use by local civilian agencies to deal with a state of emergency.
  • Updates depending upon local hazard needs. Not the supply depot but an overlapping command center (if needed) and/or mobilization point.
  • Supply depots to be keep separate from armoury/unit tasking’s
  • Includes basic ICS training with specialized knowledge added depending on location (wildfire/flood/earthquake etc..)

• It is impossible to figure out exactly what the next major conflict will require but there are aspects to which Canada can train for and become known for:
  • Small unit leadership. From section to company command we are more and more relying upon effective small unit leaders and even when dealing with the mess of the Ukraine it is the difference in small unit leadership that is most obvious
  • Heavy emphasis upon night fighting. We were known the for trench raids of WW1 and it’s time to bring that back. Lets utilize a high level of training and ensure that we can punch when the opponent may be weak
  • Winter training. Winter isn’t going away so we should be not only training in these conditions but a leader within NATO in operating in the cold.
  • Less training on the static and more both mobility training (i.e. shoot and scoot) and urban training. Conflicts will be where the people are and we don’t train much in urban fighting settings.
  • No unit is completely manned. This is on purpose as it forces a discussion on a) how to man it up completely and b) forces a unit to rely upon communication with others. Note that it’s a flip/flop between battalion led exercises on who provides the manpower depending upon time of year
  • Increase emphasis upon plugging and playing units. Complete a brigade exercise at CFB Suffield with BATUS/Strathconas and the PPCLI. A winter training exercise in Norway with a unit from there. RCR’s go to meet with the Marine Corp in Florida….well maybe not that one…
• If Canada politically will not fund a full force then we must be as adaptable as possible to be useful, in a meaningful way, to those other resources.
• Promotion to general field rank requires:
  • Proven experience in small unit leadership.
  • Proven leadership through battalion leadership integrating multiple units into battle plan
  • May involve 3rd party feedback from allied nations
  • Planning and supporting a major field exercise
  • Note this can be either plans or logistics roles for supply folks.
  • Proven leadership through brigade/fleet exercise.
  • This will be judged in part through 3rd party observers from allied nations commenting on responses.

Ignore JTF-2 for this. They are part of CANSOF, as is CSOR.

The better question is does Canada need 9 Reg Force Infantry Bn’s.
To answer that, one needs to know what the Defence policy is, which is still under re-write.

 

[McG]

Currently 11 primary units (9 infantry battalions) + JTF2 + Governor General Guards for ceremonial purposes

JTF 2 is not infantry. The Ceremonial Guard is a tiny planning staff that takes on a surge of PRes to execute ceremonial duties in the summer months. The 9 battalions are the only “primary units” of infantry.

Only 1 cap badge per battalion. Intent is to eliminate the regimental godfather blessing and focus on role more.

You might find that this actually exacerbates the “godfather” influence within regiments while increases tribalism between regiments.

Wikipedia lists 49 units in the reserves some of which have multiple battalions

If it contains multiple battalions, then it is multiple units.