• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure

lenaitch

Sr. Member
Reaction score
425
Points
810
I'm just going to jump in here and say that, as an outsider, I find the discussion fascinating and, as a citizen and tax payer, a tad disheartening. A little difficult to cut through the acronyms but that doesn't detract from it. It seems the wrong folks are running the army.

Carry on.
 

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,900
Points
1,040
A good number of us on this site can remember when the "dismounted" TOW was "mounted" on top of an M113 or a Jeep (replacing 106 mm recoilless rifles) so that they could fire and retire in a hurry. Circa 1970s

Those same TOW systems were mounted in pairs on M113s in Norwegian built turrets. Circa 1980s.

Discussions ensued on moving the turrets to the AVGPs/Bisons/LAVs/LAV6s.
Discussions ensued on replacing the turrets with new ones.
Discussions ensued about strapping TOWs onto LAV turrets.
Discussions ensued about replacing the TOWs with new ATGMs/LRAAWs/MRAAW(H)s/ALAWs
The TOWs were upgraded to RF standard
The TOWs were withdrawn from service
Discussions continued about replacing the TOWs with new Carl Gustaf rounds and 40 km NLOS rounds.

And you got reissued the 1970s systems, dismounted, and no suitable vehicles (like the M113s and Jeeps) to mount them on.

Good news. They are still useful against T72s, BMPs, BTRs, BMDs and MTLBs. What's your blast signature like and time to target?

Canadian Army development.
Heck, we had Iltis variants for TOW and we had a LAV 3 TOW under Armour and correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't there a BV206 variant. I know the Italians had one for AMF(L) but not sure if Canada did or not.

🍻
 

MilEME09

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
731
Points
940
If we are going to go all in on the LAV 6, we need a TUA turret, be it a new design or otherwise. Heavy weapons like the TOW, and C16 AGLS should not be dismounted primarily, they should be mounted systems.

Doctrine is only good if we practice it properly, I don't see it a lot, atleast not on my side.
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
743
Points
1,060
Heck, we had Iltis variants for TOW and we had a LAV 3 TOW under Armour and correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't there a BV206 variant. I know the Italians had one for AMF(L) but not sure if Canada did or not.

🍻
Aye, I'd forgotten about the LAV3-TOW. In my defence, I hardly knew them.

The Canadian Department of National Defence has awarded Genertal Dynamics Land Systems – Canada a C$ 49.2 million (about $46.3 million) contract to take 33 of the 71 LAV-III chassis originally manufactured under a previous contract for LAV-III TOW Under Armour (TUA) vehicles
external link
, and use them as infantry carriers, instead of inegrating the Kvaerner TUA turret from older M113s. GDLS Canada will oversee the LAV-III TUAV conversion and act as the lead integrator. Rheinmetall Canada of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, will supply the Remote Weapon Station, which will feature a universal gun cradle capable of mounting 5.56, 7.62 and 12.7 mm armaments and a cooled thermal sight system. Delivery of the converted Infantry Section Carriers will occur from June 2008 – March 2009. GDLS release
external link


Here today and gone tomorrow.
 

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,900
Points
1,040
If we are going to go all in on the LAV 6, we need a TUA turret, be it a new design or otherwise. Heavy weapons like the TOW, and C16 AGLS should not be dismounted primarily, they should be mounted systems.

Doctrine is only good if we practice it properly, I don't see it a lot, atleast not on my side.
And under armour mortar carriers.

🍻
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
743
Points
1,060
1622679326493.png

1622679423990.png

JaXD9Wl.jpg


The Finns and the Swedes certainly mounted them on BVs but I don't think Canadians ever did.
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
743
Points
1,060
If we are going to go all in on the LAV 6, we need a TUA turret, be it a new design or otherwise. Heavy weapons like the TOW, and C16 AGLS should not be dismounted primarily, they should be mounted systems.

Doctrine is only good if we practice it properly, I don't see it a lot, atleast not on my side.
I'm still a fan of, in addition to dedicated ATGM platforms in dedicated platoons, strapping a pair of ATGMs onto the LAV turrets.

If you're going to insist in carting my brethren around the country on the off-chance they might come in handy then the least you could do is keep some distance between you and the other chap's big guns.
 

SeaKingTacco

Army.ca Fixture
Donor
Reaction score
1,876
Points
910
View attachment 65335

View attachment 65336

View attachment 65337


The Finns and the Swedes certainly mounted them on BVs but I don't think Canadians ever did.
We absolutely did have BV-206 mounted TOW in Norway. I personally came across one, rolled, on a mountain track in 1992, when I trying to find a good OP for my FOO party. The Patricias, pride aside, were unhurt.
 

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,900
Points
1,040
We absolutely did have BV-206 mounted TOW in Norway. I personally came across one, rolled, on a mountain track in 1992, when I trying to find a good OP for my FOO party. The Patricias, pride aside, were unhurt.
:ROFLMAO:

Reminds me of the Texan tank crew that my FOO party adopted on a winter Reforger/Z Bty flyover after their M 60 slid down a hillside, threw both tracks and was abandoned by their company.

:ROFLMAO:
 

TangoTwoBravo

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
368
Points
880
of all of the above quotes, these two interest me the most:




We have an Army where the website says we consist of:


That's 36,700 who are potentially deployable. (do we really only have 13,700 primary reservists or is the Army's own web page out of whack?) In any event that well over a division and a half of folks. We have enough equipment for an armoured regiment, six LAV battalions and a proper 18 gun artillery regiment plus a good number of equipped engineers and support trades yet we wonder about whether we should be thinking of deploying nothing more than a "well-enabled BG"? We're seriously discussing divesting or making dormant even more capabilities?

As a Canadian taxpayer I want to take back ten billion per year because it's obviously being utterly wasted as an insurance policy for our national defence. I don't know what it's being spent on but a defence capability ain't one of them.

The government gives the Army funding to permit the manning for almost two divisions (Reg and Res combined). It behooves us to create a doctrine commensurate with that manning (albeit in a perfect world we should work out the doctrine first and build the manning afterwards but ... Canada). That doctrine should be the roadmap for everything else that makes up the Army as a whole - from cognitive, to procedural, to organizational, to material, and to moral components of how to make an army fight (yup and somewhere way down the line that doctrine should determine if we have 2 or 3 guys crewing a LAV [or even if it should be a LAV] and how many guys are needed for dismounts).

Instead of being a doctrine-based army we have become a capabilities-based army which in short means trying to figure out what we can do with the shit we've got. That's wrong on so many levels. And for full disclosure that's not a new thought I've had - it comes from Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" that was published in the Army and Training Bulletin in 2001/2. It was true then and its even more true today.

Folks. We're desperately in need of figuring out what the Army's role in Canada's defence is (and I believe a forward presence and an ability to deploy much more than 1/2 of a BG is involved as just one part of that, and should include special forces, quick reaction, medium weight peacekeepers and a whole herd of enabling systems from EW, UAV, loitering munitions etc) and then build and sell that doctrine with all of its consequences. And it needs to be a doctrine that can rapidly change as threats and capabilities change. We need to add capabilities. I can't think of a single one to divest - maybe change some from active to reserve status yes, but divest, no. And the reality is that we will be locked into some systems that we have now for some time to come but that doesn't mean we stay frozen in time and don't think outside the box and plan for the things that are needed to be successful in high intensity conflict

We simply cannot afford to have another 20 year Army Transformation plan like the one that led us to where we are now.

End of rant.

Returning to writing about history

🍻Soyou think
So
of all of the above quotes, these two interest me the most:




We have an Army where the website says we consist of:


That's 36,700 who are potentially deployable. (do we really only have 13,700 primary reservists or is the Army's own web page out of whack?) In any event that well over a division and a half of folks. We have enough equipment for an armoured regiment, six LAV battalions and a proper 18 gun artillery regiment plus a good number of equipped engineers and support trades yet we wonder about whether we should be thinking of deploying nothing more than a "well-enabled BG"? We're seriously discussing divesting or making dormant even more capabilities?

As a Canadian taxpayer I want to take back ten billion per year because it's obviously being utterly wasted as an insurance policy for our national defence. I don't know what it's being spent on but a defence capability ain't one of them.

The government gives the Army funding to permit the manning for almost two divisions (Reg and Res combined). It behooves us to create a doctrine commensurate with that manning (albeit in a perfect world we should work out the doctrine first and build the manning afterwards but ... Canada). That doctrine should be the roadmap for everything else that makes up the Army as a whole - from cognitive, to procedural, to organizational, to material, and to moral components of how to make an army fight (yup and somewhere way down the line that doctrine should determine if we have 2 or 3 guys crewing a LAV [or even if it should be a LAV] and how many guys are needed for dismounts).

Instead of being a doctrine-based army we have become a capabilities-based army which in short means trying to figure out what we can do with the shit we've got. That's wrong on so many levels. And for full disclosure that's not a new thought I've had - it comes from Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" that was published in the Army and Training Bulletin in 2001/2. It was true then and its even more true today.

Folks. We're desperately in need of figuring out what the Army's role in Canada's defence is (and I believe a forward presence and an ability to deploy much more than 1/2 of a BG is involved as just one part of that, and should include special forces, quick reaction, medium weight peacekeepers and a whole herd of enabling systems from EW, UAV, loitering munitions etc) and then build and sell that doctrine with all of its consequences. And it needs to be a doctrine that can rapidly change as threats and capabilities change. We need to add capabilities. I can't think of a single one to divest - maybe change some from active to reserve status yes, but divest, no. And the reality is that we will be locked into some systems that we have now for some time to come but that doesn't mean we stay frozen in time and don't think outside the box and plan for the things that are needed to be successful in high intensity conflict

We simply cannot afford to have another 20 year Army Transformation plan like the one that led us to where we are now.

End of rant.

Returning to writing about history

🍻
So you think that towed artillery are appropriate for a mechanized Brigade in a high intensity conventional fight?

We have the LAVs Bns to deploy a CMBG. We have 80 gun tanks, but they are not all the same. 20 of them are truly world-beating. We do not have GBAD which would usually be a Formation asset. Our infantry are one UOR away from being relevant. - much easier to acquire and field ALAWS than SP howitzers. So we could field a great BG. We need some real equipment work, though, to field a CMBG in a prime time fight.

Ps - I am having some quote box problems...
 

IRepoCans

Jr. Member
Reaction score
15
Points
130
We did similar prearaiton with 5 AB Bde in the UK ...

.... Except that the only 'theatres' we could enter were in the developing world i.e., 3rd world countries, without a viable air defence capability, containing our nationals who might have to be evacuated through forced entry.

Even though we were formed and continuously trained as an Airborne Brigade, with all the bells and whistles, there is no way we could have successfully pulled off a theatre entry airborne operation against a peer/ near peer enemy; except, perhaps, as part of a spectacular 'forlorn hope' I suppose.

The same would apply to other air delivered troops. No air superiority, no airborne/airlanding/airmobile operation.
Precisely, I believe only the Americans (and really it's only the Rangers because of their dedicated air assets) can conduct a theatre entry against a near peer threat. Now, airmobile forces to facilitate NEOs is something we could do; especially if such a force regularly practiced with the units and agencies concerned.

But if Libya (which is the only contemporary event I can think of where Canadians were to be evacuated) is to be an example of anything, all our people were pulled out by chap from the shakies; as, according to his testimony: we didn't have anything planned.

I'm still a fan of, in addition to dedicated ATGM platforms in dedicated platoons, strapping a pair of ATGMs onto the LAV turrets.

If you're going to insist in carting my brethren around the country on the off-chance they might come in handy then the least you could do is keep some distance between you and the other chap's big guns.
My favourite thing about the ATGM / DFS capability in the CAF right now is that the subject matter experts in the capability are the Tor Scots and they don't even have LAVs, and they do it part time.
 

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,900
Points
1,040
So you think that towed artillery are appropriate for a mechanized Brigade in a high intensity conventional fight?
Good God, No! There must be a hundred or more posts on this website from me whinging constantly about the need for properly armoured, self propelled guns (tracked preferable, wheeled) for both brigade and battle group direct support. I mentioned an eighteen-gun regiment because its a real combat enabler (even if towed it can still support a light brigade well, a medium brigade poorly, and a heavy brigade hardly at all) where an eight-gun regiment which doesn't even train as a proper regiment is about as useful as a penny packet of tanks is.
We have the LAVs Bns to deploy a CMBG. We have 80 gun tanks, but they are not all the same. 20 of them are truly world-beating. We do not have GBAD which would usually be a Formation asset. Our infantry are one UOR away from being relevant. - much easier to acquire and field ALAWS than SP howitzers. So we could field a great BG. We need some real equipment work, though, to field a CMBG in a prime time fight.
ALWAS?

My point simply was sit down and build a proper doctrine covering the things the Army needs to do in the future that isn't based on a constructing a Lego based building-block battle group. Create that doctrine so that it creates a force that can transition from simple every day missions to the really big scary big emergency stuff with the people and equipment needed for each step already in hand and trained. (Yup. I'm talking a form of mobilization here)

In the mean time we have lots of stuff that can be slotted into the developing doctrine on an interim basis while we concentrate on acquiring the new capabilities and training needed for the new doctrine. A lot of the stuff we already have is actually quite useful (such as the LAV 6.0 for smaller mission OOTW/peacekeeping.

Long story short, the Army costs the country entirely too much for it to be satisfied with doing just little things here and there. You don't need twelve manoeuvre battalions/regiments and a plethora of headquarters to keep fielding what we do. You could probably do that with two battle groups where each battle group recruits 70% of its people off the street on a two year contract, trains for one year and deploys for one year being replaced in alternating years by the second battle group.

Now I'm not advocating that we reduce the Army to two battlegroups but if we really want to reduce our heavy personnel costs and transfer that to much of that to equipment and then we could have two really well equipped battle groups. The point though is that we could keep a battle group in the field indefinitely with a force this small (say some 4-5,000 folks). We don't need an almost 40,000 strong army to do it. So if we're going to have 40,000 folks then we better have higher ambitions than battle groups; we need a plan that allows us to grow into a substantially larger force with all the bells and whistles that will allow us to survive and thrive in a modern high intensity fight.

🍻
 

TangoTwoBravo

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
368
Points
880
ALAWS - advanced lightweight anti-armour weapon system. The project meant to bring us something like Javelin, Spike, Bill etc. Manportable antitank missile in the 2km band.
 

OldSolduer

Army.ca Legend
Reaction score
1,709
Points
910
I'm saying that the doctrine, such as it was, evolved along with the availability of the weapons and lessons learned. By the time you started receiving LAVs to replace Grizzlies the Berlin Wall had fallen, history had ended and the UN didn't want heavy weapons in Yugslavia.

TOWs and all other ATGM type thingies were surplus to requirement. Apparently a good number of people think they still are.

Frighteningly offensive donchano.
IMO too many members and some of the leadership of the CAF have FORGOTTEN what the CAF's primary purpose is.

I had a Bde Comd - some of you know him - who told us the primary role of the CAF is to defend Canada and anything else is a distraction. He and I got along quite well, despite some of his quirks.
 

GK .Dundas

Full Member
Reaction score
17
Points
180
Precisely, I believe only the Americans (and really it's only the Rangers because of their dedicated air assets) can conduct a theatre entry against a near peer threat. Now, airmobile forces to facilitate NEOs is something we could do; especially if such a force regularly practiced with the units and agencies concerned.

But if Libya (which is the only contemporary event I can think of where Canadians were to be evacuated) is to be an example of anything, all our people were pulled out by chap from the shakies; as, according to his testimony: we didn't have anything planned.


My favourite thing about the ATGM / DFS capability in the CAF right now is that the subject matter experts in the capability are the Tor Scots and they don't even have LAVs, and they do it part time.
Care to expand on this ?
 

blacktriangle

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
173
Points
630
I'd like to know who is "Chap from the shakies".
Shaky Boats Service.

Back to ATGMs - hasn't ALAWS been going on for the better part of 15 years in some form or another? Seriously - what is the issue there? It seems sad even by CAF standards...
 

daftandbarmy

Army.ca Relic
Reaction score
4,591
Points
1,060
I'd like to know who is "Chap from the shakies".

'Shaky Boats' comes from the fact that they sometimes deploy by kayak/folboat. And apparently they're a little miffed about the banter :)


SAS and SBS at war over 'shaky boats' banter that's 'undermining morale'​



EXCLUSIVE: Special Boat Service complained that SAS pals were undermining their reputation with constant jibes - and now they've been banned from using the terms

The SAS have been told to stop calling their sister regiment the Shaky Boats Service after SBS troops complained.

A senior SAS officer made the order after troopers said the name-calling was undermining morale and reputation.

Another nickname – Dope On A Rope, because the SBS abseil from helicopters on to ships – was also banned.

A source said teasing came to a head when a member of Seal Team Six – the US special forces unit which killed Osama bin Laden – asked an SBS operator why his regiment was called the Shaky Boats.

It is understood memos were then posted on noticeboards inside the SAS headquarters at Credenhill on the
outskirts of Hereford. One SAS soldier said: “When I heard about this I thought it was an early April Fools joke.

“The relationship between the SAS and the SBS has always been a bit tetchy, but trying to stop the SAS referring to the SBS as the Shaky Boats is nonsense.

“No-one in the SAS calls them the SBS. They are referred to as the Shaky Boats and an order like this is just going to enforce that.

“We know it winds them up, which is precisely why we do it. It’s a bit of banter. It’s just amazing that someone has complained.”

Relations between the two elite units have often been strained. Members of both regiments always like to claim theirs is the more professional force.

The latest animosity between them dates back to the early days of the Iraq War, when senior SAS non-commissioned officers accused their opposite numbers in the SBS of being unprofessional following a botched operation.

After the troops returned to the UK, one senior member of the SAS even accused them of being incompetent and lacking courage.

The claims related to an incident in which a small SBS force was ambushed by a 300-strong force of Iraqi insurgents.

Newspaper reports at the time said the SBS were forced to withdraw, leaving equipment and vehicles behind.


But the SBS said they remained in position and fought off the Iraqi force while firing more than 7,000 rounds in the process.

The row led to the then director of special forces ordering both units to end their rift.

The SBS dates back to 1940 and used to exclusively recruit men from the Royal Marines.


 

FSTO

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
391
Points
930
'Shaky Boats' comes from the fact that they sometimes deploy by kayak/folboat. And apparently they're a little miffed about the banter :)


SAS and SBS at war over 'shaky boats' banter that's 'undermining morale'​



EXCLUSIVE: Special Boat Service complained that SAS pals were undermining their reputation with constant jibes - and now they've been banned from using the terms

The SAS have been told to stop calling their sister regiment the Shaky Boats Service after SBS troops complained.

A senior SAS officer made the order after troopers said the name-calling was undermining morale and reputation.

Another nickname – Dope On A Rope, because the SBS abseil from helicopters on to ships – was also banned.

A source said teasing came to a head when a member of Seal Team Six – the US special forces unit which killed Osama bin Laden – asked an SBS operator why his regiment was called the Shaky Boats.

It is understood memos were then posted on noticeboards inside the SAS headquarters at Credenhill on the
outskirts of Hereford. One SAS soldier said: “When I heard about this I thought it was an early April Fools joke.

“The relationship between the SAS and the SBS has always been a bit tetchy, but trying to stop the SAS referring to the SBS as the Shaky Boats is nonsense.

“No-one in the SAS calls them the SBS. They are referred to as the Shaky Boats and an order like this is just going to enforce that.

“We know it winds them up, which is precisely why we do it. It’s a bit of banter. It’s just amazing that someone has complained.”

Relations between the two elite units have often been strained. Members of both regiments always like to claim theirs is the more professional force.

The latest animosity between them dates back to the early days of the Iraq War, when senior SAS non-commissioned officers accused their opposite numbers in the SBS of being unprofessional following a botched operation.

After the troops returned to the UK, one senior member of the SAS even accused them of being incompetent and lacking courage.

The claims related to an incident in which a small SBS force was ambushed by a 300-strong force of Iraqi insurgents.

Newspaper reports at the time said the SBS were forced to withdraw, leaving equipment and vehicles behind.


But the SBS said they remained in position and fought off the Iraqi force while firing more than 7,000 rounds in the process.

The row led to the then director of special forces ordering both units to end their rift.

The SBS dates back to 1940 and used to exclusively recruit men from the Royal Marines.


Its a sad day when the Special Forces turns into Special Needs Children.
 
Top