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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

IIRC the Lima plant can produce 120/month.

I assume that, should the demand increase, they could double that if required.... at least.


In February 1980, the first M1 Abrams rolled out of LATP. After a contract the plant began producing the Abrams at a rate of 30 a month.

Chrysler subsequently sold the Defense subsidiary to General Dynamics in 1982.[3] In January 1985, the last M1 rolled off the assembly line, and in October, production began on the improved M1 (IPM1). The plant later manufactured the M1A1, with the first pilot vehicle built in August 1985. The M1A1 was produced at a rate of 120 a month.[4]


120 M1A1 a month is 3 US Tank Battalions a month.
 
Fair comment.

If I could edit my remark I would.

Having said that there are a lot of people drawing salaries that are related to National Defence and that don't show up directly in the National Defence budget while a lot of those civilians employed by DND are not seen to be directly contributing to the frontline effort.

FJAG wants to supply more Reserve Troops at the expense of the Regular Troops. I'm wondering if there is opportunity for savings in the civilian sector of DND.

Sgt (non-spec, basic IPC) = $73K.
PS equivalent = CR4. Max pay = $55K
 
Does everyone collecting a government pay check need to be presented as an extraneous pig at the trough? We can’t spend our budget on major equipment & war essential consumables for lack of people, but we should manage the budget by cutting the too few who we have?
No one is suggesting, well I'm not, that everyone is at the trough. What I am suggesting is that we have far too many people administering the forces than actually being the forces. Every military needs to tails; one being the immediate logistics tail and the other the overarching administrative one. IMHO the administrative one has completely outgrown its usefulness. There are far too many leaders with far too much staff. IMHO they need a significant culling as well.

I'm not going to disagree with your argument that the Army has its Reg/Reserve balance wrong. I do however question the fact that you're really just changing the manning of the same basic force structures from full-time to part-time...using the Reg Force PY savings to create Res Force Brigades (admittedly with the key enablers that we're currently missing put back).
Effectively, in peacetime, all armies are "in reserve". The issue should be how many people do you need in full-time positions to develop doctrine, achieve leadership proficiency, manage the organization and its gear and react rapidly in an emergency and how many people can you safely put into part-time positions to round out the force when needed and time is available. Canada has skewed that ratio beyond all logic.

We're currently seeing Russia in a full-scale shooting war with a NATO partner nation. A nation that until just before the initiation of hostilities was hosting our military trainers. Even this extreme situation hasn't led the Canadian government to deploy any significant new troops and equipment to Europe. Hasn't led to some dramatic increase in Reserve activity. No scramble to urgently acquire vital military equipment. No serious talk about re-activating a Canadian Brigade Group in Europe. No loading of LAVs and tanks onto Ro-Ro's so they're ready to deploy if needed.
Can't argue with that. Democracies being what they are we'll always be burdened by those who consider re-election more important than national survival. That said, many of the decisions that I criticize are not made by elected officials but the mandarins, civilian and military, who are the stewards of the CAF. Frankly with the state the CAF is in we don't even have the equipment and capabilities to send any weapons or deploy a brigade in Europe.

You might write this off as just another example of the talk-much, do-nothing leadership of an anti-military government. However, do you see any of those actions taking place in the UK? In France? Germany? Sure, the Germans are increasing their defence spending, but are they pushing Brigades forward?
They actually are and will be. There's much movement to expand enhanced forward presence southeast and moving closer to borders. The UK has just refocused its defence view towards the Pacific and is in need of a quick rethink. The US has certainly sent large elements forward and my guess is that the Poles are adding to their already forward thinking deployments

That's what's making me wonder if your model of using the savings to just create more of the same old Brigade Groups is the right path?
I try to be weapon neutral in my thinking except in the way of obvious forces. As an example, I've thought for a while that our brigades need a more robust cavalry force which can do more than simply gather information; I think entity structures based on threes (platoons, companies, battalions) just make sense; I think both direct and indirect fire support is critical and that anyone who builds an army around riflemen without adequate ATGMs, mortars, tanks, artillery, air defence and a sustainable logistics system is a simpleton. Basically the combined arms brigade group structure is sound whether its in the light, medium or heavy category. It's not rocket science. Some day we'll have weapon systems that will have us go in a different direction but for the time being that's it.

The issue for us is to have a doctrine and equip the force in full. The flexibility comes from the RegF/ResF mix. You might need two full rifle companies in a battalion and no artillery for day to day needs but you'd better have trained reservists to fill out that third company and the artillery regiment when the time comes. It's too late when you see the Russians doing a three month exercise at the Latvian border.

FJAG wants to supply more Reserve Troops at the expense of the Regular Troops. I'm wondering if there is opportunity for savings in the civilian sector of DND.
I quite frankly do not want to see any full-timer from the field force Army go at all. My example does two things - one expand the capabilities with existing numbers and the second, more radical, shows how a reduction of full-time field force could leave the same capabilities if properly trained and organized reservists were available and provide sufficient funding to buy the essential material needed. Particularly in a country that seems to profess an aversion for a standing army.

I do not want to target civilians. We need many of their skills as much as service members. IMHO we have far too many military and civilians in full-time salaried positions that do not advance the effort to deliver defence capabilities. We need to cull the full-time salaried by better, smarter more agile management practices. No one wants that though.

It reminds me of Leslie's attempt back in 2010/11. The first thing that happened right out the gate is that the DND HQ side of the house refused to take part. After that everyone fought for their turf. The only way to address that is with a top down directed, time limited arbitrary culling of the herd leaving it to sort itself out afterward.

🍻
 
Ignorant civilian question:

How impractical is it to look at the CMBG's as purely force generation/ administrative commands, with largely self contained battalions and any actual Bde level deployment being "hand picked" to develop the force needed for a given mission?
 
Sgt (non-spec, basic IPC) = $73K.
PS equivalent = CR4. Max pay = $55K
Hahaha.
Sgt=Chief Clerk at small unit.
Very small unit OR that is run by civilians (DRDC, RMC spring to mind) are run by an AS1 or AS2 with AS1, CR3 and 4s working for them, so the civil service equivalent would be 61 to 65k per year. You get pretty good value for that extra 8k from the Sgt.
 
No one is suggesting, well I'm not, that everyone is at the trough. What I am suggesting is that we have far too many people administering the forces than actually being the forces. Every military needs to tails; one being the immediate logistics tail and the other the overarching administrative one. IMHO the administrative one has completely outgrown its usefulness. There are far too many leaders with far too much staff. IMHO they need a significant culling as well.

Tend to agree.

Effectively, in peacetime, all armies are "in reserve". The issue should be how many people do you need in full-time positions to develop doctrine, achieve leadership proficiency, manage the organization and its gear and react rapidly in an emergency and how many people can you safely put into part-time positions to round out the force when needed and time is available. Canada has skewed that ratio beyond all logic.

Key element missing there I think. What portion of the standing force should be put onto foreign battlefields to maintain currency with modern operations? Related is how much should be spent on innovative structures, doing things differently.

Can't argue with that. Democracies being what they are we'll always be burdened by those who consider re-election more important than national survival. That said, many of the decisions that I criticize are not made by elected officials but the mandarins, civilian and military, who are the stewards of the CAF. Frankly with the state the CAF is in we don't even have the equipment and capabilities to send any weapons or deploy a brigade in Europe.


They actually are and will be. There's much movement to expand enhanced forward presence southeast and moving closer to borders. The UK has just refocused its defence view towards the Pacific and is in need of a quick rethink. The US has certainly sent large elements forward and my guess is that the Poles are adding to their already forward thinking deployments

The UK has refocused the RN and marines on the Indo-Pacific although it has neglected its North Sea and Baltic commitments basing a Littoral Response Group and a Carrier in the area. It has also deployed 3 UK Div forwards to Estonia and other troops to the Poland-Belarus border.

They could do more. But compared to what we are doing they are doing not badly.

I try to be weapon neutral in my thinking except in the way of obvious forces. As an example, I've thought for a while that our brigades need a more robust cavalry force which can do more than simply gather information; I think entity structures based on threes (platoons, companies, battalions) just make sense; I think both direct and indirect fire support is critical and that anyone who builds an army around riflemen without adequate ATGMs, mortars, tanks, artillery, air defence and a sustainable logistics system is a simpleton. Basically the combined arms brigade group structure is sound whether its in the light, medium or heavy category. It's not rocket science. Some day we'll have weapon systems that will have us go in a different direction but for the time being that's it.

The issue for us is to have a doctrine and equip the force in full. The flexibility comes from the RegF/ResF mix. You might need two full rifle companies in a battalion and no artillery for day to day needs but you'd better have trained reservists to fill out that third company and the artillery regiment when the time comes. It's too late when you see the Russians doing a three month exercise at the Latvian border.

It would all help if our organizations were not only weapons neutral but also free of regimental and unit idiosyncrasies. I really liked the Italian model in that regard.

1x Regimental Commander
1x Cmd and Log Sub Unit with Sigs, Maint, Tpt and QM
1x Unit Commander
1x Support Coy with 4x 120mm mortar, 4x ATGM systems, 12x Recce Vehs

To this point all units, Lt-Med-Hvy Infantry and Tank are identical

For the Infantry
3x Rifle Coys with 1x Support Pl with 3x 81mm mortar and 2x ATGM systems and 3x Rifle Pl with 3x Rifle Section.

For the tanks
4x Tank Coys with 14 tanks

Even the cavalry follows the same plot except for replacing the Support Coy with a Heavy Armoured Car subunit..

That means that a Lt Infantry unit can be move up the Lt-Med-Hvy spectrum fairly easily. And once you have graduated to the Heavy Infantry what is the delta to convert to Cavalry or Tanks?

I quite frankly do not want to see any full-timer from the field force Army go at all. My example does two things - one expand the capabilities with existing numbers and the second, more radical, shows how a reduction of full-time field force could leave the same capabilities if properly trained and organized reservists were available and provide sufficient funding to buy the essential material needed. Particularly in a country that seems to profess an aversion for a standing army.

I do not want to target civilians. We need many of their skills as much as service members. IMHO we have far too many military and civilians in full-time salaried positions that do not advance the effort to deliver defence capabilities. We need to cull the full-time salaried by better, smarter more agile management practices. No one wants that though.

It reminds me of Leslie's attempt back in 2010/11. The first thing that happened right out the gate is that the DND HQ side of the house refused to take part. After that everyone fought for their turf. The only way to address that is with a top down directed, time limited arbitrary culling of the herd leaving it to sort itself out afterward.

🍻

Fair enough. What can't be done won't be done.
 
Hahaha.
Sgt=Chief Clerk at small unit.
Very small unit OR that is run by civilians (DRDC, RMC spring to mind) are run by an AS1 or AS2 with AS1, CR3 and 4s working for them, so the civil service equivalent would be 61 to 65k per year. You get pretty good value for that extra 8k from the Sgt.
RMC is a small unit? I would expect their CClk to be a WO.
 
RMC is a small unit? I would expect their CClk to be a WO.
Sorry, meant to say- AMS in RMC (clerk there is an AS1 or 2) and sections in DRDC (clerks there are AS1 or 2). Both look after between 30 and 50 people.
 
Sgt (non-spec, basic IPC) = $73K.
PS equivalent = CR4. Max pay = $55K
ENG 4 are paid more than LCdr's so six figures. Retire as a LCdr, join public service, less responsibility and more pay. Kids be an engineer!
 
Tend to agree.



Key element missing there I think. What portion of the standing force should be put onto foreign battlefields to maintain currency with modern operations? Related is how much should be spent on innovative structures, doing things differently.
You can’t make a blanket statement about force numbers for foreign operations. That comes with the specific theatre and what is needed versus what can be sent.

The UK has refocused the RN and marines on the Indo-Pacific although it has neglected its North Sea and Baltic commitments basing a Littoral Response Group and a Carrier in the area. It has also deployed 3 UK Div forwards to Estonia and other troops to the Poland-Belarus border.

They could do more. But compared to what we are doing they are doing not badly.



It would all help if our organizations were not only weapons neutral but also free of regimental and unit idiosyncrasies. I really liked the Italian model in that regard.
I think the Italians aren’t anything to be emulated.
1x Regimental Commander
1x Cmd and Log Sub Unit with Sigs, Maint, Tpt and QM
1x Unit Commander
1x Support Coy with 4x 120mm mortar, 4x ATGM systems, 12x Recce Vehs

To this point all units, Lt-Med-Hvy Infantry and Tank are identical

For the Infantry
3x Rifle Coys with 1x Support Pl with 3x 81mm mortar and 2x ATGM systems and 3x Rifle Pl with 3x Rifle Section.
You don’t want a medium Mortar in a Light Infantry Coy, they belong in Combat Supprt in a dedicated Mortar Platoon or Platoons.
I don’t see the point to 81’s in Mech Inf as you can put a 120mm in a LAV or IFV and get a significantly more capable system.
For the tanks
4x Tank Coys with 14 tanks

Even the cavalry follows the same plot except for replacing the Support Coy with a Heavy Armoured Car subunit..

That means that a Lt Infantry unit can be move up the Lt-Med-Hvy spectrum fairly easily. And once you have graduated to the Heavy Infantry what is the delta to convert to Cavalry or Tanks?
Terrible idea. IMHO.
Frankly I’m of the mind the LI should be a different MOS/MOSID/MOC whatever than Mech Inf.
There are inherently different skill sets for both - the same way I don’t think that Armor should be the same as Cavalry / frankly LAV Inf units are more Calvary than the Armor units.

Sure you can stick LI in the back as GIB’s as needed, but you need crew that are dedicated to vehicles for Mech Inf (be it heavy or med) as proper vehicle emolument isn’t something you just pick up.
The same way a Medium Force needs to fight differently than a Heavy or a Light. - trying to have a generic force just results in something that does nothing well.
Fair enough. What can't be done won't be done.
 
Or by average do you mean the mean or mode instead of median?

Average and mean are the same thing. Mode is just a count of a measurement value (most frequently occurring one).

The distinction is important because clusters of measures away from the median can significantly alter the mean without changing the median. For example, "average/mean" income is often skewed (upward) by the effect of a small number of extremely high incomes.
 
ENG 4 are paid more than LCdr's so six figures. Retire as a LCdr, join public service, less responsibility and more pay. Kids be an engineer!
I was an EG-6 when I retired, making $88,000, this is the current levels, sigh I should have not retired early.

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You can’t make a blanket statement about force numbers for foreign operations. That comes with the specific theatre and what is needed versus what can be sent.

I strenuously disagree. Your statement might be correct for the US Forces but it is certainly not correct for the Canadian Forces.

Canada's efforts are not going to single-handedly sway any war. It will be a contribution to someone else's effort. With that Canada will contribute whatever the Government of the Day sees fit. That may be 5 Divisions of Infantry with all the trimmings or it may be a platoon of Special Forces. Or maybe it is a frigate standing offshore.

The call is entirely discretionary.

Just as it is for the US when it decides if it is going to fund 10 divisions or 12 and then decides if it is going to use them and where and when they are going to be used.

The war will be fought with the people and equipment available.
 
I strenuously disagree. Your statement might be correct for the US Forces but it is certainly not correct for the Canadian Forces.
I’m missing your point.
If the Cdn Gov says the CAF will send 2 Bde then the CAF does. No difference.

Now the CAF should have been given guidance (I’d say they have with SSE) as to force structures etc. But that is irrelevant to actual wars - where the Cdn Gov may deploy a lot more than was expected.

The war will be fought with the people and equipment available.
Agreed. You do to war with the Military you have, not the military you want.

Which I why I’ve argued the CAF needs a Brigade all three force constructs Light, Medium and Heavy in order to be able to deliver the most capable and practical for to a theatre.
 
I’m missing your point.
If the Cdn Gov says the CAF will send 2 Bde then the CAF does. No difference.

We are talking past each other. I thought you were suggesting that the situation would define the level of commitment. I was suggesting that regardless of the situation the Cdn Gov will decide the commitment.

I now believe you to be saying: the Cdn Gov and the CAF will review the situation, make an estimate and despatch a suitable commitment that conforms to the requirement of the theatre.

I still think you are wrong.

A more correct statement is: the Cdn Gov will despatch a commitment if it sees political benefit.

Now the CAF should have been given guidance (I’d say they have with SSE) as to force structures etc. But that is irrelevant to actual wars - where the Cdn Gov may deploy a lot more than was expected.

You expect more from my government than I do.

Agreed. You do to war with the Military you have, not the military you want.

100% agreement.

Which I why I’ve argued the CAF needs a Brigade all three force constructs Light, Medium and Heavy in order to be able to deliver the most capable and practical for to a theatre.

No disagreement there. Not necessarily my prescription but a workable one.
 
Ignorant civilian question:

How impractical is it to look at the CMBG's as purely force generation/ administrative commands, with largely self contained battalions and any actual Bde level deployment being "hand picked" to develop the force needed for a given mission?
Not that ignorant a question at all. If you take a look at our last defence paper Strong, Secure, Engaged you'll see that for the Army, its potential missions are set in the nature of sustained and other deployments in numbers up to 1,500. Effectively that's a battlegroup with attachments and a a national command and support element. That being the case, brigades are basically force generators already.

During Afghanistan we deployed forces of up to around 2,500 which included a battlegroup, a provincial reconstruction team and an command and support element. While brigade headquarters did form the Task Force headquarters, these were far short of a brigade deployment other than a large number of the people came from the brigade augmented by others including a fair number of reservists.

The issue though isn't whether they are already force generators, but are they capable of being force employers - in other words being able to form a brigade headquarters, deploy it into combat with various battalions, regiments under command. While SSE doesn't demand that, the brigades do train for that and are equipped and manned for that.
It would all help if our organizations were not only weapons neutral but also free of regimental and unit idiosyncrasies. I really liked the Italian model in that regard.

1x Regimental Commander
1x Cmd and Log Sub Unit with Sigs, Maint, Tpt and QM
1x Unit Commander
1x Support Coy with 4x 120mm mortar, 4x ATGM systems, 12x Recce Vehs

To this point all units, Lt-Med-Hvy Infantry and Tank are identical
See my previous comments about the superfluous colonel. Basically all out battalion sized organizations already conform to that. There's a battalion headquarters with all the C2 elements and a CSS company with all the maint and logistics requirement for that specific force. (a heavy armoured battalion, even in Italy, will have a significantly different log sub unit from a light inf battalion. See for example the differing structures for the sic forward support companies that exist within the Brigade Support Battalion in the US Army.

After that every bn/regt is tailored for its mission.

This is the standard system used by most western armies with minor variations.

Now the CAF should have been given guidance (I’d say they have with SSE) as to force structures etc. But that is irrelevant to actual wars - where the Cdn Gov may deploy a lot more than was expected.
I agree with you in all respects but believe that SSE is very poor guidance. There used to be a time when our guidance was more realistic by requiring the ability to commit a brigade on, I believe either 90 days or 180 days notice but that was before the turn of the century when the Army was hollowed out and doing back to back tours in Bosnia during the decade of darkness.

The previous White Paper - Canada First Defence Strategy wasn't much better being issued during the Afghanistan engagement and basically living under that construct. All it said was "Maintain combat-capable units at the right level of readiness". In that respect SSE was more instructive but IMHO it set a low bar. Again, IMHO, being involved in a long term conflict like Afghanistan we've learned a bad lesson that concerns itself too much to long term force sustainability and gives too little consideration for having the ability to surge a large force for a limited time like a year or two. Six month rotos as a standard are a killer and mitigate at large force deployments. Our WW2 vets who spent four or five years in Europe are snickering at us. And don't even get me started on HTLA during a combat operation.

🍻
 
The previous White Paper - Canada First Defence Strategy wasn't much better being issued during the Afghanistan engagement and basically living under that construct. All it said was "Maintain combat-capable units at the right level of readiness". In that respect SSE was more instructive but IMHO it set a low bar. Again, IMHO, being involved in a long term conflict like Afghanistan we've learned a bad lesson that concerns itself too much to long term force sustainability and gives too little consideration for having the ability to surge a large force for a limited time like a year or two. Six month rotos as a standard are a killer and mitigate at large force deployments. Our WW2 vets who spent four or five years in Europe are snickering at us. And don't even get me started on HTLA during a combat operation.

🍻

Not just deployments, postings too, the fast moving of our personal ends up creating a force almost constantly in flux from people posting in and out each year. Deployments should be extended, minimum 9 months to a max determined by the mission, within reason. Postings should be limited in my opinion to two scenarios contract resigning, and operational requirement. Make contracts longer, say 6 to 8 years minimum, and your posting is your posting for that entire time. This creates more stability for those with families, and for the member, it will also save money on moves.
 
Not just deployments, postings too, the fast moving of our personal ends up creating a force almost constantly in flux from people posting in and out each year. Deployments should be extended, minimum 9 months to a max determined by the mission, within reason. Postings should be limited in my opinion to two scenarios contract resigning, and operational requirement. Make contracts longer, say 6 to 8 years minimum, and your posting is your posting for that entire time. This creates more stability for those with families, and for the member, it will also save money on moves.
Agreed. I've never understood the posting turbulence at lower ranks and junior officers. Practically speaking a junior officer should be able to stay in one location until ready for appointment as a company commander. Non-commissioned ranks to CSM appointment. And even there, some could remain in their home unit.

I think the problem is that there are far too many staff positions that need to be filled across the force by Sgt and Captains and up. That usually forces moves when more regimental employment would be better for the individual and the corps. That's a guess.

🍻
 
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