• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,902
Points
1,040
The gene pool to select Infantry battalion COs is officers who have been rifle company OC. If you increase the number of battalions without increasing the number of rifle companies, then you are weakening the pool of potential COs. There will be more cases of people getting the job who do not deserve it. Single sub-unit battalions is a structural weakness that hampers generating good PRes COs; we should not import that to the Reg F even if the battalion is fleshed out with extra PRes companies.
Here are my thoughts on that which I'll freely admit are not without disadvantages nor are my final thoughts on the concept:
  1. With the prerequisite that all Res F officers have the same training as their Reg F counterparts, even if concentrated and streamlined, I consider the ordinarily achievable rank by the Res F to be captain, with a smaller number of majors and very, very few LCols who will reach battalion command. I do expect that in 70/30 battalions many DCOs will be Res F;
  2. I expect most COs (and RSMs) to be Reg F regardless of whether they are 30/70 or 70/30 units;
  3. Regimental bunching will be stopped. The best majors across the force will be selected for promotion to CO regardless of what cap badge they wear. They will change cap badge to that of their new unit on posting (quite frankly I'd like to reduce the PPCLI, RCR and R22eR to one battalion each if for no other reason than to break up the regimental cabals families that exist now);
  4. You can reduce the need for new COs annually by increasing command tours to three years which concurrently provides more stability to the unit. With the increased number of units, the number of experienced COs for higher command or staff positions would still be greater than now even with a three year tour;
  5. There are no single sub-unit battalions (although there are plenty of those right now in the Res F and when I was in the RCHA in the 70s we essentially had only six batteries feeding three regimental CO positions). Every unit, regardless of whether it is 30/70 or 70/30 has a full establishment of three to five company positions and a DCO that might be filled by Reg F majors and is fully manned albeit by a combination of Reg F and Res F.
If a lessened gene pool is the trade off for doubling the Army's number of formed and trained battalions and sub-units (and the elimination of a highly inefficient Res F command and training system), I think I might accept pushing the gene pool a bit. My own experience within the Reg F artillery was that while there was the odd plug as a battery commander, the majority were capable of regimental command. I expect that is true for most classifications.

🍻
 

GR66

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
335
Points
1,010
I've been re-reading a couple of these related threads and giving thought to various possible ways of reorganizing the Army and I'm going to suggest a contrarian opinion.

FJAG (and others) have regularly pointed to the US National Guard as a example of how a Reserve force can be equipped in the same way as the Regular Force and can be a cost effective way to expand the size of the expensive "break in case of fire" heavy force. This makes total logical sense. However, I think there are enough structural (and cultural) differences between the US Army/society and the Canadian Army/society that replicating that model here (at least in the short to medium term) would be difficult to impossible.

Not only is there a general shortage of equipment (from vehicles to support weapons to comms to air/sea transport, etc., etc., etc.) but facilities are lacking, the balance of trades is out of whack, our units are spread out and typically not located near suitable training areas, etc. There are also a deeply ingrained cultural issues between the Reg Force and the Reserves as well as difficulties posed by the Regimental system.

For these reasons I'd suggest that at least for the first stages of Army restructuring that the heavier, mechanized elements of the Army be concentrated in the Reg Force where they have better support and access to training areas while the Reserves concentrate on developing an effective light capability which is more in line with what can reasonably be achieved based on our current limitations.

These light Reserve forces can still follow a hybrid Reg Force/Reserve model, centralized depots can still be used to concentrate training and LAVs/Tanks can still be made available to Reservists to train augmentees.

As long as we begin creating the basic structures that we can build upon later and start breaking down the cultural barriers to change then we can adjust the force balance, shift/add equipment and prepare for future expansion at a future date.
 

CBH99

Army.ca Veteran
Donor
Reaction score
700
Points
990
I agree. The American style would be un doable here, even if we went on a buying spree & provided reserve units with the same vehicles/equipment that the Reg Force uses. The Americans have an integration with their society that is far ahead, and far deeper than most western countries could even fathom.


Your idea on Reg vs Reserve in terms of structure - That is a good place to start and sounds logical. The Reg Force can focus on mechanized and heavier forces, while the Reserve Force can focus on developing a more potent and substantial light capability.


My question for you (genuinely, not being facetious) - isn’t that already the case? Even if not intentional?

No Reserve units have LAVs or Tanks. Mostly G-Wagons for recce units, and G-Wagons and Milcots for others. Light/medium trucks to throw the troops into the back of, and can tow the odd C3 around when needed.

(As for the reserve force, artillery units tend to be the heaviest, and only because they have the C3 to train on.)


So if I am understanding your suggestion correctly, are we not already doing something similar?
 

daftandbarmy

Army.ca Relic
Reaction score
4,591
Points
1,060
So if I am understanding your suggestion correctly, are we not already doing something similar?

Yes.

The Reserves are pretty much irrelevant and (mostly) play mainly with themselves in the corner using the left over toys the other kids didn't want.

Mission accomplished :)

Having said that, once upon a time we were issued AVGPs and it was a complete waste of a resource, so I can see the rationale.
 

KevinB

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,188
Points
910
Yes.

The Reserves are pretty much irrelevant and (mostly) play mainly with themselves in the corner using the left over toys the other kids didn't want.

Mission accomplished :)

Having said that, once upon a time we were issued AVGPs and it was a complete waste of a resource, so I can see the rationale.
Yes but no integrated structure was honestly conducted - and I remember seeing the state of Mo AVGP's - they where sad sad sad.
 

daftandbarmy

Army.ca Relic
Reaction score
4,591
Points
1,060
Yes but no integrated structure was honestly conducted - and I remember seeing the state of Mo AVGP's - they where sad sad sad.

The available man days per month were a fraction of what was required to properly maintain and operate them #staffcheckfail ;)
 

MilEME09

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
731
Points
940
Yes.

The Reserves are pretty much irrelevant and (mostly) play mainly with themselves in the corner using the left over toys the other kids didn't want.

Mission accomplished :)

Having said that, once upon a time we were issued AVGPs and it was a complete waste of a resource, so I can see the rationale.
The way I see it, the reserves don't just need a restructure, and new legislation. We need solid leadership with experience, officers need some kind of OJT package, and In the CSS world, a maint O is a requirement, if you don't have one, then one needs to be posted in. My unit had not had one in the entire time I have been in, finally got one last year and the difference in our ability to maintain kit and support others is night and day because we had someone who knew that side of things.

The second thing is we need SMART goals for every unit to reach, STARS started to get there but there needs to be more strict time lines, and plans to reach things like X Battalion will provide one platoon head quarters for deployment, and have consequences for misses targets if no reason is provided as to why it was missed, within reason. The reserves need to become force enablers, right now we are more force disablers due to our ad hoc nature.
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
743
Points
1,060
The available man days per month were a fraction of what was required to properly maintain and operate them #staffcheckfail ;)

Which is why the Bison was a much better option. An armour plated box on wheels. It even swam.

Now if only it had been held in the District Service Battalions' transport companies along with the 400 Foremost assembled Bv206s. And not borrowed by the Regs.
 

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,902
Points
1,040
For these reasons I'd suggest that at least for the first stages of Army restructuring that the heavier, mechanized elements of the Army be concentrated in the Reg Force where they have better support and access to training areas while the Reserves concentrate on developing an effective light capability which is more in line with what can reasonably be achieved based on our current limitations.

I'm not trying to fight for my ideas to the death here but let me make these observations:
  • With respect to culture and the ARNG - our Res F culture right now is a complete waste of oxygen. Notwithstanding the excellent contribution of many reservists in Afghanistan, those contributions were made in circumstances which will probably never occur again (i.e. six months of predeployment training) and will absolutely not serve us in the scenario of a break-glass-in-case-of-fire situation. Our Res F (and I dare say our Reg F) culture has to change if the Army wants to be at all relevant. The only reason the government supports the Army with cash right now is because they haven't realized yet that the emperor has no clothes. I don't want to duplicate the ARNG but use it as a model and adopt those things that work well. Culturally they are not much different from us. Systemically we are worlds apart. Cultures can be modified and structure must be changed when they have continuously proven to be defective;
  • I tend to favour the Res F having the heavier equipment primarily because the heavier equipment (tanks and artillery and, to an extent, LAVs) are rarely used during peacetime day-to-day activities. If one keeps a large component of the Reg F manning heavy equipment, they are less useful in the day-to-day peacetime missions. As an example look at Latvia - a place where tanks and SP guns are a necessity yet all we have there is a LAV company and some dismounted TOWs. Light and to some extent medium infantry are much more versatile for the peacetime missions that our government favours. I expect to see more of the traditional peacekeeping type of missions and far fewer, if any, of the Afghanistan type commitments. The Army should be structured to have its full-time component oriented towards those lighter missions;
  • In business transformation there are two competing imperatives. The first is to resist immediate and large reorganization - instead try to find quick wins to help overcome resistance to change. Opposing that is the requirement to embed the changes in the new culture so that, amongst other things, there is no backsliding. When it comes to equipment, the Reg F has a voracious appetite in grabbing the goodies for itself (see the Bison as a prime example). Heavy equipment is very much coveted by the Reg F regardless as to whether or not it needs it on a day-to-day basis. If we start a cultural change to build the Res F as but leave the heavy equipment to the Reg F, while focusing the Res F on the light equipment backsliding becomes all to easy. The key here is to clearly focus on the vision of transformation of the Army to the notion that the Res F will take a predominant role in the heavy equipment side of the force, and start down the road to conversion in gradual stages that develop confidence in the ultimate achievability of the goal. That's not to say that the Res F will only be heavy. Other elements need to be more proficient at light and CSS. Again if you look at the ARNG and the USAR together, you will see that only a small portion is heavy armour. The majority are CSS, light manoeuvre, artillery, engineer and other specialties. That should be our goal as well;
  • Do not focus on current limitations. The plan has to be designed to pound those limitations into the dust. No reorganization plan will ever work until we first make some changes to the culture of the Res F - employee protection legislation is a part of that; some minor legislative changes to put some teeth into mandatory training requirements; absolutely a rehabilitated individual training structure; a defined collective training structure; a proper integrated leadership structure. I have a tendency to drive timelines but my guess would be that one could lay the foundation for the structural changes in one year. Transformation itself would probably take another four years but could be done within the resources which are available right now with existing personnel numbers, equipment holdings and infrastructure. To advance the total force by curing all its capability deficiencies would take additional time and resources.
It's obvious that I favour radical reform. I do this primarily because I have seen 55 years of fine tuning the Res F over-and-over again but with none of it leading to any change in the fundamental situation. Fine tuning a patently broken system is futile and as they say, "insanity is doing the same thing over-and-over again and expecting a different result". It's time to stop being insane and time to be bold.

🍻
 

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,902
Points
1,040
The way I see it, the reserves don't just need a restructure, and new legislation. We need solid leadership with experience, officers need some kind of OJT package, and In the CSS world, a maint O is a requirement, if you don't have one, then one needs to be posted in. My unit had not had one in the entire time I have been in, finally got one last year and the difference in our ability to maintain kit and support others is night and day because we had someone who knew that side of things.
The legal distinction between a reservist and a regular is "continuing" vs "other than continuing full-time service".

When it comes to maintenance of equipment "full-time service" is required. With "full-time" maintainers, equipment gets maintained while the reservists go on with their full-time civilian jobs. With "other than ... full-time" maintainers no maintenance is conducted simply because the maintainers are at their full-time civilian jobs. That's a really simple and obvious concept.

The trouble is the system has too few full-time maintainers and thus the solution to the problem, from a Reg F point of view, is don't give the reserves any equipment that needs maintaining. This also solves the budgeting problems when buying new equipment - if one only equips the Reg F then its cheaper in the long run.

IMHO, however, this is taking a short view when leadership should be looking at the long view. There is a need to leverage the substantial annual cost savings that are inherent in reserve service. So far that vision is distinctly absent.

🍻
 

Brad Sallows

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
980
Points
910
Raising a question, again: what capabilities can be learned and retained with "X" funded days per year (not including any administrative time whatsoever)? (Assuming "training weekend" culture can be modified so that Sunday is not "morning: endex, packup, go home.)
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
743
Points
1,060
Raising a question, again: what capabilities can be learned and retained with "X" funded days per year (not including any administrative time whatsoever)? (Assuming "training weekend" culture can be modified so that Sunday is not "morning: endex, packup, go home.)
I think we also underestimate the willingness of part-timers to self-educate. This very site is a reflection of that.

Interesting information well presented would be read and viewed at home leaving training nights for validation and discussion.
 

dangerboy

Army.ca Veteran
Subscriber
Mentor
Reaction score
397
Points
910
I think we also underestimate the willingness of part-timers to self-educate. This very site is a reflection of that.

Interesting information well presented would be read and viewed at home leaving training nights for validation and discussion.
Would they be paid to do this? It is not very fair to expect them to do this at home on their own time without being paid (I know the majority already do this, and it is not right).
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
743
Points
1,060
Adjust the pay scales accordingly if you feel so inclined. Pay them a stipend rather than an hourly rate.

Having said that I do feel that many in the "volunteer" communities are more into avocations than vocations. They are self motivated. Until they get bored.
 

GR66

Army.ca Veteran
Reaction score
335
Points
1,010
I'm not trying to fight for my ideas to the death here but let me make these observations:
  • With respect to culture and the ARNG - our Res F culture right now is a complete waste of oxygen. Notwithstanding the excellent contribution of many reservists in Afghanistan, those contributions were made in circumstances which will probably never occur again (i.e. six months of predeployment training) and will absolutely not serve us in the scenario of a break-glass-in-case-of-fire situation. Our Res F (and I dare say our Reg F) culture has to change if the Army wants to be at all relevant. The only reason the government supports the Army with cash right now is because they haven't realized yet that the emperor has no clothes. I don't want to duplicate the ARNG but use it as a model and adopt those things that work well. Culturally they are not much different from us. Systemically we are worlds apart. Cultures can be modified and structure must be changed when they have continuously proven to be defective;
I'm with you on the end goal we should be working toward, but I believe that there are simply too many obstacles to making this work in the Force 2025-2030 time frame. Changes to legislation, infrastructure, doctrine, procurement, training, culture, etc. all take time and I believe if you try to do all of these things at once and too quickly you risk breaking the system altogether. Some may say this isn't a bad thing...the system is broken already...but you could lose what Government support there still is if it turns into even more of a shyte-show than it already is.
  • I tend to favour the Res F having the heavier equipment primarily because the heavier equipment (tanks and artillery and, to an extent, LAVs) are rarely used during peacetime day-to-day activities. If one keeps a large component of the Reg F manning heavy equipment, they are less useful in the day-to-day peacetime missions. As an example look at Latvia - a place where tanks and SP guns are a necessity yet all we have there is a LAV company and some dismounted TOWs. Light and to some extent medium infantry are much more versatile for the peacetime missions that our government favours. I expect to see more of the traditional peacekeeping type of missions and far fewer, if any, of the Afghanistan type commitments. The Army should be structured to have its full-time component oriented towards those lighter missions;
Again, this makes total logical sense for the end result, but...
1) we still need to maintain a useable force while all of the structural/organizational/legislative/material changes are being made.
2) The proposed "Heavy" Reg Force component is (as many have pointed out) is really a Medium force. Our government has been (and will almost certainly continue to be) casualty adverse, so I see a LAV-based force continue to be the preferred type of deployment of non-CANSOF forces going forward. Once the required organizational changes have been made to make the Reserves a deployable entity and we finally get around to purchasing actual Heavy force equipment, then one of the Light Reserve Brigades could take on that equipment to become your "break glass in case of fire" Heavy force...while the Reg Force LAV Brigade would now be your ongoing Medium force for OOTW deployments.
  • In business transformation there are two competing imperatives. The first is to resist immediate and large reorganization - instead try to find quick wins to help overcome resistance to change. Opposing that is the requirement to embed the changes in the new culture so that, amongst other things, there is no backsliding. When it comes to equipment, the Reg F has a voracious appetite in grabbing the goodies for itself (see the Bison as a prime example). Heavy equipment is very much coveted by the Reg F regardless as to whether or not it needs it on a day-to-day basis. If we start a cultural change to build the Res F as but leave the heavy equipment to the Reg F, while focusing the Res F on the light equipment backsliding becomes all to easy. The key here is to clearly focus on the vision of transformation of the Army to the notion that the Res F will take a predominant role in the heavy equipment side of the force, and start down the road to conversion in gradual stages that develop confidence in the ultimate achievability of the goal. That's not to say that the Res F will only be heavy. Other elements need to be more proficient at light and CSS. Again if you look at the ARNG and the USAR together, you will see that only a small portion is heavy armour. The majority are CSS, light manoeuvre, artillery, engineer and other specialties. That should be our goal as well;
I would embed the cultural changes by integrating the Reg Force and Reserves even in the absence of heavy equipment. I'll try and sketch out a rough idea for a possible structure when I have more time but I'm envisioning a Reg Force LAV Brigade and two hybrid Reg Force/Reserve Light Brigades. The Reserves wouldn't be left on their own as a separate entity from the Reg Force. In fact, in the short term it's likely that the most development and new equipment might go to the Light forces.

All the LAV Brigade really needs to become an effective Medium-weight force really is maybe a turreted mortar vehicle and some Remote Weapons Stations with ATGMs and SAMs. On the Light end of the spectrum there are lots of opportunities for the development of new doctrine, TTPs and equipment...all of which are better suited to the current support capabilities of the Reserves. Once the new equipment (real IFVs, new tanks, etc.?) start to come online in a decade+ the Reserve Brigade(s) will have already had a chance to work out the new structures and get the required support systems in place to be able to start taking on the Heavy role.
  • Do not focus on current limitations. The plan has to be designed to pound those limitations into the dust. No reorganization plan will ever work until we first make some changes to the culture of the Res F - employee protection legislation is a part of that; some minor legislative changes to put some teeth into mandatory training requirements; absolutely a rehabilitated individual training structure; a defined collective training structure; a proper integrated leadership structure. I have a tendency to drive timelines but my guess would be that one could lay the foundation for the structural changes in one year. Transformation itself would probably take another four years but could be done within the resources which are available right now with existing personnel numbers, equipment holdings and infrastructure. To advance the total force by curing all its capability deficiencies would take additional time and resources.
I envy your optimism regarding timelines but find it difficult to believe them. It might take a swimming pool full of Kool-Aid to convince me but I hope you are right and I'm wrong.
It's obvious that I favour radical reform. I do this primarily because I have seen 55 years of fine tuning the Res F over-and-over again but with none of it leading to any change in the fundamental situation. Fine tuning a patently broken system is futile and as they say, "insanity is doing the same thing over-and-over again and expecting a different result". It's time to stop being insane and time to be bold.

🍻
Again, I don't think we're really too far apart on the end state, but just on what we consider as realistic timelines and some of the specific intermediate steps required.

:salute:
 

FJAG

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,902
Points
1,040
Raising a question, again: what capabilities can be learned and retained with "X" funded days per year (not including any administrative time whatsoever)? (Assuming "training weekend" culture can be modified so that Sunday is not "morning: endex, packup, go home.)
I start from the position that every recruit goes through full NCM DP1 training at a depot battalion before being "posted" to a unit. High school and university students should be able to do this in two summers and a winter DL period (so roughly 15 month after enrollment they are fully DP1 trained in their specialty.

Unit training works on 10 weekends of 2.5 paid days each. 8 weekends (Sep - Apr) dedicated to refresher training at the individual level and 2 weekends (May and Jun) to preparation for summer exercise. The summer exercise would be two (better yet 3 - Fri night to Sun night) weeks in August leaving all July free for vacations. Based on a three week exercise that's 48.5 training days per year. If one structures the training into a three year readiness cycle then each full cycle provides 145.5 training days which is the equivalent of 6 months of 5-day weeks.

NCM DP 2 courses are taught solely at depot battalions. Depot bns (and their regional companies) conduct training year round for the Reg F and those Res F personnel able to attend them including DL trg where appropriate. They ramp up in the summer to teach primarily Res F personnel during high school and university break periods. NCM DP 3 and above training and all officer trg is conducted at the CTC with DP1 offr training primarily during the university summer breaks.
I think we also underestimate the willingness of part-timers to self-educate. This very site is a reflection of that.

Interesting information well presented would be read and viewed at home leaving training nights for validation and discussion.
We should very much try to leverage DL wherever possible. Modules should be adjudged for time required, "attendance/comprehension" validated and paid for on that basis. That said, most DP1 and DP 2 skills are hands on.

🍻
 

KevinB

Army.ca Fixture
Reaction score
1,188
Points
910
The available man days per month were a fraction of what was required to properly maintain and operate them #staffcheckfail ;)
The way I see it, the reserves don't just need a restructure, and new legislation. We need solid leadership with experience, officers need some kind of OJT package, and In the CSS world, a maint O is a requirement, if you don't have one, then one needs to be posted in. My unit had not had one in the entire time I have been in, finally got one last year and the difference in our ability to maintain kit and support others is night and day because we had someone who knew that side of things.

The second thing is we need SMART goals for every unit to reach, STARS started to get there but there needs to be more strict time lines, and plans to reach things like X Battalion will provide one platoon head quarters for deployment, and have consequences for misses targets if no reason is provided as to why it was missed, within reason. The reserves need to become force enablers, right now we are more force disablers due to our ad hoc nature.
Which is why the Bison was a much better option. An armour plated box on wheels. It even swam.

Now if only it had been held in the District Service Battalions' transport companies along with the 400 Foremost assembled Bv206s. And not borrowed by the Regs.

Without a Regular Force Maintainer Platoon/Troop etc any significant equipment will not be able to be maintained IMHO at the Res level.

However if the local armories have simulators - pooled equipment with Reg Force maintenance staff can keep the equipment going - and be available for collect training on Weekends/Summers - and the simulators can keep the Res force up to speed during the other times.
 

Kirkhill

Army.ca Legend
Subscriber
Donor
Reaction score
743
Points
1,060
I start from the position that every recruit goes through full NCM DP1 training at a depot battalion before being "posted" to a unit. High school and university students should be able to do this in two summers and a winter DL period (so roughly 15 month after enrollment they are fully DP1 trained in their specialty.

Unit training works on 10 weekends of 2.5 paid days each. 8 weekends (Sep - Apr) dedicated to refresher training at the individual level and 2 weekends (May and Jun) to preparation for summer exercise. The summer exercise would be two (better yet 3 - Fri night to Sun night) weeks in August leaving all July free for vacations. Based on a three week exercise that's 48.5 training days per year. If one structures the training into a three year readiness cycle then each full cycle provides 145.5 training days which is the equivalent of 6 months of 5-day weeks.

NCM DP 2 courses are taught solely at depot battalions. Depot bns (and their regional companies) conduct training year round for the Reg F and those Res F personnel able to attend them including DL trg where appropriate. They ramp up in the summer to teach primarily Res F personnel during high school and university break periods. NCM DP 3 and above training and all officer trg is conducted at the CTC with DP1 offr training primarily during the university summer breaks.

We should very much try to leverage DL wherever possible. Modules should be adjudged for time required, "attendance/comprehension" validated and paid for on that basis. That said, most DP1 and DP 2 skills are hands on.

🍻
With respect, I seem to remember a lot of time sitting in class-rooms, between smoke breaks, listening to instructors reading slides and quoting from Pams. We got to fondle the occasional FN, SMG and HP. Range time happened once a year. I remember with particular fondness trying to make 40 minutes on Dental Hygiene interesting.
 

daftandbarmy

Army.ca Relic
Reaction score
4,591
Points
1,060
Without a Regular Force Maintainer Platoon/Troop etc any significant equipment will not be able to be maintained IMHO at the Res level.

However if the local armories have simulators - pooled equipment with Reg Force maintenance staff can keep the equipment going - and be available for collect training on Weekends/Summers - and the simulators can keep the Res force up to speed during the other times.

We already have SAT Trainers/simulators at the armouries.

They're always broken and the guy from 2000 miles away, who is the only person allowed to mess with them, can never make it in to fix them.

Although my experience is now a couple of years out of date, so some some kind of miracle might have happened since then.

Just sayin' :)
 

daftandbarmy

Army.ca Relic
Reaction score
4,591
Points
1,060
With respect, I seem to remember a lot of time sitting in class-rooms, between smoke breaks, listening to instructors reading slides and quoting from Pams. We got to fondle the occasional FN, SMG and HP. Range time happened once a year. I remember with particular fondness trying to make 40 minutes on Dental Hygiene interesting.

Coincidentally, that was my experience when I participated in staff training as well.

Nothing like watching a LCol painstakingly read a slide word for word and all that's going through your mind is "I wonder what he's getting paid per word today", and "He'd soooo fail Gold Star".

Needless to say, I 'got busy' and couldn't attend after that :)
 
Top