Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Kirkhill]

Interesting little article found yesterday.

Short form: Technology changes. Warfare is.

Drone Warfare In Ukraine: Historical Context And Implications For The Future

The Ukraine War has been dubbed the first drone war—and the first “StarLink War”—considering the publicly apparent role of advanced technologies in the conflict. However, the issue is what the Ukraine War might teach us about the future of military power.

www.hoover.org

The argument is summarized here:

A clear-eyed assessment of the battlefield realities in Ukraine demonstrates that drones are largely in continuity with the development of military capabilities coherently understood since the late 19th century. Their use in Ukraine is notable, simply because they carry to maturation concepts under long-term historical development. By generating a widespread reconnaissance-strike complex, drones in Ukraine allow both Ukraine and Russia to fight in a truly systemic manner, bringing to fruition the logic of the modern battlefield. There is much to learn from the Ukrainian case—and those that learn its lessons are likely to gain military power. But its lessons are primarily intellectual, not technical or material.

Modern military history demonstrates that, barring a decisive initial victory, most wars settle into a long-term positional rhythm, broken only by societal collapse or a well-designed, well-executed series of offensives over months or years.

The necessity of the breakthrough battle stems from changes in the character of war that began in the mid-19th century. Indirect fire artillery combined with rail-based long-range transportation and telegraphy to expand the battlespace in width and depth. This necessitated a new military logic that progressed beyond the linear tactical model that dominated early modern warfare, and which Napoleon ultimately perfected.

Moreover, the development of the modern bureaucratic state depersonalized military leadership. It is no coincidence that the final personalized battles of the 19th century occurred at the creation of the German Empire, which marked the final ascendance of bureaucratic governance and the destruction of the chivalric model that dominated from the 10th century. Campaigns had to be won over time in a series of engagements, individually disconnected, but made whole through a coherent strategic scheme.

The technology changes but the game remains the same.

....

I'm not sure how you see having Javelin in an AA platoon or company results in "deny the Javelin to the FEBA troops".

Perhaps because I didn't say that. What I was responding to was the suggestion that there be no Javelins in the section and that they should be in specialist elements. My response was why not both?

I like UAVs and missiles as much as the next guy but for some reason you seem to see a need to replace existing artillery systems.

I don't see a need to replace existing artillery systems. But those who lack existing artillery systems are looking for alternative means to deliver the same effects. And if they can't afford, or find guns, they can't afford or find aircraft either. That lack doesn't change their need or want to win wars and for that they need something that will do the same job as artillery.

 

[Rifleman62]

I doubt the rifle section can function well if it's overloaded with capabilities. It might be workable in peacetime with the advantages of long training, but everything has to also work under wartime conditions, which I predict would result in foreshortened training times.

Add the fact that Infantry Bn's, Coy, Pl, and Sect are never going to be at full strength due to casualties and possibly LOB's.
Your dedicated, experienced anti armour specialist may be one of them .

 

[daftandbarmy]

Add the fact that Infantry Bn's, Coy, Pl, and Sect are never going to be at full strength due to casualties and possibly LOB's.
Your dedicated, experienced anti armour specialist may be one of them .

If there was a coherent strategy, and operational plan with the right resourcing, for the Reserves they might be... one of these days.

Meanwhile:

Michel Maisonneuve: Neglected reserves highlight the dire state of our military​

Recent comments by the Minister of National Defence, Bill Blair, as well as several articles in the National Post and other media have highlighted the dire state of the Canadian Armed Forces. Not one of those comments or articles however has focused solely on the state of Canada’s reserves: the sailors, soldiers and air personnel who serve our country part-time, all while holding down civilian jobs. Things are especially grave in that sector.

Today, there is not much the regular-force CAF can do without reserve support. Our reserve ships are being used in operations because of a lack of naval crews. Our army reserves are essential to fulfilling our international tasks such as the enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia, and they are always at the ready for domestic operations. Our reserve RCAF squadrons employ former regular force airmen and women on many tasks including as pilots. As is the situation with the regular forces, the recruitment crisis in the reserves is crippling Canada’s capabilities and our reputation abroad. It is time for the Canadian government to give our indispensable reserves stable funding and respect.

MSN

 

[Kirkhill]

“Despite the requirement to achieve mass and concentration for decisive results, the greater lethality of weapons dictated a contradictory need for dispersion. Much of the history of modern warfare can be written as a function of attempts to reconcile these seemingly contradictory elements.”

— Bruce Menning

The Return of the Tactical Crisis - Modern War Institute

“Despite the requirement to achieve mass and concentration for decisive results, the greater lethality of weapons dictated a contradictory need for dispersion. Much of the history of modern warfare can […]

mwi.westpoint.edu

Watch: Inside Ukraine's new fortifications built to repel Russian invasion

Along the frontline Ukrainian engineers are installing miles of defensive fortifications, from trenches to concrete bunkers.

www.forces.net

Trench warfare not consigned to history as British Army training site gets revamped

At Senny Bridge Training area there are about 300 meters of newly refurbished trenches, built in the style similar to those seen in Ukraine.

www.forces.net

As Zaluzhnyi described, “Modern sensors can identify any concentration of forces, and modern precision weapons can destroy it.”

 

[Kirkhill]

On a dispersed and sensor-saturated battlefield, the role and impact of electronic warfare has increased significantly. But besides communications frequently being hampered, there are other constraints. Contrary to popular belief, most Ukrainian commanders do not usually promote personal initiative. This is especially true regarding higher-ranking reserve officers, who still adhere to the Soviet method of top-down, centralized decision-making. Unsurprisingly, the same applies to most Russian commanders. Besides cultural limitations, heavy attrition on both sides has aggravated the shortage of experienced commanders even further. So, while the German Army a century ago was able to conduct dispersed attacks on a grand tactical scale, current actions by either side in Ukraine remain limited in scope and duration.

From the Modern War Institute article above.

I have said before that if anyone is going to win this war for Zelezny it is going to be his Intelligence director, Budanov.

And I think Kraken offers a clue.

The Kraken Regiment (Ukrainian: Спецпідрозділ «Kraken», romanized: Spetspidrozdil «Kraken») is a Ukrainian military volunteer unit, part of the spetsnaz units of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR)[3] formed in 2022 as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Origin​

Many of the eventual members of the Kraken Regiment were amongst those who gathered in the Kharkiv hideouts that had been stashed with arms in preparation for the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. At the same time, Kostiantyn Nemichev, who was at the time head of the local National Corps, was gathering volunteer soldiers. They took part in the defence of Kharkiv, and by March after driving out Russians of Vilkhivka the unit had started to form to the point the name ″Kraken″ was chosen after a commander of the unit suggested it based on his Naval special forces background.[15]

In April 2022, the unit dismantled the monument to Marshal Georgy Zhukov in Kharkiv.[16] In late September, it was reported that Nemichev claimed the unit had captured more than 15 Russian officers, handing them over to the Main Intelligence Directorate. He was quoted saying “All of them were thrown into the infantry. Therefore, it is indicative that Russians have big problems now. They do not know where to get people to send to death. Therefore, they gather them in different units and deploy them here. So they’re not doing well as it is, and then we come along and ‘spoil the mood’ some more.”[17]

Also in September, the regiment was reported to have played a key role in recapturing Izium.[18] In late December, the Main Directorate of Intelligence published a video showing Kraken along with the 92nd Separate Mechanized Brigade carrying out an assault on Novoselivske, successfully removing the Russian forces in the settlement and inflicting losses upon Russian equipment and personnel.[19] In January 2023, the president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy personally thanked the regiment for their work fighting enemies in the Soledar region.[20]

In March 2023, Kraken announced the destruction of a Russian observation tower in Bryansk Oblast through the use of a kamikaze drone.[21] The unit posted a video of the operation showing the tower being destroyed, though did not specify exactly when it took place.[22][23]

According to leaked documents, in response to the worsening situation in the Battle of Bakhmut, UAF Ground Forces Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi "declared a need for HUR's elite Kraken unit to prevent the UAF from losing Bakhmut" and subsequently deployed it to the city. No further information was provided, but Bakhmut was still under Ukrainian control six weeks later.[24]

I am reminded of David Stirling and outfits like the LRDG and The Artists' Rifles - highly irregular irregulars. Just the match for Little Green Men.

Kraken Regiment - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Kirkhill]

Army Budget Invests in Lessons from Ukraine with Focus on Deterring China - Defense Opinion

The U.S. Army’s newly released budget incorporates the top lessons from combat in Ukraine and sends a powerful message as a deterrent against possible conflict with China.

defenseopinion.com

Here are four key insights about the budget starting with munitions, air defense and armored vehicles and culminating with the rising dominance of deep sensing, which is the collection of data to support targeting, situational awareness and decision-making.

 

[Kirkhill]

Gunny calls for the Skirmishers.

A Company of Light Bobs per Battalion or a Battalion of Rifles per Regiment. Taking after the Chindits and the Marine Raiders with an intent to operated in self-reliant Squads armed with rifles, GPMGs, CG84s and 60mm mortars. Operating independently, not in line. In the defence conducting offensive patrols.

Force Design Is Still Too Heavy

The Marine Corps needs a small, logistically independent light infantry force.

www.usni.org

 

[WestIsle]

A Company of Light Bobs per Battalion or a Battalion of Rifles per Regiment. Taking after the Chindits and the Marine Raiders with an intent to operated in self-reliant Squads armed with rifles, GPMGs, CG84s and 60mm mortars. Operating independently, not in line. In the defence conducting offensive patrols.

Force Design Is Still Too Heavy

The Marine Corps needs a small, logistically independent light infantry force.

www.usni.org

Sounds like validation for 2 Mech and 1 Light Infantry battalion per brigade to me!/s

 

[KevinB]

Gunny calls for the Skirmishers.

A Company of Light Bobs per Battalion or a Battalion of Rifles per Regiment. Taking after the Chindits and the Marine Raiders with an intent to operated in self-reliant Squads armed with rifles, GPMGs, CG84s and 60mm mortars. Operating independently, not in line. In the defence conducting offensive patrols.

Force Design Is Still Too Heavy

The Marine Corps needs a small, logistically independent light infantry force.

www.usni.org

So SOF…

 

[Kirkhill]

So SOF…

Yeah, about that...

Assembling the Pieces​

It could be argued that the Marine Corps already possesses light infantry in the form of special operations troops such as the Marine Raider Regiment. But special operators are not infantry, and light infantry are not elite troops. In any case, the Marine Corps cannot supply every infantry battalion with special operators.

Light infantry units should work in concert with, not in place of, line infantry. Organizationally, this suggests two approaches. The first would be to include one light rifle company per battalion. The second would be to include one light infantry battalion per regiment, attaching one light company to a line battalion during the workup and deployment.

The first arrangement would make light infantry organic to every battalion, giving the battalion commander full control of the light company. However, staffing the company could prove difficult, and maintaining training and readiness standards could be an issue for those less experienced in employing light infantry.

The second method would ensure integrated training standards are maintained, but integration with line battalions might prove challenging and require longer workups. The light company would be beholden to two sets of training standards, one each from the lending and receiving battalions. Manning also could be difficult.

However the units are attached, light infantry training should be demanding and should emphasize small-unit actions. With limited logistical support, Marines will have to learn how to purify water, forage, hunt, and fish. And the Marine Corps also should reemphasize the importance of survival schools and increase funding for specialized schools such as Combat Hunter and the Mountain and Jungle Warfare Training Centers.

The author seems to be at pains to separate the tiers

Line Infantry - holding defenses and mounting assaults
Reconnaissance, snipers, or scouts, - battalion assets
Light Infantry - dispersed small unit actions
Raiders -
MARSOC?

I get the value of the light force he is talking about, especially in the 1st Island Chain but not sure how it is different to the Raiders. Why not just raise more Raiders and add a Raider Battalion to each Littoral Regiment? Then you end up with a Defensive Battalion with the anti-ship missiles and the Anti-Air missiles and a Raider Battalion conducting offensive patrols of the zone.

 

[KevinB]

I don’t think he wants to tie the Raider’ish light units to anything.
Which means they require a great amount of support outside the ‘box’ something that the Corps isn’t able/going to provide.

Despite his claims to the contrary he seems to want the capability of MARSOC’s MRB’s but inside the USMC.

I understand the need and desire for Light Forces in the GPF, but I don’t think the USMC has the ability to support individual BN’s like that outside of the Regiments.