I‘ve read the thread, thought about it, here‘s my Christmas wish list in no particular order:
1. Return NDHQ to Winnipeg. I‘d rather keep some distance from Ottawa, no need to invite command staff to beauracratical functions, etc... Closer ties? Yeah, that‘s worked out really well for us eh.
2. Trust. Where is the trust? When I was in, I was only a Pvt. So I wasn‘t involved in many "big decisions." I was however, entrusted with many responsibilites. I trusted my Warrant. I honestly feel that he was a hard man, who knew when to push, and when to slacken the leash. In the field, with live ammo and given an objective, we acted. I trusted those around me, and followed training and my own instincts. Worked out well enough. So where is that trust from the government? The ammo acquired for us in the field was "reserved" so that we could use in appropriately in training. i.e. Many rounds went down range. More than allotment for the exercise according to the book. Why is that? Can you place a cost on training in that manner? Apparently so. As I understand it, when a large exercise is planned within the CF itself, it‘s all in house, so decisions regarding the EX are made taking the current allocation of funds from the budget into account. Is this an accurate assumption? If so, then I‘m also assuming that Ottawa trusts the CF to train it‘s staff as it sees fit, within the confines of the QR&O, etc... So, if this is also the case, then shouldn‘t equipment allocation also fall into the confines of the CF? I‘d like to see some trust.
As I understand things, given full control of procurement, the fear is that the CF will behave as kids in a candy store. Every year spending everything on the latest desires and then holding out the hand for more. Even as Chretien spoke about the Military this past month, about how, "they always want more." Are the CF akin to children?
Trust them to do the job, but allow them the opportunity to provide for themselves with the kit to do that job. Effectively.
3. Emergency priority for the immediate replacement to the Sea King, period. I am a pilot, and I‘ve heard all of the arguments. The age of the airframe has nothing to do with it. Honestly, if allowed the opportunity, I‘d happily fly a Spitfire tomorrow. But would I fly one operationally? No. That is the difference. Not age, but air time. You can replace engines and avionics as much as you want, but when the airframe hit‘s it‘s limit, then you‘re waiting for a catastrophic structural failure. These aircraft have been flown and used for many years, there is no question, replacement is at hand. Period. (For the record, I‘m not certain, but I‘d bet that the Sea King flown by the President isn‘t a 1960‘s product that was used operationally by the military for 30-35 years before it was allocated to the Pres. Even if it was, what‘s the bet it has a maintenance budget and schedue we‘d love to match. Comparision by the gov doesn‘t work for me.)
4. Changes to the recruiting structure. I don‘t have the answers to this one. You can try for the best, but it‘s a role of the dice. I‘d like to see more emphasis on the personal aspect of the recruit. Look into the kids eyes, test him/her, see what they‘re made of, so to speak. Apply pressure to those while they‘re still in the applicational phase. Give them a true idea of what military life is like. Especially if they‘re desiring combat arms. I understand that‘s what happens when they arrive at BMQ or Battle School, but would it hurt to weed out before then? And instead of denying entry, offer trades suited to the aptitude of the applicant. Something along those lines. I‘m probably way off here, but I can‘t get past the guys in my platoon who arrived from CFRC; one with a fractured foot which they not only knew about, but they instructed him to go to the MIR, get a recourse and then await another trade at Borden (faster than healing before entry and awaiting a slot for the trade he was interested in) and the other with dreams of SAR Tech (which they said he could achieve from the infantry) who was 50 pounds overweight and mentally soft (coddled and sheltered his entire life, poor kid didn‘t have a chance). He didn‘t have the character or self-discipline to make and stay with the changes required of himself to achieve those goals and he floundered holding onto his unrealistic expectations of the infantry until he released himself in disappointment. Those two stick out, in my platoon alone another half-dozen walked away for various reasons, most of which fell under the, "we had no idea it was going to be like this" category. Most were surprised we were being trained to kill. When you only have 32 guys to begin with, losing those guys for those reasons was a waste. Take into account the injuries and you begin to understand the 70% overall attrition rate. There must be a better way? Any ideas? I‘m stumped, and you probably wouldn‘t want my thoughts anyway, I‘m sure I‘m highlighting the "narrowness" of my thoughts here as it is eh
5. Political accountability for the decisions to send soldiers to theatres of operation. i.e. Somali anyone?
That‘s about it, I‘m sure it‘s more than enough eh
Correct me for any of my assumptions, it‘s only my opinion. Hope I haven‘t offended anyone here.
