Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[MJP]

Biggest down side of NB is that our AEV are so heavy that QC will not accept them as highway loads for months around spring and fall each year.

Been involved in that file just a little bit and Quebec is the extreme example, but even in Alberta you can't move the tanks back from Wainwright to Edmonton until spring road restrictions have been lifted. There have been exceptions but it takes some finagling to get done.

 

[markppcli]

Solution - post the Strathconnas to Wainwright where they have access to a rail head and a suitable training area.

 

[Rifleman62]

With an apology.

 

[dapaterson]

Me: starts googling real estate to find a location to build a gravy factory in Wainwright.

 

[FJAG]

Rule of three applies - Grandma's version

One on, one in the wash, one in the drawer.

For every vehicle you field you need two more. One being used, one being maintained and one in nice pristine condition ready to go.

I think that's a bit of a myth that grew out of the Army's managed readiness system for both people and materiel. Back in the seventies (yeah, I know, here I go again) our regiments were equipped up to their full establishment. That equipment formed our training stock and was also what we were expected to deploy with. The big difference was that we were staffed to maintain it. Yes there was a small reserve of replacement equipment and yes, every once in a while you were short a gun out for maintenance or had to use the troop sergeant major's vehicle as your alternate command post because the real one was down, but if anything that taught us how to continue functioning with battle casualties.

If you have a proper scale of equipment and maintenance capability within the units, then you do not need that 2/3 overage. When people deploy, they take their gear (or if you're a subsequent roto, transfer your gear in Canada to the returning unit while you RIP onto theirs). Need to do large scale refurbishment or upgrades, cycle it through in sub-unit lots. Trade your old gear for new gear coming off the line. We did that several times with artillery refurbishments/upgrades.

I know that there are people who think that managed readiness and whole fleet management are critical. To this point I'm unconvinced. I'm part of the group that believes it only ensures that 2/3 of the force at any given time is "unready".

 

[Kirkhill]

I think that's a bit of a myth that grew out of the Army's managed readiness system for both people and materiel. Back in the seventies (yeah, I know, here I go again) our regiments were equipped up to their full establishment. That equipment formed our training stock and was also what we were expected to deploy with. The big difference was that we were staffed to maintain it. Yes there was a small reserve of replacement equipment and yes, every once in a while you were short a gun out for maintenance or had to use the troop sergeant major's vehicle as your alternate command post because the real one was down, but if anything that taught us how to continue functioning with battle casualties.

If you have a proper scale of equipment and maintenance capability within the units, then you do not need that 2/3 overage. When people deploy, they take their gear (or if you're a subsequent roto, transfer your gear in Canada to the returning unit while you RIP onto theirs). Need to do large scale refurbishment or upgrades, cycle it through in sub-unit lots. Trade your old gear for new gear coming off the line. We did that several times with artillery refurbishments/upgrades.

I know that there are people who think that managed readiness and whole fleet management are critical. To this point I'm unconvinced. I'm part of the group that believes it only ensures that 2/3 of the force at any given time is "unready".

Nothing to do with managed readiness.

It has everything to do with life lessons learned, starting from the time I could haul on my jocks myself.

Learned from my English Grandmother, the First and Second World War nurse.

Divide your resources in three piles.

What you are using.
What is ready to grab and use.
What you are repairing.

And replace with new gear when necessary.

I think the biggest disagreement we have is what constitutes a force, and what constitutes ready.

I believe you envisage a ready force as being a body fully trained and equipped to meet a particular set of circumstances at a moment's notice.

My belief is that a force can be more broadly interpreted. I would sooner have a body of the willing, able to pick up suitable arms made available to them in a timely fashion to deal with ANY situation.

We agree on the need for your force. And I agree it should be fully resourced.

But we disagree, I believe, on the value of broadening the envelope of responses available. I believe there is value in that.

I am not an acolyte of efficiency. I have spent enough time on other people's projects chasing 95% efficiency to know that 70% is the norm and, when suitably exploited, is capable of generating a profitable winning strategy.

Or in the words of a song:

"Two out of Three Ain't Bad".

 

[GR66]

Nothing to do with managed readiness.

It has everything to do with life lessons learned, starting from the time I could haul on my jocks myself.

Learned from my English Grandmother, the First and Second World War nurse.

Divide your resources in three piles.

What you are using. 100% Reg Force Units?
What is ready to grab and use. 70/30 Reg Force/Reserve Units?
What you are repairing. 30/70 Reg Force/Reserve Units?

Not 3 x the kit for each unit but rather 3 x units with full kit in different stages of readiness?

 

[Kirkhill]

Been involved in that file just a little bit and Quebec is the extreme example, but even in Alberta you can't move the tanks back from Wainwright to Edmonton until spring road restrictions have been lifted. There have been exceptions but it takes some finagling to get done.

Most (all?) of the Prairies have seasonal movement restrictions on their gravel and grid roads. Precisely because of what the Russians are experiencing in Ukraine.

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And this is how the Oil Patch works.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not 3 x the kit for each unit but rather 3 x units with full kit in different stages of readiness?

Another viable way of tackling the problem.

 

[MJP]

Most (all?) of the Prairies have seasonal movement restrictions on their gravel and grid roads. Precisely because of what the Russians are experiencing in Ukraine.

They do but we generally don't try and move tanks across any of the other provinces in the spring only in Alberta. Which is why I provided that very specific example.

As McG points out Quebec is a nightmare, pretty much year-round though

 

[FJAG]

Nothing to do with managed readiness.

It has everything to do with life lessons learned, starting from the time I could haul on my jocks myself.

Learned from my English Grandmother, the First and Second World War nurse.

Divide your resources in three piles.

What you are using.
What is ready to grab and use.
What you are repairing.

And replace with new gear when necessary.

I think the biggest disagreement we have is what constitutes a force, and what constitutes ready.

I believe you envisage a ready force as being a body fully trained and equipped to meet a particular set of circumstances at a moment's notice.

My belief is that a force can be more broadly interpreted. I would sooner have a body of the willing, able to pick up suitable arms made available to them in a timely fashion to deal with ANY situation.

We agree on the need for your force. And I agree it should be fully resourced.

But we disagree, I believe, on the value of broadening the envelope of responses available. I believe there is value in that.

I am not an acolyte of efficiency. I have spent enough time on other people's projects chasing 95% efficiency to know that 70% is the norm and, when suitably exploited, is capable of generating a profitable winning strategy.

Or in the words of a song:

"Two out of Three Ain't Bad".

With the exception of "what you are repairing" we're in agreement but that's not how the CAF is doing things.

I do agree that one pile of your kit should be to equip the full-timers for day to day training and deployment.

I also agree that there should be a second pile of kit which equips a reserve force (regardless of whether its an Army ResF or a territorial force) which is held "in reserve" and only used for training occasionally and is intended to expand the full-time force when required.

I do not think that needs to be on a 1:1 ratio. It could be 1:6 or 3:1 depending on an analysis of what is needed and what we can afford.

As to the "what you are repairing" portion, I also disagree with the 1/3 ratio. Refurbishment needs vary depending on the equipment and how it is used. "Reserve" equipment undergoes much less wear and tear and requires much less refurbishment. Equipment from units with a proper running maintenance program do not need factory level refurbishment as frequently as ones that are run into the ground without line maintenance. Rifles require less refurbishment than tanks. And so on. Major upgrades of even the heaviest equipment can be done in small batches over time. This is preferable as a smaller maintenance facility will then have a long term guaranteed workflow allowing for a stable and knowledgeable workforce. Very little equipment has a guaranteed lifecycle that fits neatly into a 1 in 3 ratio. It's a case by case basis.

I'm not arguing with the three concepts - I'm arguing with the rule of three as a proper ratio.

 

[Kirkhill]

Nothing to do with managed readiness.

It has everything to do with life lessons learned, starting from the time I could haul on my jocks myself.

Learned from my English Grandmother, the First and Second World War nurse.

Divide your resources in three piles.

What you are using.
What is ready to grab and use.
What you are repairing.

And replace with new gear when necessary.

I think the biggest disagreement we have is what constitutes a force, and what constitutes ready.

I believe you envisage a ready force as being a body fully trained and equipped to meet a particular set of circumstances at a moment's notice.

My belief is that a force can be more broadly interpreted. I would sooner have a body of the willing, able to pick up suitable arms made available to them in a timely fashion to deal with ANY situation.

We agree on the need for your force. And I agree it should be fully resourced.

But we disagree, I believe, on the value of broadening the envelope of responses available. I believe there is value in that.

I am not an acolyte of efficiency. I have spent enough time on other people's projects chasing 95% efficiency to know that 70% is the norm and, when suitably exploited, is capable of generating a profitable winning strategy.

Or in the words of a song:

"Two out of Three Ain't Bad".

Further to the above.

I worked a lot with Japanese companies.

One of the differences between their style of doing things and the Euro-American way of doing things was that they were comfortable operating plants with a lot of small units. The Americans tended to put all their eggs in one basket and go with one large piece of kit. The Europeans were somewhere in the middle.

The American position was to create one highly efficient, low cost, low manpower, low skill plant. The would create a plant out of a single line of highly efficient pieces. This plan is profitable when it works but it highly vulnerable to the unexpected.

The Japanese position was to create multiple parallel lines of equipment that was inherently less efficient, cost more, required more labour and demanded a lot of skill of the operators. Profits were good despite high labour costs and frequent breakdowns. But the plant continued to operate, working around any temporary bottlenecks. Regardless of what happened the plant continued to produce, raw material and production contracts were honoured without pause. They were reliable partners.

The European position bridged that of the Americans and the Japanese. They generally applied the rule of three.

They built three parallel lines, each operating at 66% of design capacity. Then they scheduled cleaning and maintenance times and took one of the three lines off line for a limited time and relied on the other two to maintain production flow at 66%. Warehousing managed the surges as lines went in and out of service.

In the event that one of the three lines broke down unexpectedly, and a repair could not be eventuated before the Warehouse lost inventory, then the other two lines would speed up, for the duration, to operate at 100% of capacity. Once all three lines were back up and running and inventory renewed then the lines and the operators would return to loafing at 66% of capacity.

3x 100 = 300 = Max Capacity
3x 66 = 200 = Design Capacity
2x 100 = 200 = Design Capacity in extremis.

Different ways of tackling the same problem. All have their merits and all are exploited, with variations, by successful companies.

 

[Kirkhill]

They do but we generally don't try and move tanks across any of the other provinces in the spring only in Alberta. Which is why I provided that very specific example.

As McG points out Quebec is a nightmare, pretty much year-round though

Seen. Sorry for misreading your intent.

As to Quebec. Many companies I have worked with limit the places that they will sign contracts and honour local law. Two of the most common, in North America are Louisiana and Quebec. It is only partly due to Code Civile.

 

[Kirkhill]

With the exception of "what you are repairing" we're in agreement but that's not how the CAF is doing things.

I do agree that one pile of your kit should be to equip the full-timers for day to day training and deployment.

I also agree that there should be a second pile of kit which equips a reserve force (regardless of whether its an Army ResF or a territorial force) which is held "in reserve" and only used for training occasionally and is intended to expand the full-time force when required.

I do not think that needs to be on a 1:1 ratio. It could be 1:6 or 3:1 depending on an analysis of what is needed and what we can afford.

As to the "what you are repairing" portion, I also disagree with the 1/3 ratio. Refurbishment needs vary depending on the equipment and how it is used. "Reserve" equipment undergoes much less wear and tear and requires much less refurbishment. Equipment from units with a proper running maintenance program do not need factory level refurbishment as frequently as ones that are run into the ground without line maintenance. Rifles require less refurbishment than tanks. And so on. Major upgrades of even the heaviest equipment can be done in small batches over time. This is preferable as a smaller maintenance facility will then have a long term guaranteed workflow allowing for a stable and knowledgeable workforce. Very little equipment has a guaranteed lifecycle that fits neatly into a 1 in 3 ratio. It's a case by case basis.

I'm not arguing with the three concepts - I'm arguing with the rule of three as a proper ratio.

I agree with your point on the numbers and ratios.

I will still stipulate that regardless of how many pairs of drawers you have in each pile, it helps to divide things into three piles.

 

[FJAG]

Further to the above.

I worked a lot with Japanese companies.

One of the differences between their style of doing things and the Euro-American way of doing things was that they were comfortable operating plants with a lot of small units. The Americans tended to put all their eggs in one basket and go with one large piece of kit. The Europeans were somewhere in the middle.

The American position was to create one highly efficient, low cost, low manpower, low skill plant. The would create a plant out of a single line of highly efficient pieces. This plan is profitable when it works but it highly vulnerable to the unexpected.

The Japanese position was to create multiple parallel lines of equipment that was inherently less efficient, cost more, required more labour and demanded a lot of skill of the operators. Profits were good despite high labour costs and frequent breakdowns. But the plant continued to operate, working around any temporary bottlenecks. Regardless of what happened the plant continued to produce, raw material and production contracts were honoured without pause. They were reliable partners.

The European position bridged that of the Americans and the Japanese. They generally applied the rule of three.

They built three parallel lines, each operating at 66% of design capacity. Then they scheduled cleaning and maintenance times and took one of the three lines off line for a limited time and relied on the other two to maintain production flow at 66%. Warehousing managed the surges as lines went in and out of service.

In the event that one of the three lines broke down unexpectedly, and a repair could not be eventuated before the Warehouse lost inventory, then the other two lines would speed up, for the duration, to operate at 100% of capacity. Once all three lines were back up and running and inventory renewed then the lines and the operators would return to loafing at 66% of capacity.

3x 100 = 300 = Max Capacity
3x 66 = 200 = Design Capacity
2x 100 = 200 = Design Capacity in extremis.

Different ways of tackling the same problem. All have their merits and all are exploited, with variations, by successful companies.

All three of those systems are workable - even the American one which could have flexibility through excess capacity in its one plant or through shift management. They are ways of allocating cost and risk.

That's different though from Grandma's rule of three described above.

 

[Kirkhill]

All three of those systems are workable - even the American one which could have flexibility through excess capacity in its one plant or through shift management. They are ways of allocating cost and risk.

That's different though from Grandma's rule of three described above.

Perception I guess.

Cheers.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Been involved in that file just a little bit and Quebec is the extreme example, but even in Alberta you can't move the tanks back from Wainwright to Edmonton until spring road restrictions have been lifted. There have been exceptions but it takes some finagling to get done.

But if we take the train....

 

[GK .Dundas]

As per grandma's rule three That just triggered a memory. I seem to recall reading that when Guy Simonds was CDS we supposed to purchase either 850 Centurions or work our way up to that number.
But treasury balked at the cost.

 

[FJAG]

As per grandma's rule three That just triggered a memory. I seem to recall reading that when Guy Simonds was CDS we supposed to purchase either 850 Centurions or work our way up to that number.
But treasury balked at the cost.

I do not recall that number but knowing Simonds it's not illogical at all. My favourite quote of his - one which we seem to have lost sight of over time particulalry as it relates to the ResF is:

In 1972 Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds put it this way: “The armed forces should primarily be trained and equipped for the possibility of conflict with a first-class power - the most severe testing they may have to face. It has been proven over and over again, that well trained and well disciplined military forces, trained primarily for major warfare, can easily and effectively adapt to lesser roles of aid to civil power or peacekeeping. The reverse is not the case.” 2

At the time that he was CGS in the early Fifties, there was a great expansion in the RegF to it's Cold War ceiling. At the time there were significant numbers of Militia personnel whose equipment was pretty much of the same type and quality as the RegF - Sherman tanks, 25 pounders and motorized infantry. The artillery transitioned at that time to the 105mm and 155 mm as common standards for both components. When the newly regenerated armoured corps stood up and Centurions were purchased initially in 1952, the Militia was still running Shermans. By 1971 we had just over 300 Centurions in various Marks in four full RegF regiments. Unfortunately just before that time, the Militia armoured units were losing their tanks and their tank role in favour of recce.

Four or five hundred additional Centurions would have complemented the existing Militia artillery and infantry (which was heavily 3/4 ton truck bound motorized units) structure of the day. Without the Centurions the "deployable reserve" concept really started to fall apart.

 

[McG]

Most (all?) of the Prairies have seasonal movement restrictions on their gravel and grid roads. Precisely because of what the Russians are experiencing in Ukraine.

Yeah, our AEV are so heavy that they are not allowed to be carried over paved roads in the black out seasons.