F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I suspect SAAB did not provide info because they know there is no way in hell Canada will ever buy its fighters from somewhere else than the US, so why bother and waste money and resources.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Do you need stealth for a bomb truck? I can see in a coin operation that a 737 type aircraft laden with internal bomb racks would likely be more effective than a F35. The same aircraft would not do so well in a peer to peer fight.

 

[Kirkhill]

Do you need stealth for a bomb truck? I can see in a coin operation that a 737 type aircraft laden with internal bomb racks would likely be more effective than a F35. The same aircraft would not do so well in a peer to peer fight.

Doesn't the range and speed of the ordnance enter into the equation?  And the targeting requirements?

The greater the stand-off range the less the demand to close while remaining undetected.

 

[MilEME09]

Doesn't the range and speed of the ordnance enter into the equation?  And the targeting requirements?

The greater the stand-off range the less the demand to close while remaining undetected.

exactly why a fixed fleet might be better, do we need a stealthy aircraft in some situations? yes but not all, I don't see why super Hornets (at roughly 60 million per unit) combined with a higher end F-35/Rafale/Eurofighter fleet to preform missions, stealth isnt exactly needed for NORAD missions is it?

 

[SupersonicMax]

What advantage does the SH have over the JSF?  Forget price, dual fleet would negate savings (if there would be any)

 

[MilEME09]

What advantage does the SH have over the JSF?  Forget price, dual fleet would negate savings (if there would be any)

the report also notes that unless the low cost aircraft can be bought for less then half the cost of the high cost plan it would not be cost effective. With Lockheed saying the final unit price will be around 85 million for the A model once full production begins, a mixed fleet is unlikely if we go F-35 (which all signs point to).

 

[HB_Pencil]

A few very interesting things I got out of it, One we seem to be looking towards the Australian mixed fleet model, and the report discusses the risk vs reward of a mixed fleet of lower cost aircraft to do all NORAD + some NATO missions, and having a small number of high cost aircraft to do the rest/everything. Though the summery says it may not be cost effective unless the lower cost aircraft would cost less then half the higher cost ones (with the high cost of the F-35 i think that's easy),

At this point in time, its very unlikely any aircraft is cheaper than the F-35 due to production scales. I can go into this further, but the other aircraft are not even close to the F-35 in terms of industrial scale. The Eurofighter and Rafale lines are basically producing 2 to 4 aircraft a month (depending on which facility you consider for the Eurofighter), and Super Hornet will next year be less than 2 aircraft. The cost overheads are significant at this low production levels, while they haven't made the major investments into automation that Lockheed and the partners have been making in the past decade. They aim to produce 12~15 aircraft a month after 2019.

One further wrinkle is that the F/A-18E/F actually hasn't been produced in a couple of years. I believe this is the last year of Super Hornet purchases: next year, and the year after will only see Growlers manufactured at low levels. There are significant differences between the two (in avionics specifically), so that any production reversion to vanilla F/A-18Es would incur significant Diminishing Manufacturing Costs, and some reboot in learning. What that cost is, I'm not certain, but its probably what the Aussies paid for their first set of Super Hornets. While specific fits of the Super Hornet probably was cheaper to purchase in the 2010~2014 timeframe (compared to a 2019 F-35A), its now significantly more expensive.

Also its virtually assured that the Super Hornet line will close before Canada makes up its mind. Right now the St Louis line will remain open until 2017. A competition of this scale will take at minimum two years to conduct. the budgeting cycle for a fighter is two years: long lead items need to be procured, then you commence final assembly. If there are no further aircraft forthcoming next year, then Boeing will close the line. They won't keep it open just for the possibility to win in canada, which they know would be slim in a true competition.

Two SAAB didn't provide information for the report, could they be fed up with the government?

Gripen wasn't going to win, for a number of reasons. First, they are deficient to the other competitors in a number of technical criteria areas. Second was the cost. The current Gripen models are probably around the 85 million dollar mark: they have 150 or so orders, but broken up between two production plants (Sweden and Brazil), and a lot of subcomponents will be produced in duplicate by these countries. Moreover they have been throwing around a per-hour operational cost of under $5000, when in reality its probably more than double (according to Swiss assessments).

Its thought by some that Saab wanted to keep their proprietary information out of the government's hands, so that if the competition results were leaked they wouldn't be embarrassed. The options analysis does not have the same legal safeguards in regards to information as a true RFP. They were burned badly by the Swiss leaking of a confidential technical assessment, and I suspect they did not want to get burned again for something they had little chance to win.

 

[GR66]

the report also notes that unless the low cost aircraft can be bought for less then half the cost of the high cost plan it would not be cost effective. With Lockheed saying the final unit price will be around 85 million for the A model once full production begins, a mixed fleet is unlikely if we go F-35 (which all signs point to).

I think that the only possible option for a mixed fleet would be if you went with something much less advanced along the lines of the Kai/Lockheed Martin FA-50 variant of the T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer.  That might actually be a possible option if you were to want a low-end "missile truck" for NORAD intercepts and a smaller F-35 fleet for expeditionary missions.  The T-50 is supposedly a strong contender as the future US Air Force next generation T-X trainer (possibly a long-term option for Canada as well?).  It has AESA radar and can carry a mix of weapons for a $30 million unit price (as per Wikipedia anyway:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KAI_T-50_Golden_Eagle).

There's definite disadvantages of making a choice like this but I'd say it becomes a better option if we're reducing the F-35 order to such a low quantity that we have difficulty fulfilling all the roles required of it.  I think there's likely a certain minimum number of fighters that we need to both protect our airspace and project power when necessary (I'm nowhere close to being knowledgeable enough to know what that number is) but I think we're probably better served by having at least enough less-capable aircraft to keep us over this level than having less than that number of F-35s.  I guess the question then becomes can we afford to buy and maintain enough F-35s to keep us comfortably above that level?

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The advantage of such a mix is that much of the training and maintaining of flight hours can be done with these and if we have/had a system that brought ex-RCAF pilots back on reserve status to fly them X-times a year you could maintain a cadre of skillsets and a reserve of pilots that will only need minimal upgrading for combat.

 

[McG]

That might actually be a possible option if you were to want a low-end "missile truck" for NORAD intercepts and a smaller F-35 fleet for expeditionary missions. 

Why do you propose the high-end fighter for expeditionary ops and low-end for domestic?  The CAF's needs analysis determined it "conducting early air-combat operations against a country that has strong anti-air defences are low."  Conversely, our NORAD intercepts do find themselves confronting a peer military as Russia probes around in the north.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/new-fighter-jet-options-mean-ottawa-could-avoid-buying-f-35s/article22036016/

 

[MilEME09]

Why do you propose the high-end fighter for expeditionary ops and low-end for domestic?  The CAF's needs analysis determined it "conducting early air-combat operations against a country that has strong anti-air defences are low."  Conversely, our NORAD intercepts do find themselves confronting a peer military as Russia probes around in the north.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/new-fighter-jet-options-mean-ottawa-could-avoid-buying-f-35s/article22036016/

The question becomes how political does the choice get? Dassault is lobbying hard, the Government might be looking to escape from the F-35 disaster, and the super hornet is a viable option (though the latest Advanced Super Hornet only recently flew so it would have high costs to have an airframe that wasn't near the end of its era so to speak.

 

[Kilo_302]

I did a search for the title of this article and of the URL and nothing turned up, so apologies if this has already been posted.

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-right-fighter-for-canada-is-the-super-hornet-not-t-1587492909

I find this section most compelling:

Other alternative force structures on Canada's same budget are even more enticing, such as immediately procuring 80 Advanced Super Hornets to replace the RCAF's geriatric CF-18s at $65M per copy, and retain $3.8B for eventually procuring a top-of-the-line stealthy semi-autonomous UCAV for deep-penetrating strike and reconnaissance missions. For 36 UCAVs at $75M a pop (including shared ground control stations), that would equal $2.7B. This leaves over $1B for a squadron of EA-18G Growlers to provide outstanding jamming, electronic attack and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) for the entire fleet. Keep in mind that fielding the Growler alongside the Super Hornet is extremely economical as the only differences between the two are in the aircraft's avionics and subsystems.

I find it a very hard sell that 65 F-35s will be a better solution for Canada that offers more flexibility and capability than 80 Advanced Super Hornets, 36 stealth UCAVs and a dozen Growlers. A total force of 128 aircraft in all. Seeing as the future of air combat is surely unmanned, hedging Canada's manned fighter buy, which is supposedly going to have to be relevant for the next 30-40 years, with some extremely stealthy UCAVs makes a ton of sense. It also provides a medium endurance, low-observable surveillance platform to provide everything from intelligence gathering to network connectivity functions for Canada's "total force."

Thoughts? It seems to me that the author addresses many of the "pro-JSF" arguments that are made assuming the only other option is another single type of aircraft. Mixing stealthy UCAVs for the strike role with Super Hornets and Growlers is a different prospect altogether.

 

[Loachman]

Mixing stealthy UCAVs for the strike role with Super Hornets and Growlers is a different prospect altogether.

While my UAV experience was admittedly not on a cutting-edge system, and I keep that in mind when reading pro-UAV articles, I would still hesitate - for some length - to put a lot of faith in them. If they were so great, or likely to be soon enough, major nations would not be spending so much on manned systems. UAVs have lots of shortcomings, and are not as cheap as they are made out to be.

the Government might be looking to escape from the F-35 disaster

The "disaster" exists only in the collective mind of the media hive, populated largely by drones who cannot analyze and think for themselves, but merely parrot the beeblings of other drones until they become accepted as fact and truth.

Very few have made any attempt to understand anything about this programme.

Our F18 selection process received exactly the same treatment in the media, with dire predictions of expensive catastrophe in the brewing, and accusations of political blunder, misinformation and coverup.

Aircraft go through extensive testing programmes in order to find faults and fix them. That is being done for F35 just as it was for F18. F35 will likely not live up to all of the claims originally made for it. Neither did F18, nor any other aircraft programme.

the super hornet is a viable option (though the latest Advanced Super Hornet only recently flew so it would have high costs to have an airframe that wasn't near the end of its era so to speak.

I do not see it as a viable option. Read HB_Pencil's last post. It will also cost more to update and maintain over the planned forty-year (and likely longer) lifespan. We have plenty of expensive experience trying to keep old and orphan fleets alive well past their best-before dates.

The advantage of such a mix is that much of the training and maintaining of flight hours can be done with these and if we have/had a system that brought ex-RCAF pilots back on reserve status to fly them X-times a year you could maintain a cadre of skillsets and a reserve of pilots that will only need minimal upgrading for combat.

Not that we are likely to do that, and are not so doing now, but the F35 sim would be better than buying a second fleet.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I agree Sims are a great way to keep skill sets up and will just get better. However I am nervous about putting all our eggs into one very small basket, with no backup if things go haywire.

 

[SupersonicMax]

The risk with buying the JSF is far less than the risk buying the F-18 was.

 

[HB_Pencil]

Do you need stealth for a bomb truck? I can see in a coin operation that a 737 type aircraft laden with internal bomb racks would likely be more effective than a F35. The same aircraft would not do so well in a peer to peer fight.

The reality is that the F-35's low observability features are not the main cost driver: its avionics. Structure is about 15~25% of an aircraft's cost.... Avionics is 40% and upwards. Most of the aircraft's development cost and time has gone into the programming side.

Where the F-35 will be valued in a COIN environment is its sensors and interoperability. The sensor outputs are significantly better than aircraft of the previous generation (like the F/A-18E, as I discussed a few pages ago), and the data shared will be of a higher quality as well. Basically purchasing it will enable the RCAF to keep abreast with ongoing technical and doctrinal development in COIN.

iS that worth the cost vis-á-vis a lower tech option? I think that's really dependent on a whole host of factors, some of which others have touched upon in the CAS thread in the other section.

The question becomes how political does the choice get? Dassault is lobbying hard, the Government might be looking to escape from the F-35 disaster, and the super hornet is a viable option (though the latest Advanced Super Hornet only recently flew so it would have high costs to have an airframe that wasn't near the end of its era so to speak.

Advanced Super Hornet is mostly vapourware. None of its core components exist (stealth pod, true sensor fusion package, EPE engine) save for the conformal fuel tanks that the US Navy may purchase. And it would not be cheaper at all, since you're paying for those components development and their enhanced capabilities.

I do not see it as a viable option. Read HB_Pencil's last post. It will also cost more to update and maintain over the planned forty-year (and likely longer) lifespan. We have plenty of expensive experience trying to keep old and orphan fleets alive well past their best-before dates.

Great point... and we can see the risks quite clearly in the CF-18's history. The Super Hornet is mature aircraft, and the US Navy intends to keep it in service until about 2030~2040 at the latest

From 1987 to 1999 Canada attempted to indigenously maintain the CF-18's avionics and programming, adapting them for Canadian requirements. There were several Canadian developments these really represented small upgrades that added some functions. The reality was, in the 1990s austere budget environment, that Canada's CF-18s were lagging behind. In particular they could not employ precision guided munitions that had proven themselves so effective in the Gulf War. In the mid 1990s the RCAF attempted to indigenously develop a PGM capability, known as Wartime PGM or WPGM. However the XN-5 mission computer was very limited and could not handle the programming, so they had to strip out a lot of the Air to Air functions in order to get the Air to ground capability to run. That meant aircraft had to be loaded with specific programming for either expeditionary A2G operations or NORAD/NATO multi role ops... not both. A work-around was later developed, but it was still a very limited system.

The RCAF contemplated a major upgrade effort in the late 1990s that would see a major overhaul of the system. Thirteen different areas would be modified. It was very quickly realized that this would be horrendously expensive and possessed high degrees of technical risk. Regulatory changes in the United States also prevented the release of technical information that were critical for upgrades. Based on these considerations, Canada decided to purchase the off the shelf upgrade ECP 583 for USMC Hornets, and have closely followed their upgrades since.

The parallel here is that when Canada attempted to go it alone, our capability suffered significantly because of the cost and lack of investments. Yet we were able to avoid the consequences because of the US Navy's  efforts. The reality is that if we select the F/A-18E, we're going to face a very similar situation after 2025~2030, when the USN starts prioritizing spending on the F-35C, UCLASS and perhaps F/A-XX. So we will basically be stuck trying to keep a capability in service that is well past its prime, with no assistance available from the original purchasing company. Not a great future.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The risk with buying the JSF is far less than the risk buying the F-18 was.

I suspect the only people that know the true level of risk work in Lockheed and they will only say what the bosses want public. If your right everything is good, if your wrong, then the RCAF among others are screwed. A major airframe issue or wing issue may mean a grounded fleet with no replacement for a period of time. 

 

[MarkOttawa]

36  delivered 2014:

Lockheed To Get Fees After Meeting F-35 Goal
http://news.investors.com/business/122314-731789-lockheed-delivers-targeted-36-f35-jets-to-pentagon.htm

Marines to get 80 total, plus 340 F-35Bs (260 Cs for USN):

USMC receives first F-35C
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usmc-receives-first-f-35c-407407/
http://defensetech.org/2011/03/14/navy-and-marine-corps-f-35-purchase-plan-revealed/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[MarkOttawa]

Oops! USMC to get only 63 F-35Cs vice 80:

...
We will acquire 420 JSFs (357 STOVL aircraft and 63 CV aircraft). Once the F-35 enters service, we will begin retirement of AV-8Bs and F/A-18A-Ds...
https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/programs/aviation/joint-strike-fighter-jsf

Mark
Ottawa

 

[CougarKing]

A new toy for the US Marine airwingers who will operate from larger carriers...

Janes

US Marine Corps receives first carrier variant F-35C
Quote
Aircraft CF-19 will now be transferred from the Fort Worth production facility in Texas to the 33rd Fighter Wing at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, where it will be assigned to the US Navy's (USN's) VFA-101 'Grim Reapers' for pilot training.

The USMC is acquiring a mixed fleet of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B and CV F-35C aircraft.

The current plan is for the Corps' current McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier IIs to be replaced by 353 F-35Bs, and its Boeing F/A-18 Hornets to be replaced by 67 F-35Cs. Initial operating capability for the F-35B is slated to be achieving in the coming months, while that for the F-35C is expected in 2018.

(...SNIPPED)